9 Minn. 133 | Minn. | 1864
By the Court
This is an action for a libel brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendant, a corporation, for the publication of libelous matter in a newspaper published by the Defendant. The complaint is demurred to upon the ground that the matter charged as libelous was a privileged or quasi privileged communcation, which, to be libelous, must have been published with express malice, and without probable cause, and that the Defendant is a corporation, and consequently incapable of the commission of an offence depending upon sentiment or passion such as malice.
Theoretically a corporation is perhaps incapable of passion. I say perhaps, because upon an anlaysis of the construction and practical operation of these bodies the theory becomes invested with considerable doubt.. That they should possess this attribute in law, in order to harmonize then obligations and liabilities with those of individuals prosecuting the same enterprises, there is not^ only no doubt, but an imperative necessity. Corporations have almost entirely supplanted individual action in many branches of industry. If a citizen sets out on a journey he will find himself almost exclusively in the hands of corporations until his return. The stages, rail cars, and steamboats by which he is transported, the hotels at which he is entertained, the theatre at which he may be amused, and the very newspaper by which he is informed of the events of the day, are generally the property of and controlled by corporations. Manufactures, commerce, mining, lumbering, in fact, almost every - department of human industry is largely
The previous discussion has proceeded upon the ground that the publication in this case was of a privileged character, requiring allegations of express malice to sustain it. Such, however, is not the case; but was it of that character the malice is sufficiently averred in each count of the complaint.
The Defendant insists that it appears from the complaint that the Plaintiff was a candidate for the position of Senator of the United States at the time of the publication of the article, and that
But would such a condition of things as is claimed by the Defendant, to wit, that the Plaintiff was a candidate for a public office, and the Defendant a public journal, in any manner change the position of the latter in an action for a libel published under such circumstances ? There are certain relations in life which, when charges are made against another of crimes or offences, take away the presumption of malice which otherwise attaches to such charges in the absence of these special relations. In White v. Nichols, 3 How. U S. (S. C.) Rep., 286-7, the court, to a certain .extent, defines these relations, as follows:
- “ 1. Whenever the author and publisher of the alleged slander acted in the bona fide discharge of a public or private duty, legal or moral; or in the prosecution of his own rights or interests. For example, words spoken in confidence and friendship as a caution, or a letter written confidentially to persons who employed A as a solicitor, conveying charges injurious to his professional character, in the management of certain concerns which they had*138 intrusted to bitn, and in which the writer of the letter was also interested.
“ 2. Anything said or written by a master in giving the character of a servant who has been in his employment.
“ 3. Words used in the course of legal or judicial proceedings, however hard they may bear upon the party of whom they are used.
“ 4. Publications duly made in the ordinary mode of parliamentary proceedings, as a petition printed and delivered to the members of a committee appointed by the house of commons, to hear and examine grievances.”
Under these and similar circumstances the Plaintiff must not only prove the fact of the publication, but also the malicious intent with which it was done. Will the case under consideration bear this test ?
Freedom of the press and freedom of speech are equally sacred, and equally protected by the Constitution. Section 3 of the bill of rights provides that “ the liberty of the press shall forever remain inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right.” In this country almost all offices are elective. The press does not possess any immunities, not shared by every individual. In every election the same freedom of discussion of the merits and demerits of candidates is allowed equally to press and people, and every citizen can claim to be interested in the choice of his rulers. Now can it be said-that every household visitation made by itinerant politicians poisoning the minds of electors with libelous and slanderous charges against candidates, every public harrangue filled with similar matter, every clubroom discussion in which such charges are bandied about with licentious freedom and exaggeration, are privileged communications, and impose upon the injured party the necessity of proving that they were uttered and published with express malice? We have never supposed that the freedom of speech even in this country could legally be carried to such an extent. Yet, if such is the law as to an article published in a public journal, there can be no good
The demurrer to the complaint is not well taken, and the order overruling it is affirmed.