77 Minn. 445 | Minn. | 1899
Lead Opinion
This is an action to enjoin the city of Duluth from issuing and
The defendant claims that it is authorized to issue the bonds by Laws 1899, c. 50. Is this statute constitutional? This is the only question for our decision meriting special consideration, and the answer to it must be in the affirmative. The provisions of this statute may be summarized as follows:
Section 1. The common council of any city, at any time having a population of more than 50,000 according to the last state census, is authorized to issue and sell the bonds of any such city for the purpose of taking up and funding its floating indebtedness. Section 2 provides for the manner of issuing the bonds. Section 3. No city shall be permitted to issue bonds for funding any of its floating indebtedness except such as exists at the date of the approval of this act, nor shall any such city be entitled to avail itself of the provisions of this act unless it shall proceed to do so within six months from the date of such approval. Section 4. Any city, which has already reached the limit of its bonded or other indebtedness, which avails itself of the provisions of this act, shall thereafter have no power to create any obligation which shall bear interest, except such as may be in renewal of an obligation now existing, and no officer or officers of such city shall have power to draw any order on its treasury, or issue any evidence of indebtedness, other than a bond, unless there is then sufficient money in the treasury to the credit of the fund out of which it is payable to pay the same, together with all unpaid claims previously audited against the fund. Every order or evidence of indebtedness issued contrary to the provisions of this section shall be void in the hands of everybody. Section 5. This act shall be in force from and after its passage.
The plaintiff claims that this act is unconstitutional, because it is special legislation prohibited by sections 33 and 34 of article 4 of the state constitution. The specific objections which he urges against the validity of,the act are: First, it adopts an improper basis of classification, namely, population; second, it is based upon
1. The plaintiff, in support of his first objection, urges that the attempted classification of cities on the basis of population is not germane to the subject-matter or purpose of the act, for the reason that there is no natural connection or relation between the number of people in a city and the propriety or necessity of funding its floating indebtedness.
The constitutional prohibition of special legislation on a particular subject does not deprive the legislature of the power to classify it if the basis of classification is germane to the purpose of the law. Population may be a basis of such classification, if germane to the subject or purpose of the proposed law. The subject of classification on the basis of population has been an embarrassing one for the courts, for the reason that numerous and complex considerations enter into it, and in practice it is often difficult to determine whether there is any natural relation between the population of cities of a given class and the subject-matter of the law classifying them. This difficulty has been eliminated by the adoption of an amendment to the constitution, — section 36, art. 4 (Laws 1899, p. vi.), — the here material provisions of which are these:
“The legislature may provide general laws relating to affairs of cities, the application of which may be limited to cities of over fifty thousand inhabitants, or to cities of fifty and not less than twenty thousand inhabitants, or to cities of twenty and not less than ten thousand inhabitants, or to cities of ten thousand inhabitants or less, which shall apply equally to all such cities of either class.”
It is manifest that the purpose of this amendment was not practically to repeal sections 33 and 34 of article 4 of the constitution, as to cities which might be classified pursuant to its provisions, but that its object was to enable the legislature to make population a basis of classification, although there might not be any natural relation between the subject-matter of the proposed law and the number of people in the classified cities. We accordingly hold that the amendment authorizes the legislature to classify, for the purpose of general legislation, cities on the basis of population therein specified, although such basis would not have previously been germane
2. The plaintiff, in support of his second general objection, that the act is based upon existing circumstances only, and is limited to the members of the class at the time of its enactment, urges that the provisions of the act are limited to cities having the required population at a given time, — the date "of the last state census; also to cities having a floating indebtedness at the date of the passage of the act, which proceed to act upon such provisions within six months from such date. It must be conceded that such are the provisions of the act, and that it does not necessarily operate alike upon all cities having a population of more than 50,000 at the date of the passage of the act, nor upon cities which thereafter acquired such population.
The rule is well settled that classification with a view to the enactment of general laws must not be based upon existing circumstances only or those of limited duration, except where the object of the law is itself a temporary one. The exception to the rule is as firmly established as the rule itself, and a distinctive class may be based upon existing conditions, when the purposes of the law are temporary only. Cobb v. Bord, 40 Minn. 479, 42 N. W. 396; State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 548, 58 N. W. 150; Flynn v. Little Falls E. & W. Co., 74 Minn. 180, 78 N. W. 106; State v. City of Thief River Falls, 76 Minn. 15, 78 N. W. 867; Iowa v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 112; 32 Am. Law Reg. 851. But not all existing conditions are a proper basis of classification, although the purpose sought be temporary. They must be of such a character as suggests a practical (not absolute) necessity or propriety of different legislation with respect to the subjects placed in different classes. Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 272, 33 N. W. 800. The origin or cause, however, of the existing conditions, whether it be unforeseen disaster or official incompetency, goes not to the power of the legislature to make them the basis of classification, but to the propriety of doing so.
If we keep in mind these general principles while reading the act-in question, our attention is at once challenged by the fact that it
To carry out this purpose, it was deemed wise by the legislature to require such cities to proceed to exercise the power conferred upon them to issue bonds to fund their floating indebtedness within six months after the power was conferred, and to prohibit the issue thereafter of any order or evidence of indebtedness of such cities unless the money with which to pay it was in the treasury. To have extended the provisions of-the law to cities which might thereafter grow into the class would have been an implied invitation and an inducement to such cities to incur the very evil the law was intended to remedy and to prohibit as to the future. Hence there were good reasons why the provisions of the act should be limited to cities of the class that then had a floating indebtedness, and to those that proceeded to avail themselves thereof within six months after the passage of the act. It is clear that the purposes of the act in question are merely temporary and remedial, and that the existing conditions, which are made a basis of classification, are of such a character as fairly to suggest the propriety of different legislation as to the cities classified; and, further, that during the time of its existence its provisions apply to every city of the prescribed class which desires to avail itself of the provisions thereof. It is therefore a general, not a special, law, within the meaning of the constitution.
Order affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I cannot concur. The three cities in this state having each over 50,000 inhabitants are Duluth, St. Paul, and Minneapolis. Each of these cities is governed by a number of special laws, which, taken together, constitute its charter, and which were enacted by the legislature before the constitutional amendment adopted in 1892 prohibiting such special legislation. Each of these charters is radically different from the others.' There is one limitation on the amount of bonded indebtedness of Duluth, another as to the amount of bonded indebtedness of Minneapolis, and no limitation at all as to the amount of the bonded indebtedness of St. Paul, except as to the amount which may be incurred for park purposes, which is not material here. Laws 1899, c. 50, purports on its face to include these three cities in one class, and I agree with the majority of the court that, under the constitutional amendment adopted at the last election, it is now proper to include all cities of over 50,000 inhabitants in one class, whether population is or is not a proper basis of classification as regards the particular subject of legislation. But in all other respects the classification must still be a proper one.
The subject of legislation in chapter 50 is limitation on the amount of bonded indebtedness in the cities of the class. The legislature must now treat all the members of the class alike. If St. Paul is to be permitted to go without any limitation as to the amount of her bonded indebtedness, the legislature cannot by any pretended general law change the limit as to Duluth or Minneapolis otherwise than by removing all limitations as to them also. This principle is laid down by the repeated decisions of this court and the courts of other states having such constitutional prohibitions against special legislation. But chapter 50 does not treat all the members of the class alike. It raises the limit of the amount of the bonded indebtedness, and fixes a new limit, as to Duluth, while it leaves the limit as to Minneapolis unchanged, and permits St. Paul to go without any limit at all. This is justified on the pretext of providing for temporary existing conditions, and it is held that the legislature was warranted in adopting the policy that they would cure the present evil, without encouraging the repetition of the evil in the future, and therefore had a right to make the law
A special law cannot be rendered general by making it still more special in some other respect. Limiting this law to present conditions does not in the least remove the objection I have referred to. In fact, it is, in my mind, a question whether limiting the law to present, existing conditions does not, of itself, make the law special. But I will not discuss that question now. There is no exigency or occasion for this act except the mere fact that there is a bond limit in the charter of Duluth, while there is none in the charter of another member of the alleged class. But the pretense of adopting all cities of over 50,000 inhabitants as a basis of classification in this act is a mere sham. If the act had not used words to conceal its thoughts, but had used plain, straightforward language, it would have named Duluth as the city to which it applied, and would have referred in no manner to any other city. It would simply have provided for raising the bond limit of Duluth by the amount of its present floating indebtedness, but to no greater extent. Whether this is a temporary or a permanent change in the bond limit of Duluth, it is a simple and clear case of special legislation, and comes directly within the principle of the case of State v. Ritt, 76 Minn. 531, 79 N. W. 535, decided but a few months ago.
It seems to me that chapter 50 is the most vicious piece of special legislation that has come before this court since the adoption of the constitutional amendment of 1892, and the decision of the majority throws the door wide open, not to reasonable special legislation, but to special and temporary patchwork, the most vicious of all special legislation. All the legislature has to do after this is to fail and refuse to pass general laws on any particular subject until there is a present crying necessity for legislative redress, and then seize on the present existing circumstances of such present neces