56 So. 397 | Miss. | 1911
Section 1317 of the Code of 1906 is in the following words: “It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to adulterate any cotton seed meal with hulls,
The appellant was indicted under this statute, the indictment charging that “the Alcorn Cotton Oil Company, being engaged in the business of manufacturing, sacking, and selling cotton seed meal, did then and there willfully and unlawfully adulterate cotton seed meal by mixing hulls therewith, without noting such adulteration in plain and legible characters on each sack.” The evidence in the case shows that the appellant sold cotton seed meal to one W. S. Berry, the said sacks of cotton seed meal being composed of fifty per cent, cotton seed meal, and fifty per cent, hulls, without noting such adulteration in plain and legible characters on the sacks. Manifestly, on the facts of the case, the appellant’s conduct falls strictly within the condemnation of section 1317.
It is said, first, that this section is repealed by section 14 of the act of 1908 (Laws 1908, chapter 107). We do not think- so. The act of 1908 was dealing with a wholly different subject-matter. The Law of 1908 fixes the penalty for the adulteration or sale of certain commercial foodstuffs falling below a certain standard, and provides for inspection, analysis, etc. It has nothing to do with the sale of cotton seed meal. That article is especially excepted from the Law of 1908.
It is next said that section 1317 is unconstitutional, because it does not inform the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, in this: That the said section does not prescribe any standard of adul
The learned counsel for appellants cite a number of cases from other states, every one of which we have critically examined. We do not think any of those cases is strictly in point, where the offense charged, as here, is the failure to note adulteration on the receptacles of the adulterated material. Nearly all these cases are cases in which a statute first prescribed a standard of purity, and then afterwards made it a crime to sell the particular thing, as milk, etc., unless the article so sold came up to the standard prescribed in the statute. Those cases are not at all in point in a consideration of the constitutionality of this statute, which permits the sale, ■and does not prohibit the sale, of adulterated cotton seed meal, but makes it an offense to so sell without noting the adulteration on the receptacles.
In City of St. Louis v. Liessing, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.), in the note at page 918, it is said: ‘ ‘ The regulations most frequently tested in the courts are those establishing an arbitrary standard of quality, without regard to the question of adulteration or extraction, and prohibiting under penalty the sale of milk falling below the required standard. St. Louis v. Liessing is typical of the decisions upon this question. The authorities are there very thoroughly gathered; but see, especially, also, as sustaining regulations of similar character, State v. Smyth, 14 R. I. 100, 51 Am. Rep. 344; State v. Campbell, 64 N. H. 402, 13 Atl. 585, 10 Am. St. Rep. 419; State v. Stone, 46 La. Ann. 147, 15 South. 11; Commissioners v. Hough, 1 Pa. Dist. R. 51; Kansas City v. Cook, 38 Mo. App. 660; State v. Crescent Creamery Co., 83 Minn. 284, 86 N. W. 107, 54 L. R. A. 466, 85 Am. St. Rep. 464; People v. West, 106 N. Y. 293, 12 N. E. 610, 60 Am. Rep. 452; People v. Kibler, 106 N. Y. 323, 12 N. E. 795; People v. Cipperly, 101 N. Y. 634, 4 N. E. 107 (reversing 37 Hun [N. Y.] 319); State v. Groves, 15 R. I. 208, 2 Atl. 384. The intent to evade the regulation is no part of the offense, and a dealer is guilty though he sells the milk exactly as drawn from the cows, when it falls below the required standard. State v. Campbell, supra; Pain v. Boughtwood, L. R. 24 Q. B. Div. 353; People v. Kibler, supra; People v. Schaeffer, 41 Hun [N. Y.] 23; Com
In Dorsey v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. Rep., at page 533, 44 S. W. at page 515, 40 L. R. A. 201, 70 Am. St. Rep. 762, the court expressly held that: “It would he entirely competent for the legislature by an act to prohibit the sale of flour mixed with meal, or any other wholesome article, without properly labeling the product of such combination.” That is a square decision that our statute prohibiting the sale without noting the adulteration of cotton seed meal mixed with hulls in any quantity is a constitutional statute.
In the case of State v. Campbell, 64 N. H. 402, 13 Atl. 585, 10 Am. St. Rep. 419, the state prohibited the sale of adulterated milk, or milk to which water or any foreign substance had been added. That act was assailed as unconstitutional, and the court said: “Under what is generally called the ‘police power’ of the state, the legislature may protect the public health, comfort, and safety by prohibiting the adulteration of articles of food, and may legislate for the prevention of imposition or fraud in the sale of such articles. Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536; State v. Clark, 28 N. H. 176, 61 Am. Dec. 611; State v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426; Gage v. Censors, 63 N. H. 92, 56 Am. Rep. 492. The sale of bread, the inspection of flour, beef, pork, and other provisions, the practice of medicine, surgery, and dentistry, the licensing of druggists, and the sale of drugs and medicines, are regulated, and the sale of spirituous or intoxicating liquor prohibited by statute. Gen. Laws, chapters 109, 122, 125, 129, 132, 133. Such legislation is not open to the objection that it transcends the limits' of legislative authority, the purpose and object of such legislation being the protection of the lives, health, comfort, and safety of all persons, and for securing this purpose persons and property are subjected to many restraints and burdens. They are presumed to be rewarded by the common benefits
It is curious to note in this last case that the statute was assailed as unconstitutional for directly the opposite reason from that assigned here. The complaint here is that section 1317 prescribes no standard. The complaint in State v. Campbell was that the statute was unconstitutional because it did prescribe an arbitrary standard, and on that point the court makes the following very pertinent observations: “The fixing of an arbitrary standard, in section 9, for pure or unadulterated milk, does not render the statute unconstitutional. In People v. Cipperly, 37 Hun (N. Y.) 324, a similar statute of New York was pronounced unconstitutional upon the ground that it deprived the defendant of his liberty and property without due process of law, in that it deprived him of the right upon the trial to have the issue determined according to the evidence of the fact, and compelled him to submit to the statutory declaration of the fact without having the truth ascertained. This decision was reversed in the court of appeals (101 N. Y. 634, 4 N. E. 107), and the constitutionality of the statute
We think it is perfectly clear that the legislature had the power to declare that cotton seed meal adulterated to any extent with hulls should not be sold, without noting-such adulteration as held in the two cases just above referred to by the learned counsel for appellant. We are therefore clearly of the opinion that the .statute on its face is constitutional; and since on the merits of this case, the cotton seed meal sold and unlabeled consisted of fifty per cent, hulls, it must be manifest that under any standard this appellant was properly convicted.
Nothing in this opinion is intended to state that any testimony, other than expert testimony, would be com
Per Curiam. The above opinion is adopted as the opinion of the court, and for the reasons therein indicated, the judgment is affirmed.