Albertson's, Inc. v. SinclairAlbertson's, Inc. v. Sinclair
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Per Curiam
We consider three issues in this petition for review: (1) when is a party, who seeks judicial review of a Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeals Panel decision, required to file a copy of its petition with the Commission under the Texas Labor Code section 410.253; (2) whether “the mailbox rule” 1 applies to section 410.253 filings in judicial review actions under Texas Labor Code chapter 410, subchapter G; 2 and (3) whether an untimely section 410.253 filing with the Commission deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the judicial review action. We hold that section 410.253 requires a party to file a copy of its petition for judicial review with the Commission on the same day that the party files its petition in the trial court and that the mailbox rule applies to section 410.253 filings in subchapter G judicial review actions. See Tex.R. Crv. P. 5. We also hold that untimely filing with the Commission under section 410.253 does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Charles Sinclair filed a compensation claim against Albertson’s, Inc. with the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission, for an alleged work-related injury. Albertson’s contested the compensability of the injury. A Commission hearing officer and an Appeals Panel ruled for Albertson’s. The fortieth day after the Appeals Panel’s decision was a Sunday. The next day, Sinclair filed a petition with the trial court for judicial review under Texas Labor Code chapter 410, subchapter G and mailed a copy of the petition to the Commission. The Commission received the petition two days later. Albert-son’s moved to dismiss the judicial review action, alleging that because the Commission did not receive Sinclair’s petition within forty days of the Appeals Panel’s decision, Sinclair’s filing with the Commission was untimely under section 410.253.
See
The Labor Code provides for judicial review of an Appeals Panel decision.
See
Time for Filing Petition; Venue
A party may seek judicial review by filing suit not later than the 40th day after the date on which the decision of the appeals panel was filed with the division.
Service
A copy of the petition shall be simultaneously filed with the court and the commission and served on any opposing party.
Commission Intervention
On timely motion initiated by the executive director, the commission shall be permitted to intervene in any judicial proceeding under this subchapter or Subchapter G.
In addition, subchapter G provides a modified trial de novo procedure that applies only to judicial review actions involving “compens-ability or eligibility for or the amount of income or death benefits.”
Albertson’s asserts that
Albertson’s also argues that Commission Rule 102.7 precludes applying “the mailbox rule” to Commission filings under
Lastly, Albertson’s argues that
We generally construe the word “shall” as mandatory, unless legislative intent suggests otherwise. See Schepps v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Dallas, 652 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex.1983). In determining whether the Legislature intended a provision to be mandatory or directory, we consider the plain meaning of the words used, as well as the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction. See Schepps, 652 S.W.2d at 936 (citing Chisholm v. Bewley Mills, 155 Tex. 400, 287 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex.1956)). Generally, courts construe a statutory provision as mandatory when the power or duty to which it relates is for the public good. See State v. City of Greenville, 726 S.W.2d 162, 169 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, writ refd n.r.e.). Further, just because a statutory requirement is mandatory does not mean that compliance with it is jurisdictional. See, e.g., Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Tex.1992). When the statute is silent about consequences of noncompliance, we look to the statute’s purpose in determining the proper consequence of noncompliance. See Hines, 843 S.W.2d at 468; Schepps, 652 S.W.2d at 938. Further, we liberally construe workers’ compensation legislation to carry out its evident purpose of compensating injured workers and their dependents. See Lujan v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex.1988); Ward v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 909, 910 (Tex.1979).
The plain meaning of “shall” supports a mandatory construction of
Nevertheless, the liberal construction we must give workers’ compensation laws precludes a jurisdictional interpretation.
See Lujan,
756 S.W.2d at 297;
Ward,
579 S.W.2d at 910. The purpose behind
Moreover, that
Therefore, we hold that
Notes
. See Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 5, which provides in part:
If any document is sent to the proper clerk by first-class United States mail in an envelope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped and is deposited in the mail on or before the last day for filing same, the same, if received by the clerk not more than ten days tardily, shall be filed by the clerk and be deemed filed in time. A legible postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service shall be prima facie evidence of the date of mailing.
.
See
Tex Lab.Code