Albert Toth v. The Yoder Company, a Foreign Corporation

1190 (1977); 255 L.Ed.2d Schuster v. Commis- that it would seem except to observe

raised sioner, 311, (9th Cir.1962). 312 F.2d 317 purpose to to the Act’s respect in illogical § already- purchase use 601 ease, In the instant government, nothing add this would developed site since grants providing purpose in for the of real stock of sites government’s to the local goals, acting in izing particular social is its needed hous- for construction suitable capacity. sovereign Appellant has neither fact, by appellant, as contended ing. The sufficiently alleged nor demonstrated af Kentucky authorities local that other to an al firmative misconduct contrast to make less than permitted may have been appel interpretation by leged mere error twenty- monetary contribution” a “real Ruby lees. v. 588 See United States net costs of a percent of the five (9th Cir.1978), 697, de 701-05 cert. not, view, material. in our project, is 917, 2838, nied, 442 U.S. 99 S.Ct. appellees case is whether real issue in this L.Ed.2d 284 respect have acted rationale, appellant entitled Under purposes the Act’s Authority attorney’s fees. no relief on its claim for has shown requirements. Appellant equitable estop- application no basis Accordingly, we Affirm ren- pel against appellees. appellees for the reasons indi- dered cated. generally Equitable estoppel See, government. e.g.

available 785, Hanson, 450 U.S. v.

Schweiker (1981); 1468, 67 L.Ed.2d 685 INS v.

S.Ct. 5, 8, 19, 21,

Hibi, 94 S.Ct. U.S. (1973); Crop Insurance

L.Ed.2d 7 Federal 380, 1, Merrill, 68 S.Ct.

Corp. v. 332 U.S. Light Utah Power &

92 L.Ed. 408-09, States, 389, 243 U.S. v. United Co. TOTH, al., Plaintiff-Appellant, Albert et 391, 387, 61 L.Ed. 791 37 S.Ct. estoppel do not favor particularly Courts COMPANY, foreign The YODER acting in a sover government when corporation, Defendant-Appellee. role. This proprietary than eign rather on a focuses concern distinction No. 82-1280. prohibition agents, absent government Appeals, United States Court by their statements or against estoppel, Sixth Circuit. might or revise laws conduct waive Congress. Dixon v. United See enacted 30, Argued Nov. 1983. 1304, States, 85 S.Ct. 381 U.S. Decided Dec. (1965); United States v. 14 L.Ed.2d 223 Rehearing Rehearing En Banc 16, 31-32, Francisco, 310 U.S. 60 S.Ct. San 8, 1985. Denied Feb. (1940). Estoppel, if L.Ed. 1050 situation, might permit a applied in this generous govern overly

misinformed away or funds give

ment official to assets public holds for the government See, congressional

good mandate. under 609 F.2d Gressley Califano,

e.g., (7th Cir.1979); Califano, Leimbach Cir.1979); Goldberg v.

596 F.2d Cir.1976), (2d Weinberger, 546 F.2d 480-81 nom, Goldberg v. rt. denied sub

ce 2648, Califano, 431 U.S. 97 S.Ct. Judge, filed a dis-

Krupansky, Circuit

senting opinion. Lakin, (argued),

Larry A. Wors- Smith Victor, Southfield, Mich., plain- for ham & tiff-appellant. Lewis, Hill, Wittlinger, Ad-

Timothy D. Tait, (ar- ams, Richard Sanders Goodrich & Detroit, Mich., defendant-appel- gued), lee. LIVELY, Judge, type Chief provide toggle KRUPAN rewired to two on/off

Before FAIRCHILD, SKY, Judge, and Sen end of the machine. The Circuit switches at each Judge.* ior Circuit for the machine was main motor drive horsepower. Four changed from 15 to 30 FAIRCHILD, Judge. Circuit Senior along the front “jog were added buttons” appeals from a Plaintiff strip the metal of the machine to thread defendant, notwithstanding entered commencing when through the machine plaintiff's ordering favor. verdict cylinder run. An air was attached to if judgment, the district court stated that operated mechanically clutch that it bar so doing, court wrong in so would a cord, manually. Finally, rather than a run- ground that the verdict is new trial on the machine, ning length of the full was against great weight of the evidence. pulled by It could be added. hand to shut judg entry and remand for We reverse emergency. off the electric motor in an ment on the verdict.1 July plaintiff by On was advised Toth, injured plaintiff, The Albert was inspector an that there was a crease in the roll-forming operating while a cold machine coming aluminum out of the machine. defendant Yoder manufactured strip Plaintiff cut the of aluminum sheet Company employer, Mod- and owned metal, ran out the material then in the A Corporation. ern Materials cold roll- machine, off, apparently shut forming equipped many machine is with switches, using toggle one of the added passes, pass consisting upper each of an began taking appropri- and the rolls in the shaft, having and lower a set of rolls and pass apart realign spacer. ate Mr. sizes, spacers differing mounted on each positioned Toth was near the end of the metal, strip usually A shaft. flat from a pass, taking and had been off rolls coil, through is fed the machine from metal on, pass, putting spacer last and had the pass gradually being pass to formed into pass together almost back with the rolls required shape by opposing rolls. place, unexpectedly when the machine be- “nip point” A exists where rolls come two gan plaintiff’s to turn the rolls. The hand together perform work on the metal nip point was drawn into the between the roll-forming strip. The Yoder cold machine badly plain- rolls and crushed. While the passes had twelve when Modern Materials tiff uncertain was of what started the ma- it from first received Yoder 1958 and chine, appears it that he brushed more were added later. A clutch bar two along one of the the front of buttons length along ran the machine machine, causing the rolls to turn. front, shafts, perpendicular guards There were no furnished with the pushed right engage was toward its end to prevent operator machine to or other the clutch toward its left end to disen- having nip access to the roll gage “jogged” by it. The machine could be points. bar, slipping use of the clutch the clutch to through gradually thread the metal the ma- plaintiff alleged injury The that his was beginning operation. chine at the of an proximately design caused defect of equipped The machine as delivered was machine, guards absence of for the opera- with an on/off located at the switch alleged nip points. roll The defendant entry tor’s stand at the end of the machine. designed the machine as and delivered to produced Modern Materials not have would Modern of al- Materials made a number originally designed, such accident. As an terations to the Yoder machine between stop operator only the rolls from 1958 when it was delivered and 1977 when turning, realign injured. Mr. Toth was so as to dissassemble machine * Fairchild, diversity. Senior Cir- 1. Jurisdiction is founded on Both The Honorable Thomas E. parties governing Judge, Appeals law as have treated cuit United States Court of Circuit, designation. questions. sitting by substantive the Seventh pass, by following one proce- of three plaintiff contends that the trial First, operator reasoning dures. could turn court’s erroneously implied that power position, main switch to the off must show that the shut- defect in defendant’s ting power proxi- machine was the off all to the roll-former. sole Sec- mate cause of the injury ond, rather than operator could turn show- the motor off ing that the defect was cause, opera- at the on/off switch located at the and further contends that modifications Third, operator tor’s stand. could di- by plaintiff’s employer were not su- sengage by using the clutch both his perseding causes injury. The de- Any hands. procedures of these fendant contends that judgment n.o.v. was prevented turning rolls from until proper liability because may attach to the he or someone else turned the manufacturer only when the defective on, engaged motor the clutch. The de- product reaches the user or consumer with- argued fendant only accident could out change substantial in the condition in occur as it did because of modifications which it is sold. The argues defendant by plaintiff’s employer, specifical- made the that when party’s a third alterations or ly toggle the on/off switches and modifications of product cause the inju- buttons, which caused the rolls to turn. ry, original manufacturer is not liable. jury returned special finding verdict The defendant essentially that negligent, argues defendant was neg- change substantial ligence standard 402A(b) was a of plaintiff’s cause of of (Second) Torts, Restatement of injury, plaintiff that guilty was not of con- imposes strict liability only where the de- tributory negligence, plaintiff’s and that product fective reaches “the user or con- damages $300,000. amounted to sumer without change substantial in the court, however, The district granted de- condition in which it is sold.” The lan- judgment n.o.v., fendant’s motion for hold- guage chosen by the district may court ing that: reflect the same view. It likely seems machine that caused the injury to [T]he if this standard did apply, the modifications plaintiff was substantially different made to plaintiff’s em- than the machine that was manufactured ployer would be substantial enough pre- by the defendant. It had been modified liability clude on of the manufac- many ways. in If the machine had not However, turer. only two the- modified, been the accident could not recovery ories of recognized are prod- happened. case, When this is the liability cases, ucts negligence and implied the manufacturer of the machine is not warranty, not strict liability. Hartford In liable.... this the records show Fire Insurance v. Co., Walter Kidde & that the machine as it was manufactured 283, 120 Mich.App. N.W.2d 29 and delivered would not have caused the Johnson v. Chrysler Corporation, injury regardless of the claims 532, Mich.App. (1977). N.W.2d 569 plaintiff as to the manufacturer’s provisions Thus the of Restatement wrongdoing. Thus it seems court pertaining to strict liability do appear the motion for directed verdict apply. granted have been and that a Michigan, negligent design falls judgment motion for notwithstanding the under both a theory and an granted. verdict should be If the court implied warranty theory liability because wrong matter, is in this the court would a manufacturer produce has a grant a motion for new trial product fit under either con ground that the verdict is cept. Fire Insurance Co. v. Hartford great weight of the evidence. Co., 33; Walter Kidde & 328 N.W.2d at Court, (January pp Order Elsasser v. Corp., American Motors 2-3). Mich.App. 265 N.W.2d 339 witnesses, credibility negligence theory, or substitute Under Rather, jury. that of the traditional common- its establish breach, duty, damage in the the evidence must be viewed elements law omitted.) (Citation party against whom To most favorable to the and causation. made, implied warranty, drawing motion breach establish in his in the all reasonable inferences show a defect evidence plaintiff must Corp., v. to the manufactur- favor. Morelock NCR product, attributable (6th Cir.1978). If, after er, 1104-1105 injuries. caused his evidence, viewing thus the trial court Co., Mich.App. Lilly v. Eli & Abel opinion points strongly that it so (1979), 23-24 289 N.W.2d modified minds favor of movant reasonable Mich. 343 N.W.2d affirmed, 418 conclusion, could not come to a different Appeals of Michi The Court granted. then the motion should be Id. liabil gan has that a manufacturer’s stated court, appellate reviewing An when the tri- has failed ity predicated upon whether he decision, is al court's bound the same a risk that is unreason protect against Corp., standard. Morelock NCR by the manufacturer. able 1105; Corp., F.2d at Gillham Admiral Kidde Insurance Fire Walter Hartford 523 F.2d at 109. at 33. 328 N.W.2d & A recent statement reviewing judg aof judgments standard for n.o.v. is found n.o.v., long circuit has held that ment Cormack v. American Underwriters law controls in a diversi the state standard Corp., Mich.App. 288 N.W.2d 634 ty Savings v. case. See Gold National Michigan The court wrote that: Albany, 641 F.2d 434 City Bank of of judgment A on mo- n.o.v. defendant’s Vondracek, (6th Cir.1981); v. Warkentien only is appropriate tion if the evidence (6th Cir.1980); 1 633 F.2d Garrison v. Jer is insufficient as a matter of law to Co., F.2d B. Cir. vis Webb support for judgment plaintiff. 1978).2 Michigan, with rule of law In reviewing judgment a motion for judgments respect appellate to review of n.o.v., give the Court must the non- appears to be identical to the federal n.o.v. moving party every the benefit of rea- standard, “rea which is referred to as the sonable inference that could be drawn standard, minds” test. Under this sonable from the evidence. reasonable un If disagree judgment may granted not be n.o.v. honestly minds to to minds could differ as less reasonable not whether his has drawn from the evi satisfied the conclusions to be necessary proof burden or ele- Corporation, v. Admiral of dence. Gillham action, judg- ments cause his (6th Cir.1975), of de of 523 F.2d cert. im- ment n.o.v. is nied, defendant U.S. S.Ct. proper. The raised L.Ed.2d issue Vondracek, 1, 7 motion for a n.o.v. is 633 F.2d whether Warkentien court, ques (6th Cir.1980). is evidence raise a This in there sufficient to Warkentien Vondracek, jury. language fact to tion of for the This determina found the above virtually one to be the trial to in Morelock tion is of law be identical that determining in the first instance. and concluded that the standard court sufficient, legally judgments equivalent the trial whether evidence n.o.v. evidence, may weigh pass on court not the federal standard. City Savings Albany, National validity open Bank of

2. The continued this rule of of 430, 434 (6th Cir.1981). fn.3 especially question, in v. Penn Donovan Shipping S.Ct. U.S. in In this as indicated the text of (1977) ("The proper role of 51 L.Ed.2d 112 opinion, es- and federal standards are state appellate the federal same, the trial and courts in sentially consequence it is of no so is, system reviewing jury verdicts in the size of apply standard whether we the state federal however, law.”). See Gold matter of federal diversity law. controlled cases judge phrase The district not anal- Regu- did his was clear from the context this that ysis in terms of only causation. was support lation not the for his In our review we must determine testimony. whether agree opin- his We do that support evidence record could ignored.” ion “must be and, so, finding negligence, if whether it acknowledged type Mr. Krauss that a finding could support guard barrier available in 1957 was cause. would, place, prevented plain- when in have supports the proposition record reaching nip tiff close to the point. The leaving nip point unguarded an accessible removed, guard could but the be removal practical guard when a is available can be cut off power so that the motor unreasonably dangerous negli- found and could not drive rolls. He also described Krauss, gent. Manager Mr. defendant’s using light a device beams so that when a Engineering Development, and Mr. Jo- person zone, danger reaches into the his sephs, plaintiff’s expert, both testified interrupt arm would a light beam and nip this Mr. testified area. Krauss cause to cut off. He was not point hazard, recognized would be as a certain this device was known nip points that there are where the rolls although it is on used defendant’s current together. nip come He identified other Josephs Mr. models. testified that both machine, points gears where come types were available 1957. Mr. Krauss together passes or a pulley. belt over a guarding impractical considered because of They guarded. Josephs are identi- Mr. also operations, threading certain such as nip points opin- fied the testified his strip through machine, metal where the nip points guarded ion that and operator must close to hands principle that this state rolls and be able to them the at same years art in 1957 before. time. argues Josephs’ Defendant testimo- nip points any were accessible ny ignored appar- should be because of his person standing points along at the side of misreading particular ent document. passes. machine near the ends of the brought He with him four documents as a acknowledged Mr. Krauss “most sample subject the predat- of literature on length workmen with normal arms would ing quoted Regulation He from a be to the nip point.” able reach into portion calling a guards Model Code a argument The real parties between the inrunning rolls on the side of “so that the degree concerns the of probability per operator get caught his hands in the can’t sons would extend their hands into the rolls.” On cross-examination defendant danger. zone of On the one it hand seems although brought Regulation out that the enough jog clear the that if buttons had not pertained rolling including type to mills the anyone added the performing been task quotation here the from a involved was being performed by plaintiff would have Regulation of which apparently the off power shut the or the or disen referred to or machines motor specifi- “rolls not gaged the regulation.” putting clutch his cally mentioned this De- before hands no in proximity fendant made motion to strike Jo- to the rolls. The rolls Mr. could sephs’ opinion. Assuming statement of his not then have to turn started unless some Josephs reading, person in his it was misstaken other intervened.3 Krauss testified operator adjusting ing required guard 3. While the was the machine machine of a removal off, power prevent moving parts with the was nothing there to in the over machine and man- person activating adjustment a adjustment third ual of the brushes. The using power main switch or the on/off done on a and error was trial basis until the operator's switch at stand. put properly. the labels on machine plaintiff’s right chine, While Byrnes Machinery Company, was Economic hand still inside ma- (1972), Mich.App. supervisor employee 41 plaintiff his ordered a 200 N.W.2d fellow injured adjusting consequence was brushes to activate the machine and as a while Adjust- labeling injured. the defendant's bottle machine. was Circuit perform or increases the risk operator would a task the actor creates and is a factor particular harm substantial strip through metal threading a as such causing that harm.4 require would him to This task passes. machine, it but would reach into be causation, the lack or Proximate rolls, jog necessary to be able to be it, generally question of fact by an interlock- interruption Positive jury. Gronlie v. decided not feasi- ing guard beam would 50 Mich. Company, Safety Manufacturing (1973); evidence from Da App. There no other 212 N.W.2d ble. was Thornton, 384 Mich. 180 N.W.2d probability vis v. party bearing on the either Motors General Comstock others, workers or such maintenance Corporation, Mich. 99 N.W.2d like, put their hands have occasion would (1959). Therefore, said as unless it can be offered no evi- near the rolls. Defendant of law that modifications matter other show such workers dence to plaintiff’s employer op machine endangered. would not be breaking superseding erated as a cause jury from which the There was evidence causation, chain of the issue of jog the addition have found that causation, under the facts of probable As was and foreseeable. buttons jury. left to have been supplied, originally jogged the machine was Motors In Comstock General bar, starting and in it by use of clutch Corporation Supreme Court gradually necessary to slowly and it was addressed the issue what constitutes Slipping clutch. the clutch slip the superseding approval cause and cited with eventually wear necessitate its cause following provided rule in Restate had replacement. Defendant itself sold 447, p. 478: (Second) Torts, ment buttons, jog equipped with machines intervening that an act of a “The fact equipped with a cord its current model person negligent third in itself or is purpose. jury A and a button for negligent done not in a manner does reasonably concluded that the could have superseding make it a cause of harm to buttons, of electrical addition negligent con another which actor’s would not the wear characteristics duct, bringing is a substantial factor clutch, the mechanical was about, if of the machine. alteration “(a) negli- the actor at the time gent that a conduct should have realized has a use A manufacturer might act, person third so product designing his reasonable care in “(b) knowing man the sit- a reasonable guard against unreasonable and fore existing uation when the of the third act Byrnes risk. v. Economic Ma seeable regard done would it as Mich.App. chinery Company, extraordinary highly per- that the third may This N.W.2d even * * * ” acted, son had so may include misuse be which 358 Mich. at 99 N.W.2d at 635. anticipated. necessary It is not that Id. keyA specific inquiry of the accident fore resolving manner be question seen, merely negligent superceding foreseeability. conduct of There- that the cause granted summary judgment negligent the de- actor cre- Court fendant, Where the conduct of the plaintiff appealed. and The Court of of particular ates increases the risk harm of a genuine Appeals Michigan a held that issue causing and is a substantial harm, that factor in manufacturers, existed as whether who fact brought the fact that the harm about maintenance was neces- knew continual through the intervention another force safeguards against sary, provide had liability, except does not relieve the actor of risks which could oc- foreseeable unreasonable intentionally where the harm is caused place, taking thus cur while maintenance was precluding summary judgment. scope third and is not within the of the risk created the actor’s conduct. (Second) of Torts 442B Restatement states: fore, injured by ruling upon where a manu- a motion for a new product, intervening ground facturer’s conduct trial on the based that the verdict is plaintiff’s employer of the does not against weight insulate evidence, of the a dis liability the manufacturer from unless the judge may compare trict opposing employer’s acts or omissions are unforesee- proofs weigh the evidence and it is the Antecedent tortfeasors are able. not re- duty judge to set aside the verdict liability as the result of conse- lieved a new trial if opinion he is of the quences they anticipated should have against the verdict is weight the clear Gracyalny under the circumstances. v. of the evidence. Moran v. Johns-Manville Westinghouse Corp., Electric 723 F.2d Corp., (6th Cir.1982); Sales F.2d 811 (7th Cir.1983). (6th Bruner v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422 Cir.1982). However, are not free “[c]ourts jury We conclude that could reweigh the evidence and set aside the properly have found that defendant was jury merely verdict jury because the could negligent failing guard nip points, have drawn different inferences or conclu particularly provision since the but judges sions or because feel that other tons could be deemed foreseeable. Such results are more reasonable.” Tennant v. proxi found to be be Co., Peoria Ry. & P. U. 321 U.S. plaintiff’s injury. mate cause of And be S.Ct. “Thus, 88 L.Ed. 520 foreseeable, cause the modifications were while the judge district has a duty to inter they supersed could be deemed not to be a appropriate eases, vene in jury’s verdict ing judgment cause. The n.o.v. was im accepted if be it is one which could granted. properly reasonably have been reached.” Bruner v. ordering judgment n.o.v., the trial Dunaway, 684 F.2d at 425. any court said that in it event would at analyze record, As we there was least have ordered a trial new on the little evidence, conflict in the except, per- ground against the verdict was haps, for Mr. Josephs’ categorical opinion great weight of the evidence. In a diversi nip points guarded opposed be ty question of whether a trial new to Mr. opinion guard Krauss’ that a is not granted procedural is to be is a federal practical on this machine. It seems clear question and is to be decided reference jury’s findings really were based to federal law. Pitts v. Electro-Static Fin on the inferences it chose to draw from Inc., (8th Cir.1979); ishing, relatively undisputed facts. In this con- Manion, (5th Calloway v. 572 F.2d 1033 text, it inappropriate would be for the dis- Cir.1978); Vizzini v. Ford Motor judge trict to order a new trial on the (3rd Cir.1977); F.2d 754 Oldenburg v. ground the verdict was Clark, Cir.1974); 489 F.2d 839 con great weight Tennant, of the evidence. tra, Transport, Smith v. Kenosha Auto supra. (D.Montana, 1964). F.Supp. question granting federal rule is that the judgment is reversed and the cause denying motion a new trial remanded with directions to reinstate the following jury verdict addresses itself to verdict and enter thereon. judicial discretion of judge, the trial decision will not reversed in the KRUPANSKY, Judge, dissenting. Circuit showing absence of a of an abuse of discre tion. Pitts v. Because the Finishing Electro-Static net effect of the majority’s Inc., supra holding imposition at 803.5 is the of absolute and/or event, any Eastman, 5. In see abuse of we no substantial difference discretion. Cranson v. 28 Michigan between the Mich.App. federal standard and the Day 184 N.W.2d 480 standard. In the rule is that motions Company, Mich.App. Walton Minor Bean 22 for new trials are addressed discre- sound (1970). 176 N.W.2d 717 tion of the trial court and are reviewed 1198 reasonably former was safe for use manu- roll liability on the defendant vicarious employee manner which the case, respectfully I dissent. in this facturer differently, operating it. Stated the dan pursued his claim on herein Plaintiff presented by clearly the machine was ger negligence in the theories alternative design, of defective rather a result but not form machine and breach design the roll negligence plaintiffs of the a result It axiomatic that warranty. implied making major modifications to employer establishing liability for step in the initial regard for the hazard the machine without requires defi design product negligent Thus, employees. consequences to ous by on the “duty” imposed law nition of vicariously imposed employ majority See, Lilley v. Eli e.g., Abel manufacturer. the defendant in this negligence er’s 59, 70, 289 N.W.2d Co., Mich.App. case, expressly has approach which been 418 Mich. (1979), aff'd, modified rejected in this circuit. Adams v. Union (under negli (1984) N.W.2d 164 (6th Carbide, F.2d 1453 at 1457 Cir. must establish theory, plaintiff gence 1984). duty, elements of traditional common-law regarding proof The adduced at trial causation). prevail To breach, damage and safety the defendant could devices which claim, plaintiff warranty implied on the guard against have added in 1957 to product, in the a defect prove are, my complained of herein injuries manufacturer, caused to the attributable Gootee, See, perspective, e.g., irrelevant. added). In the (emphasis injury. Id. (feasibility F.2d at 1064 supra, 712 sup not simply do instant the facts alone, design change, standing does not plaintiff on either recovery for the port on the establish theory. manufacturer). adding necessity imposes duty law safety reasonably devices was fore these design products “to upon a manufacturer by seeable the defendant manufacturer reason- intended or are safe for their eventually only the modifications if use, guarding all ably contemplated plaintiff’s employer equally were unreasonable, risks to users.” words, majority foreseeable. other Inc., Industries, v. Colt Gootee ruling only should the manufac added). Cir.1983) (emphasis safety the need for turer have foreseen also, Fire Ins. Walter

See Hartford devices, rather that it should an but have Mich.App. Kidde & ticipated every modification conceivable cor- majority As N.W.2d or could have been made which would observes, has a rectly “a manufacturer (or plaintiff’s employer purchas other product reasonably fit duty produce machine) perpetuity into from ers of the added), citing ...,” (emphasis at 1193 delivery machine’s to the the date of the Fire, Elsasser v. Ameri- supra; Hartford majority imposes then employer.2 The Mich.App. Corp., 81 can Motors any to counter duty on the manufacturer N.W.2d 339 resulting anticipated from the hazards case, majority by installing acknowl In the instant to the machine modifications injury safeguards. logi could not to its edges plaintiffs additional Carried extreme, operation majority’s opinion places plaintiffs resulted cal designed.1 In on a manufacturer not originally an absolute the machine as concession, only produce a machine safe majority con making this delivered, manufactured, employ clairvoy- also to that, as but originally cedes could not then have started to rolls. The rolls majority clear that "it seems 1. The concedes unless some other intervened.” At turn enough not been if the buttons had being per- anyone performing 1195. the task added off the have shut formed years elapsed disengaged clutch from the date this case 20 had or the motor or delivery. proximity putting of initial before his hands in might how anee to.determine perpetuity, further

be modified

protect against resulting hazards there- requirement effectively im-

from. Such a

poses liability on the absolute manufactur-

er in this case. sum, hold that as matter of I would

law, made Modern Ma- modifications

terials were not defendant, further, modifi-

cations, original design not the of the ma-

chine, plain- were the cause of Thus, plaintiff injuries.

tiff’s was not enti- on either recovery

tled

implied warranty theory, and the trial jnov

court’s of defendant’s motion affirmed. DAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, M.

James

WAYNE AUDI COUNTY BOARD OF

TORS, Wayne County Civil Service

Commission, County Wayne,

Wayne County Board of Commission

ers, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 83-1378. Appeals,

United Court of States

Sixth Circuit.

Argued Aug. 1984. Dec.

Decided

Case Details

Case Name: Albert Toth v. The Yoder Company, a Foreign Corporation

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Dec 6, 1984

Citation: 749 F.2d 1190

Docket Number: 82-1280

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.