39 N.Y.2d 326 | NY | 1976
Few legal issues have generated more public
Petitioner, a resident of Brooklyn, New York, and a magna cum laude graduate of Brooklyn College, was, at the commencement of this proceeding, a second-year graduate student participating in cancer research in the Department of Microbiology at the University of Southern California School of Medicine. He achieved an undergraduate grade point average of 3.47 and an undergraduate science average of 3.38. His postgraduate average in microbiology is 3.83. On the Medical College Application Test (MCAT), he scored 745 in science (99th percentile), 685 in general information (98th percentile), 645 in verbal (90th percentile), and 645 in qualitative (78th percentile). Petitioner applied for admission to the 1974-1975 class at respondent Downstate Medical Center, a publicly funded unit of the State university system. Following a personal interview, petitioner was notified that he was placed on a waiting list. However, when it became apparent that he would not be accepted by respondent, petitioner commenced this proceeding alleging that his qualifications for admission were superior to those of other applicants to whom respondent had arbitrarily granted preferential treatment in violation of the law. In response to his petition, respondent conceded in its answer that its admission policies were "responsive to the Eedical needs of the community’s large black and Puerto lean population.” However, it denied any violation of consti.tional rights and asserted that its policy and practice was "to insure consideration of all aspects which bear upon a candidate’s qualifications” for admission.
Respondent received 6,300 applications for the 216 positions in its 1974-1975 entering class. Initially, each application was given a "screening code”,
Petitioner’s screening code was 104 and he was one of 1,400 applicants actually interviewed. Of the 435 Black and Puerto Rican applicants, 145 were selected for interviewing. Thus, the average of Black and Puerto Rican applicants interviewed was 12% higher than other applicants. Following the interview, candidates were rated by the interviewer and those thought worthy of further consideration were presented to the admissions committee; all others were rejected. Thereafter, the interviewer would detail to the committee his reasons for recommending an applicant, and would circulate among the members a folder containing the candidates’ qualifications and interview sheet. Each member would then assign a numerical score between one and eight to the application and the average of these scores determined acceptances. Those receiving an 8.0 committee average were accepted immediately until there was no more room in the class, at which time, such remaining candidates would be put on the first waiting list. Those scoring 7.9 were put on a second waiting list and those scoring below 7.9 were rejected.
Dr. Parnell testified that in making their decision the committee members gave consideration to a variety of factors including whether the applicant was a minority group member and might be from a financially or educationally deprived
Prior to the selection of Dr. Parnell as Admissions Committee Chairman in 1970, respondent averaged no more than three minority students per class of 215. He testified, however, that since 1970 and, as a result of the present system for specially marking and considering minority applicants, the number of minority students per class has averaged 19 or 20; and that the change in admission practices was a direct result of the 1970 Report of the Association of American Medical Colleges Task Force to the Inter-Association Committee on Expanding Educational Opportunities in Medicine for Black and Other Minority Students. That report indicated that in 1970 only 2.2% of the physicians and 2.8% of the medical students in the United States were Black and that among the factors causing that situation were financial and educational obstacles, including cultural bias on the MCAT.
Dr. Parnell conceded that petitioner’s screening code was above the average score of the accepted minority applicants, and that had petitioner been a minority group member he probably would have been accepted. He explained, however, that due to the large number of applicants, qualitative achievement formed but a part of the committee’s consideration and that factors concerning the individual, as revealed in his interview, were far more important in the selection process.
Overall, 66 minority applicants were accepted, 13 more were placed on the first waiting list and 6 on the second. Due to declinations or withdrawals, only 21 minority students actually preregistered for the 1974-1975 class. It is of interest to note that petitioner’s MCAT average of 680 was higher than every one of the accepted minority students.
Special Term adopted the test espoused by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent in De Funis (supra) and stated "that petitioner had the right to have his application considered in a racially neutral manner”,
Plaintiff’s sole claim is that respondent’s admission policies and practices in giving less qualified minority applicants a greater opportunity for acceptance is violative of the equal protection clause of the State and Federal Constitutions. In addressing any such constitutional claim, a threshold decision must first be made—the standard of review to be applied
Traditional equal protection analysis is two tiered. Most classifications are subject to the lax standard of rationality which tests whether the challenged classification bears a reasonable relationship to some legitimate legislative objective. The test has been applied with great indulgence, especially in the area of economics and social welfare where, for example, it has been said that "[i]f the classification has some 'reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality’ ”. (Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485; see Matter of Levy, 38 NY2d 653; Matter of Figueroa v Bronstein, 38 NY2d 533; Gleason v Gleason, 26 NY2d 28; Matter of Bauch v City of New York, 21 NY2d 599.) Indeed, in actual application the rejection of classifications under this test appear to be rare.
Where, however, a statute affects a "fundamental interest” or employs a "suspect” classification, the strict scrutiny test has been applied. That test requires that the legislative purpose be so compelling as to justify the means utilized. Identified as suspect are classifications based on alienage (Matter of Griffiths, 413 US 717; Sugarman v Dougall, 413 US 634; Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365), national origin (Hernandez v Texas, 347 US 475; Takahashi v Fish & Game Comm., 334 US 410, 418-420), and race (Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, supra; McLaughlin v Florida, 379 US 184, supra). Fundamental interests include voting (Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330; Harper v Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US 663), travel (Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618), procreation (Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535), the right of free speech (Police Dept. of Chicago v Mosely, 408 US 92), the right of a criminal defendant to appeal (Williams v Illinois, 399 US 235; Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12) and, perhaps, the right of privacy (see Roe v Wade, 410 US 113; Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438). Significantly, however, the Supreme Court has held that education is
Where strict scrutiny is required, a painstaking inquiry is made to ensure the existence of a proper governmental objective. Thus, courts are vastly more circumspect of the relationship between the classification or interest and the legislative objective (see, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v Mosely, 408 US 92, 98-99, supra; Williams v Rhodes, 393 US 23); the desirability of the classification utilized is weighed against the importance of the State’s purpose in making the classification (see Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, supra); and, finally, an examination may be conducted to determine whether less onerous alternatives exist (see Shelton v Tucker, 364 US 479, 488). In short, the issue for determination is whether a compelling State interest is necessarily being^promoted (see, e.g., Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, supra). Theburden imposed on the State is a very heavy one. Indeed, in only two cases has governmental action surpassed strict scrutiny and in both instances the justification was national security (Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214; Hirabayashi v United States, 320 US 81).
The inflexibility of the traditional equal protection approaches is readily apparent for each is polarized and outcome-determinative. Modern day theorists, led by Professor Gerald Gunther (see Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term —Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv L Rev l)
"A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum, of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative jrf the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the CourtTWill scrutinize particular*334 classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn. I find in fact that many of the Court’s recent decisions embody the very sort of reasoned approach to equal protection analysis for which I previously argued—that is, an approach in which 'concentration [is] placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification.’ Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 520-521 (dissenting opinion).” (San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 98-99, supra [Marshall, J., with whom Douglas, J., concurred, dissenting].)7
Although a majority of the Supreme Court has not expressly abandoned the two-tiered approach, the court has at least varied, if not wholly changed, the application of the tests. Thus, while purporting to apply traditional standards, the court has recently held several State and Federal acts violative of equal protection even though rational reasons for their enactment were proferred (see Stanton v Stanton, 421 US 7; Jimenez v Weinberger, 417 US 628; James v Strange, 407 US 128; Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438, supra; Reed v Reed, 404 US 71). Therefore, we do not feel constrained to apply either traditional test but instead are ready to adopt middle ground tests in situations where such review is warranted (cf. Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 61, supra).
We turn now to decide the proper test to be applied here.
The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to guarantee equality for Blacks, and by logical extension has come to include all minority groups. Thus, strict scrutiny of racial classifications is clearly warranted in order that its mandate be carried forth (see, e.g., Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, supra; McLaughlin v Florida, 379 US 184, supra; Griffin v Maryland, 378 US 130; Pennsylvania v Board of Trusts, 353 US 230). Additionally, the amendment has been interpreted as permitting, if in fact not requiring, the correction of historical invidious discriminations (Swann v Board of Educ., 402 US 1; United States v Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 US 225; Brown v Board of Educ., 347 US 483).
It has also been suggested that the rational basis test be applied in reverse discrimination cases because "it is not 'suspect’ in a constitutional sense for a majority, any majority, to discriminate against itself’ (Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U of Chi L Rev 723, 727). In short, the argument is made that the majority can be trusted when it discriminates against itself. Additionally, it is asserted that the stigma arising from benign discrimination is far less substantial than that resulting from malign classifications and, thus, the concerns such as were expressed in Brown v Board of Educ. (347 US 483, 493-494, supra) are not present (Ely, op. cit., p 730). These contentions, superficially viewed, appear potent. On analysis, however, several untoward consequences are readily apparent. Granting preferential treatment] to some racial groups encourages polarization of the races./ Likewise, such treatment perpetuates thinking in racial terms and tends to undermine the incentive among those in the discriminated group to strive to improve their lot. Conversely, preferential treatment causes those advanced by such assistance to be held in lower esteem and thought less qualified by those who have advanced without State-sponsored advantages. Moreover, and significantly, racial preferences require extremely difficult racial determinations, for example: who is a minority group member and who is not? What races are to be favored? And, on the basis of what criteria are decisions to be made? Hence, preferential treatment programs involve perpetuating undesirable perceptions of race as' criteria affecting State action (Greenawalt, op. cit., 75 Col L Rev 559, 571-572;
We are of the view that in deciding an issue of whether reverse discrimination is present, the courts should make proper inquiry to determine whether the preferential treatment satisfies a substantial State interest. In determining whether a substantial State interest underlies a preferential treatment policy, courts should inquire whether the policy has a substantial basis in actuality, and is not merely conjectural. At a minimum, the State-sponsored scheme must further some legitimate, articulated governmental purpose. However, the interest need not be urgent, paramount or compelling. Thus, to satisfy the substantial interest requirement, it need be found that, on balance, the gain to be derived from the preferential policy outweighs its possible detrimental effects.
If it be found that the substantial interest requirement is met, a further inquiry must be made as to whether the objectives being advanced by the policy could not be achieved by a less objectionable alternative; for example, by reducing the size of the preference, or by limiting the time span of the practice. Additionally, where preference policies are indulged, the indulgent must be prepared to defend them. Courts ought not be required to divine the diverse motives of legislators, administrators or, as here, educators.
In sum, in proper circumstances, reverse discrimination is constitutional. However, to be so, it must be shown that a substantial interest underlies the policy and practice and,
In so concluding we do not intend to limit the discretion normally reposed in college administrators to determine who shall be admitted to their institutions. Courts should continue to refrain from interfering in such decision-making processes (see Matter of Lesser v Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 18 AD2d 388, 390). Indeed, by legislative fiat the institutions alone are empowered "[t]o regulate the admission of students” ) (Education Law, § 355, subd 2, par i). Nonetheless, where j benign or malign discrimination is practiced outside the bounds of constitutional limits, judicial vigilance and intervention, however undesirable, are required.
On the other hand, however, our recognition that benign discrimination is permissible should not be taken as tacit approval of such practices. We reiterate that preferential policies, laudable in origin and goal, may be laden with substantial detrimental side effects which make their use undesirable. If such practices really work, the period and extent of their use should be temporary and limited for as goals are achieved, their utilization should be diminished. Conversely, if no improvement is noted, consideration should be given to the discontinuation of the practice.
Upon the record before us we think that petitioner demonstrated that race was considered by respondent in its admissions determinations. It was shown that race was a vital and determinative consideration in the preliminary screening process inasmuch as some minority applicants receiving a screening code of less than 102 were interviewed and thereby made eligible for acceptance whereas all nonminority applicants with similar low codes were automatically rejected and not given an interview. Respondent concedes that an applicant’s race was an important factor in the admissions committee’s weighing process and that there was an admitted, albeit unstated, effort to address perceived racial imbalances in the student body of the college and to aid minority students from the local community. Moreover, the evidence reflecting the^ dramatic increase in minority admissions for 1970 through 1975 as compared with prior periods lends some measure of support to the conclusion that race was a significant factor in respondent’s admission policy and practices (cf. State Div. of Human Rights v Kilian Mfg. Corp., 35 NY2d 201). y
Although this record is somewhat sparse in content, we
We do not in any sense hold that petitioner lacks standing to maintain this proceeding. Rather, we hold only that upon this record he has not demonstrated his ultimate right to obtain relief. Indeed, it is only as a consequence of the present litigation that the minority program has been explored and that his actual predicament has been demonstrated; in the procedural posture and circumstances of this case, the fact that petitioner was not ultimately entitled to relief was not disclosed prior to the hearing on the merits. Standing to seek judicial review does not depend on a threshold demonstration of the narrower, final right to an individual remedy (see, e.g., Burke v Sugarman, 35 NY2d 39, 44). Hence, although petitioner had standing, in the final analysis he failed to demonstrate that he, personally, suffered any legal harm as a result of respondent’s student selection process.
Finally, the argument that the addition of minority applito the pool of eligible candidates operated to reduce the arithmatical chance that petitioner would be admitted must be rejected. Uncontroverted evidence was adduced to the effect that nonminority applicants were not prejudiced vis-á-vis each other by the consideration given minority applicants and that were rated on their individual merit without regard to minority candidates. Thus, by eliminating minority persons from the total students accepted or placed on waiting lists, petitioner’s relative standing with respect to the nonminority
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke concur.
Order affirmed, without costs.
. (See, e.g., De Funis Symposium, 75 Col L Rev 483; Symposium—De Funis: The Road Not Taken, 60 Va L Rev 917.)
. "Reverse” discrimination, also called "benign” discrimination, may be defined as classifications that are designed to assist selected groups of persons presumed or shown to be disadvantaged (see Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign” Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Col L Rev 559, n 4). In a somewhat broader and more coarse context, the term "affirmative action” is utilized (see Karst and Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 Va L Rev 955, n 1).
. The "screening code” is computed by adding the sum of (1) the average of an applicant’s undergraduate science and nonscience grade point averages multiplied by 20, (2) his average MCAT score multipled by .05, and (3) by adding one point if the applicant is a resident of New York.
. Apart from asking a candidate to indicate on the application whether he desired to be considered as a minority group applicant, apparently no effort was made to determine whether any person was indeed a member of such group.
. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote: "There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred. The years of slavery did more than retard the progress of Blacks. Even a greater wrong was done the whites by creating arrogance instead of humility and by encouraging the growth of the fiction of a superior race. There is no superior person by constitutional standards. A DeFunis who is white is entitled to no advantage by reason of that fact; nor is he subject to any disability, no matter his race or color. Whatever his race, he had a constitutional right to have his application considered on its individual merits in a racially neutral manner.” (416 US, at pp 336-337, supra.)
. (See, also, Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee—Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 Geo L J 1071; Gellhorn and Hornby, Constitutional Limitations on Admissions Procedures and Standards—Beyond Affirmative Action, 60 Va L Rev 975, 985-988.)
. In a concurring opinion in Vlandis v Kline (412 US 441, 456), Mr. Justice White virtually indorsed Justice Marshall’s analysis.
. The weight of decisional authority in employment discrimination actions hold
. We note with some interest the possible sustaining and countervailing rationale offered by the commentators on the merits of the controversy (see De Funis Symposium, 75 Col L Rev 483; .Symposium—De Funia: The Road Not Taken, 60 Va L Rev 917; Symposium, 1970 Toledo L Rev 377; Bell, in Defense of Minority Admissions Programs: A Response to Professor Graglia, 119 U of Pa L Rev 364; Fiss, The Pate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade after Brown v Board of Education, 41 U of Chi L Rev 742; Gellhorn, The Law Schools and the Negro, 1968 Duke L J 1069; Graglia, Special Admissions of the "Culturally Deprived” to Law School, 119 U of Pa L Rev 351; Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 NYU L Rev 1063; Morris, Equal Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences in Law Admissions, 49 Wa L Rev 1; O’Neil, Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 Yale L J 699; Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by Race, 67 Mich L Rev 1553; see, also, Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, pp 222-228; Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations).
. At the time of the hearing, 60 applicants had been accepted from the first waiting list leaving 71 more eligibles, in addition to the 83 applicants ahead of petitioner on the second waiting list.