405 F.2d 1108 | D.C. Cir. | 1968
Lead Opinion
These are appeals from a summary reversal of an administrative order granting Workmen’s Compensation for an injury sustained in the scope of employment. Appellant Van Devander worked approximately 26 hours on his job without sleep. Some of his duties included the installation of heavy electrical equipment. About twenty minutes after leaving his job Van Devander fell asleep from fatigue while driving his car and was seriously injured. The deputy commissioner, also an appellant here, entered a compensation order
The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Act affords compensation for any “accidental injury or death arising out of and in the; course of employment,”
The uncontradicted evidence before the deputy commissioner amply justified his conclusion that Appellant Van Devander’s falling asleep while driving was directly induced by the exhaus
Appellees’ argument that Workmen’s Compensation does not extend to injuries sustained while the employee is proceeding to or from the performance of his employment expresses a broad and general truism but is not dispositive of the peculiar facts presented by this record. An important step in cases of employment-related injuries is to scrutinize the factual setting to determine whether there is a direct and positive causal connection between the employment and the injury. What is required to bring the claimant within the ambit of the statute is “continuity of cause * * * combined with continuity in time and space * * *." Field v. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 139, 141, 156 N.E. 642, 643 (1927) (Cardozo, J.).
Situations in which compensation has been denied because no nexus existed between the job itself and an injury sustained while coming from or going to the job site
Reversed and remanded.
. Appellant Van Devander filed for compensation under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1957), made applicable to the District of Columbia by the Act of May 17, 1928, 45 Stat. 600 (1928), 36 D.C. Code §§ 501, 502 (1967).
. 33 U.S.C. § 902(2), (1957).
. 33 U.S.C. § 919(a) (1957).
. O’Leary v. Brown-Pac.-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 508, 71 S.Ct. 470, 472, 95 L.Ed. 483 (1951); accord, e. g., Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 288 U.S. 162, 166, 53 S.Ct. 380, 77 L.Ed. 676 (1933).
. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1957).
. The causative analysis is of course considerate of the remedial intendment of the Act, which “is to be construed liberally for the benefit of employees and their dependents.” Vozzolo v. Britton, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 262, 377 F.2d 144, 147 (1967) (footnote omitted).
. Cf., e. g., Gould Nat’l Batteries v. Industrial Com’n, 34 Ill.2d 151, 214 N.E.2d 750 (1966); Klimas v. Trans Carribbean Airways, 10 N.Y.2d 209, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14, 176 N.E.2d 714 (1961).
. E. g., Foster v. Massey, 131 U.S.App.D. C., -, 407 F.2d 343 (May 29, 1968).
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
I think the “hazard” — that Van Devander might fall asleep as he drove his car after work — was not incident to his employer’s business. The majority suggest the latter might easily have protected against that hazard by getting a taxi for Van Devander, by providing him
It does not appear that the appellant asked for any of these protections or that he indicated he was in need of help.. He alone knew how tired and sleepy he was; so I think when he undertook to drive his car home, he was engaged in his own venture and assumed the risk that he might fall asleep. To hold the employer responsible for his mishap seems to me to be improper. I would affirm.