Alexander v. Medical Associates Clinic

REVERSED; DISTRICT COURT CASE

REMANDED. ALEXANDER,

Monty Appellant, CLINIC,

The MEDICAL ASSOCIATES Corporation,

Professional

Appellee.

No. 00-1764.

Supreme Court Iowa.

June II. Scope M. Review. Har- D. Dake and Melissa Matthew P.C., Leehy, & of Wertz baugh-Adams scope summary review for The Rapids, appellant. for Cedar judgment rulings is familiar: summary Guiney judgment of Lane & Water- of a Gregory C. Our review man, the errors of Davenport, appellee. ruling for is for correction of Summary judgment appropriate

law. TERNUS, are moving party the shows there where Justice. it of material fact and genuine issues case, trespasser on plaintiff The in this a as a matter of judgment is entitled to land, asks to abolish the the defendant’s us the mov- determining law. whether limiting liability of a law rule the common burden, view ing has met this party to injuries trespassers and landowner light the record the most favorable it with a standard. replace We the motion for sum- party opposing to do and therefore affirm the decline so ap- This court’s role on mary judgment. summary judg- grant district court’s determine genuine a peal is “to whether landowner. ment to defendant exists issue of material fact and correctly applied.” the law was I.Background Proceedings. Facts and Co., Kelly Ins. N.W.2d v. Iowa Mut. Associ- defendant/appellee, The Medical (citations omitted) (Iowa 2000) 637, 641 Clinic, P.C., upon which its owns land ates Lawlor, (quoting Red Giant Oil Co. defendant’s building office is located. The (Iowa 1995)). undeveloped, open includes property Appeal. III. Issues on area. that abuts a residential Un- field defendant, plaintiff/appel- to the known appeal are rather The issues raised on Alexander, lant, Monty entered field challenges- only the plaintiff The narrow. to retrieve his sister’s evening late one deсision, of the district court’s part second darkness, he fell in a dog. Walking judged must be namely, that defendant injured ditch and his knee. duty to avoid willful the common law The trespasser. a injury and wanton filed this to recover plaintiff The suit defen- argues appeal on that the plaintiff injury, asserting the damages for his de- duty a of reasonable dant be held to should negligent was maintenance fendant its factual as to care that there is a issue and discovery, After the de- property. duty care breached. whether that was summary judg- filed motion for fendant a does not contest the district plaintiff undisputed facts estab- alleging ment law, that, he as a matter of court’s ruling trespasser that a plaintiff lished was that the defendant trespasser was a and facts find- support and there were no care duty its did not brеach common its limited ing that defendant breached Thus, the determinative plaintiff. trespasser. plaintiff duty of care to a should appeal issue on is whether Iowa granted court sum- The district resisted. trespasser law rule of abandon its common (I) mary judgment, ruling as a matter of of rea- replace liability (2) law, plaintiff trespasser, was care under the circumstances. sonable of care was applicable standard avoid7 injury, neg- willful and wanton anee of IV. Discussion. (3) no facts show- there were ligence, long adhered Iowa has the defendant breached this ing of land possessor rule “a common law This followed. appeal care. consent, right other than to enter without his owes no injure willfully wantonly, not to him free fix and he is the terms which presence to use reаsonable care after his will given. consent Intruders becomes known to avoid him.” injuring permission who come without his have Walker, 839, v. 249 N.W.2d 842 Champlin right provide no to demand that he them (Iowa 1977); Mann v. accord Des Moines place trespass, with a safe or he 1049, 1057, 45, Ry., 232 Iowa 7 N.W.2d 51 protect wrongful them their use of his (1942); Duffield, 708, v. 66 Gwynn Iowa property. (1885). 713, 523, Thus, 24 N.W. 525 a al., Page Keeton et W. Prosser and Keeton a respect landowner’s tres 58, (5th on the Law Torts at 393 of (1) passer may is twofold: the landowner ed.1984) Torts], [hereinafter Prosser on way not in such use his land a that he deliberately maliciously injury or causes plaintiff points jur The out that several (2) a once the trespasser, landowner is isdictions have abolished traditional presence trespasser, aware of a of analysis that determines the duty owed must landownеr use reasonable care to a landowner based the status of the injuring trespasser. gener avoid injured party invitee, or licensee tres — ally Third New Webster’s International Ritt, Ritt, passer. v. See Sheets Ritt & “wanton”), Dictionary (defining 2575 (Iowa 1998) Inc., 602, 581 N.W.2d “willful”). (defining A “trespasser” is one (citing rejected cases have common legal right who has another’s distinctions). fact, Sheets, In land and enters the land without the ex members of this court a taking favored press implied consent of the owner. step path by first down that abolishing the Chicago, Rock Reasoner v. Island & Pac. distinction between invitee and licensee. R.R., 510, 506, 251 Iowa however, That position, Id. at 606. did not (1960); Mann, 232 Iowa at court, gain the a support majority of of at N.W.2d liability premises Iowa remains de trespasser The rule arose “out of the pendеnt on the of plaintiff. status special privileges occupation accorded the Commodore, Inc., Richardson England. land” feudal Rosenau v. (Iowa 1999). 693, 698 N.W.2d n. Estherville, City N.W.2d present presents case a different (Iowa 1972); Compagnie accord Kermarec question presented than that in Sheets. In Ge Transatlantique, nerale 358 U.S. case, this we are asked to impose upon 625, 630, 406, 410, 79 S.Ct. 3 L.Ed.2d a landowners reasonable care with (1959); 62 Am.Jur.2d Premises Liabil respect to (1990). trespassers persons who enter ity § at 431-32 The rule has — property the landowner’s without the ex- continued to exist on a belief based that a press or implied consent landowner. property owner should not be obligated to noted, Although, already make his or as property her safe “or few courts keep particular it in condition” for abandoned with re- the bene classifications Mann, fit of spect intruders. 232 Iowa at to landowner liability, majority A 53. well-known treatise on courts have the special retained duties of a torts perhaps best articulates rationale property owner to trespasser. We will behind our rules: briefly position review the of other courts issue, on this possessor legally pro- land has the law is a because popularity

tected interest in the exclusiveness of contest where the with the side possession. general, wins, his no one has judgment most votes but because the reflects, think, rejection California’s Since jurisdictions of other approach has been even one-rule-fits-all of tres- that the interests belief prevailing Island, overwhelming. In Rhode more a furthеr reduction not warrant passers do Supreme partially Court Rhode Island to use their owners property in the right had fol its earlier decision that overruled fit. they land as see held that the tradi lowed Rowland and in which a court first trespass case liability The landmark governing tional rules retained. Tantimonico v. law classifications ers should be common abandoned Co., A.2d Ins. Allendale Mut liability law historically used (R.I.1994), in Mar overruling part 1057 Christian, 108, 69 Cal.2d Rowland ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‍v. was DiPonte, Inc., 294, 114 R.I. 333 iorenzi v. (1968), 97, abro 443 P.2d 561 Cal.Rptr. 70 (1975). addition, 127, In A.2d 131-32 in Cal statute as stated gated part by in California and Colora legislatures state Grocery, 19 Cal.4th v. Home villo-Silva abrogated partially or court abrogated do 65, 506, 714, P.2d 72 80 968 Cal.Rptr.2d standard adopting decisions 1970s, (1998). seven By the end of the In liability actions. Colo for lead and California’s states had followed radо, legislature passed a statute that not, group the latter choos five states had system of reinstated a classification-based rules to retain traditional ing instead liability for landowners. See Colo.Rev.Stat. During status.1 based on entrant’s (1997). California, in re § 13-21-115 chose to abol period that same six states trespassing crimi cases which sponse to between modify ish the distinction made injuries for incurred had recovered nals licensees, take the but did not invitees and intrusions, the during their unlawful state respect trespassers.2 same to step a law limited land legislature .enacted Rowland, Thus, years in the twelve after liability trespassers to who were owners’ rejected California’s total of eleven states crime, to commit a essen property liability owners to property rule that the common law tially reinstating the by judged the same trespassers 1541, should ch. 1985 Cal. Stat. such cases. See (codified § liability persons legal as standard their Civil Code 847 1 at Cal. 2002)). (West ly on their land. Sitka, 1056, (R.I.1994), City Borough 1057 with McMul v. & 637 A.2d Compare

1. Webb 950, Butler, (Ala. 731, 1977) (Alaska (abolishing 952-53 733 lan v. 346 So.2d 561 P.2d classifications), by 1977) abrogated part (refusing statute as common law dis abandon Shanti, 44, University tinctions); v. Bailey Pennington, Alaska 835 A.2d stated in v. 406 1225, (Alaska 1992); 1979) (Del. (same); Mooney n. 5 Mile P.2d 1228 v. Robin 47-48 537, Radovich, 63, (1970) High son, 676, 175 Colo. Co. v. Fence 471 P.2d 65 93 Idaho 308, (1971) (same), abrogat 489 P.2d 312-13 (same); Caponi, 18 St.2d Di v. Ohio Gildo part by Excavat 125, 732, (same); ed in statute as stated in Bath (1969) Tjas 736 247 N.E.2d 1141, Wills, ing 847 Proctor, 438, (Utah 1979) & Constr. Co. v. P.2d 441 v. 591 P.2d 1993); (Colo. City 8 v. & 1145 & n. Pickard (same). Honolulu, 134, County 452 Haw. P.2d 51 691, 693, 695 Camp, 284 So.2d 445, 1969) Wood v. (Haw. (same); v. Beaure 446 Cates 1973); (Fla. Colby College 402 A.2d 367, v. Inc., Poulin gard Coop., 328 So.2d 370-71 Elec. 846, Ellard, (Me.1979); Mounsey Blanchard, v. 363 (La. 1976) (same); 851 v. 116 Ouellette 693, 43, 631, & n. 7 552, (1976) (same); 297 N.E.2d 51-52 Mass. 364 A.2d 634 N.H. Balach, 161, (1973); 233, Miller, 294 Minn. Peterson v. 40 N.Y.2d 386 N.Y.S.2d Basso v. 639, (1972); O’Leary 564, 868, (1976) (same); v. Coe 199 N.W.2d 352 N.E.2d nen, (N.D.1977); Inc., DiPonte, Anto v. 114 R.I. Mariorenzi (same), (1975) Reszcynski, Wis.2d v. A.2d overruled niewicz Co., 1, 5, (1975). by Ins. part v. Allendale Mut. Tantimonico jurisdictions In addition those retreat Auto Repair, 110 Nev. 871 P.2d (1994). prior, from a ing adoption wholesale eight negligence principles, states refused In summary, six presently states use a change principles their conventional of negligence govern trespasser standard to trespasser liability, though judi they even liability; twenty-nine states have declined cially abolished or modified the distinction the opportunity to their rule in change between an invitee and a licensee.3 Addi cases; such legislatures and two state states, tionally, Maryland two and Okla reinstated the common trespasser rule homa, their after it had been decided retain common law abolished court deci only sion. Given fact that one court in governing liability trespassers, rules but twenty-seven the last years has abandoned open left question they would rule, the common law the so- discard the invitee and licensee classifica called adopt “trend” to a universal stan tions. Murphy Baltimore Gas & Elec. care, premises liability dard of Co., (1981), 290 Md. A.2d clearly lost momentum. See Baldwin part grounds by overruled in on other 285, 146, Mosley, 295 Ark. 748 S.W.2d 148 Flippo, Baltimore & Elec. Co. v. 348 Gas (1988) (“Although a jurisdic number of 680, 1144, (1998); Md. 705 A.2d 1151 Loh the 1970 n indicated a willing during' tions Lane, 1274, renz v. 787 P.2d 1276-77 ness to legal discard the distinctions be (Okla.1990); Wells, see Abbott v. 11 P.3d invitees, tween licensees and that abolition (Okla.2000) 1247, (applying 1248 status steam.”); movement has since lost its Loh analysis in premises liability to invitee renz, 787 P.2d at (stating 1276 “a number case). Finally, seven more states chose to of courts which have more recently consid maintain the common law making rules ered the have expressed issue[ ] continued by owed dependent landowner on principles adherence the common law injured party.4 the status of the duty based on proper status as a balance In stark contrast to this widespread re between the rights of a landowner and jection of negligence principles trespass general those of the public”); Tantimoni cases, er only one state since the co, 1970s has 1058, 637 A.2d at (noting “by 1060 that joined minority position, abandoning the late an increasing seventies number of ” Moody Manny’s classifications.5 v. courts specifically rejected had Rowland Co., Washington 840, 3. Metro. Area Transit v. Auth. Gas & 743 (Ky. Elec. S.W.2d 844 Ward, 1072, (D.C.1981); 433 A.2d 1988); Bell, 757, Little v. 719 So.2d 762 Hansen, 499, 303, v. Jones 254 Kan. 867 P.2d (Miss. 1998); Kinney, Carter v. 896 S.W.2d (1994); County, 310 Heins v. Webster 250 926, (Mo.1995); Piedilato, Vega 930 v. 154 750, 51, (1996); Neb. 57 v. Ford 496, 442, (1998); N.J. 713 A.2d 449 Tincani Comm’rs, County 134, Bd. 118 N.M. 879 Empire Soc’y, v. Zoological Inland 124 766, (1994); Freeland, P.2d 770 Nelson v. 349 121, 621, (1994). Wash.2d 875 P.2d 624 615, 882, (1998); N.C. 507 S.E.2d 892 Hud Gaitan, 699, (Tenn. son v. 675 S.W.2d 703 5. The state Montana has on occasion been 1984), part grounds by overruled in on other abolishing included in lists of states classifica 54, Balentine, 52, McIntyre v. 833 S.W.2d 57 tions liability. as the basis for While (Tenn. Pickens, 1992); v. Mallet 206 W.Va. it is true the court has abandoned status- 145, 436, (1999); 522 S.E.2d v. Clarke rules, liability based Supreme the Montana Beckwith, (Wyo.1993). P.2d Court’s decision do so was based a state on "prevented statute 4. Mosley, [the court] Baldwin from dis 295 Ark. (1988); tinguishing" injured S.W.2d par between classes of Morin v. Ct. Bell Ass’n, Inc., Co., Condo. Big ties. 223 Conn. 612 A.2d See Limberhand v. Ditch (1992); P.2d 491, (1985). Kirschner v. Louisville Mont. dard, to the providing guidance little land prem- recent trend in more “[t]he and that (“Such vague See id. at 694 ter ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‍ owner. the traditional ises-liability uphold law is to every сircumstance minology applied Keeton, in his categories”). common-law ...; guidelines affords distinctions torts, courts are suggests that treatise say the rule is ‘reasonable to- healthy skepticism “a more acquiring in all under the circumstances’ in care jettison of devel- years ward invitations ignores responsibility stances beguiling in favor of oped jurisprudence provide guidance.”); law to Carter Kin at Prosser on Torts legal panacea.” (refus (Mo.1995) ney, 896 S.W.2d classifications, ing abolish common law approach think the California We abandon careful work of stating “[t]o favor, respect at least with gain failed to amorphous ‘reasonable generations liability, because the common standard care under circumstances’ day in modern life. validity law rule retains kindly imрrovident”); put seems—to — a re- (stating gaining “courts are See id. Tantimonico, 1059 (quoting 637 A.2d at appreciation for the considerations newed jurist’s another contrast of common to- limitations rule, behind traditional described as “‘well-settled and ” adults”). reasonable,’ trespassing ownership Land with the stan ward “ dard, single vague duty ‘a of reasonable privileged few in is not limited care, property under which the owner acts society; many, many modern American peril with no standard which he his The private real persons property. own ” (ci judge obligations can his advance’ of land to be a trea- ownership continues omitted)). it is Moreover no solace tation the interests of opportunity, and sured landowner, spent to who has emotion deserving landowners are still consider- tо monetary al resources defend a one writer treatise agree ation. We suit, jury a or even judge meritless ours, “it consid- society that in a such as is Wood, liability. no See 284 tually finds to socially policy a desirable allow a ered (noting at the assurance that a. So.2d 694 way, his own land in his own person use has might well find a landowner jury watching for and without burden duty a care “is a violated reasonable come there without protecting those who (and generality expense) dangerous 58, Id. right.” or 395. As ' permission owner”). subject- Balanced which stated, “It is one unreasonable court need a stan against predictable for subject an owner a ‘reasonable care’ test govern may landowners dard which supposed isn’t to be against someone who right their conduct is the absencе he does not know.” there and about whom trespasser generous claim more of a (Fla. 691, Camp, v. 284 So.2d 693 Wood comes on protection trespasser since the 1973). implied express without the land or property or of the own invitation consent rule better common law is also Colby College, A.2d v. 402 er. See Poulin a to achieve reasonable balance be- suited (Me.1979) (“Whereas 846, both n. 5 851 rights and the property tween individual invitees, another’s and licensees enter the com- trespasser. of a Under interests trespasser right, color of lands under rule, in mon law a landowner knows ad- protec claiming for extended has no basis is; duty his he must refrain vance what tion.”). deliberately injuring or maliciously from care, duty in trespasser. A of reasonable summary, remain uncon we contrast, usage, despite rights property its common that the owners vinced today’s society in so little value amorphous a much more stan- based on 80 follow, in rights

those should diminished favor For suggest reasons that persons trespassing justices on another’s land. Sheets were correct their common standard is as viable decision to abolish common-law century today ago: as it was a landowner distinctions between invitees and licensees injure trespasser has a not to mali- liability cases. id. See As deliberately, ciously trespassers, and to use reason- I would follow the lead after trespasser’s presence able care those that have abolished the dis states injuring known to avoid becomes the tres- tinction between invitees and licensees but passer. Champlin, Seе 249 N.W.2d at 842. have retained the common-law re rules appropriate This strikes an balance garding trespassers. Washington Ward, between the interests landowner Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. 433 1072, (D.C.1981); and the and therefore de- A.2d Wood v. 691, plaintiffs 693, (Fla.1973); cline the invitation to it. Camp, abandon 284 So.2d 695 Hansen, express 499, on opinion We Jones v. 254 Kan. 867 P.2d 303, (1994); differentiation made between invitees and 310 Colby College, Poulin v. 846, (Me.1979); licensees remains viable. Mounsey 402 A.2d 851 v. Ellard, 693, 43, 363 Mass. 297 N.E.2d 51- V. Disposition. 52, (1973); Balach, 51 n. 7 Peterson v. 161, 639, (1972); Minn. N.W.2d We district court conclude the applied County, Heins v. Webster 250 Neb. legal principles determining correct (1996); Ford v. Bd. judg- that the defendant was entitled to Comm’rs, County 118 N.M. 879 P.2d ment as a matter of law. Because (1994); Freeland, v. Nelson plaintiff claims no other error in the (1998); N.C. S.E.2d ruling, court’s we affirm. Coenen, O’Leary AFFIRMED. (N.D.1977); Gaitan, Hudson 675 S.W.2d (Tenn.1984), part overruled LAVORATO, justiсes All concur except Balentine, grounds other v. by McIntyre C.J., LARSON, who specially concurs and 52, 54, (Tenn.1992); 833 S.W.2d 57 Mallet J., joins who this concurrence. Pickens, v. 206 W.Va. 522 S.E.2d STREIT, J., specially by concurs (1999); v. Reszcynski, Antoniewicz separate opinion. 5,1, (1975); Wis.2d Beckwith, Clarke v. 858 P.2d LAVORATO, Justice, (concurring Chief (Wyo.1993). represents This approach the specially). ground. middle Ritt, Ritt, Inc., In v. Sheets Ritt & Background. I. why To understand justices of this court decided to abrogate favor abolishing the distinction between the common-law in' premises distinctions licensees, invitees and some historical liability cases between invitees and licen- background inis order. The evolution of (Iowa 1998). sees. 581 N.W.2d the trichotomy invitee, common-law li- They stopped deciding short of “whether a censee, and in a came about distinction should persist regard with much different in wholly time and differ- trespassers,” leaving that question “for an legal ent climate from the one that exists appropriate case in parties which the can Mallet, today. S.E.2d at test whether the nature of an special act of trespass still calls for a continuation of The trichotomy “traces its roots to nine- that entrant’s Nelson; status.” Id. teenth-century England.” conflict, Ketchum, to re- common-law courts refused (citing John Mis at 887 S.E.2d trichotomy princi- the modern an Invitation to Join the place souri Declines law, the Century: they Preservation negligence “as did ples Twentieth in Carter areas, Distinction ‘su- Licensee-Invitee all other tort but rather almost (1995)). 393, 394 L.Rev. Kinney, 64 UMKC principles the new perimposed [negligence] an En trichotomy “emanated from existing entrant upon the framework of ” land; glish deeply to the culture rooted Sears, at categories.’ (quoting Id. wrought heritage; feudal tied with Abrogation the Traditional Common repre land ownership whose with lords Kan. Liability, Premises U. Law of wealth, and dominance.” power, sented (1995)). result, now at 176 As a L.Rev. same). “aware of the (citing Although Id. premises-lia- “current scheme of have the freedom that unlimited landowner threat to maintain bility judges law which allows immunity placed accompanying and its while, at the jury over discretion control community,” nineteenth-century upon the time, utilizing ‘duty princi- of care’ same ju provide nevertheless “refused to courts theory.” Id. set forth in ples authority to deter ries with unbounded same). (citing (citing cases.” Id. premises-liability mine Change. the first Ironically, II. The Sears, Tradi Abrogation the Michael oc- abolishing trichоtomy toward move Law Liabili tional Premises Common England, jurisdiction curred (1995)). L.Rev. ty, 44 Kan. U. trichotomy. Eng- gave rise com “juries so because were They did Act Liability passed Occupier’s land prised mainly potential land entrants the distinction between which abolished likely protect would act to who most Lia- Occupier’s and licensees. invitees large thereby reign community at (1957) Act, (Eng.). Eliz. bility 5 & 6 c. 31 power over his sovereign the landowner’s same). occupier of land trichotomy imposed The Act (citing Id. land.” per- of care” toward disgorge “created a “common was therefore power allow Id. jury by lawfully premises. of some of its either enter the sons who to take case from the ing judge later, the States Su years United Two forcing legal jury rulings based trichotomy criticized the preme Court rules jury аpply mechanical admiralty import into law. refused to trichotomy considering instead of Generale Compagnie See Kermarec pertinent issue of whether the landowner 625, 630-32, 79 Transatlantique, 358 U.S. in land.” reasonably maintaining his acted 410, 550, 3 L.Ed.2d 554-55 S.Ct. 409 — Id. (1959). dis The Court that “[t]he noted Moreover, came about at trichotomy the draws be which the common law tinctions were not negligence principles time when and inherited licensee invitee were tween Marsh, (citing in existence. Id. Norman S. land, deeply from a culture rooted In History Comparative and Law many traced of its standards culture which vitees, and 69 Law Trespassers, Licensees 630, 79 Id. at heritage to a feudalism.” (1953)). 182, 184 Q. prin these Rev. When The Court at 3 L.Ed.2d at 554. S.Ct. ciples they with emerge, did conflicted further noted: upon un immunity conferred landowners in an industri- justice In an effort to do trichotomy. (citing Kathryn Id. E. der the complex society, urban with Eriksen, alized Liability Premises in Texas— its relationships, and individual Change, St. economic Time “Reasonable” (1986)). have found courts Despite modern common-law Mary’s L.J. Paul, necessary increasingly to formulate court took the step anticipated in refinements, Pottebaum, subtle verbal to create sub- and and Rosenau decided to among abrogate classifications traditional com- distinction liabili- ty cases between categories, mon-law and to delineate fine invitees and licensees. Sheets, at gradations of care standards which the landowner owes to each. Yet Abolishing III. Reasons for the Dis- single jurisdiction, even within a tinction Between Invitees and Licen- and classifications subclassifications mentioned, sees. As inherent bred produced the common have trichotomy jury is the notion that a could confusion and conflict. As new distinc- not be trusted to enter verdict. As tions spawned, have been older ones observed, “jurisdictions retaining one court Through become obscured. this trichotomy plaintiff-oriented fear that semantic the common law has morass juries juries composed mostly feudal —like moved, hesitation, unevenly and with to- of impose land entrants —will unreasonable “imposing occupi- wards on owners and upon burdens defendant-landowners.” single ers a care in reasonable Nelson, 507 S.E.2d at 888. The same all the circumstances.” argument by court answers the that noting 630-31, at Id. juries 79 S.Ct. 3 L.Ed.2d at have properly applied negligence (footnotes omitted). 554-55 in all principles other areas law, of tort and has Kermarec, there been no indi- years following Nine Califor- cation that defendants other areas nia abolished its traditional classifica- have had invitees, licensees, unreasonable placed burdens tion scheme of Moreover, upon given them. that mod- trespassers replaced it ordinary jurors ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‍ern likely are more than feudal Rowland v. Chris- principles. jurors tian, themselves, to be landowners it is 70 Cal.Rptr. Cal.2d unlikely (Cal.1968). they that would willing be P.2d 568-69 Rowland place a upon burden a defendant provided impetus jur- for a number they would unwilling accept viability isdictions to reassess the themselves. trichotomy majority as outlined opinion in the before case this court. Id.; Jones, (“Stud- see also P.2d at 310 suggest ies abolition the distinc- times,

In recent this court has bеen tions between owed to an invitee poised to abandon the For trichotomy. and that owed to a licensee has not altered Rowland, example, years after this reached, greatly the results left questioned court applicability the future juries without direction or standards the trichotomy, citing discussing Ker by which to judge occupi- the action of the marec and Rowland. See v. City Rosenau lands, er of and has resulted in outcomes Estherville, that would probably be the same as if (Iowa 1972). cases, In two other this court rules applied.”) status had been expressed displeasure its with the trichoto- my. Inc., Luigi’s, See Paul Perhaps important the most for reason (Iowa 1997) (explaining abolishing our reluc the distinction is that the tricho- tance to conclusively posses tomy establish has lаnd led to confusion in the law and injured sor’s on care the basis of in inequity Recovery cases decided. Hinds, party’s status); by Pottebaum v. an entrant in many be- instances “has (Iowa 1984) (same). N.W.2d Fi largely chance, come a matter depen- nally, mentioned, justices as upon of this pigeonhole dent in which the law injured by ‘licensee,’ when she was invitee or business him, e.g. ‘trespasser,’ put has radically pothole); into a Gladon stepping had of which ‘invitee’—each Auth., Peterson, Transit Reg'l in law.” Cleveland consequences Greater different 1996) (Ohio the follow- 662 N.E.2d 287 at 643. Consider St.3d Ohio customer fare-paying whether ing: (questioning who was assaulted subway system, your premis- comes on A canvasser who by parties tracks third trespasser. thrown onto is a your consent es without consent, train, left a licen- invitee when еxiting he is was still your he has Once train). him with Mal you until do business tracks and struck lying Not see. have you Even when let, invitee. at 447 n. 7. is he an 522 S.E.2d him, it rather with seems done business that point makes the The court in Mallet towards him your duty strange that should question in like these cases up to he comes different when should be was a licensee plaintiff be whether it was he what when your door from Rather, question should invitee. colour change he his away. Does goes Or, in safe? question the premises were conversation? of the in the middle exercise alternatively, “did the landowner you discuss when position What is circumstances under the reasonable care him and it noth- with comes business safe for premises were] that [the to ensure given can be confident answer ing? No event, namely, reasonably forseeable is the morass Such questions. to these injured under the [might be that someone has floundered the law into which the court Id. at As circumstances]?” between licensees distinguish trying in this observed, question “[f]raming and invitees. recognizes it because important, manner is (citations omit Mallet, 522 S.E.2d make nor entrants landowners that neither ted). is often diffi “[i]t is that point distinctions with these archaic decisions an en cult, to discern impossible, if not mind.” Id. Piedilato, 154 Vega v. status.” trant’s ultimate the Mallet court’s agree (N.J.1998) 713 A.2d N.J. conclusion: (Handler, J., Mallet cites concurring). jurisdictions predictable, other law to be examples from If we for our following wish logic do, shape courts underscoring the tortured then have a and we tricho- applying gone through it meshes with way that such Clark, 250 Va. Assoc. v. tomy: assumptions Franconia general, reasonable (Vа.1995) (considering 463 S.E.2d Be- daily lives. make their people as an employee mall lost status be- law distinction the common cause robber); stop by attempting invitee meet licensee does not invitee and tween Maes, 907 P.2d Ltd. v. Lakeview Assoc. standard, be discarded. it should tenant, (Colo.1995)(discussing whether Id. at 443. to not own happened but paid who rent with this view is Closely aligned fell car, licensee when she invitee or was reason for Supreme Court’s Massachusetts of an parking lot walking across while licen- between abolishing the distinction Romine, Peterson v. complex); apartment and invitees: sees (Idaho 1998) 537, 960 P.2d 131 Idaho allocating the costs problem parked plaintiff who (considering whether complex injury is far too human risks of provided lot parking in downtown solely by the status to be decidеd adjacent shopped at an but who shoppers, status entrant, where the especially store, not a was therefore unaffiliated but prevents jury bility: Proposal often the from A question Abrogate the Status determining ques- ever the fundamental “Trespasser,” Distinctions “Licensee” of the tion whether defendant has acted And as “Invitee” Determinative a Land of reasonably light of the circum- Occupier’s Duty Care Owed to En- of particular stances the case. trant, (1987-88). L.Rev. S.D. Thus, Mounsey, 2A1N.E.2d at 51. life or [a] man’s does not limb become Mounsey

The court in also answered worthy protection less by the law nor say abolishing critics who the licen- those worthy a loss compensation less un- jury see-invitee distinction will leave the der upon the law because he has come without standards: the land permission of another without The abolition licensee-invitee dis- or with permission but without a busi- tinction and creation of a “reason- ness purpose. Reasonable do people care in all the stan- able circumstances” ordinarily vary their conduct depending jury dard will not leave the without matters, upon such and to focus guide standards to their determination injured status party as tres- principles of reasonable conduct. The licensee, passer, or invitee in order to applied which are now be are those the question determine always governed personal which have care, landowner has a is con- negligence. pre- Our decision merely trary to our modern social mores and vents the status as a plaintiffs licensee humanitarian values. being or invitee from the sole determi- Rowland, Cal.Rptr. 443 P.2d at 568. assessing native factor the occupier’s However, liability. foreseeability of When the reasons for the disap- rule presence time, the visitor’s and the man- pear, ought the rule disappear. ner, and place surrounding circum- reasons for the licensee-invitee distinction entry stances of his remain fac- relevant Therefore, are no longer viable. the dis- which tors will determine “in part tinction to be ought abolished. See Funk him, injury likelihood of and the ex- States, 371, 383, v. United 290 U.S. tent of the interest which must be sacri- (1933) (“It 216, 78 S.Ct. L.Ed. injury.” ficed to avoid the risk of been said so often as to have become (citations omitted). common axiomatic that the law is not im- Id. at 52 Simply put, flexible, mutable but its princi- own merely landowners would be required to cоnditions.”). ples adapts itself to varying care prevent take reasonable foresee- Hawkins, able harm. Carl See S. Premis- Trespassers. IY. concurring es Liability Repudiation Sta- After opinion Mounsey logic LARSON, J., joins special this the abolished distinction Mounsey court STREIT, J., concurs concurrence. re- and invitees but licensees between in a specially separate opinion. trespass- as to common-law rule tained the ers, adopted the reasonable the court later STREIT, J., concurring specially. tres- trapped “physically care standard for case tres- This involves innocent Housing v. Boston Pridgen passers.” injured by what ordinari- passer seriously Auth., N.E.2d Mass. ly negligent be considered conduct might (Mass.1974). had if the landowner a of reason- imposed no majority able cаre. The explains the rationale A writer treatise however, landowner, be- of care trespass- for a rule retaining separate for trespass- as a cause of Alexander’s status ers: disagree majority’s con- er. private own- civilization based on [I]n a is potential this case a Though clusion. socially a desir- it is considered ership, injustice majori- of illustration a use person able to allow to his policy ty’s holding, Alexander did not demon- way, own without the own land his trial. His strate he is entitled to a resis- summary tance for watching protecting for Clinic’s motion burden judgment generate failed to sufficient permis- who there without those come that, support facts his even assertion right. sion or standard, under California the Clinic al., Prosser and Keeton Page Keeton et W. a owеd him care. (5th the Law Torts going Despite majority’s comfort ed.1984) Prosser]. [hereinafter belief,” I to “prevailing with the believe present day’s modern times circumstances rule justifies separate this One court injustice ap will from the which result way: plication of our current land-entrant classi enter another’s and licensees [I]nvitees allud system. fication horror stories right, [but] under color tres- lands cases by majority concerning ed to claiming for extend- passer no basis trespassing recovering California criminals possi- protection. ed There remains the and un premises injuries misplaced bility of the status that the abandonment the reasonable care crite founded. Under place an unfair bur- would justices ria first discussed who has no reason den on landowner Sheets, happen. extreme such an would presence. expect trespasser’s of the status classification continuation by-gone system from the is not different Poulin, 402 A.2d at 851 n. 5. contributory where a days expressed in I think for the reasons recovery for the plaintiff was from barred retain the Prosser and Poulin should part. his or her slightest negligence on are parties common-law rule for who tres- Wichern, See Goetzman seen It remains passers. (Iowa 1982), superseded by recognize an ex- might want to this court Corp., Slager as stated in HWA statute 1989) (In (Iowa did in like the Massachusetts court ception response 435 N.W.2d 349 Therefore, at I have Pridgen. Goetzman, this time enacted legislature majority’s re- in Iowa disagree comparative reason to with the form of fault ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‍modified chapter rule as to 668 which retained es fusal abolish the Code common-law fault lim- comparative sential character of trespassers. licensee, invitee, plaintiff to extent that a tions of only and iting trespasser as greater fault is than the combined only whose but one factor in a multi-step analysis defendant(s) fault of the cannot premises liability. recover. of (codified 1293, § Iowa Acts ch. Moreover, abolishing trichotomy this (1986))). as amended at Iowa Code 668.3 judge would jury not leave the or without Goetzman, In we considered both “current judge standards which to a landown- ‘social and economic customs’ and modern principle er’s conduct. The I now advo- ” justice.’ ‘conceptions right of and Id. apply premises cate liability actions Jones, (quoting 280 So.2d Hoffman has long governing been the standard per- (Fla.1973)). In doing, so we concluded sonal negligence. The trier-of-fact would adoption comparative of fault was nec- have the opportunity weigh various fac- essary to ameliorate the harshness of the requisite tors to duty determine the of nothing” approach contributory “all or particular care under the circumstances of and to achieve for all fairness each Among case. the factors to consider Goetzman, parties. involved N.W.2d are: plaintiff To use the status of the 1) harm; foreseeability or possibility of wrong was determine then and is 2) purpose for which the entrant en- now. wrong premises; tered the The common enforced such distinc 3) time, manner, and un- circumstances because, time, with land tions at that land der which the entrant entered the predominant was considered over life. Us premises; as the ing premises status litmus test 4) use put to which the are or liability was perceived be necessary as are expected put; to be inspect cause landowners were not able to 5) reasonableness of the inspection, re- and make safe distant And property. pair, warning; or these “may while provid distinctions 6) opportunity and ease of or repair ed a cor- disposition England when the or rection giving warning; culture was deeply rooted land heritage feudalism, tied to a Of must we 7) burden on the land occupier and/or consider jus distinctions do community in terms of inconvenience tice in an society.” urban industrialized providing cost in adequate protec- Stores, Garza, Wal-Mart Inc. v. 27 S.W.3d tion. (Tex.Ct.App.2000). Unlike feudаl Ritt, Ritt, Inc., Sheets v. Ritt & England, jurors today likely more are (Iowa 1998). majori-

be landowners and able recognize ty concerned with the interests limitations a in protecting landowner faces However, landowner above all else. Keener, his or her property. Tab J. Can analysis trespass- above does not favor the the Submission Liability Premises fact, er over the landowner. this ana- Be Simplified? Case L.Rev. Tex. Tech. lytic framework functions as a restriction (1997). 1161,1172 liability landowner’s as it forces the

By eliminating status as determina- trier-of-fact foreseeability to consider factor, tive we would not eliminate it alto- harm and the reason for and circum- gether from our surrounding consideration whether stances trespasser’s en- Furthermore, particular landowner appro- try. satisfied the a gen- to characterize priate Rather, ordinary standard care. eral care as a “one-rule- should maintain the approach” traditional classifica- fits-all minimizes the balance required care strives to is not to eliminate of reasonable Rather, fitting dangers a more on the property. achieve. a label is the or- Such description majority’s approach dinary steps standard of care is to take foreseeable, they imagine only could not a situation avoid where unreasonable risks. duty balance, care to which a landowner owed Herein the true lies as the land- in a unexpectedly finding herself not required anything someone owner is to do more hazardous situation. than to act with reasonable care under the circumstanсes. majority duty claims the of care a trespasser landowner owes a under our an

present system appropriate “strikes land-

balance between the interests of the trespasser.” Despite

owner and the refer- to this “reasonable bal-

ences so-called

ance,” majority opinion is devoid of we

any discussion what consideration may give trespasser under com- FEEDS, INC., Appellee, KENT Perhaps mon law rule. this discussion is missing rigid because the classification system does not of com- permit balancing MANTHEI, Manthei, Frank Patricia It

peting interests. is examination of Grubb, Jack Grubb and Diana only one interest —the interest of the land- Appellants. owner. It does not consider the interests of a trespasser under circumstances. No. 01-530. room in a

There is no for balance test that Supreme Court of Iowa. merely determines a land entrant’s status trespasser accordingly as a concludes June trespasser landowner owed injure narrow of care not to the tres-

passer maliciously deliberately.

Surely majority imagine can circum-

stances under which even a

owed modicum of care. On the other

hand, conjure up it is not difficult to ex-

treme horror where it stories would be unjust

wholly impose any liability on ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‍the so, But in doing ignore

landowner. we where, gray despite

vast area cases negligent

landowner’s or even reckless

conduct, impose effectively analysis

care the landowner. The takes a multi-

advocate into consideration allowing

tude of factors the trier-of-faet to resolution,

arrive at the especial- most

ly regarding where the facts are close satisfy

entrant’s technical status. To standard,

overall of care a landowner notes Categories: tus Judge Allocation argument for abolishing the distinction Functions, Jury 1981 Utah L.Rev. 61 between licensees and invitees equally is (1981) (concluding ordinary negligence persuasive regarding trespassers. principles jury have constrained discretion Mounsey, J., 297 N.E.2d at (Kaplan, in premises liability jurisdictions cases concurring). The concurring opinion ex- abolished classification system). plains just that “it is sometimes hard to as A final abolishing reason for distinguish the distinc- trespassers from licensees tion is invitees, that our modern social mores as distinguish from licensees humanitarian place impor- invitees; values more and the of trespassers class tance on human life on property. than probably as as various either Welter, Mark J. Comment, Lia- Premises other classes.” Id. at Although

Case Details

Case Name: Alexander v. Medical Associates Clinic

Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa

Date Published: Jun 12, 2002

Citation: 646 N.W.2d 74

Docket Number: 00-1764

Court Abbreviation: Iowa