Alaska Wilderness League v. Sally JewellAlaska Wilderness League v. Sally Jewell
Lead Opinion
Dissent by Judge D.W. NELSON.
OPINION
Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. and Shell Offshore Inc. (collectively “Shell”) for many years have sought to develop offshore oil and gas resources in the remote Beaufort and Chukchi seas on Alaska’s Arctic coast. Shell secured leases for the Beaufort Sea in 2005 and 2007, and the Chukchi Sea in 2008, but its exploration efforts have been waylaid by a variety of legal, logistical, and environmental problems, including multiple lawsuits,
BACKGROUND
I.
The Statutory Schemes
We begin with an overview of the complex statutory backdrop to BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs in this case.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”),
While OCSLA governs the development of oil and gas resources, the Clean Water Act provides a framework for preventing and responding to potential oil spills. See
Fourth and finally, and most relevant to this litigation, the President must promulgate regulations that rеquire owners and operators of offshore oil facilities
Environmental consultation- occurs at several points throughout both OCSLA and the Clean Water Act’s four-tiered processes. National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) consultations occur when oil and gas exploration leases are first issued (at OCSLA’s second stage),
Likewise, the Clean Water Act has several types of environmental review built in throughout its various stages. At the Area Contingency Plan level, Area Committees must consult with both the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to prepare “a detailed annex containing a Fish and Wildlife and Sensitive Environments Plan” that “provide[s] the necessary information and procedures to immediately and effectively respond to discharges that may adversely affect” the environment.
II.
The Current Dispute
The case before us arises in the context of these overlapping statutory schemes, and represents “the latest chapter in a long-running saga beginning back in April 2002, when the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) established a five-year lease sale schedule for the outer continental shelf of Alaska.” Native Vill.,
The April 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico shifted the landscape in a number of ways. BOEM assumed control over the approval of exploration plans, and BSEE assumed re
Following these approvals, Plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Interior and the Department of the Interior under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs. Shell successfully intervened. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court, following extensive briefing and argument, granted summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants and Shell. Shell Gulf of Mex. v. Ctr. for Bio. Diversity, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00048-RRB (D-Alaska Aug. 5, 2013). This appeal followed.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, thus reviewing directly the agency’s action undеr the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) arbitrary and capricious standard.” Gila River Indian Cmty. v. United States,
if the agency relied on factors Congress did not intend it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, or offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Id. (quoting Lands Council,
Additionally, under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
DISCUSSION
I.
The Administrative Procedures Act
Plaintiffs argue that BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs' was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. See
The pertinent portion of Shell’s OSRPs reads as follows:
To scale the potential shoreline response assets needed, and for planning purposes, Shell based these assets upon the assumption that 10 percent of the 25,-000-[barrels of oil per day (“bopd”) ] discharge еscapes the primary offshore recovery efforts at the blowout. This unrecovered 2,500 bopd is assumed to drift toward the mainland.... It is as-suméd that half of the oil reaching the nearshore environment is recovered by the skimming systems dispatched from [a large, mobile oil spill response barge and tug]. The remaining 1,250 bopd are assumed to migrate toward the shoreline where [Shell’s spill response contractor] would mobilize personnel and equipment to intercept the oil and deploy boom for shoreline protection.7
Thus, on a straightforward reading of the OSRPs, Shell made two.assumptions— that 10 percent of spilled oil would “drive toward the mainland,” half of which would be recovered by skimming systems and half of which would “migrate toward the shoreline” — for purposes of “seal[ing] the potential shoreline response assets needed.” Nothing in the OSRPs’ text suggests that Shell was predicting a 90 to 95 percent mechanical recovery rate. Indeed, Shell’s OSRPs make clear that it was estimating the potential shoreline response assets needed in order to comply with an Alaska statе law requiring certain calculations regarding the magnitude of a worst case scenario oil spill. BSEE’s regulations identify the specific information an operator must provide when discussing its worst case discharge scenario, and these regulations do not require an estimated recovery rate for spilled oil. See
Moreover, it is equally clear from the administrative record that BSEE did not rely on a purported 90 to 95 percent mechanical recovery rate in approving Shell’s OSRPs. While Shell’s OSRPs were under consideration, the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration expressed concern that “Shell was claiming it would mechanically recovery 95 percent of oil spilled in any incident, which is many times more than the best performance currently achievable.” Pis.’ Excerpts of R. at 286,
II.
Thé Endangered Species Act
Next, Plaintiffs argue that BSEE should have engaged in ESA consultation before approving the OSRPs. Section 7 of ESA requires federal agencies to consult with the appropriate environmental agencies before taking an action that may affect endangered species or habitats.
Here, we need not decide whether BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs constitutes agency action. Even assuming, without deciding, that the approval of the OSRPs was agency action, we conclude that it was a nondiscretionary action- and thus ESA’s consultation requirement was not triggered. Because Congress has “delegated] administrative authority” to the agency to interpret this statute, Chevron’s framework applies. See Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett,
A. Chevron Step 1: The Statute’s Ambiguity
The Clean Water Act, as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, offers three pertinent instructions regarding the content and approval of operators’ OSRPs. First, at
(i) be consistent with the requirements of the National Contingency Plan and Area Contingency Plans;
(ii) identify the qualified individual having full authority to implement removal actions, and require immediate communications between that individual and the appropriate Federal official and the persons providing personnel and equipment pursuant to clause (iii);
(iii) identify, and ensure by contract or other means approved by the President the availability of, private personnel and equipment necessary to remove to the maximum extent practicable a worst case discharge (including a discharge resulting from fire or explosion), and to mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of such a discharge;
(iv) describe the training, equipment testing, periodic unannounced drills, and response actions of persons on the vessel or at the facility, to be carried out undеr the plan to ensure the safety of the vessel or facility and to mitigate or prevent the discharge, or the substantial threat of a discharge;
(v) be updated periodically; and
(vi) be resubmitted for approval of each significant change.
Id. The statute then mandates approval if the above requirements are met, stating that “the President shall ... approve any plan that meets the requirements of this paragraph.”
We find the statute ambiguous in two ways — in the statutory language itself, and in the statute’s structure. The text does not explicitly grant or deny BSEE discretion to consider additional environmental factors in the OSRP approval process.
The statute’s structure adds to the ambiguity. These two directives are listed in two separate portions of the paragraph that delineates an OSRP’s requirements. It is unclear how the broad language of
B. Chevron Step 2: The Reasonableness of the Agency’s Interpretation
Reaching Chevron’s second step, we must determine if the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous governing statute is a reasonable one. When “the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute,” we must defer to the agency’s view and not “impose
BSEE argues that the purpose of an OSRP is to ensure that private operators have response capacity consistent with federal contingency plans in the event of a worst case discharge. Thus, Congress has limited its discretion to reviewing an OSRP to determine if it meets the six enumerated requirements of
We conclude that BSEE’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable, and thus we must defer to the agency. Significantly, the sections on which the agency relies,
Our deference to the agency’s reading is similar to that provided by the Supreme Court in Young v. Community Nutrition Institute,
Just like in Young, BSEE’s position is consistent with the statute’s scheme and the agency’s longstanding policy. The applicable regulations “provide specific in
The legislative history of the Oil Pollution Act’s passage lends further support to BSEE’s interpretation. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
The dissent focuses on the breadth of
Of course, we agree that
The dissent resists the Chevron deference that we must give to the agency’s interpretation by finding the implementing regulations to be an unreasonable interpretation of the statute. The regulations define “maximum extent practicable” to mean “within the limitations of available technology, as well as the.physical limitations of personnel.”
Tellingly, even Plaintiffs do not rely on the purported vagueness of the agency’s implementing regulations. To the contrary, Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded the adequacy of the regulatory definition at oral argument, stating that “[tjhe regulations clearly define maximum extent practicable” and that “the regulations arе fully consistent with” the maximum extent practicable standard. Oral Argument at 7:55, 8:44, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid= 0000006548; We also do not find the regulatory definition to be problematic. “In the absence of ... a definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer,
More importantly, this regulatory definition is largely peripheral to our analysis. We defer to the agency’s interpretation here not because of its regulatory promulgation, but because we face a “statutory inconsistency ... giving rise to an ambiguity that calls for Chevron deference.” Cuellar de Osorio,
We address a number of additional arguments raised by Plaintiffs. They note that the statutory sections governing the federal government’s spill plans, at
Plaintiffs next argue that “[t]he regulations never say that so long as a plan addresses in some fashion various questions, the agency must conclude the plan meets the statutory mandates.” Pis.’ Opening Br. at 46. Yet,
Finally, plaintiffs argue that ESA’s consultation requirement is triggered because BSEE exercises discretion in deciding whether thе six statutory criteria are met. This position, however, is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s decision in National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
In sum, deferring to the agency’s interpretation of the statute that it has been entrusted to administer, and its own regulations, we hold that BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs was a nondiscretionary act that did not trigger a requirement for inter-agency consultation under the ESA.
III.
The National Environmental Policy Act
Finally, Plaintiffs argue, and the dissent agrees, that BSEE violated NEPA by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) before approving the OSRPs. NEPA requires federal agencies to provide an EIS for all “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”
Here, as our ESA analysis suggests, BSEE reasonably concluded that it must ápprove any OSRP that meets the statutory requirements. See
The dissent accepts Plaintiffs’ argument that no authority prevents BSEE from requiring Shell to make changes to the OSRPs in order to minimize adverse environmental effects. On the contrary, BSEE’s authority is just so constrained. The governing statute mandates that the agency “shall ... approve any plan that meets the requirements” of the statutory section.
The statute here similarly restricts BSEE’s discretion. BSEE is required to approve an OSRP that meets the statute’s requirements, which the agency reasonably interprets to be the checklist of six requirements set forth in
This does not mean that NEPA review is entirely absent. Indeed, the NEPA environmental assessment that is required to be conducted as to Shell’s exploration plan expressly considered the environmental effects of Shell’s OSRPs. As mentioned supra, an operator’s OSRP, which is the fourth step of the Clean Water Act’s oil spill response framework, must be submitted in conjunction with a lessee’s exploration plan, which is OCSLA’s third step.
CONCLUSION
BSEE’s approval of Shell’s OSRPs was not “arbitrary, capricious, ... or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
AFFIRMED.
Notes
.See, e.g., Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands, REDOIL, v. ERA,
. See Gary Braasch, The Wreck of the Kulluk, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 2014, at MM24.
. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Decision Memorandum Regarding the Suspension of Certain Offshore Permitting and Drilling Activities in the Outer Continental Shelf, July 12, 2010, at 1 available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=38390.
. ’ While OCSLA refers to "lessees,” the Clean Water Act refers to "owners and operators.” Compare
. Initially, a single agency, the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”), managed compliance with both OCSLA and the Clean Water Act. See 76 Fed.Reg. 64,432, DOI Secretarial Order No. 3229. After the Deepwаter Horizon oil spill in 2010, however, the Secretary divided MMS into three new entities. Native Vill.,
. These revised guidelines were then super-ceded in January 2015. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Information Requirements for Exploration Plans, Development and Production Plans, and Development Operations Coordination Documents on the OCS for Worst Case Discharge and Blowout Scenarios (2015), available at http://www.boem.gov/NTL-2015-N01/.
. This quote is taken from Shell’s Chukchi Sea OSRP. Pls.’ Excerpts of R. at 959, ECF No. 24-10. An analogous claim was made in Shell’s Beaufort Sea OSRP. See Pls.’ Excerpts of R. at 907, ECF No. 24-10.
. Because we determine that discretionary agency action did not occur, we need not decide whether the action “may affect a listed species or designated critical habitat.” Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
. The dissent points out that Home Builders relied in part on the fact that ESA was passed after the statute requiring the transfer of permitting power, while the provisions of the Clean Water Act at issue here were enacted in 1990, post-dating ESA’s 1972 passage. See Home Builders,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (the Bureau) did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner in approving the oil response plans, and I concur in the majority opinion as to that issue. I respectfully dissent, however, from the remainder of the majority opinion.
In my view, the Bureau was required to engage in consultation pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA) before approving Shell’s oil response plans. Moreover, the Bureau should have conducted
1. ESA Consultation
The majority holds that the Bureau’s approval of an oil response plan is a non-diseretionary action, and, thus, the Bureau had no obligation to consult pursuant to the ESA. I disagree.
a. Agency Action
The first question is whether the Bureau engaged in agency action. It did. The duty to consult exists only where “agency action” is present. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston,
Of course, not all agency actions necessitate consultation. Indeed, only those actions that “may affect” a protected species trigger the requirement,
b. Agency Discretion
Next, we must consider whether the Bureau had discretion to approve the oil response plans. It did. “The ESA’s consultation duty is triggered ... only when the agency has authority to take action and discretion to decide what action to take. There is no point in consulting if the agency has no choices.” Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack,
“Whether an agency must consult does not turn oh the degree of discretion that the agency exercises regarding the action in question, but on whether the agency has any discretion to act in a manner beneficial to a protected species or its habitat.” Natural Res. Defense Council v. Jewell,
In my view, the Bureau’s decision to approve or reject an oil spill response plan is precisely the kind of discretionary act that triggers ESA consultation. The Oil Pollution Act requires private owners or operators of vessels and facilities, such as Shell, to prepare an oil spill response plan.
The implementing regulations bolster my view, as they make clear that the Bureau can exercise its discretion to benefit a protected species. For instance, the regulations require both an owner or operator to identify resources of “environmental importance” that could be harmed by a “worst case discharge scenario” and to provide strategies that will be used to protect those resources.
Shell and the government would have us hold that the Bureau lacked discretion here because the Oil Pollution Act states that the Bureau “shall approve” any oil response plan that meets the statutory criteria.
Shell and the government note that the Bureau interprets the implementing regulations as coextensive with the “maximum extent practicable” standard. Thus, they contend, and the majority agrees, both that the regulations do not give the Bureau any discretion and that we should accord Chevron deference to the Bureau’s interpretation of the Oil Pollution Act. Yet again, I disagree.
Our analysis pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
Here, I do not believe the implementing regulations contain a reasonable definition of “maximum extent practicable.” The regulations reference the phrase only once. They provide: “Maximum еxtent practicable means within the limitations of avail
The majority relies on the Natl Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
This case, however, differs in significant respects from Home Builders. First, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Home Builders hinged in part on the fact that the ESA came after the Clean Water Act. See id. at 662-64,
2. NEPA Consultation
The majority holds that because the Bureau had no choice but to approve any oil response plan that met the enumerated requirements in the Oil Pollution Act, the Bureau was exempt from NEPA review. I disagree.
NEPA “declare[s] a national commitment to protecting and promoting environmental quality.” Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton,
Here, the Bureau did not conduct any NEPA analysis, which the majority forgives, reasoning that approval of the oil response plan fell within the “rule of reason.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen,
The Bureau did in fact possess the kind of discretion that necessitated NEPA review. The Oil Pollution Act and its implementing regulations grant the Bureau significant authority to regulate the activities of owners and operators of offshore facilities. The regulations demand that the plan include provisions for protecting wildlife and areas of special environmental importance.
Morever, the Oil Pollution Act specifically directs the Bureau to consider environmental factors in its decisionmaking process. Thus, requiring NEPA analysis is squarely in line with “NEPA’s core focus on improving agency decisionmaking.” Pub. Citizen,
I also do not think that the Bureau discharged its duty to conduct NEPA re
But an agency cannot discharge its duties pursuant to NEPA solely by relying on prior analyses if those analyses do not fulfill NEPA’s purpose of ensuring “that the agency has taken a hard look at the environmental effects of the proposed action.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
Because I would reverse the grant of summary judgment to Shell as to the duty to conduct ESA consultation and NEPA analysis, I respectfully dissent.