MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant CACI Premier Technology, Inc.’s (“CACI PT”) Motion for Reconsider
The first issue is whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, by operation of the ATS, over Plaintiffs’ claims of violations of international law against CACI PT for torture, war crimes, and inhuman treatment resulting from injuries occurring in Abu Ghraib. In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, - U.S. -,
The second issue is whether the Court will apply Ohio, Virginia, or Iraqi law to Plaintiff Al Shimari’s common law claims where Al Shimari filed suit in Ohio against a Virginia corporation for acts and injuries occurring in Iraq during a multinational occupation of Iraq. The Court holds that Iraqi law governs Al Shimari’s common law claims. The Court invokes Ohio’s choice-of-law analysis, as Al Shimari’s claims were originally filed in Ohio and are thus governed by Ohio law. Ohio applies the law of the place of injury unless certain factors demonstrate that another state holds a more significant relationship to the claims. Here, Iraq is the place of injury, and neither Virginia nor Ohio holds a more significant relationship to Al Shimari’s injuries. Therefore, the Court applies Iraqi law when evaluating Al Shimari’s common law claims.
The third issue is whether the Court should grant CACI PT’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Iraqi law wheré Al Shimari presents various common law claims for actions occurring in Iraq, which was governed by laws promulgated by the Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”), during occupation by a multinational force. The Court holds that Al Shimari fails to state a claim under Iraqi law because the law governing Iraq at the time of injury precludes both liability under Iraqi law and the application of law from a jurisdiction within the United States to CACI PT’s actions. The relevant regulations provided immunity from suit to contractors for activities related to the terms and conditions of their contracts. Furthermore; the regulations also provided that personal injury suits would be governed by the law of the state from which the contractor was sent only if the alleged injury was not connected to military combat operations. Here, CACI PT’s actions-detention and interrogation-were all related to its contractual duties as a United States military contractor and connected to military combat operations in Iraq. Accordingly, Al Shimari’s commоn law claims against CACI PT are dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND and PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The long and intricate history of this case bears little mention. The pendency
Plaintiffs Suhail Najim Abdullah Al Shimari. Taha Yaseen Arraq Rashid, Asa’ad Hamza Hanfoosh Al-Zuba’e, and Salah Hasan Nsaif Jasim Al-Ejaili are Iraqi citizens. (3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-7, Doc. 254.) Plaintiffs' bring this action against CACI PT. alleging physical and mental injuries resulting from abuse and torture; including food deprivation, forced nudity, beatings, electric shocks, sensory deprivation, extreme temperatures, death threats, oxygen deprivation, sexual assaults, and mock executions. (Id. ¶¶ 23-77.) Plaintiffs claim that all of the alleged acts occurred while being interrogated as suspected enemy combatants by CACI PT and the United States military at military detention centers within a complex located in Abu Ghraib, Iraq between September 22, 2003, and May 6, 2005, a period corresponding to the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal. (Id. ¶¶ 24-77.) At various times between 2004 and 2008. all four Plaintiffs were released from custody without being charged with any crime. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 58, 66, 77.)
On June 30, 2008, Plaintiff Al Shimari filed this action against CACI International, Inc. (“CACI, Inc.”), a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, and CACI PT. its wholly-owned subsidiary also located in Arlington. Virginia. (See Doc. 2.) The remaining Plaintiffs joined the action on September 18, 2008. (See Doc. 28.) Both CACI PT and CACI, Inc. are corporations that contractually provided interrogation services for the United States military at Abu Ghraib during the period in question. (3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10.14.) Specifically, beginning in September 2003, CACI PT provided civilian interrogators for the U.S. Army’s military intelligence brigade assigned to the Abu Ghraib prison. (Id. ¶¶ 14-16.) Plaintiffs seek to impose liability in common law tort and under international customary law, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity), 28 U.S.C. § 1350(ATS), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs-Third Amended Complaint alleges twenty (20) causes of action including torture: civil conspiracy to commit torture: aiding and abetting torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; and war crimes. (Id. ¶¶ 210-313.)
On March 18, 2009, the Court denied a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law claims, rejecting the argument that such claims were preempted or that CACI PT and CACI, Inc. were entitled to some novel form of derivative sovereign immunity for their conduct. See Al Shimari,
On September 21, 2011. a divided Fourth Circuit panel reversed the ruling denying the motion to dismiss, reasoning that CACI PT and CACI, Inc. should be immune from liability by virtue of their integration into military combatant activities. Al Shimari,
On remand, the Court decided three significant motions affecting the procedural posture of this case. First, the Court considered and granted Plaintiffs’ motion seeking the reinstatement of their Alien Tort Statute claims. (See Doc. 159.) Second, the Court considered and granted CACI PT and CACI Inc.’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims for a failure to sufficiently allege a conspiracy between (a) CACI PT and its parent company. CACI, Inc.; (b) CACI PT and its employees; and (c) CACI PT and the United States military. (Order. March 8, 2013, Doc. 215.) Accordingly, all claims involving CACI, Inc. and conspiracy claims related to a conspiracy between CACI PT and its employees were dismissed with prejudice, thereby removing CACI, Inc. from the case entirely. (See id.) On March 19, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file a Third Amended Complaint on the condition that Plaintiffs could only add allegations related to the alleged conspiracy between CACI PT and the United States military (“March 19 Order”). (Order. March 19, 2013. Doc. 227.) Third, the Court considered and granted CACI PT and CACI, Inc.’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s November 25, 2008 Order, in which the Court denied CACI PT and CACI, Inc. partial summary judgment by way of their argument that three of the plaintiffs’ common law claims were barred by Virginia’s statute of limitations. In reconsidering the November 25, 2008 Order, the Court dismissed the three plaintiffs’ common law claims, leaving only the common law
Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint on April 4.2013. (Doc. 254.) CACI PT soon thereafter filed motions to strike and dismiss. (See Docs. 300, 312.) CACI PT’s motion to strike sought to remove allegations that did not comply with the Court’s March 19. 2013 Order, including allegations of injuries not previously alleged as well as allegations about the relationship between CACI PT and its parent company. CACI, Inc., who was dismissed from the case with prejudice. (See Doc. 300.) CACI PT’s motion to dismiss focused on the plausibility of Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims. (Doc. 312.)
Prior to hearing those motions filed in the wаke of - Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, addressing the application of the Alien Tort Statute to acts occurring on foreign soil. See - U.S. -,
In accordance with the Court’s Order, CACI. PT filed (1) a Motion for Reconsideration, or in the Alternative Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and (2) a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Al Shimari’s common law claims. (Docs. 354, 363.) Oral argument was heard on these motions on May 10, 2013. Due to the potentially dispositive effect of each of these motions, the Court stayed all other pending motions, including those filed after April 18, 2013. (See Order, May 9, 2013, Doc. 433.) Having considerеd oral argument and the extensive briefing on these motions, the Court now issues its ruling.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. 12(b)(1) Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to move for dismissal where the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Where a federal court finds subject matter jurisdiction lacking, it must dismiss the case. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
The ATS is jurisdictional in nature. Yousuf v. Samantar,
B. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review
A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion should be granted unless the complaint “state[s] a plausible claim for relief’ under Rule 8(a). Walters v. McMahen,
III. DISCUSSION
The Court grants CACI PT’s motions to dismiss. First, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all claims brought pursuant to the ATS because the ATS cannot be extraterritorially applied to Plaintiffs’ claims. Second, the Court holds that the law of Iraq, the place of injury, applies to Plaintiff Al Shimari’s common law claims. Third, the Court concludes that the governing law during the relevant time period precludes both liability under Iraqi law and the application of domestic law to CACI PT’s actions. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint is dismissed.
A. CACI PT’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ ATS Claims
The Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and holds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ ATS claims because, as held in Kiobel, the acts and injuries giving rise to their claims cannot support ATS jurisdiction.
The ATS is a jurisdictional statute, enacted by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, providing that “district courts shаll have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The ATS provides no independent cause of action but provides district courts with jurisdiction over tort claims arising, from violations of international law. Sosa,
On April 17, 2013,. the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Kiobel. The issue in Kiobel was whether and under what circumstances courts retain jurisdiction under the ATS over causes of action alleging violations of international law occurring in sovereign territories outside the United States.
Kiobel rejected the extraterritorial application of the ATS. In its decision, the Court relied upon a canon of statutory construction, which states that absent Congress’s indication otherwise, there exists a presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes. Id. at 1664. The canon “provides that ‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none....’” Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
Having held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to ATS claims, the Court further held that the text of the ATS failed to rebut the presumption that the statute would not be extraterritorially applied. Id. “[T]o rebut the presumption, the ATS would need to evince a ‘clear indication of extraterritoriality.’ It does not.” Id. at 1665 (internal citation omitted). Kiobel recognized that “nothing in the text of the [ATS] suggests that Congress intended causes of action recognized under it to have extraterritorial reach.” Id. Therefore, because the alleged violations occurred exclusively outside the United States, the Court concluded that federal courts were not a', proper forum for
The application of Kiobel to this case compels the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims invoking internаtional law for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As Kiobel explained, absent congressional action, the ATS cannot provide jurisdiction for alleged violations of the law of nations where the alleged conduct occurred in territories outside the United States. Id. Here, as in Kiobel, Plaintiffs are barred from asserting ATS jurisdiction because the alleged conduct giving rise to their claims occurred exclusively on foreign soil. Plaintiffs allege that torture and war crimes occurred during their detention in Abu Ghraib, a location external to United States territory. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ ATS claims do not allege that any violations occurred in the United States or any of its territories. Therefore, on these facts, the Court holds that Kiobel’s bar against extraterritorial application of the ATS governs here and dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims.
The Court declines to adopt Plaintiffs’ argument that Iraq was not a territory external to the United States. De facto sovereignty, unlike de jure sovereignty, is subject to judicial determination. See Boumediene v. Bush,
Plaintiffs also invite the Court to interpret Kiobel to hold that the presumption against extraterritoriality can be sufficiently displaced by their claims’ sufficient connection with the United States. Indeed, Plaintiffs make much of the “touch and concern” language contained in the final paragraph of the Kiobel opinion, which states that “even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.” Id. at 1669. Thus, Plaintiffs argue, Kiobel does not impose a “bright line test” or an automatic bar when the underlying tort occurs abroad, but rather allows for the facts of the case to rebut the presumption through a significant tie to the United States. (Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Reconsideration at 6, Doc. 399.) By implication, Plaintiffs read Kiobel to permit displacement of the presumption against extraterritoriality by judicial decision rather than by legislative act. Since the facts of Kiobel involved the “foreign cubed” circumstance of claims involving foreign conduct brought by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants, Plaintiffs essentially contend that Kiobel’s outcome is limited to similar facts and the Supreme Court intended to leave open for judicial determination the question of what cases or claims could displace the presumption. Plaintiffs argue that their circumstances presented in this case meet Kiobel’s “touch and concern” requirement.
The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ reading of Kiobel. The Supreme Court makes clear that the presumption against extraterritoriality is only rebuttable by legislative act, not judicial decision. This reading is supported by at least four specific references in the opinion. First. Kiobel framed its discussion by stating that “[wjhen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,” suggesting that the text of the statute itself, rather than any judicial factual determination, must rebut the presumption. Id. at 1664 (emphasis added). Second, Kiobel stated that “to rebut the presumption, the ATS would need to evince a clear indication of extraterritoriality,” again using language directed at the statute itself. Id. at 1665 (internal citations omitted). In concluding this portion of the analysis, the Kiobel Court again stated that “nothing in the statute rebuts [the] presumption.” Id. at 1669. Third, the Court commented that a statute more specific than the ATS would be required if Congress intended courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims predicated on extraterritorial acts. Id. Fourth, Kiobel explains that the presumption serves to maintain the respect of those matters committed to other branches, such that “the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.” Id. at 1664 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
The Court’s reading of Kiobel is also consistent with Morrison, the case upon which Kiobel heavily relies. In Morrison, the issue was whether the Securities Exchange Act (“the Act”) provided a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs for fraudulent securities exchanges originating outside the United States.
Admittedly, Plaintiffs’ reading of Kiobel is a fair one. Its “touch and concern” language is textually curious and, may be interpreted by some as leaving the proverbial door ajar for courts to eventually measure its width. Nonetheless, this Court holds steadfast that its reading of Kiobel remains consistent with its articulated reasoning and the underlying jurisprudence of the presumption at the heart of the decision. Moreover, the Court’s decision adheres to the admonition against “judicial-speculation-made-law,” and comports with the presumption’s best practice, whiсh is the universal application of the presumption, providing the stable backdrop against’' which Congress is free to indicate otherwise. Id. at 2881.
Even assuming that the Court was to adopt Plaintiffs’ reading, it is unclear to the Court how to apply a “touch and concern”. inquiry to a purely jurisdictional statute such as the ATS. As noted above, Kiobel’s brief mention of the touch and
Therefore, the Court concludеs that Plaintiffs’ ATS claims are barred because the ATS does not provide jurisdiction over their claims, which involve tortious conduct occurring exclusively outside the territory of the United States. As Kiobel suggested, if Congress were to determine that the ATS should apply extraterritorially, a statute more specific than the ATS would be required. Id.
B. CACI PT’s Motion to Dismiss A1 Shimari’s Common Law Claims
The Court grants CACI PT’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff A1 Shimari’s common law claims because the. law governing Iraq during the relevant time period precludes liability for the actions in this case. Regulations governing Iraq at the time of the alleged incidents immunized contractors from liability for actions related to their contracts, as well as personal injuries suffered in connection with military operations. To reach this conclusion, the Court first finds that Ohio choice-of-law principles require the application of Iraqi law, rather than that of Ohio or Virginia, to A1 Shimari’s common law claims. These conclusions are discussed in turn.
1. Choice of Law
The Court applies the substantive law of Ohio to Plaintiff AI Shimari’s claims. The well-settled doctrine set forth in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
Transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) implicates an exception to the general rule of
Ohio traditionally applied the rule of lex loci delicti, which requires that tort actions be governed by the substantive law of the place of the injury. See Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co.,
(1) the place of the injury; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; (4) the place where the relationship between the parties, if any, is located; and (5) any factors under Section 6 which the court may deem relevant to the litigation.
Id. at 289 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971)). Morgan further identified additional considerations, comprising the fifth factor, as:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relеvant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of [the] law to be applied.
Id. at 289 n. 6 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6). With lex loci delecti ho longer applied as a matter of course regardless of the facts of a case, these other factors “must be thoroughly analyzed” prior to making a conclusive choice-of-law determination. Id. at 288. Even in engaging in the “significant relationship” inquiry, the Court remains mindful that these factors must be of such significance to require displacement of the lex loci delecti presumption. Cf. Bramberger v. Toledo Hosp.,
Nor does the fifth Section 145 factor, which implicates the multiple factors defined by Section Six of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, sufficiently displace the presumption that the Court apply the law of the place of the injury. These factors fail to point to any single state that holds a more significant relationship to the claims than Iraq. The needs of state and international systems would not suggest that state law apply to torts occurring on foreign soil, as that would create a patchwork of liability for acts occurring in the same place if the actors originate from different states. The same can be said of the certainty, predictability, and uniformity of a result — no such predictability would occur if CACI PT were subject to Virginia law while another contractor working at Abu- Ghraib but domiciled in another state would be subject to a different law. As CACI PT notes, the only Section Six factor that definitively:points to the application of state law would be the ease in determination and application. However, this one consideration, in the face of all of the other concerns, is no't sufficient to rebut the presumption of applying the law of the place of the injury, especially considering that three other Section 145 factors directly implicate Iraq in Ohio’s “more significant relationship” examination.
The Court finds unpersuasive Al Shimari’s argument that the analysis set forth in Morgan demonstrates that Virginia law is proper under Ohio’s choice-of-law analysis.
Therefore, because the present facts fail to sufficiently rebut the presumption that the law of the place of the wrong applies, Ohio’s choice-of-law rules require the Court to apply Iraqi law to Al Shimari’s common law claims.
2. Failure to State a Claim
The Court grants CACI PT’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim because the applicable provisions governing Iraq at the time of the alleged acts preclude liability fоr CACI PT’s actions. The relevant provisions under Iraqi law provide immunity for a contractor’s actions-related to the terms of the contract, and the governing provisions also carve out an exception for personal injury liability where injury results from those activities related to military combat operations. Thus, the Court dismisses A1 Shimari’s common law claims.
As both parties recognize, the operative Iraqi law at the time of the events in question arose from the promulgations by the CPA. The CPA governed Iraq between May 2003 and June 28, 2004, at which time the CPA ceded governance to the Interim Government of Iraq. See U.S. ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC,
[tjhird party claims including those for ... personal injury, illness or death or in respect of any other matter arising from or attributed to Coalition personnel or any persons employed by them ... that do not arise in. connection with military combat operations, shall be submitted and dealt with by the Parent State whose Coalition personnel, property, activities or other assets are alleged to have caused the claimed damage, in a manner consistent with the national laws of the Parent State.
(Id. at 3.) Considering the Third Amended Complaint’s multiple allegations of CACI PT’s employment and activity in Iraq, Section Three implicates CACI PT’s activities and thus precludes liability under Iraqi law. CACI PT was a United States contractor and a member of the multinational coalition. Therefore, any activity that “re-lattes] to the terms and conditions of their contract[ ]” with the United States military would not be subject to Iraqi law.
CACI PT argues that the phrase “relating to” has been interpreted broadly by the Supreme Court where Congress used this language in preempting state legislation. See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,
Considering the broad language contained in the provision, the Court holds that Order No. 17 § 3 prevents Al Shimari from pursuing his claims under Iraqi law. The alleged acts were performed as a result of CACI PT being in Iraq to perform its contractual duties. The fact that Al Shimari alleges the activities violated the contract further supports this position, as it would be relevant to determine how the acts do or do not relate to the contractual duties imposed upon CACI PT. Whether or not their actions were authorized does not diminish the fact that these activities were related to their contractual duties. But see McGee v. Arkel Int'l, LLC,
Alternatively, the Court holds that Section Six of Order No. 17 also supports dismissal here, as A1 Shimari cannot proceed with his claims as defined by state or federal law. Section Six specifically addresses personal injury claims yet, in doing so, carves an exception to liability for those claims arising from actions in connection with military combat activities. The Court finds unpersuasive any argument that this does not preclude A1 Shimari’s common law claims under Iraqi law. A1 Shimari misconstrues the provision when he argues the immunity afforded by Section Six requires that CACI PT’s actions “involve ‘military combat operations’ ” and the contract with the United States military expressly prohibited CACI PT’s participаtion in combat operations. (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 3.) Rather, the language in Section Six precludes liability where the activity is connected with military combat operations; Plaintiffs argument otherwise is too narrowly construed.
The detention and interrogation of potential enemy combatants or hostile individuals is most certainly connected with contemporaneous military combat operations. Courts have differed on whether a contractor’s activities in support of the military qualify as actual combat activity. Compare Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc.,
The Court emphasizes that its conclusion arises from the application of Iraqi law in light of Ohio’s choice-of-law rules, not the military immunity considerations set forth in Coleman v. Tennessee,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that (1) the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kiobel compels the conclusion that Plaintiffs’ ATS claims are barred by the presumption against the extraterritorial application of the statute; and (2) Plaintiff Al Shimari’s common law claims fail to state a claim under Iraqi law because, pursuant to the governing CPA regulations, CACI PT is immune from suit for claims arising from acts related to its contract or performed in connection with military combat operations. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order Reinstating Plaintiffs’ Alien Tort Statute Claims, or in the alternative Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Alien Tort Statute Claims for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. 354) is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff A1 Shimari’s Common Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 363) is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Compel Interrogator Information from the United States (Doc. 275), Defendant’s Motion to Compel Complete and Unredacted Government Reports from the United States (Doc. 279), Defendant’s Motion to Strike Non-Conspiracy Allegations from the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 300), Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 312), Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions Against Plaintiffs Al Shimari, Rashid, and Al Zuba’e (Doc. 367), Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel the United States to Produce Documents and Information (Doc. 380), Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel 30(b)(6)- Deposition Testimony from Defendant CACI Premier Technology, Inc. and CACI International, Inc. (Doc. 392), and Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 451) are DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The Court also directed a briefing schedule for CACI PT’s renewed motion for sanctions related to Plaintiffs’ failurе to appear for depositions. CACI PT filed its motion for sanctions on April 29, 2013 and oral argument was heard on that motion on May 10, 2013. (See Docs. 367-68, 433-34.) However, because the resolution of CACI PT's motions to dismiss disposes of the case, the Court does not reach the merits of CACI PT’s motion for sanctions.
. CACI PT filed its Motion as one for reconsideration, or in the alternative to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the merits of CACI PT’s motion concern the Court's jurisdiction under the ATS, a jurisdictional statute, the Court reviews the Motion under the 12(b)(1) standard.
. The Court's decision on ATS jurisdiction is dispositive of all ATS claims, including those asserted by Plaintiff A1 Shimari. The Court notes, however, that Plaintiffs Rashid, Al-Zuba’e, and Al-Ejaili rely exclusively on ATS jurisdiction. Therefore, only these Plaintiffs are entirely dismissed as a result of the Court’s ruling on ATS jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff A1 Shimari asserts common law claims, the Court proceeds to evaluate those claims pursuant to CACI PT’s Motion to Dismiss discussed below.
. The Supreme Court concluded that the focal point of the Exchange Act, which provided a substantive cause of action for securities violations, was on domestic securities fraud, and thus conduct that may occur overseas in relation to such fraud remained insufficient to invoke extraterritorial application. Morrison,
. Were courts to look at the focal point of the conduct contemplated by the ATS, its application would be limitless, as violations of international and customary law could conceivably arise anywhere. Such a conclusion would render Kiobel’s application of the presumption paradoxical and thus certainly could not have bеen the Supreme Court's intention.
. The Court notes that even were Virginia law ,to apply,, Virginia's choice-of-law rules — a substantive rather than procedural issue— also adhere to the traditional rule that tort claims are governed by the law of the place of the injury. See, e.g., Colgan Air,
. Order No. 17 was amended shortly before the dissolution of the CPA in June 2004. While adding a number of provisions not at issue here, the revisions do not substantively alter the language relevant to the Court’s analysis.
. Even if the Court accepted Al Shimari’s argument that his negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim falls under Virginia law, he would fail to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. Negligent hiring under Virginia law imposes liability for the “failure to exercise reasonable care in placing an individual with known propensities, or propensities that should have been discovered by reasonable investigation, in an employment position in which, due to the circumstances of the employment, it should have been foreseeable that the hired individual posed a threat of injury to others.” Interim Personnel of Cent. Va., Inc. v. Messer,
Additionally, negligent supervision and negligent training are not .recognized as torts in Virginia. See Muse v. Schleiden,