1 Ga. App. 289 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1907
The plaintiff in error was, by the grand jury of Cobb county, presented for the offense of shooting at another, and was convicted; a new trial was refused, and he excepts to the order overruling his motion and denying a new trial. He makes no complaint as to the charge of the court. There is no assignment of error in the admission or rejection of evidence. The motion for new trial is based entirely on the general grounds. Under the evidence there was no question or denial as to the defendant’s shooting, — the issue was as to justification. Defendant admitted, in his- statement, that he shot at Brewster; and this was the uncontradicted testimony. There was conflict as to why he shot the witness, and it was the exclusive province of the jury to settle this issue, and to determine whether defendant shot in his own defense or under circumstances of similar justification. Penal Code, §113. The witness Brewster, who testified that he was shot by the defendant, swore to a state of facts which not only demanded a verdict of guilty of shooting at another, but which would have sustained a conviction of assault with intent to murder, had the presentment been for that offense, especially as, according to this witness, the defendant provoked and commenced the difficulty. On the other hand there was testimony — and that from the other witness introduced by the State — which would have justified a verdict of acquittal on the plea of self-defense. This witness, Allen, corroborated the statement of defendant; and Brewster and Allen were the only witnesses introduced whose testimony is material. Here then is a conflict of evidence, and nothing else. It has been settled by the jury, whose exclusive province it is to determine such issues.
Able counsel for the plaintiff in error insisted that the testimony of a witness having no interest and no inducement to swear falsely should be taken, in all cases, rather than the testimony of a party interested. This is too broad a. statement of a'well-known rule ordained’ for the guidance of the jury, who may always consider the interest of the witnesses, and, in cases where there is irreconcilable conflict, may prefer that witness who appears to have no interest and no inducement to swear falsely. But that principle has no application in a case in this-court. The directions in the Civil Code, §5146, are for the jury only, and not mandatory as to them, but merely addressed to their discretion. For after all,