Alexander appeals pro se from the order of the superior court denying his petition to legitimate a minor child and terminating his rights in the child. 1
Alexander, who was incarcerated for child molestation offenses, filed a pro se petition to legitimate a minor child born out of wedlock after he was notified that Guthrie, the child’s mother, had consented to the child’s adoption by her spouse. Guthrie filed a responsive pleading objecting to the legitimation which included a request that the court terminate Alexander’s rights in the child. After a hearing on *461 the petition, at which Alexander appeared pro se, the superior court entered an order finding that Alexander had abandoned his opрortunity interest in developing a relationship with the child and that it was not in the best interest of the child that Alеxander’s petition be granted. Accordingly, the court denied the petition to legitimate and ordered that any rights which Alexander had in the child were terminated.
On appeal, Alexander claims: (1) that the trial court erred by refusing to continue the hearing on the petition so he could attempt to obtain the services of an attorney to represent him; (2) that he was indigent and the court erred by not appointing counsel to represent him free of charge; and (3) that the trial court erroneously admitted irrelevant and prejudicial evidence at the hearing.
1. Since the appellatе record does not contain a transcript of the proceedings in the trial court, we arе unable to review Alexander’s claims that the court erroneously refused to grant him a continuanсe and erroneously admitted certain evidence. An appellant who alleges error in thе trial proceedings has the burden of producing a transcript of the allegedly erroneous matter.
Malin Trucking v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
Contrary to Alexandеr’s contentions, even if he was indigent, he was not entitled to have an attorney appointed to represent him at public expense in the legitimation proceedings. Compare
Wilkins v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources,
The order of the superior court found that Alexander was the biological fathеr of the minor child at issue who was born out of wedlock in 1986; that Alexander was aware that the mother wаs pregnant and was aware of the birth of the child; that he offered no prenatal assistancе, gave no support for the child, and has never seen or communicated with the child. The court further found that Alexander was incarcerated in 1992 for various child molestation offenses and that his testimоny that he did not know of the child until he received notice in 1994 was not credible. The court concluded that Alexander has abandoned his opportunity interest in developing a relationship with the child and that the legitimation sought by Alexander was not in the best interests of the child. See
In re Baby Girl Eason,
2. The portion of the order terminating Alexander’s rights in the child must be reversed because the superior court was without authority to enter such an order in this case. Guthrie’s right to file responsive pleadings objecting to the petition to legitimate did not include a right to seek a termination of Alexander’s rights in the legitimation рroceeding. See
Adamavage v. Holloway,
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Notes
Although an appeal from a denial of a petition to legitimate requires an application pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), a termination order is directly appealable.
Hill v. Adams,
