Lead Opinion
This сase arises out of the refusal of Richard Alexander, in his capacity as the Clerk for the State Court of Gwinnett County, to file a motion to compel discovery under a particular case number requested by the filing party, Thomas Gibson. The requested case number had рreviously been assigned to a case to which the motion to compel was directly related, and Gibson filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in an effort to force Alexander to file the motion to compel under this case number. The trial court granted the mandаmus petition, and Alexander appeals from this ruling. Because we find that Alexander had a clear duty as the Clerk of the court to file the motion to compel under the requested case number without making an independent determination about whether a
By way of baсkground, on May 8, 2014, Gibson filed a complaint in Gwinnett County State Court against Samuel Wright, and the case was assigned Case No. 14-C-020432-2. When Wright failed to answer, a default judgment was entered against him on December 2, 2014. Gibson served post-judgment interrogatories on Wright on January 13, 2015, but again, Wright failed to resрond. Gibson then prepared a motion to compel discovery, using Case No. 14-C-020432-2, which he presented for filing in Gwinnett County State Court on July 17, 2015. However, a representative of the Clerk’s office indicated to Gibson that the motion to compel would have to be filed under a new case number, 15-C-03773-2, because the motion was being filed more than thirty days after the default judgment had been entered against Wright. Despite Gibson’s repeated efforts to file the motion to compel under Case No. 14-C-020432-2, he was forced to proceed under Case Nо. 15-C-03773-2.
“Mandamus will issue against a public official only where the petitioner has demonstrated a clear legal right to relief or a gross abuse of discretion.” Gwinnett County v. Ehler Enterprises,
The duty which a mandamus complainant seeks to have enforced must be a duty arising by law, either expressly or by necessary implication; and the law must not only authorize the act be done, but must require its performance.
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Gilmer County v. City of East Ellijay,
In this regard, state court clerks have the legal duty “to file pleadings, not to ascertain their legal effect.” (Citation omitted.) Ford v. Hanna,
Notably, OCGA § 15-6-77 (e) (1) does not deal with the assignment of casе numbers, but the calculation of costs for postjudgment motions filed more than thirty days after a judgment is entered. See id. Indeed, Alexander has cited to no authority to show that he was legally required to file Gibson’s motion to compel under a new case number. What Alexander was legally required to do, however, was file the motion to compel upon collecting appropriate costs as calculated per OCGA § 15-6-77 (e) (1), but without attempting to determine whether the document should legally be filed under the previously assigned case number оf Gibson’s original complaint. The propriety of the filing should be considered, if at all, by the court upon motion by the parties or on its own motion, and not by the Clerk.
Because Gibson had a clear legal right to compel Alexander to fulfill his ministerial
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The dissent’s citation to Brown v. King,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
This appeal requires us to consider, in the context of Gibson’s petition for writ of mandamus, the important issue of how case numbers are assignеd in civil actions to pleadings and motions presented for filing in our state and superior courts. The majority opinion concludes, without any discussion of the relevant legal authority, that clerks have a legal duty to file any motion presented, not in accordance with the case numbering system established under Georgia law and the Uniform Superior Court Rules, but at the will of the individual presenting the motion. Because this holding is contrary to Georgia law, I respectfully dissent.
As acknowledged in the majority opinion, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available “only where the petitioner has demonstrated a clear legal right to relief or a gross abuse of discretion.” Gwinnett County v. Ehler Enterprises,
“The determination of whether official action is required depends on the law governing the subject matter in question.” Bibb County v. Monroe County,
In fact, the relevant authority in this case is that legal authority establishing the duties and responsibilities of our superior and state court clerks with regard to the filing of motions and the manаgement of their courts’ civil cases. These statutory duties, set out by our legislature in OCGA § 15-6-61, specifically require clerks to keep an “automated civil
At the same time, Uniform Superior Court Rule (“USCR”) 39.2 provides that a court’s civil docket “shall contain separate case number entries for all civil actions filed in the office of the clerk including: complaints, motions, URESA’s, domestic relations, contempt actions, modifications on closed civil actions, and all other actions civil in nature, except adoptions.” This Court, in turn, has recognized that USCR 39.2 deals with “administrative matters related to filings in the clerk’s office” and vests in clerks the authority “to assign separate case numbers” to motions filed after entry of a final judgment. See Brown v. King,
The collective authority of OCGA § 15-6-61 (a) (4) (A), USCR 39.2, and Brown clearly authorized Alexander to assign a separate case number to Gibson’s motion to compel which was filed more than six months after entry of the final judgment in the original action and entry of a final disposition form.
Giving no consideration to this authority, the majority concludes Alexander was required to file Gibson’s motion “without making an independent determination about whether a new case number should be assigned” because the “duties of thе clerk relating to the filing of pleadings are ministerial in nature” and “do not involve the exercise of discretion.” (Maj. op. p. 395.) This holding does not withstand scrutiny for several reasons. First, it strips clerks of the authority vested in them by OCGA § 15-6-61 (a) (4) (A) and USCR 39.2 as recognized in Brown to assign case numbers generally, and more specifically, to assign separate case numbers to ancillary proceedings filed after entry of a final judgment. Second, it relies entirely on our recognition in Hood v. State,
In light of the clear authority requiring clerks to maintain a civil case management system and directing them to assign new case numbers to certain postjudgment ancillary proceedings, including postjudgment motions tо compel, I would reverse the trial court’s order which grants mandamus relief to Gibson and directs Alexander to file Gibson’s motion in a contrary manner.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Thompson joins in this dissent.
Perhaps this is the reason the majority opinion does not discuss any of the trial court’s conclusions regarding whether Gibson satisfied his burden of proof in this case and instead, focuses on Alexander’s failure to cite authority showing “that he was legally required to file Gibson’s motion to compel under a new case number.” (Maj. op. p. 396.)
I would for thе same reason reject Gibson’s argument that Alexander was legally required to file the motion under the original case number because Gibson perfected service upon the defendant in that case and already had established personal jurisdiction over him. The establishment of personal jurisdiction over a defendant does not correlate with a duty on the part of a court clerk to file a motion in a particular manner. Moreover, this ground of the trial court’s ruling and its concern that assignment of a new case number would have required issuance of a new summons and personal service of the motion are based on the incorrect assumption that new case numbers are assigned only upon commencement of a new civil action. See OCGA § 15-6-61 (a) (4) (A). See also OCGA § 9-11-3 (a) (providing that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court”); OCGA § 9-11-7 (a), (b) (defining pleadings as a complaint, answer, third-party complaint, and third-party answer); Brown v. King,
The majority argues Brown is inapposite bеcause it dealt with a postjudgment motion for contempt, yet it offers no explanation for the distinction between a postjudgment motion for contempt and a postjudgment motion to compel. Both motions are filed after entry of the final judgment and both are clearly related to enforcement of the final judgment. In any event, regardless of the applicability of Brown to the facts of this case, OCGA § 15-6-61 (a) (4) (A) and USCR 39.2 clearly direct clerks to assign separate case numbers to all motions, not just motions for contempt, filed in closed civil actions.