Ramon Carreno-Ochoa v. United States
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
January 19, 2018
494
Filed January 19, 2018
Krissa Marie Lanham, DOJ-USAO, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Ramon Carreno-Ochoa, Pro Se
Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM **
Ramon Carreno-Ochoa appeals from the district court‘s judgment and challenges his guilty-plea conviction and 63-month sentence for assault of a federal officer resulting in bodily injury, in violation of
Carreno-Ochoa waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Our independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the waiver. See United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2009). We accordingly dismiss the appeal. See id. at 988.
We decline to address on direct appeal Carreno-Ochoa‘s pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 2011).
Counsel‘s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.
DISMISSED.
Albert HAYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. VOONG, Acting Chief Inmate Appeal Officer; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-16653
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted January 16, 2018 * Filed January 19, 2018
Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Albert Hayes, Pro Se
California state prisoner Albert Hayes appeals pro se from the district court‘s judgment dismissing his
The district court properly dismissed Hayes’ Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA“) and Rehabilitation Act (“RA“) claims against defendants in their individual capacities because Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA do not authorize claims against State officials in their individual capacities. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “a plaintiff cannot bring an action under
The district court properly dismissed Hayes’ ADA and RA claims against defendants in their official capacities because Hayes failed to identify in his Third Amended Complaint a policy or custom of the State that allegedly violated federal law. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (“Because the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official, the entity‘s policy or custom must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hayes leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint because further amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile); Chodos v. West Publ‘g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is particularly broad.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hayes’ motions for appointment of counsel because Hayes failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.