*1 оf the cor- the court’s treatment of the reduction Douglas’s argument If were 09.30.070.20 language if it debt.”22 That amounts rect, only owe 7.5% interest marital he would a judgment directions that 1999.21 a reversal “with calculated from were and, money by the trial court” for be issued matter, Douglas we note an initial As 509, following the direction of Rule interest argument. Rule likely Civil has waived 10.5% is thus to be calculated from at 69(d)(3) judgment “[t]he debtor states that 18, original judgment April of the of date objections and which all defenses waives not present answer debtor does judgment case, Douglas, In this provided.” as herein Y. CONCLUSION lawyer, represented did not although response in his dispute amount the interest rulings AFFIRM the of the We entry judgment. for of to Tahni’s motion on all issues. Douglas had assuming But even objection to the award
not waived his
interest, no merit. He argument his argument merely request his on
bases to benefit finan
that Tahni “not be allowed
cially diligence” on from her lack and “injustice.” But Alaska
other concerns of modification has a clear rule on effect CORPORATION, ALASKA RAILROAD judgment interest or reversal of a on calcula Appellant, Appellate tions. Alaska Rule Procedure 509 provides: judgment money If a for in a civil case is and NATIVE VILLAGE OF EKLUTNA affirmed, prescribed by rate interest Anchorage, payable shall be from effective
law Appelleеs. trial If judgment date of the court. No. S-11619. judgment or in a civil case a is modified a judgment with reversed directions Supreme Court of Alaska. court, money by the for be issued trial judgment interest on new at the rate Sept. prescribed by payable law shall be prior judgment the effective of the date
which was modified or reversed.
Thus, appeal if an modifies or reverses a judgment
judgment and directs that a court,
money by the inter- be issued trial
est is to be calculated from the of the date judgment
original entered the trial court. case, superi-
In this this court reversed
or court and remanded for “a clarification of findings regard prop- to the Wasilla
erty, any necessary adjustments resulting
distribution
from these issues
1997;
January
year
§§
20. See
ch.
SLA
Marine
in effect on
in which the
Horton,
(Alas
judgment
Solution Servs. v.
decree is entered!.]
2003).
provides,
ka
09.30.070
relevant
part:
System,
21. See Alaska Court
How to Determine
Rates,
Post-Judgment
http://
Pre-
Interest
judgments
[T]he rate
interest
and decrees
www.state.ak.us/courts/int.htm.
payment money, including prejudg-
for the
interest,
percentage points
ment
is three
above
Brotherton,
the 12th
Reserve
discount rate
H93 McCann, Cummings Kelly S. William Mason, Anchorage, Appellant. & Ashburn Heideman, E. Hedland Brennan & Sara Heideman, Appellee Native Anchorage, for *3 Village of Eklutna. McDermott, Municipal Assistant
Thomas Boness, Munici- Attorney, Frederick H. Attorney, Anchorage, Appellee for Mu- pal Anchorage. nicipality of BRYNER, Justice, Before: Chief FABE, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, CARPENETI, Justices.
OPINION FABE, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION to remove The Alaska Railroad wishes culturally granite quarry rock from a Village Native significant land located decision, Eklutna. In a 2004 we concluded of clearly indicate legislature did exempt the Railrоad from its intention municipal zoning laws when enacted the Act, Corporation and that Alaska Railroad apply a conditional the Railroad must use may operate permit before it decision, Following the Alaska quarry. emergency regu- Railroad Board enacted allowing it to rock from the lation remove quarry applying for a conditional use without permit. Railroad also asked the clarify exempt ture to the Railroad is laws. The municipal so, creating a declined to do instead task study superior issue. The force to summary judgment granted to the Native Eklutna, Village concluding that our 2004 for a required decision permit. ap- The Railroad conditional use peals, and we affirm. AND
II. FACTS PROCEEDINGS Village Eklutna v. Board A. Native Adjustment Village Eklut decision, Native Our Adjustment, forms the back- na v. Board of H95 case, In that the Native for which Damco drop of this case.1 needed conditional use challenged permit Anchorage zoning a decision under Village of laws.7 We Anchorage grant operation concluded that Damco’s permit quarry require permit Bank did a conditional conditional use National Alaska, entry injunction allowing operate against and affirmed bank granite property mine on bank-оwned near Damco.8 Municipal-
Eklutna.2
concluded that the
We
Village
C. Native
of Eklutna v. Alaska
mining
ity
ignored
op-
evidence that the
had
(Eklutna II)
Corporation
destroy
eration would
one of two hills for
named,
village
which the
of Eklutna was
Following
court’s
of an
observing that
historical value of the
“[t]he
injunction
against Damco in
gave
twin hills that
Eklutna its name is a
began
operation
quarry.9
road
direct
*4
cultural
have
consid-
factor
should
been
injunction.
preliminary
moved for a
by
Municipality.3
the
ered”
We remanded
superior
prelim-
The
court declined to issue a
Municipality
for determina-
the case
the
inary injunction and instead entered sum-
mining operation
im-
tion of how the
would
mary judgment
for the Railroad on the
preservation
ar-
pact
the
of historic and
ground that the Railroad was immune from
resources,
chaeological
required by
zoning
Municipality
local
ordinances.10 The
Municipality’s comprehensive development
Anchorage
sought
intervened and
a decla-
plan.4
subject
ration that the Railroad was
to mu-
nicipal zoning.
considering
After
the Munici-
Corporation
B. Alaska Railroad
v. Na-
pality’s position,
court reinstated
(Eklutna I)
Village
tive
of Eklutna
summary judgment
its
favor of
the Railroad in 2001.11
appeal involving
Rail-
first
the Alaska
mining operations
appeal,
road’s
in the Eklutna
hills
On
Eklutna and the
Corporation
argued
was Alaska Railroad
v. Native
the Railroad was not immune
(Eklutna I),
Village
regulation
which we
from local land use
under state
I,
decided
2002.5
Eklutna we affirmed
law.12 We
held
Alaska Railroad
(ARCA)
injunction against
Paving Corpora- Corporation
clearly
Damco
Act13
did not
tion,
procured
rights
which had
exclusive
indicate that the
intended to im-
operate
by
quarry
an Eklutna
owned
the munize the Railroad from local
ordi-
government
Among
provisions,
Railroad.6 The tribal
and sever-
nances.14
other
we dis-
42.40.390,
Village
al
of the
residents
Native
of Eklutna
cussed AS
the section at issue in
injunction
sought
ground
appeal.15
on the
that the current
We concluded that AS
mining operation
nonconforming
was a
42.40.390 “should not be read as a clear
(Alaska 2000).
1.
2. Id. at 641-43. at 12. Id. 45.
3.
at
Id.
645.
seq.
et
13. AS 42.40.010
(AMC)
(citing Anchorage Municipal
Id.
Code
14. Eklutna
determining zoning requirements.17 Un- municipal Legisla- Request for E. The Railroad’s test, courts should balancing trial der the tive Clarification scope of the instru- weigh “the nature and Emergency Following promulgation immunity, of func- mentality seeking the kind 2004-E-l, the Railroad lobbied Rule involved, the extent tion or land use Legislature to enact a bill which Alaska thereby, the ef- public interest to be served explicitly exempted the Railroad would have regulation would have local land use fect from local land use laws.22 im- concerned and the upon enterprise hearings change considered at before But legitimate local interests.”18 pact upon Standing Transportation Committee Senate trial courts should сautioned we Standing Transportation and the House made a “unless the state has apply the test Committee. comply good attempt faith reasonable *5 Gamble, of the Pat President and CEO Thus, under the rule zoning laws.”19 Corporation, testified at a Alaska Railroad II, Railroad in Eklutna the articulated meeting Transportation Stand- of the Senate per- apply a conditional use should first for 29, April 2004. Gamble ing Committee on then seek from the and mit II in Eklutna described this court’s decision judicial through application of the bal- relief and indicated that the deci- to the committee only if the Railroad’s efforts to ancing test apply for a required the Railroad to sion permit prove use unsat- procure conditional permit: isfactory.20 Railroad, any as well as other state The Emergency
D. Rule 2004-E-l entity, present as of the court at the time 12, 2004, 12th of March is not ex- Railroad decision on the April the Alaska On borough municipal planning and empt from adopted Emergency Rule 2004-E-l. Board court that there is a zoning.... Railroad said emergency rule authorized the (1) regard applied that be with to at the Ek- test should processed store materials to: the planning and issues whenever remove stored materi- quarry; lutna requires that require project Railroad confronts a quarry. Both activities als from the zoning and that test would be Anchorage planning and permit under a conditional permit apply permit. for a If that findings, the zoning law. In its statement conditionally are in Ek- and the conditions our decision comes Railroad Board discussed Railroad, then the that the decision favorable lutna II and concluded litigate and work Railroad can the decision that 42.40.390 in the Alaska indicated “AS case-by-case litigation in on a Corporation gives Railroad that out Act the Railroad legislation, contained in Senate at 47. 22. The 16. Eklutna 560, would have amend Bill 395 and House Bill Id. at 54-55. provide: ed AS 42.40.390 to Pituso, Rutgers, (quoting State Univ. v. (b) 18. Id. plan- Municipal providing ordinances for (1972)). N.J. 286 A.2d regulation adopted ning, platting, and land use apply AS 29.35.180 or other law do not under 19. Id. corporation the land of unless the land is the person by corporation leased to another right corporation has not retained a and the 42.40.190(b) provides emergency during that an of the lease. 21. AS use the land the term adopted Railroad Board remains in rule days." than 120 effect "for more
H97
session,
twenty-fourth legislative
it
it
every
project that
for
individual
basis
municipali-
apparently failеd to do so.25
going
have
whatever
might.
boroughs it
ties and
Superior
F.
Court’s Grant
Sum-
meeting
at a
also testified
Gamble
mary Judgment
to Eklutna
Standing
Transportation
Committee
House
15, 2004,
April
On
after the Railroad enact-
May
Again,
stated
Gamble
rule,
Village of
emergency
ed its
the Native
apply for a
required
the Railroad would
Eklutna filed a motion with this court re-
“[Wjhat
court
permit:
conditional use
rule, or,
stay
emergency
questing a
exemption,
you
if
have the
has said is
don’t
alternative,
superior
a remand to the
every
permit
you
then
must
for
challenge
so that Eklutna could
you get
you
agree
what
and if
don’t
case
”
of the rule. Eklutna withdrew
enactment
back,
litigate....
you must
stay
motion for a
after we denied the
Transportation Standing
At
the House
rehearing
in Eklutna
Railroad’s motion
Representative Ogan
meeting,
Committee
superi-
II
was returned to the
matter
exempting
wondered
20, 2004,
May
or court. On
filed
al-
municipal zoning ordinances would
summary judgment
motion for
pit in the
“develop
Railroad to
a rock
low the
court, effectively seeking
ruling
right
neighborhood
middle of
residential
Railroad could not enact rules under AS
responded
against
it.”
up
Gamble
attempting
comply
first
42.40.390 without
likely
try
the Railroad would ever
was “not
regulations. The
with local land use
Munici-
Representative Ogan
something like that.”
Anchorage
on behalf of
pality of
intervened
exemp-
expressed concern that such
also
Eklutna.
public.
tion would not be well-received
Judge
Superior Court
Mark Rindner
suggested enacting a sunset clause
Gamble
summary judg-
granted Eklutna’s motion for
Eklutna,
said,
not affect
“this does
July
concluding that
ment on
mean,
*6
entirely separate.
I
we are
issue is
by our determina-
superior court was bound
quarry
out
go
get
to
in and
rock
not allowed
in
II that
42.40.390does not
tion Eklutna
regardless
Eklutna
of what we decide here
of
”
regu-
clearly exempt the Railroad from local
today
sign....
or
full
Judge Rindner awarded Eklutna
lation.
people
opposition
in
A number of
testified
in
attorney’s
public
litigant
as a
interest
fees
providing
exemption
the
a broad
Railroad
$19,989.
superior
amount of
The
the
laws,
including
representative
a
from
judgment
in favor of Eklutna and
entered
organization, a
planning
a local land use
The
Municipality on October
the
Village
representative from the Native
of
superior
deci-
appeals
Railroad
court’s
Eklutna,
representative from the Alaska
a
joined Eklutna
Municipality has
sion. The
Board,
representative
and a
Native Health
appellee.
anas
League.
Municipal
Ulti-
from the Alaska
mately
legislature
deleted
III. DISCUSSION
exemption from the bill and established
Review
A. Standard of
make recommen-
task force to “consider and
summary
of
We review
to the
on whether and
dation
Questions
are
judgment
novo.26
of law
municipal planning, platting, and
de
what extent
novo,
adopt the
de
and we
apply to interests
also reviewed
regulations
should
light
of
persuasive
most
Corpo-
“rule of law that is
owned
the Alaska Railroad
reason,
policy.”27 We review
precedent,
forming
the task force
ration.”23
bill
a liti
determination of
task
court’s
June
2004.24 The
became effective
public interest status
abuse
beginning
gant’s
at the
report
force was to file a
II,
4(d),
25. Ch.
SLA 2004.
litigation
pending.
is
Final-
gency
rule while
overturn
award
willWe
discretion.28
ly,
an abuse of dis-
the Railroad
enact rules
if there was
whether
attorney’s fees
manifestly unrea-
use rules
allowing
if the award is
it to circumvent local land
cretion or
For these
public
interest.
sonable.29
is a matter
reasons,
public
interest
we conclude
Exception to
Interest
B. The Public
applies.
doctrine
exception to the mootness
Applies.
the Mootness Doctrine
argues
appeаl
that this
question is whether
preliminary
A
ripe
ap-
until
not become
will
moot,
emergency
given that the
appeal
this
is
permit and is
plies for a conditional use
A
expired.
the Railroad
rule enacted
issue in this
denied one. That is
resolution
is moot “when its
disputed claim
case,
challenge
Eklutna’s
which stems from
relief,
if
any actual
even
not result in
emergency rule. The Mu-
the Railroad’s
If a chal
claiming party prevailed.”30
argues that the issues in this
nicipality also
repealed
expires,
is
lenged law or rule
beyond
scope
of this court’s
case are
Eklutna states
its brief
is moot.31
case
because,
holding in
under this court’s
remand
except that it
matter would be moot
that this
apply for
the Railroad must
exception
public interest
falls under the
will
permit
before the court
conditional
doctrine.
the mootness
proceedings.
further
While it is
entertain
following
fac
examine the
three
We
appeals
will not
true that this court
hear
public
whether the
interest
tors to determine
beyond
scope
remand from
issues
applies:
exception to the mootness doctrine
appeal,34
principle
does not
prior
this
“(1)
disputed
capable
issues are
whether the
Eklutna,
Railroad,
not the
in-
to this сase.
(2)
repetition,
whether the mootness doc
litigation.
impor-
round of
troduced this
trine,
applied, may repeatedly circumvent
if
question here is not
tant
whether
issues,
review
remand,
has raised a new issue on
road
important
presented are so
issues
any
whether there are
new issues
justify overriding
as to
interest
appeal.
Here,
disputed
mootness doctrine.”32
repetition
because the
capable
issue is
Holding
Applies
in Eklutna II
C. Our
emergency rule
Railroad could enact another
to this Case.
so,
in the future.
If the Railroad chose
do
argues
appeal that a
The Railroad
doctrine
circumvent re
the mootness
could
allowing
reading of AS 42.40.390
every emergency rule enacted
view because
*7
local
promulgate
to
rules that conflict with
days
expire
must
within 120
the Railroad
Therefore,
ordinances
is not
inconsistent with
if Eklutna
statute.33
were
opinion in Eklutna II. The Railroad
emergency
court’s
challenge a future
rule enacted
Railroad,
following
likely
portion
focuses on the
of our dis
challenge
would
by expiration of the emer-
cussion of AS 42.40.390:
be rendered moot
Game,
1019,
(Alaska
Reform,
&
938 P.2d
1023
28.
Coalition
Tort
Inc. v.
Fish
Citizen
for
1991) (cit
1997)
162,
(Alaska
(holding
McAlpine,
that issue was moot becausе De-
810 P.2d
171
Tait,
185,
(Alaska
repealed challenged
ing
partment
Game
v.
774 P.2d
190
of Fish and
Johnson
1989)).
regulations).
State,
1387,
Koyukuk
O’Callaghan
v.
920 P.2d
1389
River Tribal Task Force on Moose
Freas,
Rue,
1019,
(Alaska 1996)
(Alaska 2003)
(citing
Mgmt.
v.
871 P.2d
v.
63 P.3d
1020
Peloza
Conant,
(Alaska 1994));
(citing Feichtinger
see
Alaska Ctr.
v.
893 P.2d
688
also
for
Env’t,
(Alaska 1995)).
H99
footnotes,
ar-
evidence that
Based
these
the Railroad
provision presents some
This
gues
majority and the
that “both the
dissent
exempt
legislature intended to
immune,
agreed
if
that
the Railroad was not
laws. Its refer
Railroad from
could,
minimum, adopt
rules that
might
indicate
rules”
ence
“exclusive
govern
conflicting
would
over
local ordi-
rules would
government’s
no other
argument
nances.” But the Railroad’s
ne-
Railroad land. But
the term
apply on
glects
important portion
opinion
of our
also
read as a choice-
“exclusive” could
be
Examining
II.
the same
Eklutna
Board
provision
the Railroad
of-law
—if
dissent,"we
history
in the
ana-
considered
conflicting with local or
promulgated rules
lyzed
possible interpretations of
some
AS
dinances,
regulations
the Railroad’s
42.40.390.40 We noted that various members
conflict,
govern,
in the
of a
absence
Transportation
of the
Committee
Senate
unaffected[35]
local rules are
agreed
provision
was not intended to
points to
footnotes—
The Railroad also
two
regulation.41
shield the Railroad from local
decision,
oth-
in this court’s
one included
observed that one senator stated that the
We
argues
taken
provision
originally
er
the dissent —and
“was
added to ensure
exempt
that AS that Railroad bonds would be tax
together,
the footnotes indicate
law,”
a federal
and another senator
allowing
Rail- under
42.40.390must be read as
retaining
provision
advocated
minimum,”
road,
adopt
“at a
land use rules
because
tax-exempt
“the Railroad’s status as a
bond-
trump conflicting local ordinances.
that would
ing authority
again
question.”42
was
meeting
of the
The dissent examined
Transportation Committee at which
Senate
Thus,
II
our discussion
of AS
repeal
whether to
the committee considered
possible
42.40.390considered a number of
con-
particular,
42.40.390. In
the dissent
interpretations of the statute. But we did
Cook,
which,
a memorandum that Tamara
any,
interpreta-
sidered
not decide
if
of these
Legal
Deputy
of the Division of
Regarding
possibility
Director
correct.
tions was
Agency,
Legislative
Affairs
that the statute
intended as a choice-of-
Services
provision,
committee.36 Cook concluded law
we stated
that “the term
wrote
could also
read as a choice-of-
‘exclusive’
that AS 42.40.390 was either intended
provision”
law
and concluded
“AS
grant zoning
to the Railroad or to
not a clear indication
42.40.390is
property
zoning regu-
exclude railroad
exempt
from local
tive intent to
footnote,
suggest-
lations.37
the dissent
zoning.”43
a third alterna-
ed that the court had offered
namely,
that AS 42.40.390was
choice-
plausible
dissent’s view44 is that no
tive—
mandating
pro-
provision
of-law
rules
interpretation
to its
of the term
alternative
govern in
mulgated by the Railroad would
remains
“exclusive rules” in AS 42.40.390
respond-
of a conflict.38 The court
the event
reject
once we
theoretical
own, stating that “[t]he
ed in a footnote of its
posited in
of the term “exclusive” we
promulgated any
Railroad Board has
appeal,
II. Yet in this
regulation. Contrary
yet
to the dissent’s
possible interpretation
such
offered
another
*8
...
chоice-of-law rule does not
assertion
AS 42.40.390: that it was intended
authority,
only
convey
grant any immunity
independent
or
Railroad
parties.45
land
The Munici-
between laws.”39
Railroad
to third
resolves conflicts
at 47-48.
35.
36.
Id. at 63
42.
Id. at 47.
added).
(emphasis
37.
Id.
43.
Id. at 47-48
Id. at 63 n. 12.
44. Dissent at 1205.
39.
mention the absence adjudicated any equivalent, previously further can be reconsid- lends derivative or confer- 47. Dissent at it makes sense to read AS 42.40.390 as ring to enact rules on the Railroad the 48. Dissent at 1206. convey governing how it will lease or its land within, course, others the constraints of other out, points problems 49. As the dissent of the act. sections government entity proposes one arise when activity violate the rules of an- government entity other are common and have Municipality’s takes issue with the 46.The dissent development approaches led to the of traditional interprets the dissent because resolving problems these such as "the convey- separate from land term "land use” test,” sovereign governmental/propriety "the di- *9 Dissent ances or other forms of transfers. test,” chotomy,” domain in addi- or "eminent capable is of in- at 1205. But the term "use” "balancing interest test.” Dissent tion to the of conveyances cluding of kinds. and transfers all attempts negoti- proliferation to at 1207. The AS 42.40.390 also uses the terms "interests” and among govern- jurisdiction ate these conflicts of transactions," general both of which are "other suggests that while these conflicts mental entities may legal resolve, range they that can cover the full rela- terms are nevertheless be difficult to conveyances. tionships including common.
1201
any changed
exceptional
appear that there are
circum-
there exist
circum-
ered where
constituting
light
meaning
presenting a clear error
that shed new
on the
stances
stances
injustice.”50 The law the case
originally
a manifest
statute as was
enacted.
precludes
of issues
consideration
excep-
doctrine
Nor are we convinced that there exist
previous
adjudicated in a
that have been
presenting
tional circumstances
a clear error
n
“Even issues not
appeal in the same case.51
constituting
injustice.
a manifest
We decline
appellate
in
first
explicitly discussed
to revisit the issue here.
directly involved with or neces-
opinion, but
argues
require
The Railroad also
that our
sarily inhering in the
will be consid-
decision
apply
ment that the Railroad
for a condition
doctrine is
ered the law of the case.”52 The
clearly
permit
respect
al use
“is
dicta with
principle
decisis.
grounded in the
of stare
fact,
requirement
42.40.390.” But in
AS
prior
overrule a
decision
We “will
attempt
comply
that the Railroad must
originally
clearly
that the rule was
convinced
zoning
with local
laws is a central element of
longer
is no
sound because of
erroneous or
balancing
of interests
test
that we
conditions,
good
that more
than
changed
Eklutna
adopted
proper
II.57
inter
departure
would result from a
harm
adjudicated
pretation of AS 42.40.390was
at
precedent.”53
II. At
least,
Eklutna
length in
the mean
argues that
this court did
The Railroad
ing
“directly
involved
of AS 42.40.390
not decide whether AS 42.40.390 is
choice-
necessarily inhering”
with
this court’s
provision in Eklutna II
of-law
because
reasons,
decision II.58 For
these
yet
reg-
adopted
had not
a land use
case doctrine to this
we
the law the
asking
to re-
ulation. But the Railroad is
us
appeal
grant
and affirm the
court’s
arguments that we considered in
consider
summary judgment to Eklutna.
Eklutna II. After
analyzing
meaning
legislative history of
42.40.390 at
AS
Legislature’s Response
D. The
to the
meaning
length, we concluded that the
Request
Legislative
Railroad’s
for
This conclusion is in
statute was not clear.54
Clarification Is Probative but
holding in
keeping
our overall
the case:
with
Dispositive.
provides no
indication of
“that ARCA
clear
legislature’s
Eklutna contends that the
de-
regard to local
legislature’s
intent with
adopt
cision not to
the Railroad’s
authority over the Railroad and that
probative in
amendment to AS 42.40.390 is
presume
immunity
Alaska law does not
state
II,
in this case. As we observed
clarity in
zoning.”55
local
The lack of
AS
legis-
is often an error to make much of
“[i]t
provisions
and other
led us
42.40.390
ARCA
test,
opinion
lative inaction.”59 But
the same
adopt
balancing
of interests
legislature’s decision
jurisdictions we considered the 1984
courts in at least fourteen other
clarify possi-
not to revise
42.40.390 to
when faced with unclear statutes
have done
immunity
It
and observed: “[I]n
under similar circumstances.56
does
ble
II,
Carlson,
(internal
("Resort
quotations
at
at
57. See Eklutna
87 P.3d
55
50.
65 P.3d
859
omitted).
balancing
test
two
of interests
is limited
First,
requirements.
because the test
threshold
intent,
Prods.,
statutory
aims to discern
direct
Inc. v. Fairbanks N. Star
51. Bowers Office
they
Dist.,
(Alas-
grants
immunity
control when
exist.
Borough School
918 P.2d
Second,
1996).
resolve conflicts
the court will not
under
ka
balancing
unless the state has made
test
comply
good
attempt
reasonable
faith
(internal
omitted).
quotations
52.
Id.
citations and
omitted).
laws.”) (internal
citations
Carlson,
(internal quotations
at
Prods.,
omitted).
58. See Bowers
918 P.2d at
Office
(internal
doctrine)
(discussing
of the case
law
omitted).
II,
quotations
54. Eklutna
what factors.[ nation of these engaged in a though Gamble discussion disagree provision Eklutna does not that this proper definition of the Kookesh about doctrine, repeals litigant interest that the Rail- quo, status he did not mention argues the amendment does not emergency rule promulgated road had apply suit was because this filed it to remove rock from the that would allow the amendment came into effect. Al- before events, quarry. sequence this Given ternatively, argues that the amend- understanding that legislators’ apparent ment is unconstitutional. required apply the Railroad was parties acknowledge, As both permit under this court’s de- conditional use 09.60.010(b) applies only to suits filed on or Eklutna, II, we believe that cision September after 2003.62 Eklutna con- clarify legislature’s not to the mean- decision provision does not tends probative in ing of AS 42.40.390 is this case. part action because the action is of Ek- note, however, not consider a We that we do injunction against original for an lutna’s suit Railroad, of this nature to dis- decision which Eklutna filed challenge argues that Eklutna’s positive standing on its own. 86, 4,§ ch. SLA 2003. 62.See 09.60.010(b); ch. SLA 2003. 61. AS
1203 ap- stance reinforces our conclusion that this 2004-E-l is a new case Emergency Rule to original peal a stems from Eklutna’s lawsuit have either filed and that Eklutna should 11, September that was filed before 2003. original complaint its action or amended new 09.60.010(b) rule, Having determined that AS does than emergency rather protest public not Eklutna’s claim of interest bar summary filing post-appeal a motion for status, litigant we need not consider whether agreed with Ek- judgment.63 Judge Rindner its enactment violated the Alaska Constitu- lutna and concluded that the case filed tion. 11, 2003, required by September as before language of the session law.64 superior did 2. court not abuse this case has position Eklutna’s is it its discretion when determined beginning equitable been an action from public that Eklutna is a interest sought injunction, Eklutna an because litigant. attaches, jurisdiction the court equitable once argues The Railrоad next jurisdiction until continuing the dis- retains public qualify Eklutna does not as a interest pute general is resolved. This is the rule.65 litigant. This court examines four factors argues The Railroad that Eklutna should party qualifies a determine whether for the its have either filed a new action or amended public litigant exception to Rule interest Civil enacted Emer- complaint after the Railroad (1) The factors are: whether the case is 82. 2004-E-l, gency Rule but the Railroad does public designed strong policies; to effectuate complaint explain why amending the 2001 (2) plaintiff’s whether the success will cause a new cause of action would be the to add lawsuit; people from numerous to benefit filing equivalent of a new case after (3) only private party have whether could 11, September 2003 deadline. Under Alaska (4) suit; expected bring been law, a statute of limitations does not bar purported public litigant whether the interest original complaint party amending from would have sufficient economic incentive to long as the amendment relates back to the so if file suit even the action “involved claim, original filed before the limitations lacking general importance.”68 narrow issues Although period has run.66 this case does argues that cannot The Railroad Eklutna limitations, involve a statute of the “relat- satisfy the third factor because the Munici- is, ing “whether the new back” test —that pality party is a to the action. same transaction or occur- claim involves the disagreed, noting that original complaint”67 superior court alleged in the rence —is Eklutna treated as a interest by analogy. Even if Eklutna had had been useful litigant quotes complaint, sug- related cases. amended its 3, have, complaint Spenard Action Committee v. Lot gests it the amended should support sufficiently Evergreen the Block Subdivision to have been related to public interest its contention that under the original complaint that it could be considered doctrine, municipality litigant “where part of the same lawsuit. We also note ability bring an summary judgment action but Eklutna moved for so, in Ek- declines to do the situation is one where to enforce this court’s decision effort remand; purposes, only private during practical this eireum- ‘for all lutna II 1988) jurisdic- (stating Although challenge that "once a court obtains the Railroad did not equitable purposes, dispose of all procedural posture tion for of the case when it, equitable legal”). summary issues bеfore judgment, its motion for filed preserve right argu- to make this road did stipulation See, ment in a Eklutna. e.g., Ely, 263 Brown v. 14 P.3d (Alaska 2000) 15(c)). (construing Civil Rule 86, 4,§ 64. See ch. SLA 2003. § 74 65. See 18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution ("Once equity acquires jurisdiction Reform, Inc. v. court of Coalition Tort Citizens (cit- matter, (Alaska 1991) subject McAlpine, retain it until full P.2d 171 it will Daily Anchorage parties.”); ing Anchorage justice see News v. Sch. has been done between the Dist., 1990)). State, (Alaska 803 P.2d also Foster v. did not abuse its discretion expected bring have been party could Committee, Action Spenard Eklutna full reasonable at- when it awarded [suit].’”69 *12 group that a citizens’ public interest liti- torney’s we examined fees under the public prostitution was abate sought to gant doctrine.74 concluded that the litigant.70 We interest litigant even public interest group was IV. CONCLUSION Anchorage Municipality of could though the II Because Eklutna requires the Railroad anti-prostitution laws be- the have enforced permit use before conditional to do so.71 In Municipality refused cause quarry, AFFIRM operating the Eklutna we requested case, asserts that entirety. in its court’s decision action in 2001 to to take Municipality quar- mining from Railroad
prevent the so, refused to do forc- ry. Municipality The Justice, MATTHEWS, with whom injunction. Eklutna an ing Eklutna to seek Justice, BRYNER, joins, dissenting. Chief Municipality’s assistance requested also Justice, MATTHEWS, with whom Railroad enacted after the April. Justice, BRYNER, joins, dissenting. Chief Again, the Mu- Rule 2004-E-l. Emergency action, to take nicipality refused legis- my 42.40.3901is a direct view AS summary judgment motion. filed its own immunity from grant lative to the Railroad until la- Municipality did not intervene zoning. power adopt “exclusive local Heideman, attorney, Sara ter. Eklutna’s governing land use” for railroad land rules they facts in an affidavit and forth these sets necessarily governments local means disputed in the record before us. are not regulate able to might otherwise be argues that this case differs The Railroad Today lands are excluded.2 railroad Action Committee because Spenard from only alternative to this court disavows the Municipality has intervened this case prior opinion. it offered in its view that The Railroad of Eklutna. concedes behalf interpretation was that “the term alternative Municipality participated in this that “the a choice-of- ‘exclusive’ could also be read as carry litigation [Eklutna] but allowed provision promul- Railroad law Board —if yet briefing,” argues that the burden of the ordinances, gated conflicting rules with local Railroad, Municipality, not the should bear regulations govern, the Railroad’s but Denying Eklutna the costs of this decision.72 conflict, of a local rules are the absence litigant merely public interest status because unaffected.”3 joined the suit later would point I think that the court at this should purpose public interest liti- defeat the retracted, recognize doctrine, it has thus gant “designed which is to encour- changed, important part prior opin- of its age plaintiffs bring public issues of inter- retraction means that it was conclude that the ion. The court’s est to the courts.”73 We (Alaska 1995). may adopt govern- The board exclusive rules 69. 902 P.2d ing by parties having interests in or managed by permits for land owned or 70. Id. by power corporation. The conferred this sec- health, safety, is exercised for the common tion 71. Id. and welfare of the and to extent constitutionally permissible, not be limit- that the 72. The Railroad does not contend fees leases, by con- ed the terms and conditions charged were unreasonable. tracts, or other transactions. McCabe, Anchorage v. detail, position explained in more This (Alaska 1977). supported by legislative history, dissenting in the Village opinion in Native Eklutna Alaska Municipality argues that 74. The (Eklutna II), Corp. P.3d 62-65 attorney’s pay should its full fees because the J., 2004) (Matthews, J., joined by Bryner, Municipal- Railroad's case is without merit. The dissenting). ity provides support argument. little for this provides: Id. at 47. 1.AS 42.40.390 thinking The second new alternative originally mistaken rule-making offered is that the land use rules of exclusive regulation room for local Railroad left some authorized section .390 are to ensure “that The court should now of railroad lands. the Railroad has the to control activi- in accordance with its construe section .390 on its land even when wishes to ties its language as confirmed clear plain permittees,” deviate from those of its history and hold that section .390 ex- tive subject rules that these land use are municipal zoning. cludes railroad land regulations.6 It is of course true purpose one of section .390 is to ensure something that the “exclusive Is there else *13 that thé Railroad can control the land use mean? provision of section .390 could rules” permittees. Today’s opinion offers two new alternatives. activities of its lessees and section, But, following regulatory power I discuss in the power granted as thus is a plausible. neither is granted government to the Railroad ás a exercised, entity. zoning, It tois be like “for
I.
health, safety,
the common
and welfare of the
alternаtive,
(as
As the first new
public,”
the second sentence of AS
interpretation
by
clear)
states that an
offered
as a
42.40.390makes
rather than
land-
possible interpreta-
Municipality is “another
power
specify
permits
lord’s
to
leases and
Municipality’s interpretation is
tion.”4 The
However,
how land should be used.
governs conveyances of rail-
that section .390
part
interpretation,
that
second
the court’s
subject
explicit
But the
of sec-
road lands.
regulatory power granted
the land use
governing
.390 is “exclusive
rail-
tion
rules”
by
subject
section .390 is
to the land
use,
road land
not transfers of interests
regulatory power
any municipality
use
subject
important
railroad lands. The
lands,
encompasses
which
railroad
is not a
gov-
in railroad lands is
transfers of interest
reasonably possible interpretation for three
act,
by
primarily
other sections of the
erned
reasons.
42.40.285(1)
(4)
42.40.350(c)
and
and AS
AS
First,
interpretation reads the
(d).5
word
conveyances
land
and land
and
Since
“exclusive” out of section
.390. Since
subjects
separate
separate
treated in
use are
power
regulate
Railroad’s
to
its land is “ex-
sections,
statutory
that
the view
section .390
clusive,”
may
municipality
it
that a
conveyances,
it states that it
follows
governs
use,
governs
regulate
frivolous.
not also
them.7
land
seems
by
Op.
made at fair market value as determined
at 1199-1200.
by
qualified appraiser
competitive
or
bid.
provide:
5. These statutes
Op.
at 1200-01.
(4):
42.40.285(1)
AS
and
law,
legislature approves
Unless the
the action
point
response
In
to this
the court states that
may
corporation
not
merely
used in the statute
means
"exclusive” as
(1)
donate, sell,
exchange,
or otherwise con-
permittees do
also have
lessees and
land;
vey its entire interest in
regulatory power
adopt
Op.
rules.
at
to
logic
1200-01. But we know both as matter of
period
lease land for a
in excess of 55
legislative history
and from the
of section .390
corporation
right
years unless the
reserves the
legislature
that this is not what the
had in mind.
to terminate the lease if the land is needed for
governmen-
permittees do
Lessees
not have
and
purposes[.]
authority.
railroad
regulatory
tal
use
Therefore
land
42.40.350(c)
(d):
to exclude them from its exer-
there is no need
lease,
(c)
may
subject
corporation
to AS
legislature grants zoning power
When the
cise.
section,
(d)
grant
necessary
municipalities
42.40.285 and
of this
ease-
to
does not find it
to
.it
for,
permits
powers
in or
otherwise authorize
ments
state that the
is exclusive of
However,
by municipal
portions
might
les-
use of
of rail land.
otherwise be exercised
sees,
convey
zoning power.
corporation
lack
And we
its entire interest
because lessees
history
provided
legislative
that section
except
in AS
know from the
in rail
42.40.285, 42.40.370(d)
the Railroad the land
and 42.40.400.
.390 was intended
(d)
regulatory authority
government.
disposal
approved
of a
See
A lease or
of land
legislative history
of section
AS 42.40.285
the cor-
the discussion of
under
party
pages
poration
other
the state shall be
.390
1206-08.
than
infra
when,
ever,
approved
on the
.390 was
requires us to
section
Second,
interpretation
day
Senator
that two
final
of committee deliberations
legislature intended
believe
“pro-
it
needed to
municipal-
argued
Halford
that was
entities —a
governmental
separate
local zon-
operations
have the
railroad’s
both
tect the
ity
the Railroad —would
Gilman,
Imposing
ar-
ing
land.
who
railroad
restrictions.”12 Senator
authority to zone
.390,
government entities
said that
gued
two
for the deletion of section
system in which
zone the same land
some
originally
put
was
“to establish
have the
absurd, espe-
why
get
irrational as
railroad should
be so
rationale for
mechanism for
authority”
opined
is no built-in
cially
tax-exempt bonding
when there
enti-
necessary.13
between
resolving
longer
conflicts
But
this was no
thus conflicts
interpretation
argued
exemption
ties.8 The
that tax
Faiks
Senator
that statutes should
the rule of construction
problem. Hers was the last word and
still a
to reach absurd results.9
interpreted
not be
As the dissent in
section .390 was retained.
Eklutna II states:
is not
tex-
Finally,
result,
it also
and absurd
tually untenable
tax-exempt bonding
sta
order
have
history.
That
with the
conflicts
tus,
Railroad need
it was believed that the
*14
in
history
in detail
the dissent-
was examined
comparable
regulation powers
ed land use
17.10To summarize it
ing opinion in Eklutna
government.
pow
to those of a local
Such
originally
briefly,
.390 was
drafted
section
granted.
It does not matter
ers were
the Alaska Rail-
legislative session in which
granted primari
powers
were
was considered but not
Corporation
road
Act
ly
that the Railroad could issue tax-free
so
1984,
passed,
the act was
passed.
In
or so that the Railroad would not be
bonds
Transportation
of the Senate
Chairman
by municipal
operations
in its
disturbed
initially uncertain as to what
Committee was
zoning. Whatever the dominant motive
states,
today’s opinion
As
the section meant.
been,
may
grant
have
exclusive
attorney
the committee
advised
same.[14]
regulatory power was the
“was either intended to
that section .390
least controversial
authority
Railroad or to
The most valuable and
grant zoning
to the
prob-
zoning regu-
legislative history is to show the
property from
use of
railroad
exclude
11
lem,
legislature
meetings
problems,
con-
or the
was
During subsequent
lations.”
known,
addressing.
problem
is
this
was
When
cerning section .390
desirability
language
might
that
although the
the effect of
otherwise
questioned,
never
end,
apparent.15
often
Here
retaining
was.
In the
how- be obscure
becomes
section .390
point
14. Id.
response to
the court states that
commonly
"government
contend
entities must
jurisdiction.” Op.
at 1200-01.
with conflicts
See,
Singer,
e.g.,
2A Norman J.
Sutherland
correct,
generality
not detract
is
but it does
This
4502,
(6th
§
Statutory
ed.
15
Construction
give
point
would be absurd to
from the
that it
("Before
2000)
meaning of a
can
the true
statute
authority
separate government
two
entities the
genuine
be determined where there is
uncertain-
land.
court offers neither a
zone the same
The
ty concerning
application,
must
its
consideration
of,
for,
example
that
rationale
nor an
statute
given
problem society
to which the
to the
zoning authority.
conflicting
bestows
itself.”);
Breyer,
Stephen
addressed
History
Interpreting
Legislative
On the Uses
Co.,
16,
Holiday
P.2d
9. Sherman v.
Constr.
Statutes,
(1992)
65 S.
848-49
Cal.
L.Rev.
1967) (it
judicial duty
is a
"to con-
history helps
(noting
"legislative
a court
glaringly
strue statutes so as to avoid results
absurd").
purpose
of a statute”
understand the context
"clarify ambiguity"
help which can
and can
results"); City Rancho Palos
“avoid[ ] absurd
J.,
(Matthews,
by
joined
10. 87
at 62-65
P.3d
Abrams,
v.
U.S.
125 S.Ct.
Verdes
J.,
Bryner,
dissenting).
(2005) (concurring opin-
lish the bona fides of the
entity
tax-exempt
government
entitled
I
think
also
the court has made a
treatment,
granted
Railroad was
exclu-
fundamental mistake as to the nature of the
regulatory power.
In order to
sive land use
test,
“balancing of interests” test. That
operational
from
inter-
protect the Railroad
Supreme
which was first announced
zoning, the Railroad was
ference from local
Jersey Rutgers,
State Uni
Court of New
power.
leg-
exclusive
granted the same
Piluso,16
versity
rejects
ap
traditional
unmistakably
history thus
shows that
islative
proaches
problem that
to the
arises when one
was meant as a
section .390
entity
government
proposes
activity
regulatory
Railroad of exclusive land use
zoning
gov
violate the
rules
another
is,
history
power.
quite simply,
There
no
entity.
approaches
ernment
traditional
suggesting that concurrent land use authori-
(1)
immunity
inferred
based
ty
legislature,
much less
was intended
(the
competing
the status of the
entities
su
give prece-
concurrent
test),
perior sovereign
the nature of the
zoning in
municipal
dence to
case of
con-
*15
(the
activity
proposed
governmental/proprie
flict.
tary dichotomy), or
the fact
that
the
activity
authority
supported
new concurrent
munic-
was or was not
This
(the
by
property
ipal zoning given precedence
is
the
to condemn
emi
test).
Rutgers balancing
now-rejected
the reverse of the
alternative
nent domain
The
of
the court Eklut-
by
rejects
in
interpretation offered
interests test
the rote or “ritualistic”
na II. That alternative also
practice
inferring immunity
posited
concur-
of
based
the
municipalities
presence
of
zoning
rent
or absence
the above factors.17
Instead,
immunity
particular
question
If
railroad
the
of
is to be
the Railroad.
land
factors,
many
by
zoning
by considering
in
municipal
covered
and the Rail-
answered
cluding
ap
passed
regulations
those on which the traditional
road had not
based,
land,
proaches
may
that
relevant to
governing that
would be controlled
are
municipal zoning regulations.
upon
particular question
governmen
But
of which
the
the
regula-
entity,
prevail.
balancing
tal
should
The
of
passage by the Railroad of land use
land,
regula-
rejects
practice
the
governing
tions
the
the railroad
interests test
thus
inferring legislative
just
from
one fac
preсedence.
take
The now-re-
intent
tions would
words,
tor,
inferring legislative
intent
jected interpretation,
in other
read
favor
thought
of factors that are
priority
to state a rule of
rather
from number
“exclusive”
particular
to a resolution of
land
than a rule of exclusion. That is an unusual
be relevant
“exclusive,”
government entities.18
interpretation of
but at least the
use conflicts between
(1972).
balancing
policy choice.
drawback of the
16. 60 N.J.
to be up, I in To sum think that the court erred pre opinion. reflecting Far from Rutgers interpret Eklutna II when it declined to disfavoring land uses when sumption state exempt séction .390 to railroad land from zoning, they with local the New Jer conflict zoning. interpretation Such an is re- sey Rutgers that state func court stated quired by customary our touchstones of stat- generally, not be agencies would tions utory language interpretation, of the subject to restriction or control local land unusually section as confirmed its clear regulations.25 Rutgers court stated: use legislative history.27 The court has now necessary only it alter- found to recant the regard university ... there to a state With interpretation of section .390 that it native that, an instrumental can be little doubt as in Eklutna II. I think this should offered ity performing of the state an essential signal to the court that it made a mistake in for the of all governmental function benefit Eklutna II and that the mistake should now state, Legislature people Instead, be corrected. the court has offered growth not intend that its and devel interpretations. two new alternative These subject opment should be to restriction stray interpretations new so far afield from regulation. control local land use In statutory our traditional methods of inter- deed, generally be true in the such mil pretation completely implausible, to be junctions agencies.[26] all state case of my justify opinion. The court is able to its statutory Rather than use a rule of con- interpretation failure to reach a conclusive gives permission ig- courts struction that by creating meaning of section .390 spеak ques- nore relevant statutes that statutory clear-statement rule of construc- to control tion of the allocation tion. This rule allows the court to brush any land use unless the courts find them to be aside statute that addresses the land part authority that is not of the Rut- rule-making “clear” —a rule use of entities other should, my gers balancing municipal zoning test —the court than unless the boards clearly opinion, customary statutory exempts rules of in- statute the other entities municipal zoning. This is a distortion terpretation order to determine what the actually Rutgers balancing test. Our estab- meant when addressed statutory subject lished do of the Railroad’s rules However, 1991). ty Anchorage. Op. (emphasis even at 1194-95 add- P.2d 643 statutory language ed). where the considered alone reasonably leave one seems to room Noatak, 24. See v. Native Vill. meaning, we nonetheless consult Blatchford 775, 790, history statutory U.S. 111 S.Ct. 115 L.Ed.2d construc- tive tion, and the rules of J., (1991) (Blackmun, dissenting) language (noting, realizing in dis- that sometimes approval, seems clear in the abstract takes on a different clear-statement rules that so-called *17 Slope meaning when viewed in context. North designed against "are as hurdles” disfavored re- Corp., Borough 585 P.2d v. Sohio Petrolеum sults) (internal omitted); quotations Dan Ka-M. Alex, 534, (Alaska 1978); 540 State v. 646 P.2d han, Federal Criminal Is Chevron Relevant to (Alaska 1982). 208 n. 4 In such cases the Law?, (1996) (report- L. Rev 504 110 Harv. legislative history and rules of construction rule, ing that in the face of a clear-statement present compelling case that the literal must meaning "only express [legislative] action will suffice to language of the statute is not of the reading”). the disfavored establish University what the intended. Geistauts, v. 428 n. 5 Alaska Rutgers, A.2d at 703. ("Where 1983) meaning ap- a statute’s added). (emphasis unambiguous, party pears clear and ... meaning asserting a corre- a different See, concerning customary our methods of heavy demonstrating spondingly burden of statutory interpretation, Elec. v. Homer Ass’n Alex, intent.”); contrary State v. (Alaska 1992): Towsley, 841 P.2d 1043-44 (under sliding-scale P.2d at 208 n. 4 approach Alaska's Generally, guide the most reliable to the statutory interpretation, the more meaning language of a statute is the words of the statute plain of the statute the more convincing contrary legislative accordance with their common construed in the evidence Sitka, be). usage. Lagos City Borough intent must v. & clarity statutory clarity require —where for the rules. is little need there exists view, approach is taken a normal my meaning of section question reasonably interpretation is
.390 one
possible. reasons, I dissent.
For these BLANK, Appellant, A.
Laura Alaska, Appellee.
STATE A-9034.
No. Alaska. Appeals
Court
Sept.
