ALBERT SCHAW, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus HABITAT FOR HUMANITY OF CITRUS COUNTY, INC., Defendant - Appellee.
No. 17-13960
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
September 18, 2019
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-13960
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D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cv-00311-JSM-PRL
ALBERT SCHAW,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
HABITAT FOR HUMANITY OF CITRUS COUNTY, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(September 18, 2019)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
Albert Schaw, a quadriplegic, applied for a home with Habitat for Humanity
of Citrus County. Because his annual social-security-disability income didn’t meet
Habitat’s minimum-income threshold, Schaw requested an accommodation that
would allow him to supplement those funds with either food stamps or a notarized
letter memorializing the financial support that he received from his family. When
Habitat refused, Schaw sued under the Fair Housing Amendments Act,
individual by failing to make “reasonable accommodations” in policies and
practices that are “necessary to afford” the individual an “equal opportunity to use
and enjoy a dwelling.”
Habitat’s minimum-income requirement has a disparate impact on disabled
individuals receiving social-security-disability income.
The district court granted Habitat summary judgment on the basis that
Schaw’s requested accommodation wasn’t “necessary” within the meaning of the
Act, reasoning that it would alleviate only his “financial condition—not his
disability.” The court also concluded that Schaw had failed to state a disparate-
impact claim. After careful review, we conclude that while the district court
correctly rejected Schaw’s disparate-impact claim, it failed to properly analyze his
failure-to-accommodate claim. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion as to Schaw’s failure-to-accommodate
claim.
I
A
Shortly after he graduated from high school, Albert Schaw was in a
wrestling accident that left him completely paralyzed. Schaw is now wheelchair-
bound, and his current abode is ill-suited to accommodate his quadriplegia—it isn’t
wheelchair accessible, and there’s no way for him to close the bathroom door for
privacy. After seeing a television advertisement for Habitat for Humanity, a
nonprofit that builds new homes for low-income individuals, Schaw decided to
apply.
When Schaw met to discuss the application process with Habitat’s Family
Services Director, Rose Strawn, he learned that Habitat imposes a minimum-gross-
annual-income requirement of $10,170, presumably to ensure that potential
homeowners will be able to pay their mortgages.
disability prevents him from working, so his main source of income is a Social
Security Disability Insurance stipend of $778 per month, which equates to a gross
annual income of $9,336. Given the fixed nature of his SSDI, Schaw asked
Habitat to consider one of two other sources of income toward its requirement.
First, Schaw receives $194 per month in food stamps. With the food stamps,
Schaw’s gross annual income would be $11,664—enough to qualify. Second,
Schaw receives $100 per month in familial support from his father. With that gift,
his gross annual income (even excluding the food stamps) would be $10,536—also
enough to qualify. On Strawn’s recommendation, Schaw provided a notarized
letter from his father confirming that he gives Schaw $100 each month.
Habitat’s Board of Directors reviewed Schaw’s application and determined
that it couldn’t accept either of the two additional sources of income. It wouldn’t
consider the food stamps because Habitat follows HUD guidelines, which provide
that food stamps don’t count as income. And it wouldn’t accept the notarized letter
from Schaw’s father because the letter wasn’t a legally enforceable guarantee that
the monthly support would continue. The Board therefore rejected Schaw’s
application. It did, however, indicate that it would reconsider if the familial
support took the form of a trust or an annuity.
Shortly thereafter, Schaw’s attorney, Rebecca Bell, contacted Strawn to
explain that a trust wouldn’t work because it could jeopardize Schaw’s ability to
receive government benefits. When Strawn then suggested an annuity, Bell
explained that she didn’t handle annuities but knew financial advisors who did, and
Strawn took that to mean that Bell would discuss the annuity option with Schaw.
Strawn then sent Schaw a “Letter of Intent” explaining the conditions he needed to
meet in order to qualify. One of those requirements was that he “[p]rovide
documentation for [an] Annuity Plan, (for minimum of five years), as verification
of monthly support provided by [his] Father.” Later, Schaw (through his aunt,
Susan Hale) sent an email to Habitat inquiring as to the status of his application.
George Rusaw, Habitat’s president and CEO, responded that Schaw needed to
provide “legally codified” evidence of the familial support and that “the notarized
letter from [Schaw’s] father [was] legally insufficient.”
B
Schaw sued Habitat under the Fair Housing Amendments Act,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such
person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Habitat failed to provide a
reasonable accommodation for his disability, Schaw asserted, by refusing to
consider his food stamps or familial support as income in lieu of wages earned.
Second, Schaw alleged that Habitat’s minimum-income requirement has a
disparate impact on applicants receiving SSDI.
After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on
both claims. Habitat accepted the facts alleged by Schaw and conceded (1) that
Schaw is disabled within the meaning of the Act, (2) that Schaw asked Habitat to
consider his food stamps and familial support as supplemental income, and (3) that
Habitat refused to consider the food stamps and the
the form of a trust or annuity—as income for purposes of his application. Habitat
disputed, however, that the accommodation that Schaw requested was “reasonable”
within the meaning of the Act.
Shortly after the parties filed their motions, Schaw moved for leave to
amend his complaint, seeking to clarify the effect that a trust or annuity would
have on his government benefits. At the time he filed the complaint, Schaw
believed that a trust or annuity would render him ineligible for SSDI benefits. He
then learned that while a trust or annuity wouldn’t affect his SSDI, it could risk his
eligibility for other needs-based assistance, such as Medicare. Because the district
court didn’t believe that these changes would affect its analysis as to the relevant
questions of law, it declined to address the motion for leave to amend before ruling
on the summary-judgment motions.
The district court granted Habitat’s motion for summary judgment. The
court didn’t address the “reasonable[ness]” of Schaw’s request, concluding instead
that the accommodation wasn’t “necessary” within the meaning of the Act because
it “went solely to his financial condition—not his disability.” The court also
concluded that summary judgment was appropriate because Schaw had failed to
attempt in good faith to take advantage of Habitat’s proposed “alternative
accommodation”—namely, to have his father set up familial support in the form of
a trust or annuity. As to Schaw’s second claim, the court determined that he had
failed to provide any evidence that Habitat’s requirements had a disparate impact
on SSDI recipients. This appeal followed.
II
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 exists “to prohibit
discrimination based on handicap and familial status.” Schwarz v. City of Treasure
Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 (11th Cir. 2008). As relevant here, discrimination
includes refusing “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a
disabled] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”
To prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) that
he is disabled, (2) that he requested a “reasonable accommodation,” (3) that the
requested accommodation was “necessary to afford [him an] equal opportunity to
use and enjoy the dwelling,” and (4) that the defendant refused to make the
requested accommodation. Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1225–26
(11th Cir. 2016). The first and last elements are undisputed in this case—no one
here disputes that Schaw is disabled or that Habitat refused to accommodate his
request that it consider his supplemental sources of income. Accordingly, we
focus on the middle two elements—whether the accommodation that Schaw
requested was “reasonable” and whether it was “necessary to afford [him] an equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. at 1225. The district court skipped
the first question and decided the case solely on the basis of the second. But
because we find that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to both, we will
address each in turn.1
A
1
First, what do we mean when we talk about a “reasonable accommodation”
accommodation ‘is both efficacious and proportional to the costs to implement it.’”
Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir.
2014) (
775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002)).2 Assessing reasonableness “require[s] a balancing of the
parties’ needs.” Id. An accommodation isn’t reasonable if it requires “a
fundamental alteration in the nature of a program” or imposes “undue
administrative burdens.” Southeastern Comm. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410,
Notes
important here. Consider, for example, the HUD Guidelines, which list as an illustrative accommodation an exception to a “no pets” rule for a seeing-eye dog. See
Given the specifics of this case, we think it significant that federal law lists “working” as a major life activity alongside “seeing, hearing, speaking, and walking.”
breaking that addiction and maintaining sobriety.” 544 F.3d at 1227. With that in mind, we proceeded to examine whether short stays in halfway houses were an accommodation necessary to address that need. Id.
Turning to the case before us, the proper question is whether Schaw’s inability to meet the minimum-income requirement through wages earned is an “effect” of his quadriplegia—whether there is some causal relationship between the two. Habitat argues that it isn’t—that there’s no causal connection—and that even under the Ninth Circuit’s somewhat similar decision in Giebeler v. M&B Associates, 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003), Schaw would lose. We’re not so sure. To briefly explain, in Giebeler, the plaintiff worked for five years as a psychiatric technician before being diagnosed with AIDS. Id. at 1145. After his diagnosis, he sought to rent an apartment for $875 per month, but was refused because he received only around $1200 per month in disability benefits—much less than the requisite three times the rent. Id. When the plaintiff’s mother—who made plenty—attempted to sign a lease on her son’s behalf, the apartment management rejected her on the basis that it didn’t allow co-signors. Id. The plaintiff sued, and the Ninth Circuit agreed that the request—that his financially qualified mother be allowed to rent the apartment on his behalf—was clearly an accommodation within the meaning of the Act: “Barnett indicates that accommodations may adjust for the practical impact of a disability,” the court explained, and “not only for the
immediate manifestations of the physical or mental impairment giving rise to the disability.” Id. at 1150, 1154–55. The court then remanded to the district court for factual findings as to whether the request was reasonable and would provide him an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.
To be sure, Giebeler is an easier case. The court there had definitive evidence that the plaintiff was a well-established working professional at the time he contracted HIV, providing a direct causal link between the impairment and the inability to meet the minimum-income requirement. See id. at 1145. The record here isn’t so clear concerning whether Schaw would have been able to meet Habitat’s income requirement via wages earned prior to becoming paralyzed—it doesn’t tell us his pre-accident salary, or whether he lived independently or paid rent anywhere before the accident. Complicating the inquiry, Schaw is classified for SSDI purposes as an “adult disabled child”—a designation indicating that, as a recent high-school graduate at the time of his injury, he hadn’t yet reached full earning potential. Accordingly, we’re lacking evidence here of the clear causal connection present in Giebeler. We just don’t know.5
That said, Schaw’s complaint alleges that his inability to meet Habitat’s minimum-income threshold through W-2 income is a result of his quadriplegia.
The district court didn’t explicitly consider whether that was so; instead, it summarily determined that the requested accommodation “went solely to [Schaw’s] financial condition—not his disability.” Under our precedent, however, it’s clear that an accommodation addressing an inability to demonstrate wages earned could in some cases be “necessary”—that is, could “alleviate the effects of a disability.” Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1288. Accordingly, the district court should have considered here whether Schaw’s inability to demonstrate the minimum required income through W-2 wages was an effect of his disability.
2
Of course, it’s not enough that an accommodation be “necessary” in the abstract—the Act pairs the word with the object of providing a disabled person an “equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”
The Supreme Court has clarified that, in this context, our focus should be (in Oxford-speak) on uniformity of “effect” rather than “application,” with the end
goal of ensuring that disabled individuals receive the same opportunities as other individuals. In U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002), the Court explained that “[t]he simple fact that an accommodation would provide a ‘preference’—in the sense that it would permit the worker with a disability to violate a rule that others must obey—cannot, in and of itself, automatically show that the accommodation is not ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 398 (discussing accommodations under the analogous ADA standard). Indeed, the Court explained that accommodations are themselves a type of preference, and that such “preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act’s basic equal opportunity goal.” Id. at 397; see also id. (“By definition any special ‘accommodation’ requires . . . different[], i.e., preferential[]” treatment.). As now-Justice Gorsuch explained during his time on the Tenth Circuit, “under the FHA it is sometimes necessary to dispense with formal equality of treatment in order to advance a more substantial equality of opportunity.” Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. St. George City, 685 F.3d 917, 923 (10th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
This doesn’t mean, of course, that under the Act a person with a disability is entitled to an accommodation that would place him in a better position to enjoy a dwelling than a member of the general public. See id. (“[W]hile the FHA requires accommodations necessary to ensure the disabled receive the same housing opportunities as everybody else, it does not require more or better opportunities.”).
As we explained in Schwarz, when accommodations “start addressing problems not caused by a person’s handicap,” a handicapped person receives not “an ‘equal,’ but rather a better opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling,”—“a preference that the plain language of this statute cannot support.” 544 F.3d at 1226 (emphasis added).
The district court here determined that “Schaw’s requested accommodation[] went solely to his financial condition—not his disability,” and, accordingly, that it would’ve given him “a better opportunity—as opposed to equal opportunity—to use and enjoy one of Habitat’s dwellings.” But again, we’re not so sure. For one thing, the district court rested its conclusion that the accommodation would provide a “better” opportunity on the flawed premise that it would remedy only Schaw’s financial status—which, for reasons already explained, may or may not be true. Moreover, the district court neglected to acknowledge an important nuance—that the “financial” aspect of the accommodation here concerns only the form of funding and not the amount. Schaw didn’t request, for example, that Habitat lower its minimum-income standards or allow him to get away with doing or paying any less than other applicants. He stood ready to pay the monthly mortgage in full and to demonstrate a gross annual income exceeding the minimum required level. He requested only that he—an individual allegedly limited to a fixed income as a result, he says, of his disability—be allowed to prove that income in part
through familial support or food stamps, putting him in the same position as an able-bodied person who could (theoretically) increase his income through W-2 wages. This request—to show an equal income from a different source—could be construed as an invitation to “dispense with formal equality of treatment in order to advance a more substantial equality of opportunity.” Cinnamon Hills, 685 F.3d at 923.
Of course, as Habitat points out, we could look at this another way: that Schaw seeks an advantage that other applicants don’t enjoy. For instance, if an able-bodied comparator happened to bring in $778 monthly from his job and $100 in familial support, he too would have been denied a home. But nothing in the statute indicates that the fact that a theoretical non-disabled person also could potentially benefit from an accommodation renders that accommodation improper. Again, “[t]he simple fact that an accommodation would provide a ‘preference’—in the sense that it would permit the worker with a disability to violate a rule that others must obey—cannot, in and of itself, automatically show that the accommodation is not ‘reasonable.’” Barnett, 535 U.S. at 398. The inquiry is whether the requested accommodation would provide a disabled person an opportunity to enjoy a dwelling that would otherwise—due to his disability—elude him.
* * *
Having (hopefully) provided some clarification regarding failure-to-accommodate claims under the Fair Housing Amendments Act, we think it prudent to remand for the district court to consider whether, in light of this opinion, Schaw has stated a failure-to-accommodate claim—specifically (1) whether Habitat has shown that Schaw’s facially reasonable request would nonetheless result in an undue burden on or fundamental alteration to its program and (2) whether the requested accommodation is necessary to afford Schaw an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. See
III
Schaw separately claims that Habitat’s minimum-income requirement has a disparate impact on SSDI recipients. Here, we agree with the district court—Schaw fails to state a claim.
In contrast to a disparate-treatment case in which a plaintiff seeks to establish that a defendant had “a discriminatory intent or motive,” a plaintiff bringing a disparate-impact claim challenges practices that have a “disproportionately adverse effect” and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 524 (2015) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff can demonstrate a discriminatory effect by showing that a policy “makes housing options
significantly more restrictive for members of a protected group than for persons outside that group.” Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton Cty., 466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). Evidence demonstrating a “significant discriminatory effect suffices to demonstrate a [prima facie] violation of the Fair Housing Act.” Jackson v. Okaloosa Cty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994). That said, it’s not enough to show that a few people are affected by a policy—rather, the disparity must be substantial enough to raise an inference of causation. Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 1994); see Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1218 (holding that a district court correctly rejected a disparate-impact claim because the plaintiff failed to present any relevant comparative evidence).
We needn’t go any farther here, because Schaw failed to provide any evidence of discriminatory effect in the district court. Schaw alleged that Habitat’s minimum-impact requirement has a disparate impact on persons with disabilities because the requirements make it impossible for a person receiving SSDI to qualify for a home. In response, Habitat provided evidence of numerous applicants receiving SSDI who’d been approved for a Habitat home. Rather than provide any evidence to the contrary, Schaw sought to amend his complaint to clarify that the minimum-income requirement has a disparate impact on “SSDI applicants who receive $847.50 or less in SSDI per month.” Still, though, he offered no evidence.
This reverse-engineered claim—tailored specifically to Schaw’s particular circumstances—still fails. Schaw didn’t submit any evidence to prove that Habitat’s requirements disproportionately exclude those receiving SSDI (no matter the amount) as compared with able-bodied individuals making the same amount of money from non-SSDI sources. Accordingly, the district court properly found that Schaw failed to state a disparate-impact claim.
IV
In sum, we hold (1) that a court must first consider whether a plaintiff has shown that a requested accommodation is facially reasonable and then whether a defendant has demonstrated that the accommodation would result in an undue burden or fundamental alteration to its program or policy; (2) that a plaintiff’s financial state in any particular case could be unrelated, correlated, or causally related to his disability and that, in some cases, an accommodation with a financial aspect—even one that appears to provide a preference—could be “necessary to afford [an] equal opportunity to use or enjoy a dwelling” within the meaning of the Act; and (3) that Schaw failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Habitat’s minimum-income requirement disproportionately excludes SSDI recipients.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court as to Schaw’s disparate-impact claim and vacate and remand the district court’s order for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion as to Schaw’s failure-to-accommodate claim—to determine, perhaps among other issues, whether Habitat has shown that Schaw’s facially reasonable accommodation would result in an undue burden or a fundamental alteration to its program and whether Schaw’s financial state is a result of his disability such that the requested accommodation is “necessary to afford [him an] equal opportunity to use or enjoy a dwelling.”
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”