Alex Pearson v. Anthony Ramos

fact, easily have done so. could seems to have discovered PEARSON,

government Plaintiff-Appellee, Alex simply by showing the forms to forgeries employees asking them the bank forms; signed had

whether Anthony RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant. Grintjes’s to think that attor- is no reason if thing could not have done the same No. 98-4110. neys they thought the information was relevant. Appeals, United States Court of Finally, Brady requires violation Seventh Circuit. if only a new trial there is a reasonable possibility the outcome of the case Argued June would been different had the evi have Decided Jan. Crivens, suppressed. dence not been See point, Grintjes 172 F.3d at 996. this On that the outcome of the case could

urges

well have been different if he had the had This, investigate forgeries. chance to '

however, pure speculation. Even under

Grintjes’s theory, earlier disclosure of the forgeries

evidence of the could have

affected the outcome of the case if

Grintjes’s investigation of the documents actually up

had turned evidence that the

forgeries by people were committed within banks; possibility seems remote at Notably, many

best. months have now

passed Grintjes since became aware of the

forgeries, yet Grintjes’s counsel admits forgeries

that no evidence that the were employees yet

committed bank has literally nothing

been uncovered. There is suggest government’s failure to forgeries

disclose the evidence of the soon

er affected the outcome of case in

way.

Ill conclude that Brady

We there was no

violation in this ease and the district

court did in per- not abuse its discretion

mitting government to introduce re- showing

buttal evidence the forms

verifying deposits forged. were

judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

allowed the yard to use for an hour a week, or five hours a if they week have in segregation been for at least 90 consecu- However, days. tive one of the authorized sanctions for serious infractions of yard rules is denial of privileges for 90 days. During period a six-month the plain- tiff committed four such infractions and was punished for each one with a day 90 denial privileges, of the “sentences” (“stacked,” to run consecutively par- as the it). result, ties call aAs he was denied access to the year. for a He con- tends that this denial was a cruel and punishment. unusual The defendant claims entitlement immunity, to as well challenging as judgment on the merits. The plaintiff ar (Argued), Richard P. Reichstein Chica- gues that since defendant could have IL, go, for Plaintiff-Appellee. appealed from the denial of his immunity judgment, claim before the trial and Light (Argued), Erik G. Office of the appeal too late for him to now. That is General, IL, Attorney Chicago, for Defen- wrong. Even when right there is a of dant-Appellant interlocutory appeal, party can wait till POSNER, COFFEY, Before the case is over and then appeal, bringing RIPPLE, Judges. Circuit interlocutory rulings before us all nonmoot Foods, him. Jays adverse to v. L.L.C.

POSNER, Judge. Circuit Allied Chemical & Product Workers Un a state plaintiff, prisoner, brought (7th ion, 20, Local 208 F.3d 614 Cir. § against suit under 42 1983 U.S.C. 2000); Chicago Retired v. Police Ass’n superintendent disciplinary-segrega- of the City Chicago, 7 F.3d 608 Cir. of prison, seeking damages tion unit of the 1993); Dept. Chambers v. Ohio Human for harm that the plaintiff claimed to have Services, 145 F.3d 796-97 Cir. being suffered as a result of denied access 1998). principle applicable This is as the prison yard for exercise for an rulings immunity as to other inter year. jury plaintiff entire A awarded the Quinn, locutory rulings, SEC v. 997 F.2d $15,000 in compensatory damages and (7th Cir.1993); Bise, 287 173 F.3d Goff $50,000in punitive damages; judge cut (8th Cir.1999); 1068, 1072 Ernst v. Child & $15,000 punitive damages and en- County, Youth Services Chester judgment plaintiff, precipitat- tered for the (3d Cir.1997); F.3d 492-93 Kiser v. ing appeal. Garrett, Cir.1995); F.3d Kramer, but Price v. F.3d see segregation

Prisoners in the unit are (9th Cir.2000), (9 although as we ex cells, to their which are confined small Quinn feet) and, plained post the defendant who feet because the cell con- bed, immunity appeal till after trial pones his tains a toilet and sink as well as a rights immunity of the forfeits one cramped. They are allowed out confers, at all. right not to be tried trips library to the law or the health-care however, it Certainly standpoint, from our unit or to receive visitors or take a shower week, single for a file a except preferable party once a are also is Romero, 518, 526-27 Anderson v. rather than a end of the case at the appeal (7th Cir.1995); O’Malley, 17 Eberhardt v. interlocutory appeals. series (7th Cir.1994); McBride v. F.3d may legal In doctrine order Michiana, 457, 460 Village fashion, law evolve in common continue to Harris, (6th Cir.1996); Buonocore v. us to has instructed Supreme Court (4th Cir.1995). even if appeal of an decide the merits Davenport On to the merits. defense, immunity since a good there is (7th Cir.1988), DeRobertis, F.2d 1310 enti the defendant is decision on whether erroneous, clearly upheld, we as freezing the law immunity requires tled to finding Amend judge’s Layne, acted. of the date he Wilson in segregation ment entitled held 1692, 603, 609, 119 143 S.Ct. 526 U.S. days more to five hours of out-of- for 90 (1999); County Sacramen L.Ed.2d 818 of Anderson v. cell exercise a week. See also 5, Lewis, 833, 841 n. 118 v. 523 U.S. 527-28; Romero, 72 Jami supra, F.3d at 1708, (1998); 1043 Sie 140 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. (7th Thieret, son-Bey v. 867 F.2d 1046 226, 232-33, 111 gert Gilley, v. 500 Sakai, 1001, Cir.1989); v. 40 F.3d Allen 1789, 277 114 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. (9th Cir.1994). in seg 1004 Confinement may be this rule is absolute Whether solitary regation approximation is an doubted, v. explained reasons Kalka confinement, this and evidence that court (D.C.Cir.2000), Hawk, 90, 94-98 215 F.3d convincing indicates Davenport found (2d 191 F.3d 244 Coughlin, Home v. and long stretches of such confinement Cir.1999), inapplicable the reasons are but prison have adverse effects on can serious important on the merits is here. The issue unre psychological well-being. When ers’ resolved without further and should be for out-of-cell exer opportunities lieved judgment reverse the delay. We shall cise, reasonably confinement could be such merits, so moot the issue of immu and, by cruel reference to the described as express nity. But we cannot forbear to prisons, current norms of American unusu action of the district surprise our at the Tighter right al. limits on the to exercise immunity. defense of rejecting court in period of re upheld have been when the single no could believe that a 90- Since one days. E.g., was shorter than 90 striction day yard privileges denial of would be Ramos, 754, Thomas v. 130 F.3d 762-64 punishment unusual for a serious cruel and (7th Miller, Cir.1997); v. Caldwell rules, prison disciplinary violation (7th Cir.1986). 589, F.2d 600-01 dispositive issue this case is whether point stacking of such sanctions to the 90-day threshold for consid prisoner year of an entire depriving ering oppor a denial of out-of-cell exercise punish access is cruel and unusual violation of the cruel possible tunities a ment; was no case law and as there when clause is of punishments and unusual acted indicating arbitrary. immunity defendant But issues of course side, argument no then or now that authorities are entitled tenable to one stacking clearly guidance so violated the to some from the courts with respect meaning vague gener an in the defen to the of the Amendment that official think it a would have to know alities of the Constitution. We position dant’s had did, yard privi it from reasonable rule that a denial of guidance even without days at a immunity leges it that the for no more than 90 stretch case is obvious punishment. defense should have been sustained. Wil is not cruel and unusual Ramos, 614-15, supra, F.3d at 763- Layne, supra, 526 U.S. at Thomas v. son Lane, 466, 1692; 64; cf. Henderson v. Creighton, 119 S.Ct. Anderson v. (7th Cir.1992) curiam). 635, 639-41, At least in (per 97 469 483 U.S. S.Ct. (1987); punish for the cruel and unusual Burgess Lowery, general; L.Ed.2d 523 Cir.2000); an has a relative as well as ments clause forms of with the component. imposed absolute Certain other sanctions on the time, cruel and un punishment are considered plaintiff each such good as loss of to the conduct regard usual without Rather, time. he asks us to treat case imposed. which are Lousiana ex rel. if 360-day denial yard privileges Resweber, Francis v. 329 U.S. 67 had been decreed for a course of miscon- (1947); 91 L.Ed. 422 In re Kem embracing duct the four infractions. mler, 436, 446-47, 136 U.S. 10 S.Ct. that; Suppose we do we still do not (1890); L.Ed. 519 James v. Milwaukee that, circumstances, think it could County, 956 F.2d Cir. reasonably punishment be found that the 1992). Even a mass murderer is not to be was cruel and unusual. All four infrac- being quartered. executed drawn tions plaintiff occurred when the was out- addition, however, punishment forms of side his cell. All occurred within the short are permitted may for serious crimes space They of six months. marked the imposed violate the clause if for trivial plaintiff as violent and incorrigible. To Helm, ones. Solem (1983); allow him to exercise would L.Ed.2d 637 Rice v. Cir.1998); have him Cooper, given additional opportunities to 1132, Doyle, Leslie v. 125 F.3d prison 1135 attack staff and set fires. Prevent- Cir.1997); Saccoccia, v. United States 58 ing access to the was a reasonable (1st Cir.1995). 754, is, F.3d 787-89 That protecting method of the staff and the proportionality (though there is a norm of prisoners other propensi- from his violent in attenuated recent decisions of the Su ties. Any objection to the punishment Court, notably preme Harmelin v. Michi based on considerations of proportionality 957, 990-94, 2680, 501 111 gan, U.S. thus dissolves and leaves for consideration (1991), we continue to only whether the yard privileges denial of it, 477, recognize Henry Page, 223 F.3d year for a does so much harm a prisoner to (7th Cir.2000)), 482 and we can imagine the a, that it is intolerable to the sensibilities of being by norm’s violated a imposing 90- society civilized no matter what the cir- day yard privileges denial for some ut no, cumstances. The answer is and is terly prison’s trivial infraction of the disci supported by case Tyson, Martin v. rules, plinary though any we cannot find (7th Cir.1988) 1451, 845 F.2d (per 1456 support to suggestion. case such a Perrin, curiam); Bass v. trivial, The infractions here were not (11th Cir.1999); LeMaire v. one, plaintiff however. In the first the and Maass, Cir. guard, another inmate and a attacked beat 1993), which casts still further doubt on injuring seriously enough him require to qualified district court’s denial of im- second, hospitalization. his the munity. blankets, coats, plaintiff set fire to and “solitary” prisoner To confine in a who boxes, producing cardboard so much behaves like a wild he beast whenever respiratory smoke that with let out of his cell is the least cruel measure Next, problems had to be evacuated. that occurs to us for with such a dealing plaintiff spat in of a guard the face who person. prison What else should the have trying was him plain- restrain after the suggested by done? No answer is Last, guard. tiff had assaulted another he court, plaintiffs lawyer by or the district unspecified threw a broom and a bottle of merely and we technician, register shall our astonish- “bodily fluids” at a medical judge’s ment at the remark none of got the fluids the victim’s face. We do plaintiffs not understand the infractions involved “serious plaintiff arguing be harm 90-day for each such infraction a to others.” first inflicted seri- (the arson) harm, yard privileges withdrawal of would be ous and the second (the punishment, conjunction in excessive even the fourth assault with the bottle of 886 he has simply because fluids) penalty, it is danger of vere a serious

bodily created of such offenses. great many committed harm. inflicting serious per- scarcely competent for It would be evi that no credible telling It is constitutionality of the son to assail any physical presented dence was for bur- punishment prescribing statute plaintiff harm to psychological that he had commit- ground on the glary, confinement protracted result of his that, if burglaries punishment many ted so unit, permit he was although segregation him, upon might he were inflicted for each testifying that he perjure himself ted fact for life. The mere kept prison be year that he was during the weight lost im- may be punishments cumulative unchallenged when yard privileges, denied in the same distinct offenses posed for he did not lose records showed upon ques- is not material prosecution testifying that his teeth any weight, and Intoxicating Jugs v. Four tion.” State of his lack of out- consequence fell out as (1886), 140, 2 Atl. Liquor, 58 Vt. exercise, in fact he lost when of-cell Vermont, quoted O’Neil of the at outset one tooth and that (1892) L.Ed. 450 testify him to permitting period. Even Hawkins original); see also (emphasis rules of evi violated the about his teeth n. Hargett, F.3d nonexpert permitted A is not dence. Aiello, Cir.1999); States v. United testimony. Fed.R.Evid. 702. expert give (2d Cir.1988). disci- Every knowledge as he Wholly lacking medical sanction, sentence, must every plinary like was, incompetent to testi plaintiff was cumulatively, for treated separately, be if between fy on the causal relation determining whether it is cruel purposes of Pedraza healthy gums. See exercise Any permit rule would and unusual. other (5th Cir.1995); 194, Jones, v. 71 F.3d defendant, long at the end of a criminal a Reno, 1391, v. 21 F.3d 1396-97 cf. Fedro career, together tack all to ask a court to (7th Cir.1994); Litigation, re TMI In and decide punishments his criminal (3d Cir.1999); 613, F.3d Summers whether, they single punish- had been a System, 132 F.3d R.R. Missouri Pacific (it) ment, have been cruel and would Cir.1997). (10th There was no defendant sentenced Suppose unusual. a testimony concerning the effects of expert years in previously had served 20 to death plain on the the denial of privileges it for an crime. Would unrelated health, though or an physical tiffs mental imprisoning him a open argue to be a expert permitted hypo to answer was years executing and then person for possible question concerning thetical punish- him and unusual constitutes cruel solitary protracted effect of confinement think ment? We not. general. on event, are at a loss to Incidentally, treat we any wrong judge what district was single To understand sanctions a sanction. stacked puni thinking upheld he an award of consequence the ridiculous when produces do so Ra damages against Superintendent enabling prisoner, simply of recidivat tive mos, wrong thinking if are Eighth a colorable even we ing, generate plaintiffs sanc was no of Suppose Amendment claim. that the violation suggestion that the rights. disci There is prison’s tion for an infraction of the no any acted malice toward single were week’s defendant with plinary rules au imposed He sanction yard privileges; plaintiff. withdrawal of law; im though he in thorized state theory, if he committed 52 plaintiffs only was this fractions, year’s repeatedly, that a it complain posed he could authorized, no but he had rights stacking violated his also yard privileges denial of violating the believe he was “If reason to Eighth [the under the Amendment. for im- The criteria subjected Eighth himself to a se- Amendment. has defendant]

887 ’ posing punitive damages rights a civil case, Wade, on which see Smith v. Our understanding of the issue before 30, 56, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 us—and import of the of majority’s (1983); Ass’n, Kolstad v. American Dental conclusion-—will best be understood if the 526, 535-36, 527 U.S. surrounding facts Mr. Pearson’s extended (1999); Patterson, Kyle L.Ed.2d 494 196 deprivation placed are fac- broader Cir.1999); 697-98 Merri- tual context of the case. weather v. Family Dollar Stores of Mr. serving Pearson is a 45-year sen- Indiana, Inc., 103 F.3d 581-82 tence Stateville Correctional Center Boulter, Cir.1996); Iacobucci v. (“Stateville”) for murder. For disciplinary (1st Cir.1999), remotely were not reasons, Mr. placed Pearson was in segre- Indeed, satisfied here. there isn’t enough House”; gation in “I Mr. Ramos is the evidence the state of mind of the defen- (or Unit Manager cell block supervisor) for justify finding liability, dant to if even I House. Inmates in segregation usually the plaintiffs confinement was a violation are allowed at least one hour of outdoor Amendment, of the as we have held (“yard”) recreation privileges per week. it is not. For there is no evidence that After an inmate has been in segregation Superintendent actually Ramos was aware more, 90 days or he is allowed five plaintiffs physical risk or However, hours of time per week. psychological well-being. See Wilson directive, under Stateville called “Admin- Seiter, 111 S.Ct. istrative Directive 05.03.140” or “Depart- (1991); Long In re Term 504,” ment Rule the warden or his desig- Segregration

Administrative Inmates Ramos) (here, nee Mr. deny can limit or Percenters, Designated as Five yard privileges to inmates who have been Cir.1999); Perrin, Bass v. found guilty of certain offenses for oth- supra, 170 F.3d at 1317. disciplinary er reasons. According to the policy, yard privileges may be restricted The judgment of the district court is up days to 90 for an inmate’s first reversed with instructions to enter judg- and, thereafter, offense allows for succes- ment for the defendant. sive imposed restrictions to be for subse- quent offenses. When the warden orders REVERSED. lockdown, a given yard no are time. prohibited Inmates are not from RIPPLE, Judge, concurring Circuit in (to exercising their cells the extent that judgment. the exercise in possible), the cells is and given are an pamphlet instruction on how Eighth The Amendment to the Constitu- to do so. tion of the prohibits United States the infliction of cruel and punishment. unusual period beginning Over the in November question The we must resolve in this case 1993, ending May and the prison’s Mr. is whether Ramos violated this consti- adjustment committee found Mr. Pearson provision tutional when he ordered Mr. guilty of a series of infractions.1 For each Pearson to be in segregation infraction, confined Mr. Ramos restricted Mr. Pear- without an opportunity to and, exercise outside yard privileges days, son’s for 90 ex- long period his cell a of time. cept gap,2 for a one-week the restrictions (1) seriously 1. These gap infractions were: as- 2. There was a one-week between the 90- 1993; saulting prison a official in November day periods for his first and second offenses. (2) setting fires outside his cell in March 90-day period The first ended on March 1994; (3) assaulting prison April a official in period began and the second on March 1994; (4) seriously assaulting yet and another 23, 1994. prison May official in not vio- manner does Pearson in this Ex- Mr. R.47 at 3-4. consecutively. See ran It arrives at Amendment. in March week-long gap late the for this cept was denied Mr. Pear- however, characterizing by Mr. Pearson this conclusion between December at all times under these privileges continuous confinement son’s 23,1994. 15,1993, December and the unfortunate simply circumstances as sentences of consecutive accumulation by imposed yard privileges This loss Indeed, no making part. from, Mr. Pearson’s and ad- separate was Mr. Ramos to confine- ad- prison between sentences to, distinction imposed dition adjust- and prison charges The criminal a court for justment committee. ment here, disciplinary measures ment committee’s at issue measures the administrative included the infractions that, Pearson’s for Mr. multi- when majority emphasizes credits, imposi- good time revocation of committed, and the Cruel are ple offenses segregation, time of additional tion not violat- Clause is Punishments Unusual grade” for Mr. to “C Pearson demotion im- are separate punishments when ed time, commis- the denial of period a violation; the concomitant posed for each of time. period sary privileges can be in the total sanction enhancement restriction, Mr. year During this of the offender’s product as the viewed was, mat- practical as a daily life Pearson’s v. Ver- behavior. See O’Neil recalcitrant ter,3 his cell.4 October limited to mont, grievance in Mr. Pearson submitted L.Ed. 450 yard privi- lack of protested which he law is of criminal general principle This that, result, he was leges and claimed to criminal respect unexceptional. With stress, harm and suffering “psychological court, it is well- by a imposed sentences (internal quotation R.47 at 5 etc.” See The jurisprudence. in our established omitted). trial, At Mr. marks citations however, remains, whether question from that he suffered Pearson testified resolution of helpful to the appropriate or was loss and that he weight appetite (internal today. prob- us The situation before id. big” as See not “as before. omitted). that we require before us does marks and citations lem quotation Eighth Amend- against measure

simply length prison of a sen- ment standards Rather, condi- this case concerns that, tence. majority as a mat- panel The holds must determine of confinement. We confinement of tions prolonged ter of days during for 28 year, was under lockdown Mr. Pearson left 3. Over the course of 90-day pe- Finally, during a month and more the fourth period. riod, his cell at least four times month, eight either to times a often seven cell 13 times for a Mr. Pearson his left week), (generally once visit take showers under a 24 hours. was total of members, go library, family to the law during period. days 42 this for lockdown he left his visit health Whenever the center. cell, legs and his Pearson’s were shackled Mr. apparently transferred cells Mr. Pearson "Any walking he by chains. arms restrained year. the It the course of few times over have been little did outside his cell would cells appears each of Mr. Pearson’s that During the R.88 at 2. more than a shuffle.” sink, bed, and a would have contained 90-day period, Pearson left his cell first Mr. window, They have had a also would toilet. times a total of 31.7 hours. at least 23 (Although prison for open. In its sum- could be which cracked that Pear- show Mr. records order, re- mary judgment the district court given 3 time on Febru- son was hours of open area ports an that his cell contained ary denies that this Mr. Pearson long 3'8" approximately and between 10'2" occurred.) period, During day the second 90 Later, at 4. 4'8" wide. See R.47 left at least 20 times for a Mr. Pearson his cell denying the motion for district court's order away from it. The about 33 total of hours stated the court judgment as a matter days for 33 prison was under a lockdown 90-day open cell was During area Mr. Pearson’s during period. the third that the this period, cell at least 16 Mr. left his at 2. Pearson "two five feet.” R.88 prison hours. The times for a total of 32.5

889 Sheahan, prison Cir.2000) whether a official can execute ad- (internal penalties way ministrative in such a as to quotation marks and citations deprive prisoner opportunity of an omitted). satisfy To the subjective compo- his a prolonged exercise outside cell for nent, the inmate must demonstrate that time, case, period year. almost a prison official knew of a substantial risk injury. of serious The official must be aware of the facts from which the infer- on the Relying methodology articulated ence could be drawn that a substantial risk by the Supreme Court a number of Farmer, of serious harm exists. See decisions,5 panel majority immediately 1970; at Henderson, proceeds to appeal the merits of the rather 196 F.3d at 845. than examine in pos- the first instance the There can be no doubt—indeed it is sibility qualified there is a valid immu- ground common between the parties and nity defense. panel majority The then panel admitted majority that, contrary jury determines to a —that verdict failure to afford prisoners an adequate op- rendered under instructions about which portunity to exercise can state an Eighth issue, party neither takes Mr. Pearson was Amendment claim. See Antonelli v. treated a manner that violates the Sheahan, Cir. Eighth Amendment. 1996). Although Mr. Ramos is correct principles governing basic a condi- Davenport DeRobertis, cases like tions of confinement case Eighth under the (7th Cir.1988), 844 F.2d 1310 do not set out Amendment are well-settled. The Su- the constitutional minimum for exercise preme Court has said that “a offi- time, principles that can be drawn cial may be held liable under from this circuit’s case law manifest a clear Amendment denying humane condi- denying prisoners aversion to outside exer- only tions of confinement if he knows that cise time for periods extended absent an inmates face a substantial risk of serious acute Davenport need to do so. and Har- harm disregards by failing risk ris Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232 Cir. take reasonable measures to abate it.” 1988), strongly suggest that a total restric- Brennan, Farmer v. acceptable only tion is when that restric- This tion is short term. Davenport, See objective subjective test has an com- (“[W]e F.2d at 1315 are impressed by the ponent. To satisfy objective compo- number of decisions that suggest hold or nent, the inmate must establish that the (confined that a failure provide inmates alleged deprivation is “objectively, suffi- ) very for more than a period short ... Farmer, ciently serious.” 511 U.S. at with (internal opportunity for at least five hours quotation S.Ct. 1970 marks omitted). a week of exercise outside the cell and citations raises To be sufficiently serious, Harris, serious questions.”); constitutional the official’s action or omission must result in 839 F.2d at 1236 (emphasizing “the denial of the minimal weeks). civilized measure of restriction was four life’s necessities.” One Farmer, year doubt, U.S. at not short term. No S.Ct. 1970 (internal quotation marks are situations in which and citations considerations of omitted). This circuit has only prison security require said that such a drastic cur- deprivations” “extreme make out a “condi- tailment of an inmate’s movement. There indeed, notes,6 tions-of-confinement claim.” Henderson v. are panel majority as the 226, 232-33, 5. Layne, See Wilson Siegert Gilley, 526 U.S. 500 U.S. (1999); 114 L.Ed.2d 277 County 143 L.Ed.2d 818 Lewis, Sacramento v. 841 n. of See, Perrin, e.g., Bass v. (1998); 118 S.Ct. (11th Cir.1999); Maass, LeMaire v. to question Perhaps the most difficult measures which such in cases extreme a acted with Mr. Ramos is whether resolve particularly of because tolerated have been for him of mind culpable state sufficiently instance, For security situations. acute that shows Mr. The record to be liable. in LeMaire decision Ninth Circuit’s the restric- successive imposed these Ramos offi- prison that proposition for the stands response in to his Mr. Pearson on tions restric- complete may impose cials safety the infractions disciplinary of period extended for an tions—even had demonstrated. Mr. Pearson threat security an acute time—when for these re- Thus, motivation Mr. Ramos’ This at 1457-58. do so. need to purpose. penological had some strictions this ex- acknowledged as well has circuit Ramos has Moreover, Mr. if it is true that Romero, ception. See Anderson exercising in their seen other Cir.1995) (“To deny prison- a 518, 527 he say that cells, too much to might it be of outside for exercise opportunity er all risk a substantial consciously disregarded would, suggest, violate the cases cell his of harm. prison- unless the Amendment the assessments the difficult factual Given security risk if allowed an acute posed er case, including in time.”). made that must be for even short of his cell out intent, court took district the of the issue confinement of that whether the the view for the exer- opportunity without prisoner a close presents before us The case long period cell so his cise outside of these application the one for difficult punishment cruel unusual constituted law, existing case our principles. Under It therefore jury. the issue for was an purport not majority does panel the which jury the under in- the issue to submitted overrule, on exercise restriction a total here. are not contested that structions be would not sustainable this duration conditions prison that such jury The found Therefore, exigent absent circumstances. punishment. cruel and unusual constituted imposing in such of Mr. Ramos the action court, in no error perceiving The district entirely on whether depends a restriction verdict, it stand. jury let the in securi- prison basis adequate there is an jury that colleagues now ver- My ignore cer- regard, there is In this ty concerns. that, matter of hold as a dict and that Mr. in the tainly evidence record under Mr. Pearson these confinement of He offender. dangerous was a Pearson cruel and un- did not constitute conditions peri- the four restriction three of received is difficult see punishment. It usual he perpetrated ods because assaults legal majority error finds where hand, clear On the other prison staff. I justifies approach. such a As rigid that pose not the serious Mr. Pearson did that earlier, cannot be certainly it have noted of an inmate the “beast” threat jury permitting court’s the district (Noonan, 12 F.3d at 1464 posed. LeMaire aggregate. punishment assess J., dissenting). matter, simple sentencing but This is not of viable alternatives The existence conditions matter. basic taken into Pearson can must also be Mr. out-of-cell exercise is not whether question Mr. days number of argues, Mr. Ramos of a certain deprived consideration. As be time, deprived be from human whether he can was cut off all but Pearson manner. days less than certain a continuous But seems of those contact. it justi- be meaningful majority’s approach Nor he could exercise can pro- two-step ground Notably, the district court fied on way in his cell. Supreme Court for outlined cell was “too cess Pearson’s stated Mr. immunity qualified at 2. the assessment exercise.” R.88 meaningful small Cir.1993). requires Surely, claims such action. Even if we construe all facts favor of complies with Supreme Pearson, court Court Mr. Mr. Ramos is correct in his by holding directive that, record devel- argument at the time he oped at trial creates a genuine acted, issue of it was not entirely clear that fact as to triable whether Mr. Ramos’ ac- confinement imposed he violated the tions constituted cruel unusual punish- Eighth Amendment. Nor was it clear at ment. the time that “stacked” administrative punishments imposed for subsequent in- bottom, At majority appears simply fractions were to be analyzed cumulatively. disagree with jury as to whether Indeed, my colleagues take contrary this incarceration offends the sensibilities position today. I Accordingly, believe that society. civilized analy- Central to its Mr. Ramos is qualified entitled to immuni- appears “beast,” sis to be the belief that a and, ty basis, on that join in reversing the atOp. beastly deserves treatment. judgment of the district court. Moreover, its expressing manner of disagreement places in doubt the circum- under which

stances it would be appropri-

ate, view, in its to submit an Eighth

Amendment case jury. the past, recognized

we have jury role of the

assessing prison condition cases. See v. Shansky,

Walker Cir.1994). Today’s opinion marks a decid- TY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, mistrust in that ed and a institution con- comitant endorsement of the view that judges are endowed a superior with view GROUP, what INC., society our JONES ought to tolerate in the Defendant-Appellant. prisoners.

treatment of No. 00-2746. 5. United States Appeals, Court of If all the facts of this case are construed Seventh Circuit. Pearson,

in favor of Mr. certainly permit sufficient evidence to jury to find Argued Dec. a violation of the Amendment. We Decided Jan. nevertheless must determine whether Mr. qualified

Ramos was entitled to immunity

at the time of Mr. prolonged Pearson’s “[Gjovernment

incarceration. officials

performing discretionary gener- functions

ally are shielded liability from for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not clearly

violate statutory established or con- rights

stitutional which reasonable would

person have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. The law

must be clear when the defendant official See, Wade,

acted. e.g., Rakovich Cir.1988) (en

banc).

Case Details

Case Name: Alex Pearson v. Anthony Ramos

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Date Published: Jan 22, 2001

Citation: 237 F.3d 881

Docket Number: 98-4110

Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.