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Alaska Airlines v. Judy Schurke
846 F.3d 1081
9th Cir.
2017
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 disposition above, more than a trivial amount. Helmuth as- we need address serts, however, remaining that the in these proposed class contentions. pending might action contain Florida REVERSED and REMANDED. members, as few as several hundred each meaningful whom could recover relief

roughly $100.3 parties’ dispute need resolve the

We point. enough It is conclude right damages waiver seek value,

future class actions has some and it plainly Very does. few class members INC., ALASKA AIRLINES an Alaska would bother to file their own individual corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, (or actions to recover minimal non-exis tent) damages statutory actual dam Judy SCHURKE, ages $1,000. capped at For capacity her official small-dollar as Director these, of the of Washing claims like even under a statute State Department ton of Labor and Indus fee-shifting provision, action a class tries; Smith, in Elizabeth her official only is often the realistic means of obtain capacity Employment as Standards ing any monetary recovery. Shutts, See Program Manager of the State of 2965; 472 U.S. at Crawford, Washington Department of 201 F.3d at Cutting off access to a Industries, Defendants-Appellees, procedural tool that may offer the obtaining monetary realistic means of re Flight Association Attendants-Com deprived lief the absent class members of America, munication Workers AFL- here, something of might value if it even CIO, Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee. relatively be worth little. The fact class members required give up were No. 13-35574 anything at all in exchange for worthless United Appeals, States Court of injunctive precluded relief approval of the Ninth Circuit. fair, reasonable, settlement as and ade quate 23(e)(2). under Rule Argued May and Submitted Seattle, Washington challenges Helmuth the reasonableness January Filed grounds, settlement other such disparity between what the named plaintiffs got and what the rest the class received,

members and she contends

addition that the class could be certi- 23(b)(2).

fied Rule In light of our parties pursue damages overlook the fact the settle- class action under ment also considerably waives absent class members’ law could be more valuable than pursue damages pursue damages class action such law, FDCPA, they claims under so have not ex- as no court of which are aware we plored analogues damages state-law cap held that the FDCPA’s damages FDCPA preempts permitting contain similar class action larger state statutes caps. cap, recovery. States without such a *2 (argued) Hutcheson

Mark Andrew Francis, Wright Davis Tremaine Rebecca LLP, Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiff- Appellant. Tacoma, (argued),

James Paul Mills Washington, Defendants-Appellees. (argued), Phair Barnard Kathleen Iglitzin Campbell Barnard Schwerin & LLP, Seattle, Washington, for In- Lavitt tervenor-Defendant-Appellee. WALLACE, Before: J. CLIFFORD KLEINFELD, and J. ANDREW CHRISTEN, Judges. Circuit MORGAN by Judge CHRISTEN Dissent OPINION KLEINFELD, Judge: Circuit Senior This is a Labor Act decide, case, the merits case. We entity upon decide but which should merits, Washington, State Adjustment System Board established pursuant bargaining agree- off, to a collective entitled to time child, ment. entitled to use it for just a sick for her own illness or vacation.1 Facts. disagreed the airline Though became between *3 to interpret how her They entitlement. do union, agency the airline and a state and it dispute not that she was entitled to seven dispute arises out of a between a flight days of vacation leave. But she had sched- attendant and the airline about her sick it for uled December. The airline claimed attendant, flight leave. The Laura Masser- December, she could it in use but ant, toMay, called sick in care for her Masserant claimed under the Wash- son proposed who was ill. to She take two statute, ington she was entitled to use it days off as sick to care for him. But May for her child’s illness. Masserant up she had used all her sick leave. She had would be to more sick leave in her, coming vacation leave but vacation June, and the retroactively airline liberal- leave is scheduled the October before the its policy ized so that she could use it in year in which it is to be used. Masserant May, that, but even with she still did not leave, had cashed out most her vacation enough have sick leave to cover the time had all remaining and scheduled her vaca- she off she in May. agen- needed The state December, tion leave for so she had none cy Washington that administers the stat- May. available to her in If Masserant had agrees interpretation ute with Masserant’s sick, despite having called up used all Washington statute. leave, her sick she would have accumulated The Washington statute does not create “points.” Under the collective off, paid an entitlement to time sick leave agreement between her union and the air- or It employee otherwise. limits an line, if flight calls in áttendant sick too may whatever her entitlement be “under many using up times after all her sick bargaining agree- of a terms leave, accumulating many points, too she is or employer policy.” requires ment And subject graduated discipline—counsel- employee taking “[t]he leave under ing, for warning, enough points, termi- the circumstances in this described section nation. collec- comply must terms Masserant claimed an entitlement to use bargaining agreement employer or tive her December vacation leave for her leave, policy applicable except to the for being illness charged child’s without any relating terms to the choice of leave.” points, Washington Family Care Act. That state does not Flight entitle an The Alaska Airlines-Associated if employee any employee bargaining agree- leave. But Attendants 49.12.270(1): (b) spouse, parent, parent-in-law, Wash. Rev. Code or grandparent employee who has a If, bargain- under the terms of a collective emergency serious health condition or an ing agreement employer policy applica- or condition. employee, employee ble to an is entitled employee may An take advance leave off, paid to sick leave or other time then an employee until it has been earned. The tak- shall allow an to use ing leave under circumstances de- any employee’s or all of the choice of sick comply scribed this section must with the leave or other time off to care for: bargaining agree- terms of the collective (a) A child of the awith health employer policy applicable ment or to the requires leave, condition that treatment super- or except relating for terms to the vision; choice of leave. days, ment entitles use available attendants trade vacation within denoted, limits. to take care of a stated however provides expressly sick It that “sick child.2 fail, they cannot do What without for of a family leave” is usable illness notice, up.4 They have to call in show member, employee, just and that prior sick a certain number of hours availability family to care departure flight,5 of their scheduled most liberal members is as broad “the it too often or else suffer “points.”6 do flight of the States in which attendants are graduated discipline if many There is too points domiciled.”3 accumulate. “Points” are deleted for attendance,7 subsequent periods proper parties is not between no action is taken the first few about whether could take points,8 but Masserant’s available and un- *4 leave, but when. The collective used sick leave have covered her would is stuffed full of limitations to for day sought the two absence she in plane being prepared assure that a when May. Masserant have called in sick could takeoff, flight for number of requisite despite lacking available sick three important attendants are on board. The flight hours for before each which she was part, for purposes, are the scheduled, apparently but the airline would scheduling use of vacation points against have assessed her for ab- Flight get days leave. attendants after sence without available leave. She wanted days year, years, their first after five days days to take two from the seven days days years, after 10 and 35 after 18 vacation leave she De- had scheduled post years. The airline has to a list of cember, points. to But avoid the airline available times October 1 of vacation permit her to take would her Decem- preceding year. Flight attendants have May. ber time in vacation Vacation leave is 15 days sign periods “banked,” is, -and vacation up, treated as an entitle- granted seniority Flight ment, are on a basis. January exchanged and can be may 2. "Sick leave be ... pursuant designated 5. "Sick calls be used must made to the (2) applicable Company poli- Company representative State law at least two hours and/or cy- (3 Company policy, prior prior Pursuant no at- check-in hours scheduled points departure)." tendance are for assessed an absence (zeropoints per day),” called in for a sick child example, equals 6. For a "No Show” 1/2 points, Using collective-bargaining "Reported Quarterly 3. "Whenever a the new Illness child, equals points, "Report- refers to Point a sick it is understood Reduction” a that this placeholder ‘family Using Quarterly is a for member.' ed illness or With the after without agreement, equals Company Point Association’s Reduction” and will between 1/2 apply points, "Emergency Drop” equals the most liberal of the laws of the and an states 1/2 Flight point. in which Attendants are domiciled in 1/2 determining appropriate definition of 'family When member.' this definition is quarter during de- "For each which calendar a termined, including any subsequent Flight amend- quar- Attendant is active for the entire pursuant changes ments in law or in the chargeable during ter no and has occurrences law, interpretation company (2) will quarter, points two will be delet- entire publish the definition distribute it to and Flight ed from the Attendant’s accumulated Flight (0). Attendants.” points until the total reaches zero Time on leave of absence will not be counted toward absence, improvement.” Flight record “In all cases Attendant designated be required Compa- will to call the ny representative,” [points]: 8. "0-4 No action taken.” 1/2 points for cash of the scheduled vaca- are assessed for an advance absence called in tion, child,” flight cannot take the for a but attendant sick but it is not obvious how he Though time off advance the time slot far this reaches. sick leave can previous she scheduled the autumn. Mas- clearly child, be used to for a no care sick days explicit serant had taken of vacation such provision four made vacation and out 21 when days cashed leave suggests evidence that vaca- sick, got leaving her tion child seven flight cannot be so A mixed. days previous she days had scheduled fall attendant can trade vacation attendant, for vacation in December. She claimed en- another flight subject to a dead- instead, May titlement to it in take line approval. flight And a attendant the Washington statute. can to 4 up points accumulate for ab- 1/2 action, disciplinary senteeism with no matter, practical As 2 points quarter per subtraction thereaf- off to take time care for her quarters ter which no there are sick penalty though child even she without occurrences, chargeable despite the ab- available, no sick leave because for a sence available leave. flight points, attendant’s first there is 1/2 penalty. flight If gets attendant too Analysis. many points, they by good can be reduced year. attendance the next *5 The issue before us is not whether Mas- leave, is to serant use her vacation union, Masserant and her the Associated December, toMay, scheduled care Attendants, Flight disagreed the air- with Though for her sick child. is what the position. But of grieving line’s instead it about, case is all it is not posed the issue bargaining agreement collective The us. issue before us is to limited grievance procedure, they an adminis- filed is, Railways preemption, Labor Act complaint trative with the of State Wash- or whether the state administrative board ington Department of Labor and Indus- bargaining agreement the collective griev- The Department tries. determined that procedure ought ance to decide whether to was entitled use her Decem- to Masserant is entitled so use Decem- ber to vacation leave care for her child in May. ber vacation This is of one May. The airline was fined for violat- $200 those to the Thomas cases which Reed airline, ing Masserant, the statute. The you you “If think that applies, Powell line agreed delay and the union have to thing can think inextricably about at- appellate proceedings and other so that something to thinking tached else without this preemption Labor Act dis- to, of thing the which is then attached pute may adjudicated. be The district you legal have a mind.”10 granted summary judgment against court the airline’s We now claim. important The most fact about this case review the district court decision novo.9 de Washington is circularity the the between of the bargaining

Some relevant statute the collective agreement bargaining agreement. employ- and em- The statute makes the (as ployer not entirely opposed customs are clear cut. ee’s to leave entitlement for) provision says A may dependent that “no attendance what the leave be used Arnold, Espinal Symbols Nw. 10. Thurman W. Gov- The (1935) (attributed ernment Thomas Powell). Reed agreement. proceed union could bargaining serant and her on the collective bargaining agreement grievance procedure, the collective but whether the And of leave to whatever the state expands agency procedure use is an alternative of the point statute despite Railway to them available says.11 that, if is enti- appears be preemption. Act leave, whether denom- tled take Railway Labor Act was enacted “The kind, any or other then inated sick leave interruption any ... to com- avoid [t]o to care for a sick be used operation any or to the carrier merce relative, just employee himself. But requires engaged therein.”12 statute, under entitlement agreements carriers make settle dis- bargaining to be defined putes with to avoid inter- their This employer practice. or de- ruption to It as covers airlines commerce.13 Washington statute on pendence of the it includes man- well as And “a railways.14 bargaining agreement estab- datory system of resolution.”15 that leave lished its command “shall “Congress’s RLA ‘to [was] intent governed” by the collective keep disputes out labor [carriers’] employer policy. or process, To this facilitate courts.”16 as a claim can be resolved “mandatory provides RLA arbitral grievance under the collective disputes ‘growing mechanism to out handle “any contro- agreement. provides It interpretation grievances or out versy meaning ... application agreements concerning or present- agreement” terms of this shall be rules, working pay, rates of condi- designated to a individu- grievance ed as ”17 tions.’ al, appealable person’s decision with that Disputes regime general- are Adjust- Flight Attendants’ Board of major or ly characterized as minor. either (two appointed by the un- ment members *6 “[M]ajor disputes to create contractu- seek ion, company) and to mediation by two rights, disputes al minor enforce (National or arbitration Mediation Board disputes defining so about Railway provides Labor Act them,”18 names, rights guaranteed by bargain- party each strikes list of seven and three). ing agreement minor question is not whether Mas- are Minor disputes.19 Airlines, Fennessy pursuant ... 16. 91 F.3d 11. "Sick be used v. Southwest 1359, (9th 1996) applicable (emphasis origi- State law.” in 1363 Cir. nal) Lewy Transp. (quoting v. Southern Pac. Int’l, Int’l 12. Serv. Inc. v. Bhd. of Aircraft Co., 1281, (9th 1986)). 799 F.2d 1289 Cir. Teamsters, 1069, 779 F.3d 2015) (en banc) 151a) § (quoting 45 U.S.C. Norris, 248, 17. 512 U.S. S.Ct. 2239 (internal omitted) (alterna- quotation marks 153, First). (quoting § 45 U.S.C. original). tion in the 152, § First. 13. 45 U.S.C. Corp. Ry. 18. See Rail v. Labor Execs. Consol. 299, 302, 2477, Ass’n., 491 U.S. 109 S.Ct. Norris, v. 14. Hawaiian Inc. 512 U.S. (1989) (quoting Elgin, & E. L.Ed.2d 250 Joliet 2239, 246, 248, 114 S.Ct. 129 L.Ed.2d 723, Burley, Ry. Co. U.S. (1994). (1945)). 89 L.Ed. 1886 Serv., (citing at 1073 Aircraft Norris, & Bhd. R.R., R.R. v. Chi. River Ind. 114 S.Ct. 2239. Trainmen 512 U.S. at of 40, 77, added)). (1957) (emphasis L.Ed.2d 622 disputes preempted by coverage, are the RLA faith denial of and insurance through preempted, must be dealt with first a carrier’s nevertheless because the bad “inextricably faith claim was process, internal resolution intertwined” with Adjustment group policy health System then a com- established Board pursuant to the prised management.20 of workers agreement.24 Lueck among holds “when reso purposes Act states its are to lution of is substantially a state-law claim of provide disputes settlement “all” dependent upon analysis conditions,” of the terms of an “pay, working about rules or parties made in between disputes “all” growing interpre- out of contract,” labor preempted by the claim is or application agreements tation about law, federal labor and a state rules, law suit “pay, working conditions.” should A be dismissed.25 dictum in Lueck exception is an pre- There this broad speaks directly to the case before us. emption, though, independent “[cjlaims says involving Lueck vaca rights. obvious, exceptions Some are such pay, tion or assignment, overtime work as when the state does not concern short, unfair discharge—in the whole “pay, working rules or conditions.” But range disputes traditionally resolved plenty possible there are claims that through be brought arbitration—could arguably overlap both collective the first they instance in state court” were agreement provisions and state law. The preempted.26 deemed Such court Supreme appears Court to have evolved action would a central “eviscerate tenet from possible preemption the broadest federal labor-contract law under rule, rule qualified toward more at least arbitrator, court, that it is the not the who respect state-created responsibility interpret has the the la rights. bor contract the first instance.”27 The case, The seminal preemption establish- this case is the one answered ing pre- the breadth of dictum, dictum, though merely emption, is Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.22 precisely because Masserant’s claim is It that federal labor must holds law ought her vacation be deemed paramount under the supremacy clause December, in May available rather than statute, areas covered the federal affecting state law use leave. avoid inconsistent state law interpretations Though implied it had been in Lucas under state contract law of collective bar- *7 Lueck, Flour and state gaining agreements.23 claim limitation on was federal Corp. explicitly Lingle Norge Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck articulated v. Division,28 apparently independent holds that an An employee’s wrong state claim for conditions, working tort discharge, protecting unrelated bad ful state law 20. 25. 220, § 45 U.S.C. 184. at 105 S.Ct. 1904. Id.

21. 45 U.S.C. 151a(4)-(5). 26. 219-20, at 1904. Id. 105 S.Ct.

22. 369 U.S. 95, 571, 82 S.Ct. 7 L.Ed.2d 593 27. Id. at 220, (1962). 105 S.Ct. 1904.

23. 103-04, at Id. S.Ct. 571. 28. Inc., Lingle Norge Magic Chef, Div. v. 399, 1877, 100 486 U.S. 108 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 24. 410 (1988). (1985). L.Ed.2d undis- retaliatory discharge wage The amount due was rate.36 from

employees already paid, in fact been claims, puted and had compensation was filing workers immediately.37 filed a albeit not She reason preempted.29 The not to be held agency seeking against action the state a “indepen- claim was that the state law was agency’s enforcement declaration that the agree- bargaining dent” collective preempted by the National La- policy was All the fired that mattered ment.30 Act.38 bor Relations We ruled claim was employee’s state law whether preempted,39 not but policy was were re- discharged the em- was and whether she held that The Court state versed.40 interfere with ployer’s motive was disadvantaged agency’s policy workers filing compensation of her workers’ deter had into who entered retaliatory discharge claim This claim.31 unrepresented agreements, since workers “purely factual would be resolved enforcement,41 get agency could so the Na- court to con- requiring inquiry” tional Relations Act antidiscrimi- bargaining agree- strue the agen- provision preempted nation the state ment.32 cy refusing to enforce a claim on from Hawaiian Livadas v. Bradshaw33 and preemption. account of The collective bar- Norris,34 quarter from almost Airlines nothing gaining said about guidance our most recent century ago, are wages when the to fired due They expand indepen from the Court. that a claim paid. had to be The Court held right exception to Rail dent broad under state law was be- preemption. way Labor wages really cause the immediately were due was one state law Livadas, required an em- a state law “entirely independent” of understand- ployer employee’s wages fired pay ing bargaining agreement, of the collective company practice immediately, but and the amount the was entitled office, from the central which send a check undisputed.42 to was days a few after termi- would arrive nation.35 The filed claim bargaining agree- Because employer in the against appropriate her silent, Livadas created ment was ten- agency, citing agency, but the state previously sion with most articulated policy, intertwined”; refused en- “inextricably its nonenforcement standards: re- against “analysis” bargain- her be- quires force her the collective terms; to look to ing agreement’s “independent” cause it would have the collective factual”; “purely anyone requiring determine 112-13, 2068. 29. at 36. Id. at Id. S.Ct. 1877. 407-10, 108 S.Ct. 1877. 30. Id. at 113-14, 37. Id. at S.Ct. 2068. 31. 108 S.Ct. 1877. Id. 111-12, Id. at 114 S.Ct. 2068. Id. *8 Aubry, v. 39. Livadas 987 559-60 (9th 1991). Cir. 107, 2068, 33. 512 114 129 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (1994). 93 Livadas, 110, at 114 S.Ct. 40. 512 U.S. 2068. 246, 2239, 129 34. 512 U.S. 114 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 128-30, 41. Id. at S.Ct. 2068. 114 (1994). 203 S.Ct, 111, 124-25, Livadas, 114 2068. 35. 512 U.S. at 114 42. at S.Ct. 2068. Id.

1089 agreement. Citing “construe” to tleblower Protection Act” because he re- Livadas holds that Lueck43 Lingle,44 fused to certify plane thought he was Livadas, so preemption federal cannot not be read unsafe.49 As in the Court held broadly as to “pre-empt nonnegotiable though even the basis for indepen- an conferred on individual dent state give law could rise to a law,” regardless grievance as matter pursuant to the collective bar- the underlying whether facts could also gaining agreement, that not imply did given grievance to a only have rise grievance brought, could be to the bargaining agreement.45 collective In the exclusion of a claim state court.50 The context of a claim “only where the reference source” of the em- fired bargaining to the collective agreement enforce, ployee sought protection have been blowers, would determination of un- whistle was state law.51“[W]here rate, disputed fact wage Livadas’s the resolution of a state-law claim depends “bare fact that a collective interpretation an of the the claim though will be its is preempted,”52 long consulted” but “as as the state- meaning undisputed, was not re- would law claim can be resolved without inter- quire preemption.46 itself, The determination preting the claim is employee was to a ‘independent’ agreement.”53 State penalty having “entirely been “immedi- law independent” claims ately” calendar, depended only on a bargaining agreement are not “entirely independent under- subject standing embodied in the bar- Act LMRA arbitration.54 gaining agreement.”47 agency would quite We have opportunities had a few merely “look to” the in the decades since these to try decisions rates, agreement for wage which was them, apply and have vary- articulated undisputed.48 ing adjudication. formulas for doing, so

The other recognized case from the we have that distinguishing term, Hawaiian Inc. v. preempted from non-preempted 1993 un- claims Norris, involved an who claimed “is always der state law not a task that ”55 he was fired violation of a state “Whis- ‘lends itself to analytical precision.’ Lueck, 43. Allis-Chalmers Corp. deprive v. 471 U.S. remedies 202, 1904, (1985). law.”). 105 85 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 206 available under state Inc., 44. Lingle Chef, Norge Magic Div. of 258, 51. Id. at (quoting S.Ct. 2239 114 An- 399, 1877, 486 U.S. 100 L.Ed.2d Co., drews v. Louisville & Nashville R. 406 (1988). 410 320, 324, 1562, U.S. 32 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 95 (1972)). 123, Livadas, 45. 512 U.S. at 114 S.Ct. 2068. 52. Id. 261, at S.Ct. 2239. 124, 46. Id. at 114 S.Ct. 2068.

47. Id. at 114 S.Ct. 2068. 53. Id. Lingle, (quoting 114 S.Ct. 2239 408-10, (1988)). 486 U.S. at 108 S.Ct. 1877 n.12, 48. Id. (citing Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 S.Ct. n.10, 54. Id. at 259 & 114 S.Ct. 2239. 246, 249-51, 49. Burnside v. Kiewit 491 F.3d (1994). Pacific L.Ed.2d (9th 2007) (quoting Cir. Cramer v. Inc., Freightways, Id. at S.Ct. 2239 existence C[T]he Consol. 2001) (en banc)). potential remedy of a CBA-based d[oes] *9 1090 have not compels preemption, we often always whether question

fundamental to address all three. sufficiently independent needed right is the state agreement bargaining of the collective In which identified an the cases we preemption of the Nation- the broad avoid independent claim that was not state Relations and al Labor frequently preempted, most question requiring judgment Act. That is a was the extent to which the collective bar- par- in the facts and about the to be gaining agreement had considered case, merely cannot be resolved ticular and claim whether the state was so decide varying or another of the by relying one preempted. independent as not be phrases the cases: “inextrica- disability words and discrimination claims California terms,” intertwined,” “analysis bly preempted Espi- Jimeno and were not independent,” “interpretation,” nal, “entirely because the collective general and “look to.” antidis- contained clause, the state discrimi- crimination our developed, have tool We without nation claim could be evaluated making judgment, that unavoidable agree- construing the collective background three-step decision tree. The Century- v. ment.57 Balcorta Twentieth preemption Supreme is the broad Corp., Film that a California Fox we held Our Court decisions discussed above. requiring picture employees motion says three-step decision tree when the ex discharge to be hours of within ception for an cursory preempted, not exami- can be made: state bargaining agree- nation of (1) court must consider: whether [The] say ment showed did what govern the CBA contains “discharge” discharged meant or when a claim, giving actions rise to state paid.58 to be employee had state law so, (2) and if state “require us even to refer to did sufficiently articulated a standard clear bargaining agreement, let the state claim can be evaluated interpret In Cramer v. alone it.”59 Consol- considering overlapping pro- without Inc., Freightways, idated a California law (3) visions whether the prohibiting two-way mirrors that allowed has shown an its intent to allow preempted, observation of toilets was not prohibition to be altered or removed employees’ privacy because the claims A private contract. state law will arguably were “not even covered only if the answer to the first bargaining agreement.”60 “yes,” and the answer v. Corp. per- Burnside Kiewit Pacific either the second or third is “no.”56 goes the furthest of of our cases haps “yes” question, rejecting preemption, employ- Since answer the first since the two, a “no” to compen- either ees’ law claim additional other Airlines, Sys., Espinal 56. Miller AT&T F.2d Network 57. v. Nw. 90 F.3d (9th (9th 1996); Jimeno, 1988) (footnote omitted); Cir. see Cir. Espinal also v. Nw. 90 F.3d (9th 58. 208 F.3d 1102 Cir. standard); (9th 1996) (quoting the Cir. Miller eno v. Mobil Oil 66 F.3d Jim Id. at 1111. (9th 1995) (same); Cir. Cook v. Growers, (9th 2000) (en Lindsay Olive Cir. 60. 255 F.3d 1990) (same). banc).

1091 daily meetings for sation and travel time The words used what describe distin- guishes an right was addressed to some extent in are not the collec- talismanic, and are not from consistent bargaining agreement.61 tive But state law case to Supreme case. The Court has used provided applied that the state rule “un- “analysis terms,” “construe,” requir- bargaining agreement less the collective ing “interpretation,” phrases, and other expressly provides otherwise.”62 union “consult,” and we have likewise used “in- opt could out of the state at,” terpret,” “analysis,” “look and others.68 rule, law but the collective bargaining recognized have opacity We of these expressly so provide. did attempts to draw a line indepen- between required only Thus the state rule a look at dent and intertwined state claims. In Bal- bargaining agreement the collective to see corta, we called the line “hazy.”69 express whether there “opt-out,” was Burnside, Cramer we said it was not and no further of it was needed to “a line that itself to analytical preci- lends adjudicate claim. the state our We limited sion.” today decision: “Our decision reaches we up What with from all wind these opt-out, not opt-in statutes.”63 cases is judgment, the need to exercise hand, On the other we held that a mechanical part rule. Our three test and state claim Firestone v. was phrases only “hazy” words and establish Southern Gas Co.64 The state and indeterminate line indepen- between California law claim for overtime time and a rights dent state and state inextrica- half, but an exemption bly had bargain- collective intertwined the collective case, ing agreement. In bargaining agreements that met certain sounder is that view the state law and the required terms.65 Because the claim “the bargaining agreement are indeed in [to] be inextricably intertwined. terpreted to ... determine whether Cali fornia’s exemption provision overtime ap Washington says that what- plies,” it sufficiently “independent” was not family ever care mem- distinguished avoid We depends bers the on her preemption.66 Livadas because there the collective bar bargaining agreement. We held gaining agreement had terms Burnside that “if the solely exists needed to be as a result then the claim is “interpreted.”67 (9th 2007). See, 61. 491 F.3d 1053 Cir. “mighty e.g., an “acorn” into a oak.” 107, 122, Bradshaw, Livadas v. added). (emphasis (1994); Id. at 1062 62. 129 L.Ed.2d 93 Valles v. (9th Ivy Corp., Hill 410 F.3d Cir. 63. Id. at 1064 n.11. 2005). (9th 2000). Century-Fox 64. 219 F.3d 1063 Cir. 69. Balcorta v. Twentieth Film (9th 2000) Corp., 208 F.3d Cir. Station, 65. Id. at 1066. (quoting v. Fox Television Ramirez Inc., 1993)). (9th 998 F.2d Cir. 66. Id. at 1066-68. Inc., Freightways, 70. Cramer v. Consol. (9th 2001) (en banc); Id. Cir. see at 1067. v. Kiewit Burnside Pacific 2007) Cramer, Many cases also tell us that we (quoting scope grow allow the from 255 F.3d at *11 analysis employee comply” there.”71 The with preempted, and our ends “must those case, right “except any relating In this established terms terms to to right paid leave take care dependence law is a to choice of leave.” This of the use designated family other a sick child or state claim on the terms of the collective members: bargaining agreement means that the col-

(1) bargaining agreement to If, lective has of a collective under the terms analyzed employee to see whether the is bargaining agreement employer poli- or paid to If the em- entitled as Firestone. cy applicable employee, to an leave flight ployee to sick leave or other is entitled to leave is entitled attendant off, paid employer bargaining agreement, shall time then an under collective any or all of employee allow an use she can it to care for her son when he use not, leave or choice sick ill. If not. us to employee’s is The statute directs paid other time off care for: bargaining agreement the collective to de- (a) employee whether the is entitled termine A child of the with any leave. requires health condition that treat- supervision; ment or or test, part right Under the “if the three (b) spouse, parent, parent-in-law, solely exists as a result of the then or grandparent of the who preempted, the claim is and our analysis or a serious health condition an ends there.”73 no Since the statute creates emergency condition. leave, right any of paid kind and condi- An employee may expansion rights upon not tions its take advance em- ployee leave until it under has been earned. em- entitlement ployee bargaining agreement, analysis taking under the circum- “the ends right stances in this section must there.” The to leave this case is described comply “substantially dependent analysis terms of the of a bargaining agreement employer poli- collective-bargaining agreement.”74 or There- cy applicable except preempted. fore it is relating terms to the choice of leave. agency argue The union the state (2) Use leave other than sick leave bargain- that no of the collective “analysis” child, or off to for a other time care ing agreement is needed because of “the grand- or spouse, parent, parent-in-law, undisputed restrictions” the collective bar- parent the circumstances de- gaining agreement pre- places use governed scribed in this section shall be they scheduled vacation leave. Because do appropriate the terms of the collec- not that Masserant was not enti- employer tive or tled to use her vacation leave scheduled for policy, applicable.72 December to care for sick child in expressly May, they argue, statute limits the necessary. no is They establishes “entitled” to argue that because a “look mere to” the terms of a collective bar- bargaining agreement “under gaining agreement employer practice policy.” establishes she is Burnside, Caterpillar (quoting 491 F.3d at 1059. 74. Id. Inc. v. Williams, 386, 394, 482 U.S. 107 S.Ct. 72. Wash. Rev. Code 49.12.270. (1987)); 96 L.Ed.2d 318 see Allis-Chalmers Lueck, 202, 220, Corp. v. 73. Burnside Kiewit Pac. (1985). 85 L.Ed.2d to use her in pendently December leave of the collec- needed, May, “analysis” they bargaining agreement. so avoid tive If prong logically independent, under the second it’s “inde- .has, part three pendent,” test. Whatever she whether the analysis is intellec- they argue, solely tually arises out of challenging Otherwise, the Wash- or not. ington distinction, point statute. preserving a uni- form meaning the collective bargaining argument say- That fit a would *12 agreement, Any would be analy- defeated. of ing “regardless an employee whether is can be to sis made or simple sound com- paid entitled to under collective plex. bargaining agreement employer policy, employee Second, the is up nevertheless entitled to argument the the overlooks first days per year to ten of leave to test, which, care for of part part the three barrier family members,” overcome, sick because it would if precludes any not to ask need right independent establish a of the collec- whether bargaining agree- the collective bargaining agreement. tive But the Wash- analyzed ment in pro- would be the state ington says opposite, statute the ceeding. that Preemption the applies because the is upon right entitlement conditioned paid solely take leave arises from paid her entitlement to off time the bargaining collective This agreement. bargaining collective agreement. has She statute if applies the has a show entitlement right leave under the bargain- conferred by the collective bargaining agreement collective her ing agreement, use the is so state inter- child, leave to care for according with, her sick and not twined to the statute. Thus whatever Mas- bargaining collective agreement. cannot, by

serant the terms the dissenting Our colleague heavily relies statute, “solely” arise out the statute. Kobold,75but, on our in recent decision argument The for Masserant seems to Kobold says, that case was “similar “analysis” no be that the collective in pertinent respects” bar- Livadas all because gaining agreement it is needed because by was controlled outcome the calen- plain undisputed dar, and not bargaining she is enti- not the agree- collective argument tled to it. That ment.76 expand Railway Kobold not did First, is mistaken ig- for two reasons. it preemption. Oregon The purpose of required nores the employer pay distinction be- the deducted “analysis” “looking tween mere days amount within seven, at.” when purpose distinguish independent is to wages days” were due.77“Seven could be rights state from intertwined with counted out a calendar and needed bargaining agreement. bargaining agree- of the collective purpose distinguish Likewise, is not to hard from ment. Kobold held easy analysis. claim, “Analysis,” fiduciary duty the context of relying breach determining Oregon statutes, two preempted in- was not whether dependent statutory provisions create “[t]he agreement, impose refers the state on an duties inde- contrast, claim logically pendent By cannot of a be determined inde- CBA.”78 832 F.3d 1024 75. 77. Id. Id. at 1040. Id. at 1041. claim is de- in this ease exists all. Masserant’s at issue

Washington statute CBA; preempt- it is not dependent upon the pendent conditioned and duty creates a ed; pursue be allowed to agreement. and she should on the collective judicial in the state administrative not mean Preemption of course does reasons, respectfully I For process. these to use her dissent. to care for May time vacation December that the her son. All it means is I. claim is not use her vacation leave whether she could Labor Act. for this scheduled time advance by the purpose is to be determined a Personal Leave Com- Masserant filed in the bar- process resolution Washington Department of plaint with the gaining agreement, argued Labor & Industries which she All is which process. resolution we decide parties’ terms of CBA violate *13 used, process must be dispute resolution at the first level prevailed the WFCA. She it reach. what result must Department’s process of the administrative Department issued a notice and the $200 by rejecting The district court erred denying of infraction to Alaska Airlines preemption. Accordingly, we reverse and request. Alaska Airlines filed this her resolution so that appropriate remand for seeking a declara- action federal court dispute by process resolved the the can be the that Masserant’s claim and WFCA tion in the collective established are preempted choice-of-leave agreement. (RLA). See 45 by the AND REMANDED. REVERSED 151-188; § Rev. Code U.S.C. Wash. § agreed 49.12.265-.295.The district court CHRISTEN, dissenting: Judge, Circuit Masserant, union, and the her De- that recognized The court the district partment of Labor & Industries that the underlying claim is issue Masserant’s preempt RLA state enforcement does not what benefits the collective Masserant’s WFCA because WFCA it the provides, whether parties’ claims are parties’ the terms of the CBA violate CBA. Family Act. Washington Care Masserant court, appeal to our Alaska Airlines argues “non-nego- On the WFCA creates argues requires RLA rights” that Alaska Airlines and the tiable mandatory bargain away. litigate dispute To via AFA could not resolve CBA, claim, procedures outlined in grievance need not be CBA Masserant’s through rather than state administrative interpreted. parties agree that requires RLA that minor procedures. CBA identifies circumstances under which used, here, disputes, such one at issue scheduled leave be as the accrued and first be in the carrier’s using leave to care for an must addressed scheduled and, process is not of those internal resolution if employee’s sick child one there, view, Adjust my presented not resolved circumstances. district comprised ment correctly court Mas- Board workers and ruled WFCA, 184; if 45 Atchi management.1 serant asserts arises from the See U.S.C. 1410, 562-64, 94 disputes The RLA divides labor into "ma 107 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 563 Atchison, (1987). arising Topeka “Major disputes” "those jor” disputes. are and "minor” Buell, 557, change Ry. 'out of the of collective & Fe Co. v. 480 U.S. formation Santa

1095 son, Buell, Fe Topeka Ry. & Santa Co. and the claim must be resolved under the 557, 563, 1410, Id; 107 94 mandatory 480 U.S. S.Ct. RLA’s arbitral mechanisms. (1987). preempts L.Ed.2d 563 The RLA see 512 Hawaiian U.S. at claims (“[Claims state law interfere with the 114 S.Ct. 2239 Adjustment jurisdiction Board’s exclusive only through must be RLA] resolved disputes. to resolve minor Hawaiian Air mechanisms, RLA including the carri lines, Norris, 246, 253, Inc. v. 512 U.S. 114 dispute-resolution er’s internal processes act (1994). If a L.Ed.2d adjustment and an by board established is based on con independently claim unions.”). and the Even if the law, CBA, ferred it is not asserted independently does exist Bradshaw, preempted. See Livadas v. step at two the court must “con 107, 125, U.S. S.Ct. 129 L.Ed.2d sider it is nevertheless ‘substan (1994); Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. tially dependent analysis aof collective- ” We Burnside, bargaining agreement.’ closely examine at 1059 (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Supreme Court has cautioned that fed Williams, 386, 394, “cannot broadly eral laws read (1987)). 96 L.Ed.2d 318 Claims that preempt nonnegotiable rights conferred on are substantially dependent on an individual aas matter of state of a CBA also preempted. are Id. at 1060. Livadas, law.” U.S. recently This court explained poli- *14 cies underlying two-part Burnside's test: In Burnside v. Kiewit our Pacific The driving Burnside factors reflect two court articulated two-part a test for deter preemption first, concerns of doctrine: mining whether a state claim that law preventing “parties’ renege on efforts appears to implicate a collective promises their by ‘relabeling’ arbitration § is preempted 301 of by the simply alleging as actions tort suits Management Relations of breaches duties assumed in collective- (LMRA). See 491 F.3d 1053. The Burnside Livadas, bargaining agreements,” 512 appeal test is critical to the outcome of this 2068, second, at 114 U.S. S.Ct. Supreme the because Court that has held preserving of “a central tenet federal preemption the standard under LMRA ... it is labor-contract law that arbi the § applies 301 is the same one that to the trator, court, not the who has the re RLA. See Hawaiian 512 at U.S. interpret con sponsibility the labor Burnside, 114 S.Ct. 2239. Under the instance,” Lueck, tract the first 471 inquires court first whether the asserted 220, 105 at S.Ct. 1904. U.S. right cause of action involves conferred employee Reg'l on Kobold v. virtue of or Good Samaritan Med. state law Ctr., 2016). Burnside, of 832 the terms a CBA. F.3d right implicates at 1059. “If the claim neither of the solely exists as a Masserant’s of result then claim is aforementioned she concerns: does preempted, there,” our guise [] ends of a tort lawsuit that ” rules,

bargaining agreements.’ agreements concerning pay, Id. at rates of or ” (quoting S.Ct. & T.S.L.R. Co. working (quoting Detroit conditions.’ Id. U.S.C. Union, n.5, Transp. 153). U.S. parties agree the minor (1969)). 24 L.Ed.2d 325 “Minor dis dispute procedures ap relevant to this are " putes” ‘growing grievances are those out of peal. interpretation application or out of the of accrued; objects contract Masserant’s had its with Airlines breached Alaska her, to inter that she nor she ask court Masserant’s insistence should does The district her CBA. be free to reschedule it. court pret recognized right at issue is that the complaint A. leave, par- as do the right to use accrued Department of Labor & Indus- her claim as ties. Masserant describes exists, right if involves a tries based “earned violation WFCA all, by of virtue state law. at [by time that was denied use [she] operative clear that the made Burnside Airlines]”; Alaska Alaska Airlines acknowl- step first inquiry at the right is edges that the asserted Masser- right at issue analysis is whether right ant’s to reschedule her De- “claimed byor the CBA. See by state law conferred days May”; cember vacation Burnside, at 1059. deter “[T]o Industries frames Department Labor & inheres particular mine as whether the WFCA “con- law,” legal ‘the char courts “consider independent statutory right fers an offlex- claim, independent [the] acter ibility superimposed that is whatever collective-bargaining to an under a leave is available grievance whether a [and] agreement or em- from same of facts arising precisely the set ployer policy.” (second Id. at 1060 pursued.’” could be majority concludes Livadas, original) (quoting alteration is not asserts 123, 114 U.S. from the CBA “the cre- [WFCA] similarly easy imagine It another kind ates might flight situated attendant who expansion rights upon its conditions arbitration, such as an bound employee entitlement under who contests whether she had accrued bargaining agreement.” Because Masser- the CBA deter- leave at issue. Because argue ant that the creates does WFCA should be calcu- how available mines *15 leave, right paid to or claim to be a enti- lated, hypothetical flight attendant’s this leave, to or even she is tled additional that CBA, right arise from the asserted would early to use her accrued leave and, analysis step at one our would end. CBA, terms of the the court’s Burnside, See 491 F.3d at 1059. Masser- reasoning misses mark. as- the claim is because she asserts ant’s different right the to use her accrued vacation serts the Bum- right, apply a and to different family right a that leave as medical identify it is critical to properly, side test statutory protections from might arise the precise right pre- asserted.2 Masserant the WFCA, certainly one that within the but accrued leave for scheduled her vacation provided by the CBA. December, sought early it but to use to majority reasons that because the right claims the care child. She sick provided to way, refers the to use a certain WFCA accrued CBA, right terms of right to Nota- a “whatever Masser- the additional accrued leave. cannot, statute, by the terms of the Airlines does not that ant has bly, Alaska pre-emptive Supreme of federal labor-contract Court has cautioned effect preemption analysis be conducted on a case-by- must out on law remains to be fleshed a Corp. case-by-base basis.”); Míreles, basis. Allis-Chalmers case see F.3d Adkins v. Lueck, 220, 105 (9th Cir. (1985) ("The scope of full the L.Ed.2d ‘solely’ deduction, out of the pay arise statute.” But under because the asserted claim step, Burnside’s first the is was to for the failure remit the deductions right the asserted inde- manner, “exists in a timely only and. the statute CBA,” pendently of the not whether specified seven-day a limitation trans- solely Burnside, out of arises statute. 491 mitting the premiums. withheld Id. at (“If right solely F.3d the exists 1040. The CBA not specify did a time CBA, Id, a result of the the claim is then period. Our court also held the there.”). preempted, and our ends plaintiffs Kobold fiduciary breach of duty preempted just A is not it is claim not preempted because the Ore- based a state to statute refers gon statute governing such claims “cre- in a example, included CBA. For impose[d] ate[d] employ- duties an Liradas, Supreme Court concluded er of CBA.” Id. a at 1041. In that LMRA not preempt a claim did contrast, the Kobold court ruled that the challenging employer’s to failure plaintiffs same claim for money had and promptly pay wages at the time of sever- preempted, received was because “[the ance. 512 U.S. at S.Ct. 2068. The employer’s] authority to deduct from funds recognized court employee’s right that the plaintiffs] paychecks [the plain- and [the CBA, to be from but arose be- right tiffs] those applied have funds cause the failure to contested toward his premiums” health insurance pay wages severance promptly, and the were based' on the CBA and without the right to prompt payment was afforded plaintiff “would have no basis statute, by the state the claim was not upon to bring money which had and preempted. Id. (holding at issue received claim.” Id. arose out of “[bjeyond state law because enough It is not simple that a CBA bargained-for need refer to refers that is wage computing provided rates in Our penalty, statute. court collective-bargaining agreement ir- that a held claim based on statutorily [wa]s dispute”). guaranteed relevant not preempted, even generally provides when the CBA for a Our supports recent decision Kobold right. similar See Balcorta v. Twentieth position. See 1024. In Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 Kobold, appeals one consolidated 2000). Balcorta, we held that Oregon court addressed an California requiring employers law pay permitted employers portion deduct certain in the film industry employees’ wages pre- as health insurance within twenty-four discharge hours their miums if aby authorized do so CBA. Id. *16 not preempted by was LMRA 301. Id. at 1037-42. The statute made such deduc- right to payment and the of timeliness tions unlawful if the not prop- funds were payments the by were the addressed erly applied to pay premiums insurance but or, we concluded the claim for the failure to specified by within time the CBA if silent, payment tender twenty-four hours the CBA within statutory was within the preempted was not days.. limit of a allega- seven Id. 1038. The at “whether in violation has tion Kobold was that the occurred is controlled failed provisions the of the to transmit the statute and premi- withheld insurance does not turn on plan payment ums to the health in the insurance a whether was timely timely manner. at provisions Id. 1037. Our court held of the collec preempted, bargaining agreement.” that not 1111; claim was tive at even Id. though provided type the CBA for this of see also Ivy Valles v. 410 F.3d Hill 2005) timely in a (9th plans insurance (holding claim tions health Cir. manner, not where it was based the claim was we held preempted

was not right to work-free statutorily guaranteed step second be- preempted at Burnside’s though pur CBA- periods- even meal “unambiguously spe- cause the CBA to work-free ported to waive obligations parties’ rights and cif[ied]” periods). meal require interpreta- did not and therefore Balcorta, 1040; also tion. 832 F.3d at see Livadas, issue in Ko- at Like the (holding 1109-10 claim not Balcorta, at if has the bold, family required time for court is preempted to use her vacation' where here, statute, from a apply” it arises CBA are “read and WFCA, parties’ from the CBA. and not ambiguous”). nor uncertain “neither Service, Inc., Parcel Matson United Masserant asserts not B. The 2016), that a we held F.3d substantially analy- dependent on only “pe- work environment hostile of the CBA. sis the CBA and was not ripheral[ly]” involved analy- of the Burnside step The second interpretation preempted because whether requires “determinfetion] sis required. CBA Id. at 1134-35. was ‘substantially dependent’ right is state law who claimed Matson involved Burnside, 491 of a CBA.”3 on the terms subject to a work that she was hostile omitted). (citation apply To at 1060 environment, part supervi- because her test, court must “decide part way work” in a assigned “extra sors claim can be resolved at 1129. The male co-workers. Id. favored interpreting the CBA.” ‘looking] to’ versus employee’s claim employer argued that the (citation (alteration omit- original) Id. term “extra preempted was because the ted). “looking to” line between and her claim appeared work” the CBA is sometimes less than “interpreting” interpreting resolved without could be “ clear-cut, meaning con- but ‘when employee’s But the term. Id. at 1133. subject dispute, tract terms is claim was not hostile work environment that a will be consult- [CBA] the bare fact dependent upon consideration extra litigation of state-law ed the course assignments because her contention work claim to plainly require does disproportionately as- that extra work was (alteration in extinguished.’” original) Id. just to male one signed coworkers Livadas, at (quoting example ways in which the 2068); see Hawaiian S.Ct. argued male coworkers were favored. (“[A]s long at S.Ct. 2239 U.S. explained Id. the hostile work We claim can without the state-law be resolved claim was not at environment itself, the claim interpreting the Burnside’s, step because cor- “[t]he second ... ‘independent’ interpretation of the CBA ... [was] rect Lingle v. pre-emption purposes.” (quoting purely peripheral the relevant Inc., Magic Chef, U.S. Norge Div. respect assigning work.” Id. 399, 408-10, 100 L.Ed.2d 1134-35. *17 (1988))). case, Kobold, key In required Masserant’s where the state law wholly undisputed are also paycheck the CBA employers transmit deduc- analyzes ultimately step one to Although majority relies on conclude that Masserant’s two, preempted. step claim is claim in the context of Burnside’s As of require interpretation. May do Ting XUE, Petitioner, ill, when her child Masserant

had an accrued vacation scheduled permits December. The CBA vacation LYNCH, Loretta E. United States leave to be used unscheduled times Attorney General, circumstances, certain but does not ad- Respondent. dress whether vacation leave be used No. 15-9540 for an flight absence to a due attendant’s United States Court of Appeals, own illness or a child’s illness. Because Tenth Circuit. nothing “[t]here the ... CBA to interpret,” the WFCA’s state-law FILED November substantially dependent on the CBA. As January Revised pro 2017 nunc Kobold, See 832 F.3d at 1040. tunc to November majority concludes that because Panel Rehearing En Rehearing refers CBA’s provi- Banc January Denied sion to argue WFCA, that it violates the “analysis” some is required. But it does explain why the CBA must be consult-

ed, record, analyzed. much less On this I

conclude Masserant’s claim does not

“substantially depend”

CBA, and that it is not preempted under pronj* second Burnside. persuasive

There is force to Alaska’s

argument present that “crew absences

unique industry,” concerns the airline requisite

because “without the number of board,

flight a plane attendants cannot

take off.” But the limited before panel is the forum for proper resolv-

ing important underlying questions

raised Masserant’s claim. I would hold correctly that the district court con- Washington Department

cluded that the

Labor & enforcement Mas- Industries’

serant’s complaint preempt- WFCA is not RLA,

ed and that the correct forum resolving parties’ is the process.

state administrative

Case Details

Case Name: Alaska Airlines v. Judy Schurke
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Jan 25, 2017
Citation: 846 F.3d 1081
Docket Number: 13-35574
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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