5 S.E.2d 707 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1939
Where a policy of life insurance provides that "if any beneficiary shall die before the insured, and the insured shall not have designated a new beneficiary, the interest of such beneficiary shall be payable to the insured's executors, administrators, or assigns," an assignment of the policy for value by the insured does not constitute the assignee a beneficiary whose interest, upon the assignee's death before the death of the insured, reverts to the executors, administrators, or assigns of the insured, under this provision of the policy.
The provisions of the policy respecting the substitution of a beneficiary are as follows: "The insured, subject to any existing assignment of the policy, may designate a new beneficiary, by filing written notice thereof at the home office of the company, accompanied by the policy for suitable endorsement thereon. If any beneficiary shall die before the insured, and the insured shall not have designated a new beneficiary, the interest of such beneficiary shall be payable to the insured's executors, administrators, or assigns." The assignment reads as follows: "For value received I hereby assign and transfer unto Homer Williams Lumber Company of Thomasville, Georgia, so far as their interest shall appear, all of my right, title, and interest in" the policy referred to in the petition and sued on in this case.
The defendant demurred to the petition generally. To the judgment of the court sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition the plaintiff excepted.
It is contended by the plaintiff that because of the death of Homer Williams prior to the death of the insured, there having been no change of beneficiary or designation of a new assignee after the death of Homer Williams, on the death of the insured the proceeds of the policy under the provisions thereof reverted to the estate of the insured. The plaintiff urges that, under the decision in Merchants Bank v. Garrard,
Assuming for the sake of argument that the assignment in the case now before the court, under the authority of the Garrard case, supra, operated to constitute Homer Williams Lumber Company, not only as the assignee of the insured, but also as a substituted beneficiary, Homer Williams Lumber Company was not such a beneficiary as is contemplated in the provisions of the policy reading as follows: "The insured, subject to any existing assignment of the policy, may designate a new beneficiary, by filing written notice thereof with the home office of the company, accompanied by the policy for suitable endorsement thereon. If any beneficiary shall die before the insured, and the insured shall not designate a new beneficiary, the interest of such beneficiary shall be payable to the insured's executors, administrators, or assigns." The beneficiary contemplated in these provisions of the policy is a beneficiary constituted merely by designation of the insured, and is not such a beneficiary as is constituted by an assignment of all the insured's right, title, and interest in the policy, for value received, to an assignee by a contract of assignment which constitutes the assignee not only the assignee under the policy but also a substituted beneficiary. Therefore, upon the death of Homer Williams, who *98 was trading as Homer Williams Lumber Company, notwithstanding he was a substituted beneficiary, the beneficial interest under the policy did not revert to the insured's executors, administrators, or assigns. The right to recover would be either in the representative of the assignee, or in the original beneficiary, and not in the representative of the deceased insured. The legal representative of the deceased insured is not entitled to recover on the policy.
The court properly sustained the general demurrer to the petition.
Judgment affirmed. Sutton and Felton, JJ., concur.