67 So. 589 | Ala. | 1914
In this case Drewry, Hughes & Co., a corporation, sold to a large number of people separate lots of cotton cloth. Each purchase was independent of, and had no connection 'whatever with, any other purchase. Indeed, the several purchasers lived in different states, and had no connection with each other. Drewry, Hughes & Co. bought the cloth which it sold to these purchasers from a cotton mill fat Cottondale, and the cotton mill, acting under the orders of Drewry, Hughes & Co., shipped the goods, in separate, distinct lots, to such purchasers. Each purchaser’s goods were put in a separate package, his name was marked upon the package, and a bill of lading was taken from the railroad, in his name, for his goods. The goods were all put in one car by the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company, and before the car containing the goods left Cottondale the car containing the goods, and the goods, were destroyed by fire.
In the case of Childress v. McCullough, 5 Port. 54, 30 Am. Dec. 549, this court, through Goldthwaite, J.,
The above rule has not, in this state, been changed by statute or decision.
3. In so far as the rights of the parties to this litigation are concerned, we may as well say, at this point, that, as a matter of law, Drewry, Hughes & Co., under the amended complaint, are shown to be clothed with no more rights than they would have possessed if they had not sold the goods to the various consignees. The consignees had ordered the goods of Drewry, Hughes & Co., and, when that company delivered the goods to the railroad company, and the railroad company issued to the various consignees bills of lading in their respective names for the goods, Drewry, Hughes & Co. had performed all of the duties which they owed the consignees, and the consignees were the absolute owners of the goods.
Of -course, there may have resided in Drewry, Hughes & Co., under certain conditions which are of no value here, the right of stoppage in transitu, but, in so far as this case is concerned, Drewry, Hughes & Co. occupy the same relation to the railroad company as if they had not sold the goods, and, after their destruction, had brought the separate rights of action which existed in favor of each consignee — if the goods were destroyed under such circumstances as rendered the railroad company liable for their loss — against the railroad company.
4. This court has not departed from the common-law rule that, except in certain well-recognized exceptions to the general rule, an assignee of a chose in action must ordinarily, at law, sue in the name of the as
The reasons which existed at common law for the above rule arose out of the inflexibility of the rules of law as compared with those of equity, and the policy of the law to encourage repose by discouraging champerty and maintenance.—Coffman v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 184 Ala. 474, 63 South. 527.
In the case of Sutton et al. v. The Victorian No. 2, 26 Or. 194, 41 Pac. 1103, it was held that different claims against the same vessel, arising under a boat lien law, and assigned to the plaintiff might all be sued for in one complaint.—1 R. C. L., p. 367, § 41. In that case, however, the assignee was entitled to sue, and actually sued, in his own name. His right to so sue in his ovni name was the reason upon which the court based, in that case, its decision.
5. We have, as above stated, in this case numerous plaintiffs, all suing in one action for the use of one person, and each nominal plaintiff’s right of action is separate and distinct from every other right of action set out in the complaint. This, of course, is a complete departure from all precedent, and, npon principle and authority, cannot be done. It is true that Drewry, Hughes & Co., in the names of the several nominal plaintiffs, might have brought separate suits
In this state our courts have clung to the distinction which was drawn by the English courts between courts of law and courts of equity with regard to the remedies peculiar to each jurisdiction; and our Legislature has not seen proper to destroy that distinction.
“At an early day courts of law began to recognize the equitable rights of assignees and others; and, to obviate the injustice to them resulting from the rule that only the person having the legal title can sue, the practice obtained of allowing the person equitably entitled to sue in the name of the person legally entitled. In such cases the person in whose name the suit is brought is called the record, nominal, or legal plaintiff, and the person for whose benefit the action is prosecuted is called the equitable, beneficial, or use plaintiff.”—15 Ency. Pl. & Pr., 487.
In all such cases the rights and status of the equitable, beneficial, or use plaintiff are fixed by the rights and status of the nominal plaintiff; the nominal and use plaintiffs, in such cases, being regarded as 'one person.—Coffman, v. L. & N. R. R. Co., supra.
We know of no case in which a beneficial plaintiff has been permitted, in one and the same action at law, to recover in the name of several nominal plaintiffs,, on several separate and independent causes of action residing in such nominal plaintiffs.’ In all such cases, each nominal plaintiff must bring his own separate, independent suit for the benefit of such beneficial plaintiff. Until this court can discard the necessity for the-nominal plaintiff — and it can only do so through leg
The demurrer to the complaint, as amended, should have been sustained.—R. C. L., vol. 1, p. 367, subd. 41.
The judgment of the trial court is not in accordance with the above views, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in the court below.
Reversed and remanded.