USCA11 Case: 24-10126 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 05/20/2025 Page: 1 of 24

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10126
____________________

ALEXANDER BOSTIC,
Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
versus
MATARI BODIE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cv-60661-AHS
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10126

Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This dispute emerges from the fallout of a Ponzi scheme Ju-
dith Paris-Pinder orchestrated from late 2019 to late 2021. 1 Paris-
Pinder represented to her victims that they could invest in a per-
sonal-injury legal practice by advancing the practice’s clients pay-
ment in return for the investment plus interest once insurance set-
tled the clients’ claims.
Defendant-Appellant Matari Bodie was one such investor.
And after some of Bodie’s investments with Paris-Pinder generated
returns, Bodie approached Plaintiﬀ-Appellee Alexander Bostic with
the opportunity.
Bostic and Bodie entered several loan agreements memori-
alizing Bostic’s investment. Bostic then informed his pastor and
other synagogue members about Bodie’s proposal, who signed
similar loans with Bodie. But Bodie’s agreements with Bostic and
his associates guaranteed a lower rate of return than those Paris-
Pinder oﬀered because Bodie planned to retain some of the Paris-
Pinder payouts for himself.
Eventually, Paris-Pinder’s Ponzi scheme collapsed, and
Bodie’s derivative scheme with it. Bostic then ﬁled this action on

1 Paris-Pinder entered a consent judgment with the Securities & Exchange

Commission in September 2022, see SEC v. Paris-Pinder, No. 22-cv-23100 (S.D.
Fla. 2022), and pled guilty to wire fraud in November 2022, see United States v.
Paris-Pinder, No. 22-cr-20452 (S.D. Fla. 2022).
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24-10126 Opinion of the Court 3

behalf of himself and, as an assignee, 2 Bodie’s other purported vic-
tims. He alleged breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation,
unjust enrichment, and civil theft, to recover funds paid to Bodie.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. As relevant to
this appeal, the district court entered summary judgment for Bostic
on his civil-theft, unjust-enrichment, and fraudulent-misrepresen-
tation claims.
After a careful review of the record, we aﬃrm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on Bostic’s unjust-enrichment
claim. Simply, equity demands that Bodie return the funds Bostic
and the Assignors sent him. But we vacate as to the civil-theft and
fraudulent-misrepresentation claims. Under Florida law, civil theft
is an inappropriate tort for redressing claims that a defendant has
misused or misappropriated another’s money by failing to fulﬁll a
debt that mere repayment may satisfy. Plus, with respect to both
the civil-theft and fraudulent-misrepresentation claims, a genuine
dispute of material fact exists as to the parties’ mental state, includ-
ing Bodie’s intent to defraud Bostic and the Assignors when he pro-
posed the Business Loan Agreements.
As a result, we vacate the district court’s judgment and re-
mand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

2 Article III of the Constitution permits an assignee to bring suit on behalf of

others, “even when the assignee has promised to remit the proceeds of the
litigation to the assignor[s].” Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc.,

554 U.S. 269, 271

(2008).
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10126

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Judith Paris-Pinder conducted a Ponzi scheme from 2019 to
2021. As part of the scheme, she promised victims that she’d invest
money into a personal-injury attorney’s practice whose clients’
lawsuits would generate insurance settlements. The investments,
Paris-Pinder represented, would ﬁnance payments to the attorney’s
clients who would then remit the investments plus interest when
the insurers paid in full.
Matari Bodie ﬁrst invested in Paris-Pinder’s Ponzi scheme in
April 2020. His investment seemed to pay oﬀ. After giving Paris-
Pinder $5,000, Bodie received $7,500—a 50% rate of return—just
ten weeks later. Bodie then invested about one-hundred more
times with Paris-Pinder, documenting the transactions in a “Busi-
ness Loan Agreement.” Paris-Pinder prepared the Business Loan
Agreements, and they conﬁrmed that she would return to Bodie
his initial investment, plus a ﬁfty-percent return, by a speciﬁed date.
In May 2021, Bodie told Alexander Bostic about his dealings
with Paris-Pinder. Then Bostic executed several near-identical
Business Loan Agreements with Bodie, with one key distinction:
Bodie dropped the rate of return on the loan so he could pocket
some proﬁts from Paris-Pinder’s scheme.
Between September 27, 2021, and October 20, 2021, Bodie
entered into similar Business Loan Agreements with The Way of
Yah (a religious entity), and several of its members: Dannie
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24-10126 Opinion of the Court 5

Pickard, Jahi Richardson, Anthony Palmer, Shakeia Fleeks, Austin
Smith, Justin Miller, Ryan Magwood, and Chanel Miller (collec-
tively, the “Assignors”). These contracts required the Assignors to
deliver Bodie a speciﬁed sum and guaranteed that Bodie would re-
pay the Assignors at a date certain. But Bodie never discussed the
loans with the Assignors directly. Bodie stresses that, although he
prepared them with the understanding that the Assignors would
read and assent to them, he did not direct Bostic to recruit others.
Bodie instead suggests that Bostic recruited the Assignors and,
upon his own initiative, explained to them Paris-Pinder’s business
opportunity.
In total, Bostic and the Assignors sent $299,000 to Bodie’s
account at TD Bank. The funds were not segregated within the
account. 3
On September 4, 2021, Paris-Pinder stopped paying Bodie,
several weeks before Bodie executed the loans with the Assignors.
But at the time, Bodie maintains, Paris-Pinder’s delays were

3 Bostic originally agreed to invest $50,000 with Bodie. The pair executed that

Business Loan Agreement on July 5, 2021, with a repayment date of August
30, 2021. But on September 15, 2021, they executed another Business Loan
Agreement. In the September agreement, Bostic loaned $30,000 to Bodie. To
fund this agreement, the parties used a portion of the amount that Bostic
loaned Bodie as part of the July agreement. As Bostic explained in a text mes-
sage to Bodie, Bostic wanted “leave some [money] in.” So the next day, Bodie
paid Bostic $32,650, and, in effect, the September agreement superseded the
July one. The $30,000 dollars debited to the September agreement constitutes
Bostic’s share of the total amount Bodie allegedly owes Bostic and the Assign-
ors.
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10126

common, so he says he had no immediate concern that he would
default on his loans with Bostic and the Assignors. When the
weeks passed, though, and Paris-Pinder never remitted payment to
Bodie, Bodie faced impending defaults on Paris-Pinder loans he had
taken out with other investors. So Bodie used some of the Assign-
ors’ funds to pay oﬀ those other loans. In doing so, Bodie bode his
time in the hopes that Paris-Pinder would make good on her agree-
ments and that he could then repay the Assignors.
But Bodie’s hopes quickly turned to concerns as he began to
run out of money to pay oﬀ his outstanding Business Loan Agree-
ments. In November 2021, Bodie returned $200,000 to Right
Choice Motors, an entity related to Henry Smith, the pastor at the
Way of Yah Congregation. Bodie contends he did so because he
realized that Paris-Pinder’s scheme was a scam and that he wished
to remediate as much of the loans he collected as he could. But
Bostic and the Assignors suggest the payment related to a diﬀerent
contract, not the Business Loan Agreements that Bodie signed with
them.
Bodie remains indebted to Bostic and the Assignors and has
not repaid any of the $299,000 they sent to Bodie throughout the
scheme. Nor has Bodie paid the interest or the late fees that the
Business Loan Agreements guaranteed Bostic and the Assignors.
Those other debts brought the amounts allegedly owed to
$375,300, per Bostic’s April 1, 2022 complaint:
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24-10126 Opinion of the Court 7

Creditor Debt Type Itemized Debt Total Debt
Principal $30,000
Bostic Interest $7,500 $37,650
Late Fees $150
Principal $170,000
The Way of Yah Interest $42,500 $212,650
Late Fees $150
Principal $10,000
Pickard Interest $2,500 $12,650
Late Fees $150
Principal $10,000
Richardson Interest $2,500 $12,650
Late Fees $150
Principal $20,000
Palmer Interest $5,000 $25,150
Late Fees $150
Principal $5,000
Fleeks Interest $1,250 $6,400
Late Fees $150
Principal $6,000
Smith Interest $1,500 $7,650
Late Fees $150
Principal $27,000
Justin Miller Interest $6,750 $33,900
Late Fees $150
Principal $16,000
Ryan Magwood Interest $3,750 $20,200
Late Fees $450
Principal $5,000
Channel Miller Interest $1,250 $6,400
Late Fees $150
TOTAL $375,300
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-10126

B. Procedural History

On April 1, 2022, Bostic ﬁled suit alleging breach of contract
(Count 1), fraudulent misrepresentation and inducement (Count
2), unjust enrichment (Count 3), fraud, in violation of FLA. STAT. §
517.301(1)(a)(c) (Count 4), and civil theft (Count 5).
After discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judg-
ment. The district court entered summary judgment in Bodie’s fa-
vor on Bostic’s breach-of-contract claim (Count 1) because the in-
terest rates on each of the loans the parties executed qualiﬁed as
usury under Florida law, so those loans were void and unenforcea-
ble. But as relevant to this appeal, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment in Bostic’s favor as to fraudulent misrepresentation
and inducement (Count 2), unjust enrichment (Count 3), and civil
theft (Count 5).
In assessing Bostic’s civil-theft and fraudulent-misrepresen-
tation claims, the district court found no genuine dispute of fact as
to Bodie’s intent to defraud Bostic and the Assignors. It based this
conclusion on the circumstance that, although Bodie represented
that he would invest their money in Paris-Pinder’s scheme, Bodie
used Bostic and the Assignors’ funds to conduct what the district
court found to be Bodie’s own Ponzi scheme.
The district court also determined that Bostic established the
conversion elements of a civil-theft claim. The court so concluded
because it found that the undisputed evidence proved Bodie devi-
ated from the speciﬁc purpose for which Bostic and the Assignors
wired money to Bodie: investing in personal-injury settlements.
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24-10126 Opinion of the Court 9

As for the unjust-enrichment claim, the district court found
that Bostic and the Assignors established all elements: they con-
ferred a beneﬁt upon Bodie by transferring him their investments,
Bodie accepted and currently retains those funds, and it would be
inequitable to retain the beneﬁt without compensating Bostic and
the Assignors. And the court rejected Bodie’s unclean-hands de-
fense because Bodie could not show the Business Loan Agreements
injured him.
Based on these rulings, the district court entered an $897,000
judgment in Bostic’s favor, trebling the $299,000 Bodie owed, under
Florida’s civil-theft statute, FLA. STAT. § 772.11. After the district
court denied Bodie’s motion for reconsideration, Bodie timely ap-
pealed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317

, 322–23 (1986). An issue of fact is genuine if a reasonable
        trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party. An-
        derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248

 (1986). And a fact is
        material if it “might aﬀect the outcome of the suit under the gov-
        erning law” and is not “irrelevant or unnecessary.”

Id.

              On appeal, we review de novo a district court’s grant of
        summary judgment, construing all evidence in the light most fa-
        vorable to the non-moving party. Henry v. Sheriﬀ of Tuscaloosa Cnty.,
        ___ F.4th ___,

2025 WL 1177671

, *7 (11th Cir. 2025).
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  24-10126

                                 III.    DISCUSSION

               Bodie makes four arguments on appeal.
                His ﬁrst two challenge the district court’s entry of summary
        judgment on Bostic’s civil-theft claim. First, Bodie contends there
        is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he had the intent
        necessary to sustain a claim for civil theft. And second, he disputes
        that the Business Loan Agreements can give rise to a civil-theft
        claim because they do not direct the loaned money to be used for
        a speciﬁc purpose.
               Bodie’s last two arguments challenge the remaining counts
        on which the district court entered summary judgment. Third,
        Bodie argues that a genuine dispute of material fact exists on his
        unclean-hands defense to Bostic’s unjust-enrichment claim. And
        fourth, Bodie insists that the record contains several disputes of fact
        on Bostic’s fraudulent-misrepresentation claim, including whether
        Bodie intended to defraud Bostic and the Assignors and whether
        the Assignors relied on any of Bodie’s misrepresentations, given
        that he never spoke to them.
                For the reasons we explain in the next sections, we aﬃrm the
        district court’s grant of summary judgment on Bostic’s unjust-en-
        richment claim and reverse its grant of summary judgment on his
        civil-theft and fraudulent-misrepresentation claims. But to sum up,
        ﬁrst, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Bodie
        intended to steal Bostic’s and the Assignor’s funds when he entered
        into the Business Loan Agreements with them. Second, Bostic’s
        civil-theft claim is an inappropriate vehicle for recovering allegedly
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        24-10126                Opinion of the Court                          11

        misused or misappropriated money obtained through debt that any
        payment of funds will satisfy. Third, there’s no reasonable dispute
        that Bostic and the Assignors have clean hands, so equity requires
        that Bodie repay the funds he has retained. Fourth, and ﬁnally, a
        genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the parties’ mental
        state: a jury could ﬁnd that Bodie did not intend to defraud Bostic
        and the Assignors or that the Assignors relied on Bostic’s, not
        Bodie’s, representations about the Business Loan Agreements.
                   A. The district court erred in entering summary judgment
                                    on Bostic’s civil-theft claim.

                Under Florida law, a “claim for civil theft is conversion plus
        felonious intent.” Batista v. Rodriguez,

388 So. 3d 1098

, 1102 (Fla.
        3rd DCA 2024). The civil-theft cause of action imposes treble dam-
        ages on defendants who convert another’s property with the requi-
        site “criminal intent.” Bertoglio v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Fla.,

491 So. 2d 1216, 1217

 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1986). That “criminal intent” ele-
        ment requires the plaintiﬀ to prove “that the defendant had, prior
        to the commission of the act, an intent to commit a theft.” Rosen
        v. Marlin,

486 So. 2d 623, 625

 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1986); see Utah Power
        Sys., LLC v. Big Dog II, LLC,

352 So. 3d 504

, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)
        (holding there must be an intent to steal to prove civil theft). And
        a plaintiﬀ must prove that intent “by clear and convincing evi-
        dence.” Transcapital Bank v. Shadowbrook at Vero, LLC,

226 So. 3d 856, 864

 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
        Shuler Bros., Inc.,

590 So. 2d 986, 988

 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)).
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                24-10126

               Based on these premises, Bodie argues the district court
        erred in granting summary judgment on Bostic’s civil-theft claim
        for two reasons. First, he asserts that a genuine dispute of material
        fact remains over whether he acted with the necessary intent be-
        cause he says he didn’t intend to steal Bostic’s and the Assignors’
        investments. In Bodie’s view, he is just as much a victim of Paris-
        Pinder as Bostic and the Assignors are. And second, he contends
        he did not convert the funds that Bostic and the Assignors delivered
        to him under the Business Loan Agreements because the agree-
        ments did not require him to segregate the funds or direct them for
        a speciﬁc purpose.
              We agree with both of Bodie’s arguments. And because we
        do, we conclude that the district court erred in entering summary
        judgment on Bostic’s civil-theft claim.
               To put a ﬁner point on the facts Bostic must prove, a defend-
        ant commits a theft if he knowingly obtains or uses the plaintiﬀ’s
        property either with (a) the intent to, temporarily or permanently,
        deprive the plaintiﬀ of a right to or beneﬁt of the property, or with
        (b) the intent to appropriate the property to his own or another’s
        use. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(1). So Bostic must show that (a) when
        Bodie obtained the $299,000, he never intended to return it to Bos-
        tic and the Assignors, (b) when Bostic misused the $299,000, he
        never intended to return it to Bostic and the Assignors, or (c) that
        Bodie intentionally used Bostic’s and the Assignors’ money for his
        own beneﬁt. And at the summary-judgment stage, he must
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        24-10126                Opinion of the Court                         13

        establish that no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. Ander-
        son, 477 U.S. at 248.
                As for the ﬁrst route—that Bodie intended to deprive Bostic
        and the Assignors of their property when he obtained it—Bostic
        has not shown that summary judgment would be appropriate on
        this record. We start from the premise that summary judgment “is
        rarely proper” when the relevant issue turns on “circumstantial ev-
        idence of intent and knowledge.” Glob. Quest, LLC v. Horizon Yachts,
        Inc.,

849 F.3d 1022, 1029

 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Coastal Inv. Prop-
        erties, Ltd. v. Weber Holdings, LLC,

930 So. 2d 833, 834

 (Fla. 4th DCA
        2006)); see Campbell v. Ris,

310 So. 3d 68

, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)
        (“Summary judgment would be inappropriate in a civil theft action
        because of the necessity of ﬁnding intent, which should normally
        be resolved by the ﬁnder of fact.”).
               That’s so because factual ﬁndings about a person’s state of
        mind usually “must be inferred from the things he says or
        does.” Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, CIO v. Douds,

339 U.S. 382, 411

 (1950).
        And those inferences “turn[] in large part on the credibility and de-
        meanor of witnesses”—determinations “peculiarly within the
        province of the jury.” United States v. Erdman,

953 F.2d 387, 391

 (8th
        Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Long,

952 F.2d 1520, 1525

 (8th Cir.
        1991)); accord United States v. Wright,

392 F.3d 1269, 1274

 (11th Cir.
        2004).
              Bodie testiﬁed in his deposition that he intended to repay
        Bostic and the Assignors, that he thought Paris-Pidner’s invest-
        ments were legitimate, and that he accepted Bostic’s and the
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 24-10126

        Assignors’ funds because he believed that Paris-Pinder would repay
        him. And Bostic admitted in the district court that Bodie would
        not have invested with Paris-Pinder if Bodie knew Paris-Pinder was
        running an illegal Ponzi scheme. A jury could credit that story and
        conclude that Bodie never intended to steal Bostic’s and the Assign-
        ors’ funds. So an entry of summary judgment on Bostic’s civil-theft
        claim was inappropriate.
               Bostic’s argument that Bodie planned to retain some proﬁts
        Paris-Pinder remitted does not alter our conclusion. That Bodie
        planned to retain some proﬁts Paris-Pinder would have returned to
        him does not necessarily render him liable for civil theft. Bostic and
        the Assignors sent Bodie money on the understanding that they
        would receive a speciﬁed rate of return, albeit one they did not
        know was lower than what Paris-Pinder guaranteed. Bodie’s proﬁt-
        seeking motives could enable a jury to conclude that he intended
        to keep all the $299,000, plus interest, for himself. But a jury could
        also reasonably conclude that Bodie sought to generate a proﬁt
        while also repaying Bostic and the Assignors the sum that the Busi-
        ness Loan Agreements speciﬁed. So although it is undisputed that
        Bodie intended to make money through his dealings, that does not
        compel the conclusion that Bodie acted with an intent to steal.
                As for the second and third ways that Bostic can prove his
        civil-theft claim—that Bodie intentionally used Bostic’s and the As-
        signors’ money for his own beneﬁt or with the intent not to return
        it (or both)—the record doesn’t establish that, either. To be sure, it
        is undisputed that Bodie acted for his own beneﬁt. Indeed, Bodie
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        24-10126               Opinion of the Court                        15

        ran out of money to repay Bostic and the Assignors because he paid
        oﬀ debts to other investors. The issue for Bostic, though, is that,
        that conduct did not “[mis]use[]” or “[a]ppropriate” Bostic’s and the
        Assignors’ “property” under Florida law. See FLA. STAT. §
        812.014(1)(a)–(b).
               “It is well-established law in Florida that a simple debt which
        can be discharged by the payment of money cannot generally form
        the basis of a claim for conversion or civil theft.” Gasparini v. Por-
        domingo,

972 So. 2d 1053, 1055

 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2008). Of course, that
        doesn’t mean civil theft may never lie for misuse of money. But the
        funds at issue must be “speciﬁc money capable of identiﬁcation,”
        meaning “there must be an obligation to keep intact or deliver the
        speciﬁc money in question.” Belford Trucking Co. v. Zagar,

243 So. 2d 646, 648

 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970).
                The easiest cases of monetary conversion occur when one
        must hold speciﬁc funds in escrow, see, e.g., Masvidal v. Ochoa,

505 So. 2d 555, 556

 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), like when a bank receives ac-
        crued interest “in a ﬁduciary capacity under speciﬁc instructions”
        on how to deliver the interest, Aero Int’l Corp. v. Fla. Nat. Bank of
        Miami,

437 So. 2d 156, 159

 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983), or where deposits
        are “to be held intact and released only upon written conﬁrmation
        by the” owner, Eagle v. Beneﬁeld-Chappell, Inc.,

476 So. 2d 716, 718

        (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). The same goes for a bank account when joint
        tenants have a right to a certain and deﬁnitive percentage of the
        money in the account. See, e.g., Joseph v. Chanin,

940 So. 2d 483, 486

        (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Florida courts have also sanctioned
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                  24-10126

        conversion claims when a person misdelivered money sealed in an
        addressed envelope. S. Exp. Co. v. Van Meter,

17 Fla. 783

, 803–04
        (1880).
               The point is that the debtor or bailee of the putatively con-
        verted funds used them “in a way . . . expressly contrary to the
        debtor’s speciﬁc instructions and thereafter . . . refuse[d] return of
        the funds upon the debtor’s demand.” All Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Fla.
        E. Coast Ry. Co.,

355 So. 2d 178, 179

 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978).
               By contrast, Florida law does “not permit as a subject of con-
        version an indebtedness which may be discharged by the payment
        of money generally.” Belford Trucking,

243 So. 2d at 648

. So when
        a party deposits money into an unsegregated account, and “the de-
        fendant is not required to pay the plaintiﬀ identical moneys which
        he collected, there can be no action in tort for conversion”—a
        “mere obligation to pay money may not be enforced by a conver-
        sion action.” Id.; see, e.g., Rosen,

486 So. 2d at 625

 (concluding
        money was not identiﬁable because it was in a joint bank account
        and both parties had the right to control the funds); Fla. Desk, Inc.
        v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc.,

817 So. 2d 1059, 1061

 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (re-
        jecting a civil-theft claim because “the funds received . . . were un-
        segregated and were placed in a general operating account” and
        because there was no “obligation . . . to keep intact or hold a spe-
        ciﬁc fund to deliver to Florida Desk”).
               We can see how this principle works in Gasparini. The Third
        District Court of Appeal rejected a civil-theft allegation where Vi-
        tala, S.A., paid $300,000 to International Trading for the
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        24-10126               Opinion of the Court                       17

        procurement of a letter of credit. Gasparini,

972 So. 2d at 1054

.
        The court explained that, despite the discrete payment for a clear
        purpose, “the parties did not contemplate that International Trad-
        ing would keep the $300,000 in a separate account” or “hold the
        funds that it received from Vitala, S.A. in a trust or escrow ac-
        count.”

Id.

                The First District Court of Appeal reached the same result
        in Futch v. Head. There, the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiﬀ a
        commission if a particular property was sold.

511 So. 2d 314, 320

        (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Although the defendant had an obligation to
        pay the plaintiﬀ, the court noted, she did not have an obligation to
        pay the plaintiﬀ the speciﬁc funds earned from the property sale.

Id.

 at 320–21. Indeed, neither party “contemplated that a speciﬁc
        sum of money, once delivered to [the defendant], should be kept
        immutable and inviolate.”

Id. at 321

. Rather, the court explained,
        the defendant “merely owed a debt” to the plaintiﬀ “which could
        be discharged by the payment of money in general and as such was
        not the proper basis for conversion.”

Id.

               The facts here are similar to those of Gasparini and Futch,
        where Florida courts have rejected civil-theft and conversion ac-
        tions. They are not like the facts of cases like Masvidal or Aero In-
        ternational, where Florida courts have permitted such claims.
               Under the terms of the Business Loan Agreements, Bodie
        owed Bostic and the Assignors a speciﬁed sum at a date certain.
        The agreements did not require Bodie to hold their funds in a par-
        ticular account. Gasparini,

972 So. 2d at 1054

; contra Masvidal, 505
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  24-10126

        So. 2d at 556. And although Bostic and the Assignors entered into
        the agreements on the understanding that Bodie would invest their
        funds into Paris-Pinder’s scheme, the contracts did not require
        Bodie to use their speciﬁc funds to invest in Paris-Pinder’s scheme
        and then remit their speciﬁc proceeds returned from the scheme.
        Futch, 511 So. 2d at 320–21; contra Aero Int’l,

437 So. 2d at 159

.
               Nor does “[t]he fact that” Bostic and the Assignors sent
        Bodie a “certain” “amount . . . make an ‘identiﬁable fund’” within
        the scope of Bostic’s civil-theft claim. Fla. Desk,

817 So. 2d at 1061

.
        Bodie could have satisﬁed his obligations under the Business Loan
        Agreements simply by paying Bostic and the Assignors the princi-
        pal plus interest on the agreed-upon date. And that makes conver-
        sion and civil theft—proceeding under a theory of appropriation or
        misuse—improper remedies for Bodie’s alleged wrong. See Belford
        Trucking,

243 So. 2d at 648

. To be clear, our conclusion does not
sanction Bodie’s conduct; it merely recognizes that, under Florida
law, the legal claim for civil theft is not the proper vehicle for re-
dressing the alleged wrongs.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in Bostic’s favor on his civil-theft
claim.
Before we move on, though, we note haven’t seen a case
where a Florida court has parsed the civil-theft statute as we now
do. Most appear to apply the civil-theft and conversion torts’ com-
mon-law principles. But for two reasons, we conclude that Florida
courts would readily approve of the distinction we draw between
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24-10126 Opinion of the Court 19

obtaining another’s money with an intent to deprive them of it,
which is actionable for civil theft, and misusing or misappropriating
another’s money, which may not be actionable for civil theft.
First, the distinction we’ve explained faithfully enforces the
statute’s text and structure. Once money is in another’s hands be-
cause of a generalized monetary debt, the principle that such
money is no longer the creditor’s “property” applies, whether the
action is “[mis]use[],” FLA. STAT. § 812.014(1), or “[mis][a]ppro-
priat[ion],” id. § 812.014(1)(b). By contrast, one who obtains an-
other’s money with an intent to deprive them of it is, in fact, steal-
ing their property because the putative victim has an interest in the
speciﬁc funds at the time of the theft—that is, the time the alleged
tortfeasor obtains another’s property. See id. § 812.014(1)(a). And,
second, our distinction harmonizes Florida’s rule that monetary
debts are generally not actionable for conversion or civil theft, Gas-
parini,

972 So. 2d at 1055

, with its recognition that a civil-theft claim
        is appropriate where there is “an elaborate scheme to steal” money
        from others, Gersh v. Cofman,

769 So. 2d 407, 409

 (Fla. 4th DCA
        2000) (concluding a reasonable jury could ﬁnd civil theft where one
        forged signatures on checks and deposited them into his account).
                So on remand, Bostic may proceed on his civil-theft claim by
        proving that Bodie “obtain[ed]” or “endeavor[ed] to obtain” Bos-
        tic’s and the Assignors’ money with an “intent to . . . [d]eprive”
        them of the “right to” that money. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(1)(a).
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                  24-10126

                    B. The district court did not err in entering summary
                        judgment on Bostic’s unjust-enrichment claim.

              Bodie next argues that the district court erred in entering
        summary judgment on Bostic’s unjust-enrichment claim because a
        genuine dispute of material fact remains as to Bodie’s unclean-
        hands defense. As a reminder, the district court rejected Bodie’s
        argument because, even if Bostic and the Assignors had unclean
        hands, Bodie has not shown “that he was injured” by Bostic’s and
        the Assignors’ allegedly inequitable conduct. McCollem v. Chidnese,

832 So. 2d 194, 196

 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). We agree.
                Unjust enrichment enables recovery “where it is deemed un-
        just for one party to have received a beneﬁt without having to pay
        compensation for it.” Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT Utensili, SRL,

198 F.3d 802, 805

 (11th Cir. 1999); accord Dooley v. Gary the Carpenter Constr.,
        Inc.,

388 So. 3d 881

, 883 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2023). To state such a claim,
        a plaintiﬀ must prove three elements: (1) the plaintiﬀ has conferred
        a beneﬁt on the defendant; (2) the defendant has voluntarily ac-
        cepted and retained the beneﬁt conferred; and (3) it would be ineq-
        uitable for the defendant to retain the beneﬁt without compensat-
        ing the plaintiﬀ. Tooltrend,

198 F.3d at 805

 (quoting Greenﬁeld v.
        Manor Care, Inc.,

705 So. 2d 926

, 930–31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), rev.
        denied,

717 So. 2d 534

 (Fla. 1998)).
               Bodie does not dispute the ﬁrst two elements of Bostic’s un-
        just-enrichment claim. Nor could he. Bostic and the Assignors
        transferred $299,000 to Bodie, and Bodie has not returned that sum
        to them. Rather, Bodie argues, based on his unclean-hands defense,
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        24-10126               Opinion of the Court                       21

        that equity does not require that he return the funds. We see no
        fact in the record that could sustain such a position.
               Functionally, there is no reasonable dispute that equity re-
        quires Bodie to return the funds to Bostic and the Assignors: he has
        no right to those funds. Bodie seizes on the district court’s musing
        that “both sides of the case could be accused of having unclean
        hands” for “entering usurious contracts.” But the facts here belie
        the notion that the high interest rates in the Business Loan Agree-
        ments resulted from some inequitable or deceitful misconduct on
        Bostic’s and the Assignors’ part—just the opposite: Bodie proposed
        them.
               And, formally, to state an unclean-hands defense, Bodie must
        show “that he was injured” by Bostic’s and the Assignors’ allegedly
        inequitable conduct. McCollem,

832 So. 2d at 196

. But we cannot
        see how the Business Loan Agreements injured Bodie. He pro-
        posed them and used them to accumulate funds. That Bodie then
        misused those funds and incurred a substantial debt to many is an
        injury of his own making. Plus, as the district court held, the Busi-
        ness Loan Agreements are void as usurious contracts. So the agree-
        ments impose no legal obligation on Bodie that injures him. As a
        result, no genuine dispute of material fact exists on his unclean-
        hands defense.
              For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not err
        in granting Bostic’s motion for summary judgment on his unjust-
        enrichment claim.
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                  24-10126

                  C. The district court erred in entering summary judgment
                        on Bostic’s fraudulent-misrepresentation claim.

                Finally, Bodie argues the district court erred in entering sum-
        mary judgment on Bostic’s fraudulent-misrepresentation claim.
        To prove fraudulent misrepresentation under Florida law, a plaintiﬀ
        must establish these elements: “(1) a false statement concerning a
        material fact; (2) the representor’s knowledge that the representa-
        tion is false; (3) an intention that the representation induce another
        to act on it; and (4) consequent injury by the party acting in reliance
        on the representation.” In re Harris,

3 F.4th 1339

, 1349 (11th Cir.
        2021) (citing Butler v. Yusem,

44 So. 3d 102, 105

 (Fla. 2010)).
               The crux of Bostic’s claim is that Bodie represented that he
        and the Assignors would invest in a business deal—that is, the Paris-
        Pinder personal-injury-settlement scheme—not a loan that Bodie
        would use to satisfy his other obligations. Had Bostic and the As-
        signors known that Bodie would use their funds to satisfy other ob-
        ligations, they contend, they wouldn’t have entered into the Busi-
        ness Loan Agreements.
               Bodie disputes several factual premises underlying Bostic’s
        claim. He argues that he always intended to invest in Paris-Pinder’s
        scheme, so he never knowingly misrepresented any facts to Bostic
        or the Assignors. And he contends that a jury could ﬁnd that the
        Assignors did not rely on his representations about Paris-Pinder’s
        scheme.
               We agree with both of Bodie’s arguments.
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        24-10126               Opinion of the Court                         23

                First, a genuine dispute of fact exists over whether Bodie
        knowingly made any false statements to Bostic and the Assignors.
        Bostic’s fraud claim depends on the premise that when Bodie rep-
        resented to Bostic, and thereby the Assignors, that he would invest
        their funds in Paris-Pinder’s scheme, he never intended to do so.
        See

id.

 (requiring proof that the representor knew his representa-
        tions were false).
               But as we’ve discussed, a reasonable jury could conclude that
        Bodie intended to follow through on his representations to Bostic
        and the Assignors. Although Paris-Pinder stopped paying Bodie
        shortly before the Assignors invested, we know that to be the case
        only in hindsight. At the time, Bodie claims, no red ﬂags suggested
        that Paris-Pinder’s scheme was unraveling. Of course, that fact, as
        well as Bodie’s decision to use Bostic’s and the Assignors’ funds to
        repay other debts, could allow a jury to conclude Bodie committed
        fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Hurley,

755 F.2d 788, 790

 (11th Cir.
        1985) (“A subsequent act, as well as a prior act, can be used to show
        intent under Rule 404(b).”). But the facts do not compel such a
        ﬁnding. So the jury must resolve the factual questions relating to
        Bodie’s mental state.
               And second, there’s a genuine dispute of fact over whether
        the Assignors relied on Bodie’s representations about Paris-Pinder’s
        personal-injury scheme. To be sure, Bostic is correct that the mere
        fact that Bodie did not speak to the Assignors does not preclude a
        fraud claim. Harrell v. Branson,

344 So. 2d 604, 606

 (Fla. 1st DCA
        1977). But the record suggests that something may have been lost
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                  24-10126

        in translation. For instance, the Way of Yah’s corporate representa-
        tive testiﬁed that it thought Bodie, not Paris-Pinder, had a relation-
        ship with the personal-injury attorneys who were generating the
        funds to satisfy the Business Loan Agreements. The same depo-
        nent added that the Way of Yah and the other Assignors (its con-
        gregants) were “willing to do” the deal with Bodie because Bostic
        “had done a deal with him” and “received . . . the proﬁts back from
        it.” So construing the facts in the light most favorable to Bodie, it’s
        possible the Assignors executed the Business Loan Agreements
        with Bodie only because they trusted Bostic and his representations
        that Bodie would repay them and not because of any representa-
        tions Bodie made to the Assignors through Bostic.
               In short, with respect to Bostic’s fraudulent-misrepresenta-
        tion claim, the jury must resolve the factual disputes relating to the
        parties’ mental state—in particular, whether Bodie intended to de-
        fraud and whether the Assignors subjectively relied on Bodie’s rep-
        resentations.
                                 IV.    CONCLUSION

               For all these reasons, we aﬃrm the district court’s grant of
        summary judgment on Bostic’s unjust-enrichment claim, reverse
        its grant of summary judgment on Bostic’s civil-theft and fraudu-
        lent-misrepresentation claims, vacate its judgment, and remand the
        case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
             AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; VACATED
        AND REMANDED IN PART.