*1 Doyle, Gregory Digel, Knight, Holland & Sara L. for J. S04F1512. ALEXANDER v.ALEXANDER.
HINES, Justice. Brantley appeals III Jerome Alexander ending marriage entry judgment of a final and of divorce decree Kimberly Alexander, J. and asserts that the trial court erred in refusing agreement. antenuptial Finding error, to enforce an we affirm. couple February engaged 14,1997, the
On became to be married February wedding February 24,1997. 20,1997, and date of On presented Mr. Alexander Ms. Alexander with an saying marry signed it, would that he her unless she and marry that his would allow without it. Ms. attorney her, Alexander No and reviewed for unnecessary. They Mr. Alexander informed her that mar- such days scheduled, ried as four later. party alimony states that each waives and
rights property spouse. in the A “Full section headed states, toto, Disclosure Parties” in that: has “Each party a full made disclosure to the of all owned or respective party held otherwise each as is A Exhibits and attached exhibits B hereto.” no such were attached. shortly time, house; At that Alexander owned he sold after the bought couple and another home in which resided. approximately Alexander an also had investment account worth agreement, $40,000; he did not disclose it on exhibit to otherwise. couple stayed had a and child Ms. Alexander home for
to care her. The is silent possibility argument children. After an Mr. couple transferred the title the house which the lived to his mother.1 divorce,
After Ms. filed Mr. Alexander moved enforce denied his motion and refused incorporate judgment the terms final and into the judgment dispositions final decree divorce. The made decree by jury conveyance. This was later be a fraudulent alimony differed from that set forth in the which public policy, agreements matter of made As a absolutely Georgia. contemplation of divorce are not Scherer (2) (292 When a trial case such court in a divorce is faced with *2 judge employ basically three criteria in trial should the determining agreement whether to enforce such an particular (1) agreement through case: the obtained was through misrepresentation mistake, fraud, duress or or (2) agreement of material facts? the uncon- nondisclosure changed [h]ave the facts and circumstances scionable? agreement executed, the so as to make its enforce- since was unfair and ment unreasonable? (3). agreement light at
Id. 641 Whether an enforceable these trial criteria is a decision made in the court’s sound discretion. See Adams, v. 522-523 Adams Ga. that it enforce the
The trial court determined would not supra: cited three bases set forth in Ms. by agreement procured duress; assent to the was Mr. Alexander’s Alexander failed to $40,000 the material fact that he owned disclose changed account; and, had investment that facts circumstances agreement signed, by since virtue the birth of the minor the was that the trial abused its discretion child. Mr. asserts court grounds. as to The text of the court’s order makes each of these trial independent it believed the clear that that each of cited bases justification enforcing agreement. Accordingly, it for not the is not grounds necessary Court each of three that Mr. for this to address the supports if Alexander advances one the decision. undisputed marriage, the Mr.Alexander It is that to owned approximately $40,000, and that did account worth he investment by the method set forth in the disclose this Ms. Alexander Alex- or in fashion. severability agreement clause, that ander contends the contained a (a), by portion under the failure to abide and that OCGA 13-1-8 attachment lists of the contract determining entire But in owned or held does void the contract.2 antenuptial agreement, the trial court whether to enforce an essen- tially equity “approve and has discretion sits sufficiently argues knowledge that Ms. Alexander had of his assets He also precise uphold approve part, Allen, whole or in a whole.” refuse to as Allen (2) (b) (400 The court Ga. trial was not severability, language bound to method as even as question disclosure forth therein. before the misrepresentation court was whether there was or nondisclosure of noting was, there that a material fact. Ms. intelligently antenuptial agree- into an Alexander could not enter knowing waiving any ment without to which she was potential interest. denying
There was abuse of discretion the motion to enforce Judgment All the concur. Justices affirmed. Presiding concurring. Justice, SEARS, majority’s holding
I concur with Alexander’s failure despite fully account, to reveal his investment claim have antenuptial agreement assets, disclosed all his rendered his with Mrs. null and void. separately, emphasize however,
I write that this is the upon ground which the trial court’s can I decision be affirmed. believe holding the trial court erred also *3 change a due to duress and in circumstances.
Duress which will avoid contract must consist threats of bodily amounting harm, coercion, means tending actually inducing another, will coerce the will____The contrary him to act do an his free must threats person be sufficient to overcome mind and will of a ordinary firmness.3 say
Here, the threat Mr.Alexander made was to that unless Mrs. marriage could precedent quoted go singular forward. As the clear, above makes required statement does rise to level of duress to void an otherwise valid contract.
Similarly, during mere fact a child was born the course change does not create material in circumstances authorizes nullification of an Our provides guidelines adequate support Code sufficient to ensure that provided support for a child whose divorce.4 Such child wholly separate issues are from the issues that are addressed in — obligations divorcing i.e., standard contracts Critz, 201, (282 Tidwell v. SE2d seq. See 9-6-1 et OCGA § parties will owe one another after the marriage is dissolved.
I am authorized to state that Carley joins Justice in this concur- rence.
Decided March 2005. Reconsideration denied March Hicks, Gardner, Massey & Frederick Massey, V. for appellant. Thomas A. Camp,
S04F2054. BROCK v. BROCK. 29) Justice.
Hunstein,
Gregory Brock (Husband) brought
this divorce action against
Elizabeth
(Wife).
trial,
Brock
After a bench
the trial court entered a
final judgment and divorce decree
awarding
joint legal custody
of their
three minor children with Husband to be the primary
physical custodian.
application
Wife filed an
for discretionary appeal
challenging on various grounds the trial court’s property division and
custody
granted
award. We
her application pursuant
to this Court’s
Wright
v. Wright,
An implied trust is “a trust in which the settlor’s intention to create the trust implied circumstances, from the and which meets *4 requirements of Code Sections 53-12-90 through 53-12-93.” OCGA 53-12-2 (3). An implied resulting trust may arise where: § express trust reason; created but fails for any (2) a trust is fully performed without exhausting all of the trust property; purchase money resulting trust is established. OCGA 53-12-91. In case, this Husband presented no express evidence that an trust was created or that a fully performed trust was exhausting without all Thus, the trust property. to prove his claim that the conveyance of the marital home to trust, Wife rise to a resulting Husband must overcome the presumption under Georgia law that the conveyance