Alexander v. StateAlexander v. State
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Lynn G. Waxman, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
DOWNEY, Judge.
Appellant, Eddie Alexander, appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence of three and one-half years in the Department of Corrections.
Five appellate points have been presented, all dealing with alleged errors occurring during the trial. We have carefully considered all of said points and find reversible error demonstrated in only one, having to do with communication between the court and jury without counsel being present and afforded an opportunity to present argument and objections.
It appears from this record that the jury returned to the courtroom during its deliberations and presented a written question to the court: “May we have the police reports admitted as evidence for further review?” The trial judge held a short colloquy1
Appellee contends in its brief that the colloquy took place in the presence of counsel. Oddly enough, neither party cites to any part of the record for its statement and we have found none. Furthermore, we relinquished jurisdiction to fill in the gaps in the transcript which might show that counsel was present. As one might surmise, neither the trial judge nor counsel, with the multitude of work they are involved in, could remember the situation vividly enough to state the fact of what had transpired. Nevertheless, we note that the record contains a progress report or “blue card,” which states what transpired in the courtroom and concludes with the stamped statement, “There being no objection to the instructions given by the court, court recessed at 10:15 A.M. pending the call of the jury.” Appellee argued that this cryptic note means counsel was present and failed to make any objection.
The Supreme Court of Florida in Ivory2 and Williams3 held that a trial judge may not respond to a jury‘s request for additional instructions without both counsel being present and having an opportunity to participate in the action to be taken by the court. Violation of that rule is per se reversible error.
We hold that it is the burden of the court, or the state, to make the record show that all requirements of due process, including the opportunity to be heard on the instruction to be given, have been met. This “blue card” statement will not suffice to meet that important responsibility.
Westlund v. State, 570 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), is not controlling here because, in Westlund, the record shows counsel was present and simply failed to object to the court‘s action.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence appealed from are reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ., concur.