171 Ga. 57 | Ga. | 1930
Lead Opinion
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
The Penal Code (1910), § 416, provides as follows: “Any person who shall pursue his business, or the work of his ordinary calling, on the Lord’s day, works of necessity or charity only excepted, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” It is insisted by plaintiffs in error that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the defendants from operating the picture-show on Sundays, under the allegations of the petition, under the foregoing section of the Penal Code of this State; and learned counsel for plaintiffs in error have filed a very able and exhaustive brief, and supplemental brief, in
“If the sanction of time can ever be invoked to justify the exercise of governmental authority over a particular subject-matter, this can certainly be done in respect to setting aside one day in each week for rest and the cessation of all unnecessary labor. A law to this effect prevailed in the earliest times of which we have airy authentic record, and the subject was one of statutory regulation in Georgia during her colonial period, and has so continued throughout the whole term of her existence as a State. At no instant since her independence was declared has she been without such a law on her statute book. 1 It is not only unlawful, but penal, for any person whatsoever to ‘pursue their business or work of their ordinary calling upon the Lord’s day, works of necessity or charity only excepted.’ . . This prohibition upon Sunday labor was already in force when the Code was adopted, and dates back to the year 1762. The penalty 'prescribed by the colonial statute has been changed, but in other respects that statute has been operative continuously since it was enacted. There can be no well-founded doubt of its being a police regulation, considering it merely as ordaining the cessation of ordinary labor and business during one day in every week; for the frequent and total suspension of the toils, cares, and strain of mind or muscle, incident to pursuing an occupation or common employment, is beneficial to every individual, and incidentally to the community at large, — the general public. Leisure is no less essential than labor to the well-being of man. Short intervals of leisure at stated periods reduce wear aud tear, promote health, favor cleanliness, encourage social intercourse, afford op
“If a law which, in essential respects, betters for all the people the conditions, sanitary, social, and individual, under which their daily life is carried on, and which contributes to insure for each, even against his own will, his minimum allowance of leisure, can not be rightly classed as a police regulation, it would be difficult to imagine any law that could. With respect to the selection of the particular day in each week which has been set apart by our statute as the rest day of the people, religious views and feelings may have had a controlling influence. We doubt not they did have, and it is probable that the same views and feelings had a very powerful influence in dictating the policy of setting apart any day whatever as a day of enforced rest. But neither of these considerations is destructive of the police nature and character of the statute. If good and sufficient police reasons underlie it, and substantial police purposes are involved in its provisions, these reasons and purposes constitute its civil and legal justification, whether they were or not the direct and immediate motives which induced its passage, and have for so long a time kept it in force. Courts are not concerned with the mere beliefs and sentiments of legislators, or with the motives which influence them in enacting laws which are within legislative competency. That which is properly made a civil duty by statute is none the less so because it is also a real or supposed religious obligation; nor is the statute vitiated, or in any wise weakened, by the chance, or even the certainty, that in passing it the legislative mind' was swayed by the religious, rather than by the civil, aspect of the measure. Doubtless, it is a religious duty to pay debts, but no one supposes that this is any obstacle to its being exacted as a civil duty. With few exceptions, the same may be said of the whole catalogue of duties specified in the ten commandments. Those of them which are purely and exclusively religious in their nature can not be or be made civil duties, but all the rest of them may be, in so far as they involve conduct as distinguished from
“It applies alike to all business, vocations, and occupations. It concerns the general police óf the State and all interests, whether agricultural, mechanical, manufacturing, commercial, professional, or what not. It is universal, and rigidly impartial, making no discrimination whatever for or against commerce or anything else. It puts no obstacle in the way of trade or its operations which' is not encountered by every other class of wordly business or employment. Non-trading days are non-business days generally, and non-working days for all the people. Trade may go on when anything else can; it stops only when, and so long as, there is a complete suspension of worldly enterprise and activity. It is required to take no rest which is not appointed for everything else to take.”
This same case was reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States; and that court, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, quoted from the decision of Chief Justice Bleckley, and in Hennington v. State of Georgia, 163 U. S. 300 (16 Sup. Ct. 1086, 1087, 41 L. Ed. 166, 168), he said: “From the earliest period in the history of Georgia it has been the policy of that State, as it was the policy of many of the original States, to prohibit all persons, under penalties, from using the Sabbath as a day of labor and for pursuing their ordinary callings. By an act of the colonial legislature of Georgia, approved March 4, 1762, it was provided: ‘No tradesman, artificer, workman, laborer, or other person whatsoever shall do or exercise any worldly labor, business, or work of th'eir ordinary callings, upon the Lord’s day, or any part thereof (works of necessity or charity only excepted), and that every person being of the age of fifteen years or upwards, offending in the premises, shall, for every such offense, forfeit the sum of ten shillings. And that no person or persons whatsoever shall publicly cry, show forth, or expose to sale any wares, merchandise, fruit, herbs, goods, or
In Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387, 391, Judge Thurman, delivering the unanimous opinion of the court, said: “We are, then, to regard the statute under consideration as a mere municipal or police regulation, whose validity is neither strengthened nor weakened by the fact that the day of rest it enjoins is the Sabbath day. Wisdom requires that men should refrain from labor at least one day in seven, and the advantages of having the day of rest fixed, and so fixed as to happen at regularly recurring intervals, are too obvious to be overlooked. It was within the constitutional competency of the General Assembly to require the cessation of labor, and to name the day of rest.”
In Weldon v. Colquitt, 62 Ga. 449, 451 (35 Am. R. 128), this court, in holding that a court of inquiry held on Sunday is illegal, speaking through Judge Bleckley, said: “In Georgia, as in England, Sunday is a holy day. The code denominates it the Lord’s day, and as the Lord’s day all courts and magistrates are to consider it. This they are to do as matter of mere law, irrespective of religious obligation and duty. On it there can be performed no judicial labor which does not come fairly within the description of works of necessity or charity. Sunday is no day for trial and judgment, being, by the common law, dies non juridicus. The mere act of receiving a verdict on Sunday, which a jury are ready to deliver, is illegal. 49 Ga. 436. The current of decision by this court has been prosabbatic in full measure, and with that current runs, we think, the true law, as well as the general moral sentiment of the people of the State. Courts, high or low, are no less bound to abstain from ordinary labor on the Sabbath day, than are private individuals. In a time of peace, and when the magistrates of the country are not overwhelmed with police business, to an extent rendering it impracticable to dispatch the same without encroaching upon the Sabbath, a court of inquiry can not be begun and held on Sunday for the examination and commitment of offenders, not even of Sabbath-breakers, rioters, or disturbers of public worship. Warrants may issue and arrests be made, but examination and trial can not be commenced until Monday. In the record before
Chief Judge Hill, in the ease of McCain v. State, 2 Ga. App. 389, 390 (58 S. E. 550), discusses the Sunday law at length, and says: “The terms of the statute áre very broad. They not only forbid the pursuit of secular business, but forbid any work of ordinary calling on the Lord’s day, except works of necessity or charity. It makes no sort of difference that the secular business is not carried on on Sunday at the usual place of business. If the work is that of his ordinary calling, and is occasionally performed by the defendant at a different place, he violates the statute. The law not only closes the business places of secular employment during the Sabbath, but stops on said day work of ordinary calling, whatever that work may be or wherever that work may be done. The purpose of the law is to require cessation from labor, and to set apart one day as a day of rest as essential to the physical and moral well-being, not only of the individual, but of society. It ean not be doubted that the plaintiff in error in shaving his customers at the rooms of the club did pursue the work of his ordinary calling. It was simply a change of location, but the work was the same as pursued on week days at his place of business. Neither can it be doubted that this work was done by him because of the compensation paid by the members. The fact that the work in question was confined to the members of the club, and was performed in the clubhouse, may reduce the fiagrancy of the offense, but can not alter the express terms of the law. The work on Sundays was possibly not so active and constant as the defendant’s work on week days. Still, shaving was the work of his ordinary calling. ‘ Those things that are repeated daily or weekly in the course of trade or business are parts of the ordinary calling of the man exercising such trade or business.’ Reed v. State, 119 Ga. 563 (46 S. E. 837).”
The next question to be considered is whether, under the circumstances of the present case, the operation of a theater, and showing moving-pictures on the Sabbath day continuously, constitutes a public nuisance, and whether a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin such performances. One of the most recent cases decided by this court.on the question of public nuisances and the proper exercise of jurisdiction by a court of equity to enjoin such
Plaintiffs in error rely upon the ease of Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371 (106 S. E. 792, 40 A. L. R. 1132). That case is distinguishable from the case at bar. There the judgment of the trial court
But it is argued that resort should have been had to the mayor and city council to abate the nuisance complained of, if one exists, rather than a resort to a court of equity. It will be noted that each Sunday performance gives rise to a new cause of action, and the nuisance is a continuing one; and this court, in the case of Town of Bentz v. Roach, 154 Ga. 492 (5) (115 S. E. 94), held that “A continuing nuisance gives a new cause of action for each day of its continued maintenance. Butler v. Thomasville, 74 Ga. 570; Georgia Chemical & Mining Co. v. Colquitt, 72 Ga. 172; Civil Code (1910), § 4459; Mulligan v. Augusta, 115 Ga. 337 (41 S. E. 604); City of Atlanta v. Warnock, 91 Ga. 210 (18 S. E. 135, 23 L. R. A. 301, 44 Am. St. R. 17). And in such a case, in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits, a court of equity will enter
In conclusion, the case seems to stand this way: The State has on its statute books certain laws which' prohibit the violation of the Sabbath day, by punishing the violators with a certain penalty. That law, and all of our laws, are made by the people themselves. It is their right to pass legal laws, or, if they see proper, to repeal them. It is not the duty of the courts to make laws, but to interpret and apply them; and until a law is repealed, it- is the duty of the citizens to observe it; and to demand that it be enforced. 240 citizens and taxpayers of Dougherty County are asking for the enforcement of the law as contained in the Penal Code, § 416, and the court below has seen fit to grant their request, under the facts in the record, by enforcing that section, where it is made to appear that it is being continuously violated; and in view of all the pleadings in the case, the evidence, and the law bearing on it, I feel constrained to concur, in the judgment of the trial court, in granting the injunction against the continued violation of the Penal Code, § 416, and in preventing defendants from operating the picture-show in question on the Sabbath day, in violation of the plain terms of the statute.
Rehearing
The plaintiff in error asks for a rehearing in this case, for the following reasons:
“(1) The present opinion is based on the idea (syllabus 1-a) that (a) the Theatre Company itself operates the picture-show, and (b) sells tickets to the patrons, and (c), ‘turns over’ to the Legion’s charities the net proceeds, after paying the expenses; and the member or members of this court concurring in said opinion have overlooked the undisputed fact in the record that (a) it is the American Legion that operates the picture-show on Sunday (and not the theatre company) and (b) that no tickets are sold (but on the contrary said proceeds belong to the Legion’s charities from the moment when they are given). The great importance of this error in the present opinion appears when we consider the next paragraph (numbered 2) below.
“(2) The present opinion overlooks and fails even to mention the first point (and the point most strongly urged by plaintiff in error, supported by the most numerous authorities, on pages 29 to 42 of our original brief), viz.: That since the record shows (and even the present opinion admits this) that the picture-show is being operated by the American Legion, it follows that the lawfulness of the acts of the employees operating said picture-show must be determined and decided according as the acts of the employer were lawful or unlawful; — in other words, the agent (employee)' can not be guilty unless the principal (American Legion) is guilty,— this point having already been ruled expressly in favor of plaintiff in error, in New York, Massachusetts, Maine, South Carolina, and other States, without any decision anywhere to the contrary, and having been also ruled (by necessary implication) in favor of plaintiffs in error, even in Georgia.
“(3) The logical result of the present opinion is that every paid choir-singer, organist, or sexton of a church in the State of Georgia violates the Sunday law, every Sunday. If the lawfulness of the employer’s acts (the church’s) do not protect these, then nothing can protect them. Every argument used in the present opinion, against the lawfulness of the acts of the employees of the American Legion, applies with equal force against the acts of such employees of churches.
“On the question as to whether or not the picture-show constituted a nuisance which could be enjoined by a court of equity:
*76 “(1) Every word of the present opinion on this subject is fully answered by, and directly contrary to, the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Dean ease (151 Ga. 371(2), 373, 375 [supra], opinion by Justice George), and also in the case of Bentley v. State Board of Examiners (152 Ga. 836, 841 near top [111 S. E. 379], opinion by Justice Hines); and also in the case of Bennett v. Bennett (161 Ga. 936, 942 top half [132 S. E. 528], opinion by Justice Beck). Eor certainly in all of those cases the acts of the defendants which were sought to be enjoined were (a) fully as public and notorious as they were in this case, and (b) fully as continuous as in this case, and (c) far more certainly criminal, than in this case. It is the resolution of the court (in the 2d headnote in the Dean case), adopted without dissent, which is controlling and not the individual expressions of Justice George (though even they are in entire harmony with the resolution of the court,— and especially so are his expressions on pages 373 and 375, about the necessity of an act of the legislature declaring a crime to be a nuisance, before it can be enjoined, unless it was a nuisance at common law, as in the case of a gaming-house). The contention of the present opinion, to the effect that the Dean case is distinguishable from the case at bar, is based upon an entirely erroneous conception of the record in this case, as shown in the next paragraph.
“(2) The. present opinion is egregiously in error in saying that the trial judge, in this case, found the acts of the defendants to be a nuisance ‘because those acts did constitute a public and continuous violation of the law against working on Sunday.’ The fatal error in this statement is the incorporation of the words ‘against working’ therein. What the trial judge did hold (and he so certified in the record) was that said acts of the defendants were a nuisance, (a) ‘because those acts did constitute a public and continuous violation of the law’ (this regardless of what particular law was being violated), and (b) that said violation occurred ‘on Sunday’ (that is, at a time when the people are supposed to be in an especially moral mood, and therefore should not be disturbed by seeing any law violated ‘publicly and continuously’). So the truth appears, that, in this case, the trial judge based his right to enjoin solely upon the ground that the acts sought to be enjoined (a) were unlawful (regardless of what law was being violated), and (b) occurred on ‘Sunday’ (at a time when the violation might be*77 considered more ‘flagrant/ than on any other day). The trial judge did not certify that he found the acts of the defendants to constitute a nuisance because the ‘ character, health, cleanliness, or happiness’ of the public was affected in the slightest degree.
“(3) The present opinion inextricably confuses and commingles two separate things, to wit, (1) the effect of the defendants’ acts upon the defendants’ employees, on the one hand; and (2) the effect of such acts on the public generally, on the other hand. Even in the ease of a real public nuisance, it is the latter only which is entitled to any consideration.
“(4) The present opinion inextricably commingles and confuses the legal authorities bearing on two separate things, to wit, (1) those bearing on a suit by private individuals, to enjoin a private nuisance, and protect property rights, on the one hand,— and those bearing on a suit in the name of the State to enjoin a public nuisance, on the other hand.”
In the original opinion filed by the writer, he did not set out all of the facts in the record, because to have done so would have made the report unduly long, but every part of the record was carefully examined; and after a review of the entire record, including the petition, amended petition, the intervention of the American Legion, the answers of the defendants, and the evidence in the case, including the motion for rehearing, I am unable to reach a different conclusion from that arrived at in the original opinion. One or two important features of the evidence in the ease were omitted in the original opinion, and will be set out here. Eor instance, on page 13 of the record is the following advertisement by the Albany Theatre as to one of the pictures exhibited on Sunday, November 3, to wit: “With the Sunday opening to-morrow, Nov. 3rd, all Sunday performances will be under the auspices of the American Legion. Albany Theatre, Sunday, Mon., Tues. Show Boat. Sunday — Monday—Tuesday. Southwest Georgia’s Magnificent Theatre presents Edna Ferber’s great story of young love, screened in such magnificent manner as to make you catch your breath. Imagine the color of life aboard a show boat — of yearning hearts separated by circumstances that actually brought them together. Yes, in each other’s arms, but worlds apart! What drama! Never before anything like it on the stage or screen. Carl Laemmle’s picture magnificent, played by Laura La Plante,
It is true that defendants say that the statement “admission 50^ at all Sunday showings” was omitted from subsequent'advertisements, but this advertisement was sufficient to authorize the court to hold that admission fees were charged by the defendants to at least one of the shows put on at the Albany Theatre. In the bill of exceptions complaint is made in paragraph (b) that “the court erred in granting said injunction, for the reason that, independently of all other points, the plaintiff in said case failed to show (defendants and each of them contend) that the acts of the defendants complained of constitute a public nuisance, such as could be enjoined by a court of equity; and it is here recited as a matter of fact, and certified by said judge, that said judge did find said acts of the defendants to constitute a public nuisance, because said acts did constitute a public and continuously recurring violation of the law on Sunday.” (Italics ours.) The brief of counsel for plaintiffs in error states: “Thus it distinctly appears in this record that the trial judge did not find from the evidence that there was anything about the acts of the defendants (plaintiffs in error) which did constitute them a nuisance, except and unless the mere fact that said acts constituted ‘public and continuously recurring crimes, would under the law necessarily result in their being a nuisance which equity would enjoin,’ in other words the decision in the case at bar is based upon the legal proposition that any ‘public and continuously recurring’ crime may be enjoined by equity. We take sharp issue with our opponents upon this last proposition, as well as upon the proposition that the acts of plaintiffs in error do really constitute ‘crimes’ at all.” So, the present contention of the plaintiffs in error, that the court below did not pass upon ques
As to the question of whether entrance fees to the theatre was a charge, or was voluntary, the petition alleges: That said “picture-show was operated under the same license issued by the City of Albany to said defendants aforesaid, and the same license paid as an occupation tax in said State and County, on each and all of the stated dates. That said pictures were furnished under the same contract for pictures as hereinbefore alleged. That said performances were all held at the same place and the usual advertisements, and the same advertising contract with Herald Publishing Company as aforesaid. That the same prices prevailed at each and all of said performances. That said performances were operated under the same lease of the building by the owners to the said operators of the Albany Theatre, and the said defendants, owners aforesaid, are hereby notified and required to have and produce the original lease contract upon the trial of this case, the same to be used as evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs, pertinent and material to the cause in question.” The contract between the Albany Theatre and the exhibitor was produced, and provided: “The exhibitor warrants and agrees that during the period each of the photo plays herein provided for shall be exhibited in said theater the exhibitor will charge for admission to said theatre [italics ours] an actual admission fee which shall not be less than 10 cents, unless a greater minimum admission charge is herein elsewhere specified, for each exhibition, and that such photo plays shall not be exhibited unless such admission fee is charged.” So, it will be seen that the contract contemplated that an admission fee should be charged for the showing of each of the “photo plays.” The allegations of the petition were verified by quite a number of citizens of Albany; and the court was authorized to find from the pleadings and the evidence that the acts complained of did constitute an open, continuous violation of law, and was a public nuisance, and to enjoin the defendants’ from showing the moving pictures on Sunday; and construing thfi order of the court in connection with the allegations of the petition, a part of which are
And it is contended that the acts complained of did not work injury, damage, or hurt to the public, as provided by law. This record shows that there were resolutions adopted against exhibiting these Sunday shows by a number, if not all, of the Protestant churches in Albany, and certain nearby towns, and that it was alleged that the showing of these pictures on Sunday was dividing the community into- factions, and causing factional strife. What greater hurt or injury can come to a community than that, I am unable to perceive. I endeavored to point out the original opinion that the showing of these pictures on Sunday under the auspices of the American Legion was-not entirely free of charge, for the reason that the same persons were operating the picture-show who performed that service on week days for the Albany Theatre, and that they - received the same pay, and that the pro rata cost qf the films, rent charges, advertising, and all the costs, came out of the receipts from the exhibition of the pictures; and this being so, I do not see how it can be said that the exhibition of these pictures was absolutely free, and was a work of charity. It is contended by the plaintiffs in error that the employees who operated the picture-show were employees of the American Legion, and not of the Albany Theatre Company,', and therefore, under the law, unless the Albany Theatre Company were guilty of a violation of the Penal Code of 1910, § 416, the-agents, the employees of the Legion, were not guilty. But it will be borne in mind that the violation of section 416 of the Penal Code of 1910 is a misdemeanor, and in misdemeanor cases all are principals (Kinnebrew v. State, 80 Ga. 232, 5 S. E. 56; Jackson v. State, 154 Ga. 544, 114 S. E. 811); and therefore, where it appears that all of the defendants, including