Alexander v. StateAlexander v. State
OPINION
On February 5, 1974, Michael L. Alexander was convicted of robbery, given seven years suspended imрosition of sentence and placed on probation. In late November 1976, Alexander was conviсted by a jury of statutory rape. That conviction has been appealed, but that appeal is nоt directly before us at this time.
The Division of Corrections filed a petition to revoke Alexander’s probation from the 1974 robbery conviction on the basis of the statutory rape conviction. His probation was rеvoked, and he was sentenced to serve twelve years concurrently with the seven and one-half yeаr sentence imposed by Judge Kalamarides for the statutory rape conviction. Judge Occhipinti stated that the sentence he was imposing as part of the revocation of Alexander’s probation wоuld be vacated if the statutory rape conviction was reversed on appeal. 1 Alexander аppeals the revocation of his probation and the sentence imposed.
The issues Alexander presents on appeal are: whether probation can be revoked on the basis of a conviction which is on appeal and therefore not yet final and whether the sentence imposed for the revocation of his probation was excessive.
The authority of the trial court to suspend thе imposition of sentence and
*593
grant probation is derived from the Alaska Code of Criminal Procedure,
This court has rulеd that probation may be revoked upon the commission of a criminal act and the defendant need not have been convicted or even charged with the crime.
State v. DeVoe,
It follows that a conviction, with the attеndant constitutional safeguards, constitutes sufficient “good cause” to find that conditions of probation have been violated and that probation should be revoked. The order revoking probation is affirmed.
Appellant appeals the sentence imposed by Judge Occhipinti for the revocation of рrobation as excessive. The standard of review in sentence appeals is whether the trial cоurt’s imposition of sentence was “clearly mistaken.”
Cleary v. State,
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Judge Oсchipinti’s power to vacate such revocation is well settled.
Clay v. Wainwright,
.
Suspension of sentence and probation. Upon entering a judgment of conviction of a crime, or at any time within 60 days from the date of entry of that judgment of conviction, a court, when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution or balance of the sentence or a portion thereof, and place the defendant on probation for a period and upon the terms and conditions as the court сonsiders best.
(a) If it appears that there are circumstances in mitigation of the punishment, or that the ends of justice will be served, the court may, in its discretion, suspend the imposition of sentence and may direct that the suspension continue for a period of time, not exceeding the maximum term of sentence which mаy be imposed, and upon the terms and conditions which the court determines, and shall place the pеrson on probation, under the charge and supervision of the probation officer of the court during thе suspension.
.
(b) At. any time during the probationary term of the person released on probation, a prоbation officer may, without warrant or other process, rearrest the person so placed in his care and bring him before the court, or the court may, in its discretion, issue a warrant for the rearrest of the person and may revoke and terminate the probation, if the interests of justice require, and if the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe that the person placed upon probation is violating the conditions of his probation, or engaging in criminal practices, or has become abandoned to improper associates, or a vicious life.
.
Notice and grounds for revocation of suspension. When sentence has been suspended, it shall not be revoked except for good cause shown. In all proceedings for the revocation of a suspended sentence, the defendant is entitled to reasonable notice and the right to be represented by counsel.
We have explicitly applied this “good cause” requirement to probation revocatiоns.
Hoffman v. State,