The United States appeals interlocutorily from the district court’s order denying the
The State of Alaska brought this action to quiet title to sections of the beds of the Kandik, Nation, and Black Rivers.
The collateral order doctrine is a “practical construction” of the final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., — U.S. —, —,
those district court decisions [1] that are conclusive, [2] that resolve important questions completely separate from the merits, and [3] that would render such important questions effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action.
Digital Equipment, — U.S. at-,
This Circuit has never had occasion to decide whether the denial of sovereign immunity to branches of the federal government is an immediately appealable collateral order.
At first glance, federal sovereign immunity seems to fit comfortably among the types of immunities for which immediate appeal is appropriate. In Digital Equipment the Supreme Court observed that “orders denying certain immunities are strong candidates for prompt appeal under § 1291.” — U.S. at -,
We hold that, despite the label “immunity,” federal sovereign immunity is not best characterized as a “right not to stand trial altogether.” The only other case to consider the issue, Pullman Construction, concluded that federal sovereign immunity was more accurately considered a right to prevail at trial, i.e., a defense to payment of damages.
Pullman Construction concluded that orders denying federal sovereign immunity are not immediately appealable.
I.
Federal sovereign immunity is readily distinguishable from the states’ immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and foreign governments’ immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The latter two doctrines allow one sovereign entity the right to avoid, altogether, being subjected to litigation in another sovereign’s courts.
II.
Because federal sovereign immunity is a defense to liability rather than a right to be free from trial, the benefits of immunity are not lost if review is postponed. The United States argues that this is not the case and that its claim would, in fact, be “effectively unreviewable” at a later point: If this case goes to trial, the United States will have to decide whether to claim or disclaim the lands in question. According to the United States, doing so will moot the argument that the courts lack jurisdiction because the United States has never claimed or disclaimed the lands. The United States claims that the essence of its sovereign immunity is freedom from having to appear in court and take a position, and hence the benefits of immunity will be irretrievably lost if immediate appeal is denied.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, the argument is too particularized to affect our inquiry. “[T]he issue of appeala-bility under § 1291 is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a particular injustice averted, by a prompt appellate court decision.” Digital Equipment, — U.S. at -,
Second, “the mere identification of some interest that would be ‘irretrievably lost’ has never sufficed to meet the third Cohen requirement.” Id. at-,
The only foreseeable hardship inflicted on the United States by postponing review of sovereign immunity issues is the need to prepare for trials. That hardship alone is generally not sufficient to justify immediate
Admittedly, there is value ... in triumphing before trial, rather than after it, regardless of the substance of the winning claim. But this truism is not to be confused with the quite distinct proposition that certain claims (because of the substance of the rights entailed, rather than the advantage to a litigant in winning his claim sooner) should be resolved before trial.
Van Cauwenberghe,
“[T]he substance of the rights entailed” is not urgent in the context of claims of federal sovereign immunity. In this respect, claims of sovereign immunity contrast sharply with claims of double jeopardy or official immunity. In the latter type of cases, the judicial inquiry itself, rather than just a merits judgment, causes the disruption that the doctrine of immunity was designed to prevent. See, e.g., Abney,
The denial of federal sovereign immunity, we conclude, imposes no hardship on the United States that is qualitatively different from, or weightier than, the hardship imposed by the denial of such defenses as the statute of limitations or res judicata, both of which have been held to be effectively reviewable following trial. See United States v. Weiss,
III.
Not only may the denial of federal sovereign immunity be effectively reviewed after trial, but it may also be reviewed more efficiently at that time. Consider again Pullman Construction’s observation on federal sovereign immunity: “Congress requires litigants to follow certain forms and restricts available remedies, but implementing these restrictions is an ordinary task of statutory interpretation.”
For the reasons above, we hold that the district court’s order denying the United States’ motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The United States’ appeal is
DISMISSED.
Notes
. Alaska claims title under the "equal footing doctrine” and the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The central issue is navigability: the parties agree that if the rivers were navigable when Alaska entered the Union, they became property of Alaska at that time, but if they were not navigable, they remained the property of the United States. See State of Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc.,
. Section 1292(b) allows the district court to certify an order for interlocutory appeal if (1) the order involves a "controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion," and (2) “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”
. Digital Equipment suggested two other guidelines as well: (l) immunities from trial stemming from public law are more likely to be immediately appealable than immunities derived from contract; and (2) immunities derived from the Constitution or statutes are more likely to be appeal-able because their importance is presumed. Id. at -, -,
.In fact, Pullman Construction Industries v. United States claims to be the only case where the federal government has ever taken an interlocutory appeal to assert sovereign immunity without seeking and receiving permission under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
. Parallel sovereignty concerns are served by cases holding that the supremacy of federal law may, in some circumstances, be vindicated prior to a final judgment on the merits. See, e.g., Constr. Laborers v. Curry,
. The analysis would be different if an attempt were made to subject the United States to suit in state court. Cf. Mercantile Nat’l Bank v. Langdeau,
. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (exposing the United States to orders of equitable relief); 11 U.S.C. § 106 (giving consent to litigation seeking money if claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as a claim made by the government. or if the private party’s claim may set off the government's claim); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (the Federal Tort Claims Act); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491(a) (the Tucker Act); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1509 (jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims). In fact, Pullman Construction concluded, "The only portion of the United States' original immunity from suit that Congress continues to assert is a [circumscribed] right not to pay damages.... Federal sovereign immunity today is nothing but a condensed way to refer to the fact that monetary relief is permissible only to the extent Congress has authorized it."
. If, in any particular case, it would be more efficient to decide the issue before trial, the aggrieved party would be free to seek interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
. This is exactly what happens in qualified immunity cases. In the context of qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has determined that prompt appeal is worth the added burden on judicial resources. See Mitchell,
