1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 3799 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1999
I. STIPULATED FACTS
The plaintiffs4 jointly own property (hereinafter, "the plaintiffs' property") in the town of Southington. The defendant, the city of Bristol (hereinafter "Bristol"), is a municipality within Hartford County. Bristol owns a landfill that is adjacent to the plaintiffs' property.The Bristol landfill had been receiving waste materials for disposal since approximately 1950.5 Contaminants from this waste material may have migrated onto the plaintiffs' property from the landfill. On October 24, 1995, the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (hereinafter "CDEP"), entered into a "Consent Order" with Bristol in which the defendant conceded that "the operation of a solid waste disposal area at the [landfill resulted] in a discharge of water, substance or materials, including but not limited to leachate, into the waters of the State."6 (Parties' Stip. Ex. B.) The Consent Order required that Bristol: undertake certain investigations and studies with regard to the landfill; and propose plans in order to remediate the leachate contamination caused by the landfill. (Parties' Stip. Ex. B.) The Consent Order did not, however, require Bristol, now or in the future, to CT Page 3800 clean-up the contamination. (Parties' Stip. Ex. B.) The Consent Order did require Bristol to acquire control over all of the contaminated water rights or interests therein that were located within a certain "zone of influence."7 Part of the "zone of influence" extends onto the plaintiffs' property in Southington.
The Connecticut General Assembly, in 1996, enacted Special Act 96-12 (hereinafter also referred to as "the Act"), which, by its terms, allowed a municipality to acquire by condemnation certain rights in property that is located outside the corporate limits of a municipality.
On April 14, 1997, after the passage of the Act, the Bristol city council passed a resolution authorizing the acquisition Bristol of certain easement rights on a portion of the plaintiffs property.8 Thereafter, on July 30, 1997, Bristol commenced condemnation proceedings for easement rights on the plaintiffs' property.
On August 27, 1997, the plaintiffs filed this application for a temporary injunction against Bristol as a result of its attempt to take easement rights on the plaintiffs' property. Along with their application for a temporary injunction, the plaintiffs filed a verified complaint.
The verified complaint9 seeks, inter alia, the following relief: (1) an injunction from Bristol's taking of the plaintiffs' property interests; (2) a declaration that Special Act 96-12 is void, and/or unconstitutional; (3) a declaration that the taking is invalid and/or unconstitutional; and (4) a declaration that the taking is against public policy.
On September 17, 1997, Bristol filed a "Certificate of Taking" with the court, and recorded the certificate in the Southington land records. Bristol then commenced an appraisal of the fair market value of the easement rights to be taken. Upon completion of the appraisal, Bristol deposited with the court the amount of the appraised value of the easement rights.
The parties are each seeking summary judgment on all of the claims of the verified complaint, supporting their respective motions with numerous exhibits, documents and a joint stipulation of facts.
II POSITIONS OF PARTIES CT Page 3801
The plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law for the following reasons. First, the plaintiffs argue that Special Act 96-12 was invalidly enacted, and consequently any act of condemnation that was authorized pursuant to the Act is void. Second, the plaintiffs contend that because Special Act 96-12 is "patently unreasonable and is not related to a legitimate state purpose," it is unconstitutional. (Pls' Mem. Supp. p. 19.) Third, the plaintiffs assert that the defendant's taking of their property rights was not done for a public use or purpose, and therefore the taking itself is unconstitutional. Fourth, in a similar argument, the plaintiffs claim that the taking violates statutorily expressed public policy with regard to the environment. Finally, fifth, the plaintiffs allege that Bristol's condemnation exceeds the scope of Special Act 96-12, and is violative of General Statutes §Conversely, the defendant argues in support of its motion for summary judgment that: (1) Bristol's taking of the plaintiffs' easement rights was proper under Special Act 96-12; (2) Special Act 96-12 is valid; and (3) Special Act 96-12, and the taking, are constitutional because they are both for the public purpose of monitoring and remediating contamination from the landfill.
III. ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
The issues in dispute for this court to decide are: whether Special Act 96-12 was validly enacted; whether Special Act 96-12 is constitutional; whether the defendant's taking of property rights on the plaintiffs' property was constitutional; whether the defendant's taking of property rights on the plaintiffs' property violates public policy; and whether the defendant's actions in the condemnation proceeding exceeded the scope of authority given by Special Act 96-12.For reasons more fully set forth below, this court holds that: Special Act was validly enacted; it is constitutional; the defendant's actions in connection with the taking of property rights were constitutional and in line with public policy; and the condemnation proceeding did not exceed that scope of Special Act 96-12.
IV. LEGAL DISCUSSION CT Page 3802
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
"Practice Book § [17-49] provides that rendition of a summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Millerv. United Technologies Corp. ,B. Validity of Special Act 96-12
As a threshold matter, the parties' arguments raise the issue of whether Special Act 96-12 is invalid because the General Assembly enacted the Act despite Bristol's failure to comply with General Statutes §The plaintiffs contend that Special Act 96-12 is invalid on its face, or in the alternative, as applied to them because the Act was not enacted in accordance with General Statutes §
Bristol does not dispute that it did not adhere to the requirements for the initiation of local, special legislation, as provided for in General Statutes §
1. "Special Legislation"
At the outset, the court finds that the defendant's argument that Special Act 96-12 is not "special legislation," is without merit and against the evidence. Even under the definition of "special legislation." propounded by the defendant,11 it is obvious from the record that Special Act 96-12 was enacted specifically for Bristol.12Although the legislature does not define the term "special legislation" for purposes of General Statutes §
Special Act 96-12 applied only to municipalities that have landfills within their corporate limits, and which are subject to a Consent Order issued by the CDEP between August 1, 1995 and December 31, 1995, ordering them to close the landfill and acquire certain ground water rights within and without their boundaries. The Act provided that in the event that the municipality could not agree with the owners of water rights or interests on a fair price to be paid for those interests the municipality would be authorized, pursuant to the power of eminent domain, to condemn such ground water rights or interests therein.
The CDEP Consent Order required Bristol to acquire water rights in property that was located beyond its municipal limits. CT Page 3804 The Consent Order was issued on October 24, 1995, a date within the limited applicable time frame established by the legislature. Bristol was unable to purchase the necessary water rights and interests beyond its municipal borders.
In light of the foregoing, it cannot be fairly said that the Act was an act of general applicability to all Connecticut municipalities. Based upon the language of the Act, the undisputed facts regarding Bristol's need for the legislation, the CDEP Consent Order and the legislative history of Special Act 96-12, there is no question that the Act was legislation specially drafted for the local, municipal concerns of Bristol. Having determined that the Act was special legislation as referred to in General Statutes §
2. Effect of § 2-14 on Special Act 96-12
Section The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that "one legislature cannot control the exercise of the powers of a succeeding legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Patterson v. Dempsey,
In the instant case, the defendant failed to comply with General Statutes §
Indeed, in an action quite similar to the present one, this court (Sheldon, J.), relying on the decision in Patterson, held that the failure of the General Assembly to enact special legislation (in the form of a special act), in accordance with General Statutes §
(special act supercedes requirements of General Statutes §
Therefore, this court finds Special Act 96-12 was validly enacted special legislation. The plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on count two of the verified complaint is denied and, the defendant's motion for summary judgment on count two is granted.
C. Constitutionality of Special Act 96-12
The plaintiffs next challenge the constitutionality of Special Act 96-12 on substantive due process grounds. Specifically, the plaintiffs aver that Special Act 96-12 "does not fairly and reasonably" preserve the peace, health and morals of the public because the Act "expressly permits Bristol to condemn [the plaintiffs' property interests] in order to pollute and contaminate their groundwater and subsurface soil." (Pls' Mem. Supp. p. 21.) They reason that because the contamination of the environment is not a legitimate governmental interest, the Act, under rational basis review, is unconstitutional.The defendant does not squarely address the plaintiffs' claim that Special Act 96-12 is unconstitutional. It does, however, argue that the taking was constitutional because the taking was done for a valid public purpose. In light of the specific CT Page 3806 argument put forth by the plaintiffs regarding to the constitutionality of the Act, it is irrelevant that the defendant has failed to directly address the issue. There is sufficient evidence before the court to properly determine whether the Act is constitutional. In fact, in the instant case such a determination is necessary.13
"[A] party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . While the courts may declare a statute to be unconstitutional, our power to do this should be exercised with caution, and in no doubtful case. . . . Every presumption is to be given in favor of the constitutionality of the statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman,Inc. v. EI Constructors, Inc.,
Although it is somewhat unclear whether the plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of Special Act 96-12 under the due process clause of the
"The due process clause of article first, § 8 [of the state constitution], like the similar provision in the federal
The court must judge the constitutionality of the Act as it would any other economic or social welfare legislation. "The court's function in examining the constitutional aspects of [economic or social welfare] legislation is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CT Page 3807Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu Partnership v. Bailey, supra,
"must be reviewed in accordance with the rules that normally govern constitutional challenges of economic or social welfare legislation, by ascertaining whether the legislature has acted arbitrarily or irrationally." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu Partnership v. Bailey, supra,
"Even under this less exacting test of constitutionality, [economic or social welfare] legislation will survive a substantive due process test only if it is both rational and related to a legitimate state purpose." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Black v. Goodwin, Loomis Britton, Inc., supra,
"The guarantee of substantive due process requires that a law be reasonable, rather than arbitrary and capricious, and that its operation has a real and substantial relation to the object to be obtained." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)State v. Matos,
The plaintiffs have not challenged the validity of the Consent Order of the CDEP. Nor have they posited that the Consent Order is not in furtherance of valid and legitimate environmental goals. Therefore, this court is entitled to rely on the presumption in favor of viewing the Consent Order as an instrument created for the benefit of the state.
The Consent Order mandated Bristol to acquire water rights for all the water contaminated by its landfill. The purpose of Bristol's acquisition of the aforementioned property rights and interests was to enable it to undertake certain investigations and studies with regard to the level of contamination in the groundwater. (Parties' Stip. Ex. B.) By doing so, Bristol, at some point in the future, would be able to present plans and proposals to the CDEP for the remediation of the groundwater contamination. (Parties Stip. Ex. B).15 Compliance with the Consent Order provides the opportunity to maintain and possibly ameliorate the level of water contamination caused by Bristol's CT Page 3808 landfill. Complying with the Consent Order and thus fulfilling its objectives is in the interests of the public and serves a valid purpose.
The Act allows Bristol to adhere to the CDEP directives by conferring upon it the rights it requires in order to condemn property rights outside of its borders. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 6, 1996 Sess., p. 1948-49; 39 H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1996 Sess., p. 1929-31.
Legislative authorization to condemn property located beyond a municipality's borders is an exceptional and significant power. The legislature's limitation on the applicability of Special Act 96-12 to those municipalities that were issued Consent Orders between August 1, 1995 to December 31, 1995, guards against potential future abuses of the power and was rationally related to the Act's legitimate purpose.
Enacting Special Act 96-12 was a reasonable exercise of legislative authority for a legitimate governmental purpose. Accordingly, it is constitutional under both the state and federal constitutions.
The plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment for count three of the verified complaint is denied. The defendant's motion for summary judgment for count three is granted.
D. Constitutionality of Taking
The plaintiffs next contend that the condemnation of the plaintiffs' property interests was not done for a "public purpose," and thus the taking was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the taking allows the defendant to continue to pollute the plaintiffs' property. Because the pollution of an individual's property is not a valid public use of property, plaintiffs conclude the taking must be unconstitutional.The defendant responds that the taking was constitutional, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' characterizations, because the taking was done for a valid public use. The defendant reasons that "Bristol's taking of the [e]asement [r]ights was for a public use-to comply with the [CDEP] Consent Order for the closing of the [l]andfill and the concomitant remediation of the ground water contamination resultant from the leachate." (Def.s CT Page 3809 Mem. Supp. p. 9.) As such, it maintains that the taking was constitutional.
"It is fundamental that the state government or any properly designated agency thereof may take private property under its power of eminent domain, if the taking is for a public use and if just compensation is paid therefor. Conn. Const., Art.
"In this State it is settled that public use means public usefulness, utility or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit; so that any appropriating of private property by the State under its right of eminent domain for purposes of great advantage to the community, is a taking for public use." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford,supra,
The defendant condemned the plaintiffs' property interests so that it could comply with the CDEP Consent Order. The CDEP Consent Order's primary purpose was to require Bristol to monitor, control and test the level of contamination within the "zone of influence," though both parties readily acknowledge that some continued contamination of the property could occur as an unavoidable incident to that purpose. The purpose of the taking was not to promote further pollution, though such continued contamination may be an incidental result. The condemnation of the plaintiffs' property interests was done for benefit of the general public, in that it was a necessary means to achieve the abatement of contamination emanating from the Bristol landfill. CT Page 3810 Because the abatement of contamination is certainly beneficial and of "great advantage" to the general public, the taking was done for a public use and was constitutional.
Similarly, for all of the reasons discussed in this decision regarding the purpose of the Act and the taking itself, the court rejects the plaintiffs' argument that Bristol's taking violates any environmental public policy of the state of Connecticut.
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted for count six and count seven of the verified complaint, and the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment for those counts is denied.
E. Scope of Special Act 96-12
The plaintiffs next argue that Special Act 96-12 permits the defendant to take only ground water rights and therefore, the defendant's condemnation of easement and other property rights on the plaintiffs' property exceeds the express authorization of the Act, rendering the defendant's condemnation action ultra vires.The defendant asserts that its actions were not ultra vires because the language in Special Act 96-12 expressly allows for the condemnation of "ground water rights and interests therein," which necessarily includes easement rights. (Emphasis added).
In resolving the present dispute, it is necessary to apply the well established rules of statutory construction. "When [the court] engages in statutory interpretation, [its] fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Texas-Ohio Power, Inc.,
Special Act 96-12 provides in relevant part: "Any municipal corporation having a landfill within its corporate limits, with respect to which landfill the Commissioner of Environmental Protection has issued an order . . . requiring such landfill to be closed and requiring the acquisition of ground water rights or interests therein as part of the closure, shall have the right to purchase ground water rights or interests therein which may extend beyond the corporate limits of such corporation. . . . If such municipal corporation cannot agree with any owner of real property upon the amount to be paid for ground water rights or interests therein, it shall proceed in the manner provided in section
As indicated previously, there can be little doubt as to the intent and purpose of Special Act 96-12. The General Assembly enacted Special Act 96-12 in order to provide Bristol with the means to carry out the requirements of the Consent Order. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 6, 1996 Sess., p. 1948-54, 2400, 2402 (Bristol Mayor Frank Nicastro and Southington Town Counsel Attorney John Weischel argued together for the passage of the Act, so that Bristol would have the ability to comply with the CDEP Consent Order); 39 H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1996 Sess., p. 1925-32.
The Consent Order required Bristol to acquire all of the ground water rights that were located within the specific "zone of influence". It required Bristol to gain control of such ground water interests, both within and without its municipal borders, as had become contaminated by the landfill.
Although the language of Special Act 96-12 does not expressly authorize a municipality to condemn easements, it is plain from the legislative history that the legislature contemplated that Bristol would have such statutory authority. The legislature passed Special Act 96-12 so that Bristol would have the ability CT Page 3812 to comply with every aspect of a CDEP consent order. One of the aspects of the CDEP's Consent Order was that Bristol test, monitor, and evaluate the level of the contamination within the "zone of influence." (Parties' Stip., Ex. B.) These functions could not be carried out unless Bristol had access to the contaminated properties. Therefore, Special Act 96-12 must be construed to permit this.
Moreover, our courts have "traditionally eschewed construction of statutory language that . . . thwarts its manifest purpose." Sutton v. Lopes,
The plaintiffs accurately point out that "the authority to condemn property is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner of property and against the condemnor." (Pls' Mem. Supp. p. 4-5); see Simmons v. State,
The plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to counts one and four of the verified complaint is denied, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to counts one and four is granted.
F. General Statutes § 8-129
CT Page 3813
Finally, the plaintiffs claim that because General Statutes § The defendant responds that because General Statutes §
"[T]he power of eminent domain, is one of the `attributes of sovereignty, inherent and necessary to the existence of every government, and the exercise of [this power], its mode, form and extent, within constitutional requirements, is unlimited."Conners v. New Haven,
The Connecticut Supreme Court has clearly stated that "[i]t is within the province of the legislature to determine both thequantity and quality of the estate which a condemnor may acquire." (Emphasis added.) Northeast Gas Transmission Co. v.Collins,
There is no prohibition against a legislature authorizing the taking of less than a fee interest in private property. The legislature's use of the language "ground water rights or interests therein," can be reasonably construed as authorizing the condemnation of less than a fee interest in the plaintiffs' property interests, especially when viewed in light of the legislative history of the Act. Accordingly, the defendant's taking did not violate General Statutes §
The plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment upon count five of the verified complaint is denied. The defendant's motion for summary judgment upon count five is granted. CT Page 3814
IV CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs' have presented emotionally compelling, though ultimately, legally untenable arguments. In the final analysis, the plaintiffs' arguments must fail when tested against the constitutional, statutory and common law principles which govern this case. The application of the law in this case mandates that the defendant prevail because its actions are within the scope of Special Act 96-12 which is valid and constitutional. For all of the above reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the verified complaint is granted in its entirety. The plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to the verified complaint is denied in its entirety.It is so ordered.
ANGELA CAROL ROBINSON JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT