*1 (Green) expressly found a witness reliance Sulli- and Carter’s DeSarno credible, this court cannot substitute a con- In misplaced. van, is supra, issue, trary credibility determination based on a the offi- and no dual-role there was paper cold record. with the parte contacts made ex cial that seeking “vengeance”. deciding official The official determined here adduced has been No evidence supported charges its else, ven- Green, was bent on anyone or preponderance of the evidence. 5 Camero, supra, in- Ryder geance. § 7701(c)(1)(B). evidence, That U.S.C. proceedings trial-type adversarial volved testimony ele formed of and circumstantial regulations not here by agency provided ments, preclude a determina is such as involved. See Welcker that the Board’s decision tion this court (Fed.Cir.1985). 1577, 1582-83 752 F.2d evidence. 5 was not based on substantial § 7703(c). pre-termina U.S.C. We conclude require case met all steps taken in this tion We have considered each of DeSarno and statutory due ments of constitutional arguments other and find them Carter’s process. merit. without AFFIRMED. Evidence Substantial present an extensive and Carter DeSarno testimony and evidence which of the
review In the superficial plausability.
bears argument, each minute jury of a
manner inconsistency is
“inconsistency” possible must de- depth. Because we
discussed Board’s decision was whether the
termine
CROFOOT, Petitioner,
re-
evidence we have
Alex M.
based on substantial
That review
the record
detail.
viewed
attractiveness of De-
the surface
shatters
STATES GOVERNMENT
UNITED
argu-
The
assertions.
Sarno
Carter’s
OFFICE, Respondent.
PRINTING
ment,
credibility and cit-
attacking Green’s
Appeal
checks,
No. 84-1603.
(bank receipts,
affi-
ing documents
davits)
unpersua-
refuting the
is
as
Appeals,
United States Court
appel-
governing
rules
light
sive
Federal Circuit.
late review.
2,May
Department
En-
Griessenauer
(Fed.Cir.1985),this court
ergy,
cial’s during cross- direct and
was on demeanor Griessenauer, 754 F.2d at
examination. in this similar case decline
364. We im- approach, which that sensible
abandon agencies
partially serves
alike. parts of a witness’ tes
That some phe is a common
timony may be attacked basis, however, supplies no It
nomenon. enti the fact-finder is not holding that parts of that witness’ to credit other
tled Where, here,
testimony.
Davis, Judge, part Circuit dissented opinion.
and filed Kaiser, Brudney,
James J. Bredhoff & Washington, D.C., argued petitioner. With him on Jeffrey the brief was R. Freund, Washington, D.C. Spooner, Director,
Sandra P. Asst. Com- Branch, Litigation Justice, mercial Dept, of D.C., Washington, argued respondent. With her on the brief were Richard K. Willard, Acting Atty. Asst. Gen. and David Cohen, Director, M. Washington, D.C. DAVIS, Before RICH Circuit WEN, Judges, and CO Judge. Senior Circuit COWEN, Judge. Senior Circuit Petitioner seeks a review of a final order Systems of the Merit Protection Board (MSPB Board), MSPB Docket Number DC07528211510, up- M.S.P.R. ground held his removal on the of notori- ously disgraceful conduct. For the reasons forth, to be set the decision of the Board is part, part, affirmed in reversed in and re- manded. found,
I.
for the
dent basis
removal. She
however, that the GPO had established its
position
from his
was removed
Petitioner
disgraceful conduct
Operator
Photocomposition Keyboard
preponderance
the evidence.
(GPO)
Printing Office
for the Government
rea-
The
cited three
July
The
sustained the
also
ab-
for its action:
Unauthorized
sons
agency’s
ground
falsehood
*3
work;
(2) Notoriously dis-
from
sences
estoppel,
of
stating
petition-
collateral
conduct;
Falsehood. The
graceful
pretenses preclud-
er’s conviction for false
a claim
charges stemmed from
latter two
denying
ed him
from
he had submitted
in
workmen’s
by petitioner
1981 for
filed
Relying
a
claim.
on
false
MSPB decisions
allegedly
after he
sustained
compensation,
in
employee
which fraudulent
an
conduct of
job.
of its
injury
on the
As a result
was either admitted
established
the
petition-
investigation,
concluded that
GPO
MSPB,
hearing
presiding
before the
the
injury
intoxicated
er suffered the
while
that the
charges
official held
two sustained
fraud
home and
criminal
near his
filed
presumption
raised a
that the
against him.
charges
impaired the efficiency
conduct
of the ser-
presented
vice and that he had not
suffi-
felony of
was indicted for the
Petitioner
presumption.
cient evidence
rebut the
against
the United States Govern-
fraud
footnote,
However, in
presiding
a
the
offi-
trial,
ment,
but his
the United States
that if the
cial added
doctrine of collateral
Columbia,
the
District Court for
District of
apply,
estoppel did not
find the
she would
hung jury. Shortly
there-
resulted
a
proof
not met its
of
burden
after,
plea bargain
to a
with the
pursuant
respect
charge
with
to the
of falsehood.
prosecutor, petitioner
a
of
entered
charge
pre-
lesser
“false
guilty
appeal,
to the
of
the Board
On
determined
tenses,”
petitioner
estopped
a misdemeanor in
District of
not collaterally
the
was
contesting
agency’s
This
was entered and ac-
from
the
falsehood
Columbia.
charge,
of
the
cepted by
judge
the court under the doctrine
because
district court
25,
Alford,
v.
91
no factual
Carolina
400 U.S.
had made
determination with
North
160,
(1970).
respect
underlying
Petitioner was removed the GPO nexus was based falsification, the Board shortly guilty plea accepted after his because fraud- present “in the the Upon petitioner’s the district court. stated that perpetrated against is official ulent conduct appeal appellant is employing agency, and the upheld the removal. She determined that on-the-job alleged for an charge, claiming a benefit agency’s first of unauthorized absences, indepen- injury.” could not as an stand
664 Service,
II. Postal 6 MSPB 6 M.S.P.R. (1982). 578 cases, however, § these it 7513(a), 5 federal Under U.S.C. was found that the committed agencies may discharge employees only for promote underlying such cause as will fraudulent conduct the con- Ordinarily, the burden is viction. placed on the to demonstrate that We think that the Phillips holding
such a “nexus” exists.
Board’s
Berg
land,
(4th Cir.1978);
F.2d
on the nexus issue constituted an error of
Hampton,
Young
requires
pursuant
law which
reversal
to 5
(7th Cir.1977);
Department
Merritt v.
§ 7703(c)(1). In
pertinent
U.S.C.
cases
Justice,
(1981).
In in
MSPB
found,
presumption
we have
was raised
employee’s
stances
where
conduct is so
factually
where it was
established that the
itself,”
egregious
speaks
that “it
how
employee had committed the offense with
ever, presumption
of nexus is raised and
*4
See,
he
charged.
was
e.g., Hayes,
employee
the
Hayes
must rebut it.
v. De
727 F.2d at
(employee
1536
tried and found
partment
Navy,
the
727 F.2d
of
guilty
Masino,
of assault
battery);
and
(Fed.Cir.1984);
States,
Masino v. United
(customs inspector
F.2d at 1054
admitted
1048, 1055,
(1978).
589 F.2d
basis
question whether a nexus existed between
*5
dearth of case law which
though there is a
notoriously
dis-
the sustained
consequences of a
delineates the collateral
and the
graceful conduct
plea,
to an
we
pursuant
conviction
Alford
respects,
In all
the decision
other
consequences
think that at least the same
of the Board is affirmed.
as to a
to such a conviction
should attach
PART,
AFFIRMED IN
REVERSED IN
plea,
under a nolo contendere
conviction
PART,
REMANDED.
plea by
analogous to the
considered
Alford
37, 91
400 U.S. at
Supreme
Court.1
DAVIS,
Judge, dissenting
part:
in
Circuit
11(f)
167;
Fed.R.Crim.P.
at
see also
S.Ct.
(1974). In an
note
Al
I
II of
advisory
disagree
committee
I
not
with Parts
do
plea, the
ordering
in
contendere
plea,
(except
a nolo
opinion
the court’s
for
ford
“voluntarily, knowingly, and
remand),
defendant
reject
I
the conclusion
of a
but
imposi
to the
understandingly
that,
consents]
substantial evi-
Part III
in this
if he is
penalty] even
tion of a
finding that
supports
[criminal
the Board’s
dence
participa
to admit his
unwilling or unable
plea-and-convietion
petitioner’s Alford
constituting
crime.”
tion in the acts
disgraceful conduct. For
show
37,
at 167.
at
91 S.Ct.
400 U.S.
(a)
me,
factors here are that
the critical
held, after the
expressly
that the fact of
courts have held
Several
conviction,
not
that the
a
conten-
pursuant
to
nolo
a conviction
Alford
actually com-
proven
that Crofoot
fact
variety
to a
of collat-
plea gives rise
dere
underlying his
the offense
mitted
subsequent proceed-
consequences
eral
Alford
he
evidence that
Qureshi
plea
rather that his
See,
Immigration
but
ings.
e.g.,
here,
Georgia, 608
v. State
reversible error. Willett
Although
not resolve the issue
we need
1.
Cir.1979);
(5th
States ex
arguably
United
guilty might
warrant
F.2d
plea an Alford
(2d Cir.1974).
Casscles,
Dunn v.
those determinations. That I can- COMPANY, INSURANCE prior not see how the plea-and-con- Appellant, Alford notoriously disgraceful viction could show If the MSPB had not made the STATES, Appellee. The UNITED findings it making findings did—either no at all on the accepting facts or the Alford Appeal No. 84-1526. plea as conclusive1 —an conviction Alford might notoriously disgraceful indicate United con- States Court of Appeals, findings duct. But the MSPB show that Federal Circuit. plea-and-conviction this now stands Alford 7,May simply wrongful fears of plus unwillingness go to through another trial. That cannot amount “notoriously disgraceful conduct.” If it
be said that his fellow would not
know of findings the MSPB and would
therefore believe he had in fact committed offense, that, the answer is on Cro- reinstatement,
foot’s he and the Govern- Printing
ment publicize Office should findings.
MSPB In entering his Alford
plea petitioner had denied he had commit- offense,
ted the accordingly he would continuing
be consistent in deny; routinely could bow to the MSPB’s (as offense)
factual
this court does not overturn. *6 holding plea-and-con- that the Alford enough by
viction is itself show notori-
ously conduct, disgraceful the court seems wholly disregard
to me pres- the crucial
ence in this case of the MSPB’s factual
findings that Crofoot has not been shown
to have committed the offense. Because of
those I would reverse and direct only signifi- reinstatement because the
cant sustained the MSPB—noto-
riously disgraceful conduct—has no sub- support.
stantial conviction, today's 1. It must be majority remembered that here the full does not over- apply principles MSPB refused to ruling. of former turn that adjudication (collateral estoppel) to the Alford
