18 So. 2d 810 | Ala. | 1944
Lead Opinion
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *3
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *4
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *5 Plaintiffs, under the Declaratory Judgment Statute of this State (Title 7, §§ 156-168, Code of 1940), seek to test the constitutional validity of what is commonly referred to as the "Bradford Act," which concerns labor and labor organizations and passed by the Legislature in 1943. Acts 1943, p. 252, Code 1940, Tit. 26, § 376 et seq. All parties upon this appeal argue the case upon the assumption of the regularity of the proceeding in every respect, and the case will be so considered here.
The attack is upon the Act as a whole and upon several of its separate sections. The cause was, by consent, tried before a court of Jefferson County composed of three of its judges, including the presiding judge of that circuit. In the court below the ruling was that the Act as a whole was constitutional, and Section 7, here so vigorously assailed, was likewise held valid. Sections 12 and 17 were held void, and Sections 13 and 14 void in part, but that the validity of these particular features of the Act did not affect the validity of the Act as a whole. The court refrained from passing upon the constitutionality of Sections 15 and 16. But upon this appeal counsel for the respective parties have very ably argued all the questions presented as to each feature of the Act, and seek a conclusion of the whole matter. We acquiesce in this treatment of the appeal and proceed to decision of all questions raised.
At the outset reference may be made, as is often done, to the principles by which courts are guided when it is sought to strike down as violative of the constitution a legislative act. Uniformly, the courts recognize that this power is a delicate one, and to be used with great caution. It should be borne in mind, also, that legislative power is not derived either from the state or federal constitutions. These instruments are only limitations upon the power. Apart from limitations imposed by these fundamental charters of government, the power of the legislature has no bounds and is as plenary as that of the British Parliament. It follows that, in passing upon the constitutionality of a legislative act, the courts uniformly approach the question with every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity, and seek to sustain rather than strike down the enactment of a coordinate branch of the government. All these principles are embraced in the simple statement that it is the recognized duty of the court to sustain the act unless it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that it is violative of the fundamental law. State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Murphy,
Another principle which is recognized with practical unanimity, and leading to the same end, is that the courts do not hold statutes invalid because they think there are elements therein which are violative of natural justice or in conflict with the court's notions of natural, social, or political rights of the citizen, not guaranteed by the constitution itself. Nor even if the courts think the act is harsh or in some degree unfair, and presents chances for abuse, or is of doubtful propriety. All of these questions of propriety, wisdom, necessity, utility, and expediency are held exclusively for the legislative bodies, and are matters with which the courts have no concern. This principle is embraced within the simple statement that the only question for the court to decide is one of power, not of expediency *10 or wisdom. 11 Am.Jur. pp. 799-812; A. F. of L. v. Reilly, District Court of Colorado, 7 Labor Cases No. 61,761.
The broad doctrine as thus announced is sustained by the weight of authority, both in the Federal and the state courts. For our own State the cases of City of Ensley v. Simpson,
Likewise, another principle should be kept in mind, and that is: Where the validity of a statute is assailed and there are two possible interpretations, by one of which the statute would be unconstitutional and by the other would be valid, the courts should adopt the construction which would uphold it. 11 Am.Jur. p. 725. Or, as otherwise stated, it is the duty of the courts to adopt the construction of a statute to bring it into harmony with the constitution, if its language will permit. This principle has been often recognized by our own Court. State v. Birmingham So. Ry. Co.,
"The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy. We have repeatedly held that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt the rule is the same."
Bearing in mind these well-recognized principles, we proceed to a consideration of the constitutional questions here presented.
The particular objection here urged so strenuously is that the Act contains more than one subject. Of course, as has been often stated, the purpose of the requirement of a single subject is primarily to prevent "log-rolling" legislation, which would result in the support of doubtful measures induced by adding others upon unrelated subjects. It has been stated, also, that incidentally, the purpose was to avoid ill-considered provisions passing into law while the thought of the Legislature is directed to another subject.
The title to the Act, like every instrument known to the law, is to be construed as a whole. Gibson v. State,
"It is settled under our decisions that however numerous the subjects stated in the title, and however numerous the provisions in the body of the act may be, if they can be by fair intendment considered as falling within the subject-matter legislated upon in the act, or necessary as ends and means to the attainment of such subject, the act does not offend our constitutional provision that no law shall embrace more than one subject, which must be expressed in its title."
Counsel in argument ingeniously select different phases of the subject of the Act, insisting that each is separate and distinct. But we cannot agree. As we have previously noted, the title of the Act must be construed as a whole and considered in the light of the subject matter treated in the body of the Act. When so considered, we find in the passage of this Act no infringement of Section 45. The entire Act, as well as the title, indicates that the subject *11 matter concerns labor and the regulation of labor organizations. Clearly enough, the establishment of a Department of Labor and a provision for a Mediation Board come within the influence of this subject. So, likewise, as to the numerous regulations contained in the several provisions of the Act.
Counsel refer to some of the prohibitions embraced in the Act, which, it is urged, do not come within the meaning of the word "regulation"; citing to this effect Miller v. Jones,
"It is claimed that the title does not indicate anything as to injunctions or their prohibition or that it limits and restricts the jurisdiction of courts of equity, and that these subjects are not germane to the title. We have repeatedly held that, although numerous provisions in an act are not expressed in the general title, the purpose of the constitutional provision is fulfilled when the general subject indicated by the title reasonably covers the provisions of the act when they are related and have some connection, more or less direct, with the subject of the legislation. Unless the act contains matters having no relation to the title, the constitutional provision is not violated. The provisions of the statute as to injunctions are not inconsistent with, or foreign to, the general subject. The act therefore does not violate the constitutional provisions requiring all acts to contain but one subject, which shall be expressed in the title."
But we forego further discussion. Upon careful consideration of argument of counsel for plaintiffs, including a reconsideration of many of the authorities cited (among them, State v. So. Ry. Co.,
The Act as a whole is further attacked upon the theory that it is repugnant to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166. But we think this question was fully answered by the Wisconsin Court in Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
Argument is advanced also that the Act is invalid because of a capricious discrimination, in that it expressly excludes organizations coming within the influence of the Act of Congress known as the Railway Labor Act, as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-188. But a study of that Act, to which we gave attention in Steele v. L. N. R. Co.,
And in addition to this, the authorities very generally recognize that as to the matter of classification, much is left to sound legislative discretion. As said by the Supreme Court of the United States in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones Laughlin,
Like thought was also expressed in People of State of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,
Certainly, the full scope of the National Railway Labor Act suffices to demonstrate that the exclusion of organizations concerning that particular field was not an arbitrary or unfounded discrimination. The two authorities cited should, we think, likewise suffice to answer this contention.
We are thus brought to a consideration of the several sections of the Act here under attack. The validity of the Act and its several provisions rests upon the question of whether or not the State, through its lawmaking body, was within the proper exercise of its police power.
As we have often observed, the exercise of this power is a governmental function, and is of such a character that it cannot be alienated or surrendered by the legislature. The limits of a state's police power have never been fixed nor its boundaries defined. This for the reason that it is not subject to any definite limitations or boundaries, for it represents the state's great reserve power, and at all times is co-extensive with the necessity of the case and the safeguard of public interest. It is a power inherent in the government, and while it may be set aside by the Constitution, yet in order to find that it has been so set aside, the Constitution must plainly so indicate. And the authorities agree it is a peculiar function of the law-makers to determine when the welfare of the people requires the exercise of the state's police power and what are appropriate measures to that end, subject only to the power of the courts to judge whether any particular law is an invasion of rights secured by the Constitution. State v. Murphy,
And in Nebbia v. New York,
"No exercise of the private right can be imagined which will not in some respect, however slight, affect the public; no exercise of the legislative prerogative to regulate the conduct of the citizen which will not to some extent abridge his liberty or affect his property. But subject only to constitutional restraint the private right must yield to the public need.
"The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth, as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by securing that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.
"It results that a regulation valid for one sort of business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for another sort, or for the same business under other circumstances, because the reasonableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts."
The opinion contains many illustrations where private rights must yield to the *13 public good in obedience to the mandate of the lawmaking power.
There are, of course, limitations to the police power, though they have never been drawn with any degree of exactness. As observed in 11 Am.Jur. p. 975, it is much easier to recognize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its boundaries or prescribe limitations to its exercise. As observed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
The police power is said to extend in a general way to all great public needs. 11 Am.Jur. p. 978. Each state has the power to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons, individuals, and corporations within its jurisdiction for the public convenience and the public good, the only limitation being that such regulations shall not prove repugnant to the provisions of the state or national Constitution. 11 Am.Jur. p. 987.
We should stress, also, the fact that a police regulation not operating unreasonably beyond the occasion of its enactment, is not rendered invalid by the fact that it may affect incidentally the exercise of some right guaranteed by the constitution. But the police power may not unreasonably invade private rights guaranteed under the federal or state constitution. And, as we observed in State v. Polakow's Realty Experts, supra, all regulations involve in some degree a limitation upon the exercise of the right regulated. The test is whether the limitation imposed is really by way of regulation only and is one whose purpose and effect go no further than throw reasonable safeguards in the public interest around the exercise of the right. If the limitation is of this character, its imposition is a proper exercise of the police power resident in the legislature and whose exercise is one of the latter's most important functions.
As we have observed, this power must not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, and there must be some reasonable relation to the regulation and the ends to be attained. But if upon the matter men may reasonably differ, in view of all the circumstances, the legislative act in the exercise of the police power must be sustained. Leary v. Adams, supra. The cases recognize the rule that the lawmaking authorities may not, under the guise of police power, impose restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon the use of private property or the pursuit of useful activities. The restriction imposed must bear some substantial relation to the public need or general welfare.
In Euclid, Ohio, v. Ambler Realty Co.,
Speaking also to a zoning ordinance, the United States Supreme Court in Zahn v. Board of Public Works,
"The most that can be said is that whether that determination was an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unequal exercise of power is fairly debatable. In such circumstances, the settled rule of this court is that it will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body charged with the primary duty and responsibility of determining the question."
In Labor Board v. Jones Laughlin, supra, the Court was dealing with an act of Congress subjecting the employer to many restraints in regard to his relationship with his employee. The act was vigorously criticized as being one-sided in its application; that it subjects the employer to supervision and restraints and *14 leaves untouched the abuses for which employees may be responsible. The Court, in answering the argument, observed that it was dealing with the power of Congress, not with the particular policy or with the extent to which the policy should go, saying:
"We have frequently said that legislative authority, exerted within its proper field, need not embrace all evils within its reach. The Constitution does not forbid 'cautious advance, step by step,' in dealing with the evils which are exhibited in activities within the range of legislative power."
And we may observe, additional restrictions upon the rights of the employer are to be found in the Fair Labor Standards Act of Congress, recently considered and enforced by this Court in the case of Cudahy Packing Co. v. Bazanos,
With these general observations we may now proceed with their application to the several sections of the Act here assailed.
We may note at the outset that no one giving study to the historical background of the laboring man in his struggle to better his condition in life can for one moment doubt the wisdom and, indeed, the necessity, for organization. Some of these early struggles may be found noted in 31 Am.Jur. p. 836, but need no elaboration here. As observed in Vol. I, Teller's Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Sec. 64, the right to form and join labor unions is but the expression of the employee's right to a free and open market, a recognized substantive right.
In Labor Board v. Jones Laughlin, supra, the Court, after observing that the statute there in question went no further than to safeguard the right of employees to self-organize and to select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or other mutual protection without restraints or coercion by their employer, said:
"That is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear a right to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize its business and select its own officers and agents. Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise of the right of employees to self-organization and representation is a proper subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority. Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that they were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that, if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer."
We find ourselves in accord with the courts generally that the right of organization is a fundamental one. 31 Am.Jur. p. 851. See also Pittman v. Nix, Fla.,
And we think it is well-settled that the members of a labor organization — that is, workmen who are not bound by contract for a definite period and have not, by agreement freely made, given up such rights — may, without liability, abandon their employment at any time, either singly or in a body, as a means of compelling or attempting to compel, their employers to accede to demands for better terms and conditions. As the Massachusetts Court observed in Pickett v. Walsh,
In Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. v. Cruise,
"They seem to be unanimous, also, in holding that employes may rightfully organize themselves into associations for mutual protection and betterment; and *15 that, having thus organized, they may by confederated action withdraw from, or decline to enter, the service of any particular employer."
But our country has grown in population and in industrial importance, and with this growth labor organizations have kept apace. Their power and influence are fully felt and well understood, as well as many conflicts between labor and management in all forms of industry.
As said in Carpenters' Joiners' Union v. Ritter's Cafe,
"The economic contest between employer and employee has never concerned merely the immediate disputants. The clash of such conflicting interests inevitably implicates the well-being of the community. Society has therefore been compelled to throw its weight into the contest. The law has undertaken to balance the effort of the employer to carry on his business free from the interference of others against the effort of labor to further its economic self-interest. And every intervention of government in this struggle has in some respect abridged the freedom of action of one or the other or both. * * *
"The right of the state to determine whether the common interest is best served by imposing some restrictions upon the use of weapons for inflicting economic injury in the struggle of conflicting industrial forces has not previously been doubted. * * *
"But the circumstance that a labor dispute is the occasion of exercising freedom of expression does not give that freedom any greater constitutional sanction or render it completely inviolable. * * * We must be mindful that 'the rights of employers and employees to conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others for a share in the products of industry are subject to modification or qualification in the interests of the society in which they exist. This is but an instance of the power of the State to set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.' "
In some of the states statutes have been passed modeled after the National Labor Relations Act, and providing a complete supervision of labor relations for employers in intrastate enterprises. Illustrative is the Colorado Act of 1943. Session Laws of Colorado 1943, c. 131, p. 392-418. Somewhat similar is the Wisconsin Act (Chapter 57, Laws of 1939), treated in Christoffel v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
The power of a state to pass such regulatory measures is based upon the police power, and this has been generally recognized. In the very recent case of Ex parte R. J. Thomas,
The Colorado Act was reviewed in A.F. of L. v. Reilly, 7 Labor Cases 61,761, supra. And in Thornhill v. Alabama,
Indeed, as we read the briefs, counsel for plaintiffs with commendable candor concede that the subject is one which may be embraced within the exercise of the police power of the State. The argument, as we understand it, is that the various provisions of this Act to which they have raised objections, do not constitute reasonable regulations, are unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, or violative of fundamental rights secured under both the State and Federal Constitutions.
(1) The name of the labor organization; (2) the location of its principal office in Alabama; (3) the name of the president, secretary, treasurer, and other officers and business agent, together with their salaries, wages, bonuses, and other remuneration paid each, and the post office address of each; (4) the date of regular election of officers; (5) the number of its paid-up members; (6) complete financial statement of all fees, dues, fines, or assessments levied or received, together with an itemized list of all disbursements, the name of recipients and the purpose therefor, covering the preceding twelve months; (7) a complete statement of all property owned by the organization, including monies on hand or credited to the organization.
The Director of Labor shall have printed and make available public forms for the making of such report, and at the time of the filing of such report, it shall be the duty of the organization to pay the Director of Labor an annual fee therefor in the sum of $2.00. The Director is to file and index the reports, and the section provides that the records provided for shall be made available by the Director of Labor in his office to the Governor of Alabama for examination. It is made unlawful for any fiscal or other officer or agent of any labor organization to collect or accept payment of any dues, fees, assessments, fines, or any other monies from any member while such labor organization is in default with respect to filing the annual report required by this section.
In Section 18 of the Act the violation by any labor organization of any of its provisions subjects them to a civil penalty of a sum not exceeding $1000 for each such violation. And by the same section the violation of the provisions of Section 7, as to the officers or agents collecting dues and other monies while such organization is in default with respect to filing the annual report, is declared to be a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of not exceeding $500 or by imprisonment at hard labor for not exceeding twelve months, or both.
In arguing against the validity of this section counsel lay much stress upon the constitutional right of free speech and of assembly, and we are cited, among other authorities, to De Jonge v. Oregon,
Counsel do not contend that labor organizations are immune from regulation, but assert the contrary. They say, however, regulation is one thing, but restraint of liberty of speech another. But we think this argument overlooks the full power of the Legislature in the exercise of the police power of the State, and it overlooks also the full meaning of the word "functioning," as employed in Section 7. As defined in the Act, a labor organization is one which has within its membership employees working in the State of Alabama, organized for the purpose of dealing with employer or employers concerning the hours of employment, rates of pay, or the tenure or other terms and conditions of employment. And the courts, of course, take judicial knowledge of the fact — and the Act so discloses — that there are assessments and fines and dues, monies collected and disbursed, officers elected, and agents employed. Such organizations may sue and be sued and its properties subjected to the satisfaction of any judgment rendered against it. Title 7, Secs. 142-145, Code of 1940. The purpose and scope of the activities of labor organizations is fully discussed in United Mine *17
Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co.,
"Function," as used in this Act, simply means a labor organization, whether incorporated or not, engaged in business in this State, and in the character of business thus indicated, for the promotion of the interests of its members. True, as a part of its functioning, and a part only, the assemblage of its members for discussion is had, but this is merely incidental. As the authorities cited indicate, every enactment for public need necessarily results in some restraint of individual liberty.
But as observed by this Court in Carter v. Knapp Motor Co.,
" 'Courts are competent to adjudge the acts men do under color of a constitutional right, such as that of freedom of speech * * * and to determine whether the claimed right is limited by other recognized powers equally precious to mankind.' * * * 'Whenever state action is challenged as a denial of "liberty", the question always is whether the state has violated the "essential attributes of that liberty." ' " [
Numerous instances might be cited to indicate where private rights must yield to public need. The establishment of the Securities Commission of this State is one example; and the requirement of a certificate to conduct the business of real estate brokers, treated in State v. Polakow's Real Estate Experts, supra, is another.
As observed by the Supreme Court of Texas in Ex parte R. J. Thomas, supra, the state, under its police power, may enact laws which interfere indirectly and to a limited extent with the right of speech or the liberty of the people where they are reasonably necessary for the protection of the general public. And as observed in Carpenters' Joiners' Union v. Ritter's Cafe, supra:
"Where, as here, claims on behalf of free speech are met with claims on behalf of the authority of the state to impose reasonable regulations for the protection of the community as a whole, the duty of this Court is plain. Whenever state action is challenged as a denial of 'liberty', the question always is whether the state has violated 'the essential attributes of that liberty'. * * * While the right of free speech is embodied in the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause, that Clause postulates the authority of the states to translate into law local policies 'to promote the health, safety, morals and general welfare of its people * * *. The limits of this sovereign power must always be determined with appropriate regard to the particular subject of its exercise.' "
The argument advanced here was also advanced and answered by the Colorado Court in A. F. of L. v. Reilly, supra, and to like effect. See also Christoffel v. W. E. R. B., supra. And in Whitney v. California,
If we follow the argument of counsel for plaintiff to its ultimate conclusion, it is difficult to see where any effective legislation could be had concerning regulations of organizations of this character. We think the authorities which we have herein cited clearly demonstrate that they are subject to the police power of the state, and that the contention as to the violation of the constitutional provisions of free speech and assembly invalidates any of the provisions of the Act, is untenable.
The argument is further advanced that the Act requires the issuance of a license to a labor organization as a condition precedent to functioning in the State; and much stress is laid upon International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg,
The question resolves itself after all as to whether or not the filing of these reports can be held to be a reasonable regulation under the police power of the State. The Director of Labor has construed the Act to the effect that these reports are not for public consumption. We think a reading of the Act clearly indicates that they are to be exhibited to the Governor only, and the Director is justified in this interpretation of the Act. Clearly enough, if we are to have a Department of Labor to deal with labor organizations, and to attempt to settle disputes, and to bring about industrial peace in this State, it is a reasonable regulation that the Director be informed of the character of the organization, its varying rules and regulations.
The constitution, rules, and by-laws of a labor organization are the source of its authority. They constitute not only the contract between the labor union and the members, but also the contract between the members and other members of the union. As said in Vol. I, Sec. 62, Teller on Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining: "Questions relating to the property, funds, and internal administration of labor unions raise no problem peculiar to such unions." And in the succeeding section of this work the author cites instances in which it became necessary to carefully examine into the source of the particular organization involved, so as to determine whether or not it was in fact a labor union or merely an organization seeking, for its own advantage, to assume the cloak of such a union.
A rather extreme example of the constitutional validity of requirements of this character is to be found in the statute of New York, which required a copy of the constitution, by-laws, rules, regulations, oath of membership and the roster of its membership, of a secret organization, to be filed with the Secretary of State, with exemption of numerous other secret organizations from the influence of the act. Upon the question of classification, the Court observed, among other things, that a lack of abstract symmetry does not matter and that the state may classify with reference to the evil to be prevented. The holding was that the requirements were valid, and the inequality produced was not actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary. See People of the State of New York v. Zimmerman,
And as to the requirement for a financial statement we think it clear enough these provisions may be fully justified as a regulation for the benefit of the members of the organization. The Texas Court in Ex parte R. J. Thomas, Tex.Sup.,
"The large membership in a single union, and the limited opportunity of the individual member to personally familiarize himself with the manner in which his union is operated make it impossible for the individual worker to protect himself in his own right against its mismanagement. These circumstances present a field for legislation by the State for the protection of the rights of the laborer as well as the general public."
Nor can we agree that any claimed right of privacy in any manner affects the validity of Section 7. It has in it no elements of a "fishing expedition" as spoken of in Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co.,
The provisions of Section 7 have the appearance of having largely been taken from Section 5 of the Labor Relations Act of the State of Kansas, Laws 1943, c. 191, as found reported in 2A Labor Law Service No. 41,033. The Kansas Act, however, in Section 6 goes one step further and makes specific provision to the effect that the records filed with the Secretary of State shall be available to all persons. *19 We do not find where the provisions of this Kansas Act have been tested in the courts. It is given comment by the author in an article to be found in the January, 1944, issue of the Iowa Law Review, with particular reference to the requirement of financial statements, which the author insists is to be sustained, both upon the ground of protection of the members of the labor organization and upon the further ground that the financial affairs of unions, particularly economically powerful unions are matters of public concern.
But the Legislature has seen fit to make these requirements, and we are not able to say that they are arbitrary or capricious. The most that could be said for plaintiffs is that the question is a debatable one, and as we have pointed out, when such is the case, it is the duty of the court to sustain the legislative act.
We have already answered in the negative the contention that the Act conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act, and, as we have said, it imposes no burden on interstate commerce. We have also stated our view that no license is here required, and that the two dollar fee provided for in this section is but an incidental charge. Likewise, we have adverted to the case of International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, supra, as indicating its inapplicability to the instant case. After all, and reduced to its last analysis, the question is whether or not the Legislature, in the provisions of Section 7, overstepped the bounds of police power of the State. If it be conceded there is debatable ground — and we think that is clear — it is our duty to declare in favor of the validity of this section. Such is our conclusion.
We may add the record discloses a number of labor unions (192) promptly complied with the provisions of Section 7. And it also may be noted that Congress in Section 117 of the Revenue Act of 1943, 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev. Code, § 54(f), inserted a provision requiring labor organizations, though exempt from income tax, to file an annual report with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue disclosing "the items of gross income, receipts, and disbursements, and such other information for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this chapter as the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, may by regulations prescribe." And though not here binding, it is proper also to direct attention to the fact that the three judge ruling of the court below in the instant case, declaring Section 7 valid, was likewise the ruling of the three judge federal court in the case of Borden v. Sparks et al., D.C.,
It seems to be established by the decided weight of authority (Coppage v. Kansas,
Though these cases may not have involved legislative acts, yet the principles that they recognize must be taken into consideration in determining the validity of this particular section. Counsel for defendants lay some stress upon A. F. of L. v. Reilly, the Colorado case cited above, defining a secondary boycott. But there is little similarity between the Colorado statute and Section 12 of the Bradford Act. The Court there was dealing with Section 2(11) of the Colorado statute, supra, Laws *20 1943, c. 131, defining secondary boycott. That provision of the Colorado Act here pertinent reads as follows:
"The term 'secondary boycott' shall include causing or threatening to cause, and combining or conspiring to cause or threaten to cause, injury to one not a party to the particular labor dispute, to aid which such boycott is initiated or continued, whether by (a) withholding patronage, labor or other beneficial business intercourse; (b) picketing; (c) refusing to handle, install, use or work on particular materials, equipment or supplies, or (d) by any other unlawful means, in order to bring him against his will into a concerted plan to coerce or inflict damage upon another or to compel the party with whom such labor dispute exists to comply with any particular demands."
It is this provision which was upheld by the Colorado Court.
Section 12, however, makes it a crime — a misdemeanor — with permissible heavy penalty, for a single workman to refuse to handle any material because not produced, processed, or delivered by members of a labor organization. The question of boycotts is fully treated in 31 Am.Jur. p. 955 et seq., and in an extensive note to Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell,
"The individual may do and does many acts which in their effect are or may be coercive as to another. The right to do those acts inheres in the natural freedom and the civil rights which are his."
We have shown that the authorities recognize that the workman has a right to refuse to work with non-union material. Yet under this section he would be compelled to work, or else be guilty of a criminal offense. Of course, every man may engage to work for or deal with, or refuse to work for or deal with, any man or class of men as he sees fit — whatever his motive or the resulting injury — without being held in any way accountable therefor. 31 Am.Jur. p. 842. Some of the authorities have said that members of labor unions consider the material processed or delivered by non-union workers threatens the interest of the union, and that in refusing to work on such material the union is only refusing to aid in its own destruction. 31 Am.Jur. p. 942.
This Section 12 makes no reference to a conspiracy or to the confederated action of two or more persons. Nor does it have reference to any intention of injury to another. The individual workman may be acting in entire good faith and in obedience to a rule of his local union, or he may be acting in entire good faith in what he considers to the best interests of the union to which he belongs, and to labor unions in general. His conduct may be in the nature of an individual protest against the use by his employer of material not processed by members of a labor union. But all of this is entirely lawful. He is acting within his rights, but without coercion and without confederation, and without malicious intent.
The authorities are to the effect that a labor union may, so long as its action is not directed against a particular individual, refuse to permit its members to work on material produced or transported by non-union labor, and that a strike called to compel the handling of union material only is not unlawful. 31 Am.Jur. p. 942. Of course, the refusal of the individual worker may culminate in a labor dispute, but if so, his action would be entirely lawful. The effect would be, as is well argued, to make it a crime under such circumstances to engage in a labor dispute concerning work with non-union material. A workman, even though acting in a proper manner, and refusing to work on non-union material but offering to submit the matter to a board of mediation, would yet be guilty of an offense.
It is to be noted that this section does not deal with the right to strike for non-union material. It deals solely with individual protest of the individual workman. We are inclined to the view that it is simply a refusal to perform a contract for personal service, which is under this section made a crime, and that it infringes closely upon the Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution prohibiting involuntary servitude of any character. As *21
said in Bailey v. State,
"In this class of cases where the entire subject-matter of the legislation is otherwise within state control, the question has been whether the prescribed rule of evidence interferes with the guaranteed equality before the law, or violate those fundamental rights and immutable principles of justice which are embraced within the conception of due process of law."
And we may note the very recent case of the United States Supreme Court, re-affirming the Bailey case and others of like character, in Pollack v. Williams,
And as observed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Labor Board v. Jones Laughlin, supra, the single employee is helpless in dealing with his employer, dependent as in most instances he is upon the daily wage for maintenance of himself and family and unable to safely leave his employment, however aggrieved he as an individual may feel. To all practical purposes, under the terms of this section the employee, though in entire good faith and convinced that material produced by non-union labor is destructive of his interest, yet in order to hold his job and continue to work, must suppress any expression of such conviction.
The Colorado Court in A. F. of L. v. Reilly, supra, declared Section 20 of the Colorado Act as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This section required that all labor unions be incorporated. The Court held that this was an unwarranted interference with the union's internal organization affairs and the imposition of unwarranted burdens upon the exercise of the basic rights guaranteed in the bill of rights. The Court in that opinion observed: "Said section is an imposition of a previous general restraint upon the exercise of basic civil rights, and the finding and declaration herein, as previously stated, is founded, and the conclusion of the Court reached, upon that ground."
As to whether or not the provisions of Section 12 contravene the Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is a question we may leave to one side and undetermined. Like the Colorado Court, we think the decision may well be rested upon the ground that it violates fundamental and basic civil rights as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This section makes no distinction in what the authorities refer to as a lawful or unlawful strike. It must be construed, therefore, as having application to a perfectly lawful strike for a lawful purpose conducted in a lawful manner. The question, therefore, is whether or not a small group of individuals, for a legally justifiable reason, may be denied the right to strike unless it is by secret ballot, authorized by a majority of the regular employees working in the plant or in the business.
Of course, as we have observed, the right to strike or to refrain from work is a personal, individual right. Reduced to its last analysis, therefore, the question arises as to the reasonableness of a regulation making the right to strike dependent upon the will of others who may not in any manner be connected with, or interested in, the welfare of the minority group. Indeed, these other employees may not belong to or believe in a labor organization. *22
This Act is wholly different from the Wisconsin Act dealt with in Hotel, etc., Employees' Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
The Wisconsin Court recognized this principle and gave it effect in upholding the Wisconsin statute, but we have no such provision in the Act here under consideration. The denial of the right to strike is made to rest, not upon the rule of the majority of any bargaining unit or in any craft to which the workmen belong, but upon the whim or caprice of others who may be employed in the business, plant, or unit thereof, whoever they may be and whatever views they may entertain as to labor or labor unions. The unit referred to is, of course, the unit of the business or plant, presumably having reference to those larger corporations whose business activities call for separate locations or units.
The principle recognized by the Oregon Court in American Federation of Labor v. Bain,
True, in Dorchy v. Kansas,
Nor do we interpret Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
And in considering this section, it should be kept in mind, as stated by the Massachusetts Court in Pickett v. Walsh,
But we forego further discussion, as much of the reasoning applicable to Section 12 is likewise to be applied to Section 13. We are well convinced that a prohibition to strike, placed upon a minority group unless sanctioned by secret ballot of others who are without interest in their welfare, is an unreasonable and arbitrary restraint, and must be stricken down.
In other parts of the body of the Act are declarations to the effect that every person shall be free to join or refrain from joining any labor organization except as provided otherwise in Section 16 of the Act, and nothing in the Act shall impede or diminish any right to strike or the right of individuals to work. It is further declared that nothing in the Act shall be so construed as to invade unlawfully the right of freedom of speech.
And Section 15 concerns the declared policy of the right to work, a declaration which in fact needed no reiteration, as it is a right universally recognized. One's employment, trade, or calling, is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Millonas,
In Lash v. State,
Expressly excluded are dues and assessments. These are, therefore, not involved. This section was directed towards the practice whereby a person seeking a job is required to obtain a permit or a certificate by the payment of a sum of money to some organization before being permitted to exercise his right to work. The Legislature, in the exercise of its police power, has seen fit to put its stamp of disapproval upon any such practice, and Section 15 was merely to put in force the declared policy of the Act that the right to live involves the right to work. We are persuaded without further discussion that the language here is sufficiently explicit and cannot be condemned for indefiniteness. That it is a proper exercise of the police power appears not to be seriously questioned.
We might point to the charges contained in Local Union No. 57 v. Boyd, Ala.Sup.,
Of course, all of these divisions of opinion concerning the proper place for the supervisory employee revolves around the question of a conflict of interest and as to whether or not one can serve two masters. The proper place for such supervisory employee has often been considered by the National Labor Relations Board, with the result they were held to be more correctly designated with management. Leading to like result is the case of H. J. Heinz Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
We are persuaded without further discussion that this regulation has a reasonable basis upon which to rest, and that the objections to its validity are not well taken.
The section protects existing insurance contract rights; that is, rights to insurance benefits secured by reason of membership in labor organizations. By reason of this stipulation it may be that as a practical result the restriction imposed will be of a limited nature. As we construe it, it must mean that as to a member of a labor union who had, by reason of such membership or by reason of contract, secured certain insurance benefits which are to be lost upon his separation from the union, advancement to the position of superintendent would not be prohibited. This for the reason that his union connection is essential to the preservation of his benefit contract. Anyone, however, hereafter becoming a member of the union, and by reason of such membership, or by contract, becomes entitled to certain benefits, must yield those benefits by accepting a supervisory position. This for the reason the provisions of Section 16 are before him in the eyes of the law, and he takes his benefits subject thereto. But this relates only to the practical operation of Section 16. As thus construed, we are persuaded that it is a valid provision.
But this proceeding is under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Code 1940, Tit. 7, §§ 156-168, and all parties to the suit are interested and are desirous that the rights under the Act might be fully determined and their future course thus charted. We think we should proceed upon that basis.
We recognize the force of the argument that the separability clause should be given effect, where possible, to save the Act. But the principle is well understood that a clause of this character may not be invoked to save the Act when in contravention of the obvious legislative intent. State ex rel. Crumpton v. Montgomery,
There are a number of sections in the Act the validity of which are in no manner here brought into question. It is clear enough, therefore, that the invalidity of the several sections herein indicated in no manner affects the Act as a whole. And we have already observed that the Act as a whole is entirely valid.
The result of our finding, therefore, is that the Act as a whole is to be sustained, including Sections 7, 15, and 16, under attack in this proceeding; that Section 12, and so much of Section 13 as prevents a strike except by a vote of a majority of the employees in a business, plant, or in a unit of such plant expressed in a secret written ballot, is declared ineffective, together with the provisions of Section 14 intended to make more effective that part of Section 13 as to unlawful strikes; and all of Section 17, are declared to be invalid.
The ruling here as to the invalidity of Section 12 and the portion of Sections 13 and 14 as above indicated, is in accord with the holding of the Court below; and the cross-assignments of error as to these rulings are without merit. Like observation is applicable to Section 17, the ruling here being in accordance with the ruling of the court below. There was no holding in the court below as to the constitutionality of Sections 15 and 16, which are held to be valid.
It results, therefore, that the cross-assignments of error are not well taken, and that the judgment appealed from is due to be affirmed.
Affirmed.
FOSTER, LIVINGSTON, and STAKELY, JJ., concur.
THOMAS and BROWN, JJ., dissent.
Dissenting Opinion
I have only to say that in my opinion the Bradford Act, Acts of Alabama 1943, p. 252, Code 1940, Tit. 26, § 376 et seq., is contrary to organic law, state and federal.
The act offends the rule of duplicity clearly stated in Section 45 of the Constitution of Alabama. Many authorities cited in Code 1940, Const. Art. IV, § 45, p. 98, Vol. 1 uphold this position. See Ballentyne v. Wickersham,
The several subjects contained in the title and body of the Bradford Act are "to create a Department of Labor of the State of Alabama and to provide for its personnel, powers, functions, duties and the performance thereof," and "to prohibit executive, administrative, professional, and supervisory employees from becoming members in certain labor organizations."
In my judgment no one can successfully maintain that under the title indicated, two distinct classes and material professions are not contained in the title and body of the act. They are distinct and independent of each other, do not contribute to the full accomplishment of the purpose of the act, nor complement what is otherwise incomplete.
I observe with Chief Justice Stone that, "It follows irresistibly that both the title and the body of the act contain two subjects," and for this reason the Bradford Act must be pronounced a failure as a constitutional enactment and cannot be saved by the rule of severability. Ballentyne v. Wickersham, supra.
Since the matter before us is of public moment (State ex rel. Bland v. St. John,
Such is the effect of the illegal restraint imposed by the enactment in the use of the word "function" when considered as a comprehensive term. It cannot mean less than to operate and is not limited in its use employed in the opinion of the majority. That is to say, this attempted legislation is a limitation on natural rights of individuals constituting the membership of unions. It denies the right of organization of local or national unions, denies the right of dissemination of union views and action touching its federation as a state or national union, and this amounts to a denial of the right of collective bargaining and due consideration of proposed strikes or picketing and the freedom of contract, local or national.
I am in accord with the decision of the Chief Justice in striking down sections 12 and 17 of the act and in holding sections 13 and 14 void in part. The doctrine of severability as construed by this court would not permit the elimination of the illegal sections indicated, and those in the opinion of the Chief Justice, and leave a constitutional enactment, under many authorities that obtain.
Dissenting Opinion
Section 45, Article IV of the Constitution is, in part, a charter of our liberty and way of life. It definitely recognizes the fact that all wisdom does not reside in the Legislative Department of the State, that the Legislators in general originate and come from the great body of the common people who constitute the backbone of our civilization, but, nevertheless legislative bodies have in their midst and a part thereof the astute and cunning who represent special interests, above the common good of all the people. And it is a matter of legislative history running back to the foundation of the republic that "Jokers" are embodied in legislative acts to protect and serve private interests to the detriment of the common good, and sometimes to punish some group or faction. Hence said section provides, and we find kindred provisions in most every state in the union: "Each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."
In Ballentyne v. Wickersham, it was observed: "There was a second abuse, against which this provision was levelled. The subject of the act 'shall be clearly expressed in the title.' The intention of this was, that the title of the act or bill should inform the members of the legislature, and perhaps the public, of the subject on which the former were invited to vote and legislate. Matters foreign to the main objects of the bill had sometimes found their way into bills — surreptitiously, at times, it was charged — and thus the members were induced to vote for measures in ignorance of what they were doing. The constitutional provision intended to render a continuance of this abuse impossible." Ballentyne v. Wickersham,
What is the subject of Act No. 298, referred to as the Bradford Act? It is not to police and regulate labor in general nor to regulate organized labor in Alabama. The act deals with more than one subject, both in its title and body. *27
The first subject of the act is a State Department of Labor, and that subject is expressed in the title, "To create a Department of Labor of the State of Alabama, and to provide for its personnel, powers, functions, and duties and the performance thereof." This the act undertakes to do by Sections 3, 4 and 5, 7, 19 and 20.
The next subject just as clearly expressed in the title and dealt with in the body of the act is, "to provide for the appointment by the Governor of boards of mediation, and to provide for their personnel, powers, functions, duties, and procedure." This was provided for in the Code of 1940, Tit. 26, § 28. Provision for the appointment of such boards from time to time is made in § 6 of the act, and the jurisdiction, powers and functions are prescribed and they are authorized to act wholly and independently of the "Department of Labor of the State of Alabama." Said § 6 provides, inter alia: "The board of mediation shall make a finding of facts and a recommendation for settling such strike, lockout, or other dispute or disagreement, and, if such strike, lookout or other dispute or disagreement shall have been submitted for arbitration, a determination or award, which may be enforced by any court of law or equity in the same manner as other determinations or awards of matters submitted for arbitration. Such board shall remain in session no longer than is necessary to accomplish the purposes for which it was appointed, and in no event more than thirty days in which to make a determination, and the board shall be allowed an additional ten days time to make their findings of fact and recommendation for settling such strike, lockout, or other dispute, or disagreement, and, as soon as it shall have rendered its findings of fact, recommendation, determination or award, it shall be discharged. Copies of each finding of facts, recommendation, determination and award shall be submitted to the governor, and the director of the department of labor and to each party or a representative of each party to such strike, lockout, dispute, or disagreement."
The only connection with or relation of the Board of Mediation to the Department of Labor is that a copy of the report made to the Governor must be filed with the Director of the Department of Labor, and when the board makes its report it passes out of existence.
True the boards of mediation are empowered to deal with labor disputes and strikes and controversies between organized labor and the employers of labor. This presents a case strictly analogous to the case presented in Ballentyne v. Wickersham,
Another distinct subject dealt with in the act, both in title and body is, "to prohibit political contributions by labor organizations."
What has that to do with a Department of Labor? It is more nearly related to elections and denies the right of organized labor to speak through the ballot box. True it is, such organizations sometimes see but dimly their real interest, and follow the "will of the wisp" but if they want to be foolish, they have that right under the constitution, so long as other groups are allowed to do so. This is equal protection of law.
Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 18 relate to and deal with labor organizations, not through the department of labor, but through a direct legislative mandate, and form a definite and distinct subject, wholly apart from the dominant purpose of the act — to create a Department of Labor. The purpose of these sections is punitive of labor, and no doubt were a dominant force in inducing the enactment of the law.
At the tail end of the Act, § 22 is added to effect a repeal in part of § 28, Title 26 of the Code of 1940, embodied in the chapter on industrial relation. Probably not half *28 of the members of the Legislature had any knowledge that any such legislation was on foot. Certain it is there is no intimation in the title of the act that this repeal was contemplated.
Glamorous, fulsome and laudatory canons of constitutional and statutory interpretation are often used to camouflage and bolster up doubtful and vicious legislation, and to obscure and set at naught the provisions of the supreme law of the land, — the constitution, which, in the end, must stand as a "pillar of Cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night" if our civilization and way of life are to be preserved, but such glamorous and fulsome rules of statutory interpretation cannot, in our jurisdiction, save an act which is double in its title and body, from the condemnation of § 45 of the Constitution of 1901.
I shall not here collate the authorities, but rest content to refer to the authorities cited by my brother Justice THOMAS, in his dissenting opinion, in which, for reasons stated above, I concur.