56 S.C. 252 | S.C. | 1899
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
In the year 1879, Jefferson McDaniel conveyed two parcels of land, one containing 80 acres and the other 119 acres, fio his three grand-dhildren, William Alexander, George Miller McDaniel, and Annie Belle McDaniel, reserving to¡ himself and to< his son, B. F. McDaniel, life estates in the same, and also the usufruct thereof, during their lives. Jefferson McDaniel remained in possession of both tracts. The two grand-children, George Miller McDaniel and Annie Belle McDaniel, departed this life while minors, unmarried, without issue, and their estates vested in their father, the said B. F. McDaniel, in fee simple, as sole heir at law. The deed of conveyance in question is in the “Case,” and from its terms the fee in the two' tracts of
This action was commenced 29th July, 1898. Judge Aldrich, after a full hearing, decreed in favor of the plaintiff, and required Jefferson McDaniel to specifically execute his contract by conveying one-half of the two parcels of land to the plaintiff, and required Jefferson and B. F. McDaniel to pay the costs between them — for he in his decree found “B. F. McDaniel is as much responsible for this litigation as Jefferson McDaniel, arid that he should pay half of the costs,” but denied B. F. McDaniel any relief.
From this decree Jefferson McDaniel appeals on the following- exceptions: First: That his Honor erred in his conclusion of fact, th'at there was an agreement entered into between Jefferson McDaniel, on the one side, and the plaintiff and B. F. McDaniel, on the other, under and in pursuance of which, plaintiff and B. F. McDaniel were to convey their interest in the land described in the complaint to Jefferson McDaniel, and in consideration of such conveyance, the
As to the second and third exceptions, they must be overruled.
We do not see anything in the case which gives any support to the fifth exception, and it is overruled.
We hold, in answer to the sixth ground of appeal, that when a person under a contract conveys his one-third interest in a tract of land to another person, it belongs to that consideration known as a valuable consideration. Let this exception stand overruled.
So far as the seventh exception is concerned, we fail to see that the contract was hard and wanting in equity; but, as we before remarked, we believe the ends of justice will be fully met as to all three of these parties, if we set aside the deed of conveyance of William Alexander and B. F.
We see nothing in the. eighth exception.
We think William Dixon’s testimony relevant.
!he twelfth exception is immaterial.
It is the judgment of this Court, that’the judgment of the Circuit Court be modified by setting aside the deed from William Alexander and B. F. McDaniel to Jefferson McDaniel, thereby leaving a life estate in the two tracts of land to the said Jefferson McDaniel, and declaring that the fee in said lands is already vested to. one-third thereof in William Alexander, and to the remaining two-thirds in B. F. McDaniel, and that Jefferson McDaniel be required to. pay the costs of this action. Let the action be remanded to the Circuit Court to enforce our views.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. With some hesitation 1 'concur in the result. I am not satisfied that the contract relied upon by the plaintiff has been proved as clearly as a Court of Equity should require, when asked to enforce the performance of what seems to me a most extraordinary arrangement, especially as to B. F. McDaniel, who, if the plaintiff should succeed, would lose everything and obtain nothing. But as a Court of Equity is invested with large discretion in a case of this kind, I am inclined to think that the conclusion reached by Mr. Justice Pope affords the best solution of the matter, and effects substantial justice between all the parties by placing them in statu quo. I concur, however, fully in the conclusion that there was error in imposing any part of the costs upon B. F. McDaniel. So far as I can discover, there is no testimony tending to' show that he had anything to do in bringing about this litigation, and I am unable to perceive any reason why he should be charged with the payment of any part of the costs.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. Under' the pleadings in the case, this Court, if it is satisfied that there was such an agreement as is alleged in the complaint, should affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court as to specific performance of the contract; while, on the other hand, if it is not satisfied that such an agreement was entered into', it should dismiss the complaint. I am of the opinion that the Circuit Judge was correct in his findings of fact relative to the said agreement, and that there was no> error on his part in adjudging that the contract should be specifically performed.
I, therefore, dissent from the opinion of Mr. Justice Pope.