209 F. 582 | 7th Cir. | 1913
(after stating the facts as above).
“Both upon principle and authority it is clear that a master is answerable for defects in any instrumentalities which he has temporarily taken over from the owner and made a part of his own plant. In such cases the elements of possession and the exercise of control are decisive. * * * So far as regards his obligations to his servants, he must be considered as the owner pro tempore. This principle is applicable whether he has borrowed the appliance in question or has hired it for a specific consideration or has taken possession of it for a definite or an indefinite period with a view to the performance of certain work in which he and the owner are both interested.”
Where an elevator company took a car from a railway company by means of an inclined track, an employé of the elevator company was injured, while engaged in conducting a car by gravity down this incline, by reason of a defective brake on the car. Held, that the defect might have been discovered by the use of ordinary care on the part of the elevator company, and-that .the question of the liability of the elevator company was properly submitted to the jury. Republic Elevator Co. v. Lund et al., 196 Fed. 745, 116 C. C. A. 373 (C. C. A. 8th Cir.).
“Tbe master who contracts to do work on the premises of another must exercise ordinary care for the safety of his servants there, no less than on his own premises.”
Miller & Co. were not excused from the duty of providing a safe place and safe appliances. They had full opportunity to satisfy themselves that the premises and appliances were in good and safe condition, and were bound to do so as to defendant in error. Therefore the court properly left it to the jury to determine from the evidence whether they discharged their duty in that respect toward defendant in error.
The interest method above stated was not a proper way in which to ascertain the amount of damages. Houston Railway Co. v. Willie, 53 Tex. 318, 37 Am. Rep. 756; Rudiger v. C. St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co., 94 Wis. 191, 68 N. W. 661; Crouse v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 196-208, 78 N. W. 446, 778; Hackett v. Wis. Cent. Ry. Co., 141 Wis. 464-473, 124 N. W. 1018.
In Press Pub. Co. v. Monteith, 180 Fed. 356-362, 103 C. C. A. 502, 508, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit states the rule as follows, viz.:
“The more rational and enlightened view is that in order to justify a reversal the court must be able to- conclude that the error is so substantial as to affect injuriously the appellant’s rights. ' Prejudice must be perceived, not presumed or imagined.”
Here,- whatever presumptions there are rebut the theory of prejudice or injury.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.