153 Iowa 397 | Iowa | 1911
It is conceded that A. J. Albright, now deceased, was at one time the owner of the land in controversy. The plaintiff claims the property under an alleged gift from the deceased and by adverse possession. The defendant, the widow of A. J. Albright, asserts title to the' same tract under the will of her said husband, which has been duly probated. The trial court, after hearing the testimony, found that the gift was made to plaintiff as alleged, and that he took and held possession thereunder, but that he had not sufficiently shown any permanent improvements made on the land in reliance upon such gift. The court further held and found that while the gift did not,' for the reason mentioned, become consummate as such, plaintiff’s possession and claim of right thereunder for more than ten years was sufficient to perfect the title in him by adverse possession. A decree was therefore entered quieting title in plaintiff, except as against the defendant’s claim of dower to which the court held it was subject. Both parties appeal; but, the defendant’s appeal being first perfected, she alone will be spoken of in this opinion as appellant.
The case as made by the plaintiff tends to show that A. J. Albright was- in his lifetime a man of considerable
Of the additional circumstances relied upon by the plaintiff we refer.to the following: He arrived at his majority and married in the year 1896, the date of the alleged gift. Two or three months after that date, he moved upon and took possession of the Mill farm, and personally occupied the same for four years. He paid no rent to his uncle. His possession, use, and enjoyment of the premises and of the produce thereof was exclusive. He made various improvements on the premises in the building of hog-houses and corn-cribs and renovation of old buildings and the grubbing of trees to an aggregate amount estimated by him of about $600. At the end of the fourth year he leased the land in writing, and in his.own name as lessor,
The theory of the defendant is that A. J. Albright gave the plaintiff no more than the income from the Mill, farm, and did not attempt or undertake or promise to part with the title. In support of this defense, the defendant herself testifies that soon after Lewis married she heard A. J. Albright tell him “he could go down on the Mill farm, and could have what he made off of it,” and that within a month or two thereafter Lewis went into possession of the farm. She further says that her husband and herself at one time “talked of giving the farm to Lewis, and fixing it so Lewis and his wife could not handle it, but we never done it.” No conveyance was in fact made. In the year 1901, while plaintiff was in the West, deceased advertised an auction sale of certain property, including the Mill farm, but the auctioneer named in the
Most of the testimony which we have referred to on both sides was introduced over objections to its competency
If it is enough to show good faith on his part and render it inequitable in the donor to repudiate the gift, the law is satisfied, and the donee’s title will be sustained. It is no answer to compare the amount of improvements with the rents and profits derived from the land. If there was a gift, it carried with it the rents and profits, and money so derived belonged to the plaintiff as completely as if it had been earned or received by him from a wholly independent source. It is the theory of the defendant herself that there was a gift to the plaintiff of the úse of the land. The improvements are not to be considered as in any sense or degree affording a consideration for the gift. A gift is a gratuity, and ex vi termini negatives the idea of consideration passing from the donee to the donor, and, if the donee signifies his acceptance by taking possession of the premises, and upon faith of the gift expends time, labor or money in improvements, which the donor can not in equity and good conscience be permitted to ignore, the transaction is irrevocable.
It is further argued that, at best, the plaintiff’s evidence shows an intent on part of the deceased to make a gift of the land in the future. Some of the testimony on both sides is capable of that construction, but a declaration at one time of an intent to give and at another of a gift in fact are not necessarily inconsistent. Again, so long as no deed of conveyance was made or delivered, the gift could do no more than vest the plaintiff with the equitable ownership, and declarations of intent thereafter made by the deceased may reasonably have had reference to his purpose to perfect the legal title in plaintiff by proper conveyance. Speaking to the same point in the Bevington
Observing that rule, we are led to the conclusion that plaintiff’s claim of gift is sufficiently established. Moreover, as pointed out by the trial court, plaintiff’s possession was assumed fourteen years before the death of A. J. Albright. While he does not claim to have received a conveyance of the legal title, his conduct has been that of one in possession under a claim of right to the title. His attitude has not been that of a mere tenant at will or at sufferance.
We can not attempt to discuss all the points made by counsel within the permissible limits of his opinion. They are as a rule governed by the conclusions we have already announced, and we find therein no sufficient reason for interfering with the finding of the trial court on this branch of the case.
If, as plaintiff argues, the dower should be taken from other lands of which A. J. Albright died seised, the burden of showing the existence of such lands and their value would seem to be on the plaintiff. There is no allegation or sufficient proof on that subject.
The decree will therefore be affirmed upon both appeals. A motion to strike appellant’s amended abstract has been submitted with the case. The amendment has been useful in making clearer some matters of evidence, and we are disposed to hold it was properly filed. The motion is denied. — Affirmed.