196 Mo. App. 265 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1917
Swope Parkway, hereinafter referred .to, is a boulevard in Kansas City, Missouri, 150 feet wide running from Forty-seventh street to the entrance of Swope Park. The proceedings by which said boulevard was established, or sought to be established, were taken in 1903. It was laid out in that
This action, brought June 28, 1913, is a suit in equity by certain owners of property, the tax bills on •which amount in the aggregate to $6089.56, to cancel said tax bills. After a trial and full hearing, the chancellor dismissed plaintiff’s bill, and they have appealed.
Respondents motion to affirm the judgment because the bill of exceptions is not properly sighed is clearly without merit. The case was tried before Hon. Joseph A. Guthrie, at that time the regular judge of Division No. 1 of the Jackson Circuit Court. He resigned before the bill of exceptions was signed, and Judge Buckner was appointed by the Governor as his successor. The bill was signed by Judge Buckner as Judge of said court, and following his signature appears that of Guthrie as former judge before whom the case was tried. Judge Buckner also made the order under which the bill was filed. The signing of Judge Buckner properly authenticated the bill. [Sec. 2032, R. S. 1909.] The signature of the judge who tried the case performed no function except to
The objection to the validity of the bills which we shall first consider is that the proceedings by which the work was authorized and the tax bills were issued, are defective so as to render the bills null and void. This objection has two features, one relating to the proceedings by the city to authorize the work and the other to the proceedings in the circuit court to ascertain the damages caused by the grading. However, they are so closely related that the full force of the objection is not seen or understood unless they are considered together. Before these two features are specified, it will be better to set forth the steps that were taken, as in this way the strength or weakness of the objection based on said two features will more clearly appear.
On June 12, 1911, the Board of Park Commissioners, by a resolution, fixed the grade of Swope Parkway and recommended to the Common Council the passage of an ordinance establishing said grade in accordance with the resolution. The council, by ordinance approved June 14, 1911, established said grade in accordance with the resolution and recommendation of said Park Board. On July 10, 1911, the said Park Board, pursuant to section 31, article 13, Kansas City charter, 1909, adopted a resolution numbered 10,367, that the above-mentioned portion of Swope Parkway (describing it), be graded to the full width
In the meantime, that is to say, on February 5, 1912, after the verdict had been returned but before the judgment of confirmation was entered, the Board of Park Commissioners, by resolution No. 10808, adopted plans and specifications for the grading of said portion of Swope Parkway, and approved the form of -contract for said work and directed that advertisement be made for bids thereon. This was done, and hids for doing the work in accordance with such plans and specifications were received, and on February 19, 1912, the bid of the Acme Paving & Crusher Company was accepted and a contract was awarded it ■ for the doing of such work. On February 26, 1912, said Park Board, by resolution, approved the contract and bond for the work, and recommended to the common council an ordinance providing for and authorizing the work. On March 5, 1912, the common council passed said ordinance, being Ordinance No. 11705, directing that the aforesaid portion of Swope Parkway be graded to the full width thereof and to the established grade of the same, the work and improvement to bé of the nature described and specified in, and to be done in accordance with, the plans and specifications adopted by the Park Board February 5, 1912, and on file in the office of said Board, and. in accordance with the contract- and specifications therefor between the Board of Park Commissioners and the Acme Paving and Crusher Company and its surety* entered into on Feb
Having set forth in general outline the steps taken, we can now state the two features of plaintiffs’
It seems to us that the first matter to be determined is, when does the city charter require the plans and specifications to be filed? The Supreme Court in Waddell Inv. Co. v. Hall, 255 Mo. 693, say that in grading matters “the specifications are to follow the passage of the ordinance and not precede it.” The charter does not expressly specify any point in the proceedings at which they must be adopted. Section 31, article 13, charter 1909, page 429, says the Park Board shall have power to cause ny road, parkway or boulevard to be graded in such manner and at such times as the Board may determine, provided, that if said Board shall, by resolution, determine that any such work shall be done and be paid for by special tax bills, the Common Council shall have power by ordinance to ratify and confirm the action of such Board and authorize the work to be done, in which case, and when so ratified, the Board of Public Works shall apportion the cost. Said section also provides that the Park Board shall let the contract to the lowest and best bidder and the work shall be done under the supervision of the Park Board, but such contract, before it becomes effective shall be ratified and confirmed by an ’ordinance of the Common Council. Now, in this case, the grade of the boulevard had been fixed by the Park Board and established by the council. The Park Board then passed a resolution, No. 10,367, that a certain part of said boulevard be graded to its full width and to the established grade. The council then passed Ordinance No. 9447. It is> true it refers to plans and specifications as being on file when there
But said section 31 of article 13 provides (charter, p. 430), in dealing with the ratification of the contract by the Common Council, that it shall be ratified, approved and confirmed “in the same manner as contracts for work clone under the supervision of the Board of Public Works are required to be ratified, approved and confirmed.” Now, the ninth paragraph of section 3, article 8 (charter, p. 313), in reference to the ratification of contracts for work done under the supervision of the Board of Public Works, says: “The ordinances ratifying, approving and confirming the contract . . . shall also provide for and authorize the improvement, and shall state the nature of the improvement and this may be done by a reference to the plans and specifications therefor, and such ordinance shall state how the cost thereof shall be paid.” This is exactly what ordinance No. 11705 did. And this is the only place, so far as we have been able to find, where plans and specifications are specifically referred to in providing for any ordinance to be passed by the council ratifying the action of the Park Board. In paragraph 6 of section 3, article. 8, which says it relates to the improvement of public highways
In this inquiry as to damages, the jury did not have to consider plans and specifications in order to know what the damages would be. The grade- was established, the width of the boulevard was'known, the ordinance called for the grading thereof to its' full
In this connection it should be remarked that there is no evidence that plaintiff in case at bar filed any claim for damages in said proceeding. Section 10, article 7, of the charter provides that any person who fails to file a claim for damages shall be deemed to have waived the same. Nor have any of the plaintiffs asserted at any time that their- property has been damaged by the grading.
The factv that the circuit court did not render judgment upon the verdict until the May term following has nothing to do with the validity of the bills. Section 13, article 7 (charter, p. 304), provides that should no claim for damages be filed at any time before the day set for hearing or if the verdict shall declare that no damages will result to private property from the proposed grading, the city may proceed to cause the grading to be done. The verdict being that there were no damages, the city was free to go ahead with the grading, and was not interested further in the proceedings to ascertain damages unless indeed the verdict should be set aside or annuled in some way. Nothing of this kind was done, and when the verdict was confirmed on May 13, 1912, the record recites that all persons and parties interested in said proceedings were present. No claim is made that the plaintiffs in the case at bar were not made parties to that proceeding and, as heretofore stated, nothing was ever done afterward by anyone in said proceeding except by the city to have the verdict confirmed.
In fine, the grading determined upon by the Park Board, and for the doing of which the tax bills were issued, received the legislative sanction of the council after plans and specifications were adopted, and said legislation also provided and directed that said work
Another ground upon which the bills are attacked is that the proceedings by which Swope Parkway was established were defective and insufficent to vest the public with an easement in the right-of-way, and therefore, although, the grading was done within the limits of the boulevard’s width of 150 feet, as marked out and actually opened on the ground, yet such right-of-way, or at least portions thereof, is or are private property.
As stated, the steps by which Swope Parkway was created, opened and laid out, were taken in 1903. In 1886, long prior to the establishment of Swope Parkway, and before the territory, through which the hereinabove mentioned portion of said boulevard now runs, was taken into the city, Jackson county established a road, 80 feet wide, known as Cleveland avenue, the center line of which so far as concerns this case, ran from the southwest corner of the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of said section 27 south to and on the center line of the east half of section 34, township 49, range 33 and on the center line of the east half of section 3, township 48, range 33, to the terminus of
These tracts will be considered in their order. They are: 1. A graveyard which, according to the map or blue print of the boulevard in the abstract, was located east of Cleveland avenue and in the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of said section 3. This graveyard contains one-fourth of an acre, and seems to have been square in shape. If so, then it is 104.354 feet each way, and if, as plaintiffs claim, its western line coincided with the east line of Cleveland avenue,
The Montopia Land Company, in April, 1906, platted this land into “Mountain View Addition” and dedicated all streets shown thereon to public use. Swope Parkway, 150 feet wide, appears on this plat as the western boundary of “Mountain View Addition.” On July 11, 1907, William Adair, who first excepted the tract for a graveyard, conveyed to J:I. C. Adair a tract described as. “Beginning 1251.2 feet west and 664.8 feet south of the northeast corner of said section 3, township 47, range 33, thence south 104.35 feet, thence east 104.35 feet, thence north 104.35 feet, thence west 104.35 feet to the place of beginning, containing one-fourth of an acre.” By mesne conveyances this tract was conveyed to Montopia Land Company by deed filed June 19, 1913. On June 13, 1907, two "days after the
It is contended, however, that the deed of July 11, 1907, from William Adair did not convey any ground occupied by the boulevard, since, as shown by various deeds in evidence, the distance from the northeast corner of said section 3 to the west line of the east half of said quarter section (the latter being the center line of Swope Parkway and -old Cleveland avenue), is 1326.7 feet, and the beginning point of the one-fourth acre described in said deed of July 11, is 1251.2 feet west of east line of said section 3, and, therefore, the west line of said one-fourth acre tract is 75.5 feet east of center line of said Swope Parkway. Said deed of .July 11, therefore, does hot affect any portion of the land inside the boundaries of said Parkway, and so plaintiffs say the title to a 35 foot strip the length of the graveyard was still left in William Adair on July 11. This is assuming, of course that the west line of the graveyard reserved nnd excepted by him in 1853 coincided with the east line of Cleveland avenue. But there was no definite location of the graveyard by
It is clear from the evidence in the record that all the graves had been there a long time and if the Parkway did not' reach to or disturb the brick inclosure on the graveyard, there was nothing to indicate to the company doing the grading in 1912 that the graveyard was being encroached upon, and the deed from William Adair to H. C. Adair dated July 11, 1907 (on record since April, 1909), would lead one to believe that the west line of .said graveyard was 75.5 feet east of the center line of the boulevard, and therefore not within its limits. • Under all these circumstances, and
2. The next two portions of said boulevard, said to be private property, have to do with what are termed the Nelson & Pitrat tracts. One Placey owned a tract 493.30 feet north and south, the west line of which was the center line of the northeast quarter of said section 3, which as heretofore stated was the center line of Cleveland avenue. This ground lay immediately south of the Collier tract herein above referred to. On March 30, 1903, Placey conveyed the north half of his land to Emory Nelson and the south half to Anna L. Pitrat. Nelson and Pitrat signed the right-of-way deed hereinabove referred to and described therein “a strip thirty-five feet wide across our entire frontage on Cleveland avenue” for the purpose of widening Cleveland avenue to 150 feet instead of eighty feet and for boulevard purposes. This deed was signed by them on March 27, 1903 (three days before they got title to the land), and plaintiffs therefore say such dedication' is not valid because of the rule' that no one but the holder of the title can dedicate. The right-of-way. deed was filed in October, 1903.
3. The next tracts said to be private property consist of two lots which abutted Cleveland avenue on the east side thereof owned by the Swope Park Realty Company. This company joined in the right-of-way deed to relinquish thirty-five feet necessary to make the 150 foot boulevard. It is urged that because the corporate seal of the company was not affixed to the deed, the strip still remains private property. As the company had a seal and it was not affixed, doubtless the failure to attach the seal made the deed insufficient as a conveyance of the company’s legal title. But the company has never complained and is not now
4. The last tract said to be private property is a strip thirty-five feet wide off the east side of a tract 100 feet long north and south by 190 feet wide east and west, lying in the northeast corner of the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of said section 3, which said thirty-five foot strip was necessary to be added to the west side of Cleveland avenue at that point to make the 150 feet of said boulevard. David C. Mastin owned all of said above named quarter-section, and in 1889 he deeded the above-mentioned 100 by 190 foot tract to certain trustees, and their successors in office, for a church lot. The deed was not filed for record until September 10, 1897, meantime the said quarter-quarter section was deeded, ydthout any reservation or exception of said church lot, to Thomas H. Mastin by deed filed January 15, 1891, and later another deed was made to him, still with no reservation, which was filed November 29, 1893. On July 14, 1909, the widow and all of the heirs of Thomas H. Mastin conveyed to said trustees for the church the aforesaid tract of 100 by 190 feet “subject to the right of the public to use the east seventy-five (75) feet of the property hereinbefore described as a portion of Swope Parkway.” The trustees of said church joined in said right-of-way deed hereinbefore mentioned, but it is contended that as said trustees did not have an unlimited estate in fee their relinquishment of the thirty-five foot strip for the boulevard was invalid. The contention being that inasmuch as the church lot might revert, if devoted to other than church purposes, the trustees had-only a determinable fee. There was no reverter mentioned in the deed. It may be
The judgment of the chancellor dismissing the bill is affirmed.