Plaintiffs Alaska Community Action on Toxics and Alaska Chapter of the Sierra Club appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants Aurora Energy Services, LLC, and Alaska Railroad Corp. The district court ruled that defendants’ non-stormwater discharges of coal into Resurrection Bay, Alaska, complied with the Multi-Sector General Permit for Stormwater Discharges Associated with Industriаl Activity — a general permit under EPA’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System — and thus defendants were shielded from liability under the Clean Water Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and hold that the General Permit рrohibits defendants’ non-stormwater coal discharges. We reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I.
“Section 301(a) of the [Clean Water Act] prohibits the ‘discharge оf any pollutant’ from any ‘point source’ into ‘navigable waters’ unless the discharge complies with certain other sections of the CWA.” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Cnty. of L.A., 725 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir.2013) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)). “One of those sections is section 402, which prоvides for the issuance of NPDES permits.” Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342). “In nearly all cases, an NPDES permit is required before anyone may lawfully discharge a pollutant from a point source into the navigable waters оf the United States.” Id. If a discharger is covered by a NPDES permit and complies with that permit, the permit “shields” it from liability under the CWA, even if EPA promulgates more stringent limitations over the life of the permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k); Natural Res. Def. Council, 725 F.3d аt 1204. However, any violation of the permit’s terms constitutes a violation of the CWA. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(a); Natural Res. Def. Council, 725 F.3d at 1204.
There are two types of NPDES permit: individual and general. Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. E.P.A,
An NPDES permit is required for stormwater discharges associated with industrial activity. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p); 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(1); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A.,
II.
The Seward Coal Loading Facility, owned by defendant Alaska Railroad Corp. and operated by defendant Aurora Energy Services, is located in Seward, Alaska, on the northwest shore of Resurrection Bay. The Seward Facility receives coal by rail-car and transfers it onto ships through a conveyor system. Allegedly, this system spills coal into the bay — a non-stormwater discharge. However, the Seward Facility has been covered under the Multi-Seсtor General Permit since 2001, and defendants argue that any such discharge is authorized by the General Permit.
Plaintiffs disagree, and filed a citizen suit in district court on December 28, 2009. On March 28, 2013, the district court grаnted summary judgment to defendants on the bulk of plaintiffs’ claims, reasoning that defendants’ non-stormwater coal discharges were covered by the General Permit. After plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the surviving clаim, the court entered judgment for defendants.
III.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Cohen v. City of Culver City,
IV.
The sole issue on appeal is whether defendants’ alleged non-stormwater disсharge of coal from the Seward Facility’s conveyor system and ship loading area into Resurrection Bay is covered by the General Permit. We interpret general permits as we would a regulation. See Natural Res. Def. Council, 279 F.3d at 1183 (noting that general permits “are issued pursuant to administrative rulemaking procedures”); E.P.A., General Permit Program Guidance 21 (1988), available at http://www. epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0381.pdf (“[General permits are considered to be rulemak-ings .... ”). “A regulation should be construed to give effect to the natural and plain meaning of its words.” Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n,
The plain terms of the General Permit prоhibit defendants’ non-stormwa-ter discharge of coal. In Part 2.1.2.10, the General Permit states: “You must eliminate non-stormwater discharges not authorized by an NPDES permit. See Part 1.2.3 for a list of non-stormwater discharges authorized by this permit.” The referenced section (which is actually Part 1. 1.3) lists eleven categories of non-stormwater discharge which are “the non-stormwater discharges authorized under this permit.” None of these categories cover defendants’ coal discharge.
Defendants point to other sections of the General Permit to argue that the list in Part 1.1.3 was not intеnded to circumscribe the universe of authorized non-stormwater discharges. First, they note that Part 8.A.2.2 authorizes certain non-
After establishing general requirements for all covered facilities, the General Permit sets out, in Part 8, additional provisions pertaining to specific industrial sectors. The section cited by defendants, for instance, governs Sector A, pertaining to timber products facilities. The Seward Facility is classified under Sector AD. This sector doеs not pertain to any particular industry, but rather is a catchall category for “facilities designated by the Director as needing a stormwater permit, and any discharges of stormwater аssociated with industrial activity that do not meet the description of an industrial activity covered by Sectors A-AC.” Unlike sections governing other sectors, the section governing Sector AD doеs not specify additional categories of non-stormwater discharge that are authorized or prohibited. With the possible exception of additional monitoring or reporting requirеments that may be imposed, Sector AD facilities are governed only by the permit’s general provisions.
The authorization in Part 8.A.2.2 is simply one part of the General Permit’s customization of its rеquirements for particular industrial sectors. The list in Part 1.1.3 states the non-stormwater discharges authorized by the permit’s general regulatory scheme, and Part 8.A.2.2 supplements this scheme for timber products facilities. For facilities in Sector AD, however, non-stormwater discharges are regulated only by the permit’s general scheme, and for those purposes the list in Part 1.1.3 is exclusive.
Defendants also point out that several sector-specific sections (applicable to sectors other than Sector AD) explicitly prohibit various categories of non-storm-water discharge, yet these sections would be surplusage if Part 2.1.2.10 already prohibited all non-stormwater discharges not listed in Part 1.1.3. However, although we generally seek to avoid constructions of a general permit that render certain of its provisions superfluous, see Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir.1976), our analysis here is controlled by the plain text of Part 2.1.2.10, which prohibits defendants’ discharges. See Bayview,
We would have reached the same result had we employed the permit shield analysis that has been applied to individual permits in decisions such as Piney Run Preservation Associatiоn v. County Commissioners of Carroll County, Maryland,
V.
The district court erred in concluding that the General Permit shielded defendants from liability for their non-stormwa-ter coal discharges. We reverse the grant of summary judgment to defendants and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.