Al-Adahi v. Obama

Case Information

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLOMBIA FllEDX;HE COURT S OFFICER MOHAMMED AL-ADAHI, ~~, CSO' CATE: .

Petitioners, Civil Action No. 05-280 (GK) v. BARACK H. OBAHA, at AL..,

Respondents. MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Fahmi Salem Al-Assani ("AI-Assani" or "the petitioner") has been detained since 2002 at the United states

Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Respondents ("the Government")

argue that his detention is justified under the Authorization for

the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 2(a), 115 Stat.

224, 224 (2001) ("AUMF") , which grants the Executive the power to

detain individuals engaged in certain terrorist activities. The

petitioner disagrees, and has, along with four other petitioners,

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus [Dkt. NO. 1).1 the merits: Mohammed Al-Adahi's petition and Motion for Judgment ^[1] To date, one of the five petitions has been decided on

on the Record were granted by this Court on August 17, 2009 [Dkt.

No. 459]. The Government filed an appeal on September 21, 2009,

and the Petitioner cross-appealed other aspects of the Order on

October 5, 2009 [Dkt. Nos. 463, .473). On December 22, 2009,

Muhammad Ali Abdullah Bawazir's petition was dismissed without

prejudice after he chose not to proceed with a merits hearing

scheduled for January 2010 [Dkt. No. 526]. Two other

Petitioners-Suleiman Awadh Bin Aqil AI-Nahdi and Zahir Omar Khamis SBSRBW

The matter is before the Court on Cross-Motions for Judgment on the Record [Dkt. Nos. 493 and 496]. On December 22, 2009,

Petitioners filed a Supplemental Brief

and the Government responded (Dkt. Nos. 527 and 539]. Upon consideration of the Motions, the Oppositions, extensive oral argument and accompanying exhibits, and

the entire record herein, Al-Assani's habeas corpus petition and

Motion are hereby denied.

I • BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition on February 7, 2005. After filing, there was extensive preliminary litigation

regarding the Court's jurisdiction to entertain detainees'

petitions, the applicability of various statutes, and the

appropriate procedures to be used.

After more than six years of litigation, the most important legal issue was resolved by the Supreme Court in Boumediene v,

Bush, 553 U.S. , 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). The Court ruled that

detainees at Guantanamo Bay, none of whom are citizens of the

United States, are entitled to bring habeas petitions under Article Bin Hamdoun--have filed Motions for Judgment on the Record. On

October 7, 2009, Hamdoun's petition was stayed for 120 days [Dkt.

No. 476]. On January 4-5, 2010, a merits hearing was held on Al­

Nahdi's petition and Motion, which are addressed in a separate opinion.

UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE iHi1ElY'i'

I of the Constitution, and that the federal District Courts have jurisdiction to hear such petitions.

The Court did not define what conduct the Government would have to prove in order to justifiably detain individuals- -that rd, at 2240 (~We do not question was left to the District Courts. address whether the President has the authority to detain these

petitioners nor do we hold that the writ must issue. These and

other questions regarding the legality of the detention are to be

resolved in the first instance by the District Court."). Nor did

the Supreme Court lay down specific procedures for the District

Courts to follow in these cases.

Boumediene was, however, definitive on at least two points: first, that the detainees are entitled to a prompt hearing, 128 S.

Ct. at 2275 (~The detainees in this case are entitled to a prompt

habeas corpus hearing."), and, second, that the District Courts are

to shape the contours of those hearings, ~ at 2276 (finding that

balancing protection of the writ and the Government's interest in

military operations, "and the other remaining questions [,] are

within the expertise and competence of the District Court to

address in the first instance. U ) .

In an effort to provide the prompt hearings mandated by the Supreme Court, many of the judges in this District agreed to

consolidate their cases before former Chief JUdge Thomas Hogan in SBeR:fl~

order to streamline procedures for, and management of, the several

hundred petitions filed by detainees. ~ Order (July 1, 2008)

[Civ. No. 08-442, Dkt. No.1). On November 6, 2008, after

extensive briefing from Petitioners' counsel and the Government,

Judge Hogan issued a Case Management Order ("CMO") to govern the

proceedings. This Court adopted, in large part, the provisions of

that Order, while modifying it somewhat, as noted in Appendix A to

Dkt. No. 283.

Much pre-hearing activity haa taken place under this Court's Case Management Order. The Government has filed the exculpatory

evidence, automatic discovery, and additional discovery required

under the CMO. The Government filed its Factual Return for Al­

Assani on August 1, 2005, and amended it on October 30, 2008. The

Petitioner responded by filing Traverses on July 2, 2008, July 9,

2008, and November 3, 2008. After a period of extensive discovery,

both parties filed substantial briefs accompanied by extensive

eXhibits.

On December 16, 2009, the Court set January 4, 2010, as the date for the "Merits Hearing" on the Cross-Motions for Judgment on

the Record for all three Petitioners who planned to go forward to

challenge their detention. On December 22, 2009, Petitioner

Bawazir's case was dismissed without prejudice after he instructed

his counsel to not proceed with litigating his Motion. Order BSeU'i'

(December 22, 2009) [Dkt. No. 526]. AI-Nahdi's case, including the

Petitioner's live direct and cross-examination on January 5, 2010,

was presented to the Court over a two-day period. AI-Assani' s case

was presented to the Court on January 7, 2010.

:U. STANDARD OF REVI:EW

The Government bears the burden of establishing that detention is justified. See ~oumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270; Hamdi, 542,U.S.

507, 533-34 (2004). It must do so by a preponderance of the

evidence. Order, Appendix A at § II.A (Feb. 12, 2009) [Dkt. No.

283-2] ; see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir.

2010);~,

Initially, the Government took the position that Article II of the Constitution and the AUMF granted the President the authority

to detain individuals. See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43,

53 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009). The Government asserted, "[a]t a minimum, .

. . the ability to detain as enemy combatants those individuals who

were part of, or supporting, forces engaged in hostilities against

the United States or its coalition partners and allies." Resp't's

Statement of Legal Justification For Detention at 2 [Dkt. No. 205].

Since the change in administrations, the Government has abandoned Article II as a Source of detention authority, and relies

solely On the AUMF. Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 53 n.4. Further,

it no longer uses the term "enemy combatant." Its refined position

UNCLASSIFIEDIlFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE saeu'!'

is:

[t]he President has the authority to detain persons that the President determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks. The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.

Resp't's Revised Mem. Regarding the Govt.'s Detention Authority

Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 3 (Dkt. No. 306].

In. Gherebi, JUdge Reggie B. Walton of this District Court ruled that the Government has the authority to detain individuals

who were part of, or substantially supported, al-Qaida and/or the

Taliban, provided that. those terms ~are interpreted to encompass

only individuals who were members of the enemy organization's armed

forces, as that term is intended under the laws of war, at the time

of their capture." Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 70-71. However, in

Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009) , Judge John

Bates of this District Court concluded that, under the law of war,

the Government has the authority to detain individuals who were

"part of . Taliban or al Qaida forces" or associated forces,

but not the authority to detain those who are merely "substantial UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE S:BeR:B'i'

supporters of those groups.,,2 Id. at 74, 76. As JUdge Urbina

succinctly stated, "the crux of the distinction between the two

approaches lies in whether the government has the authority to

detain individuals who substantially supported enemy forces and/or

directly supported hostilities against the United States. Judge

Walton has concluded that the government does have this authority,

while Judge Bates has held that it does not." Hatim v.

Obama, No. 05-1429, 2009 WL 5191429, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2009)

(citations omitted). This Court concluded that, "[w]hile [it] has

great regard for the scholarship and analysis contained in both

decisions, Judge Walton's opinion presented a clearer

approach," and adopted the reasoning and conClusion in Gherebi.

AI-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280, 2009 WL 2584685, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug.

21,2009).

Recently, the Court of Appeals considered the scope of the President's detention authority under the AUMF and related statutes

in AI-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870-75. The Court of Appeals rejected ~ The Court agrees with JUdge Bates' comment that the determination of who was a "part of n the Taliban and/or al-Qaida,

under JUdge Walton's approach, rests on a highly individualized and

case-specific inquiry; as a result, the "concept [of substantial

support] may play a role under the functional test used to

determine who is 'part of' a covered organization," and the

difference in the two approaches "should not be great." Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 76 (D.D.C. 2009).

To the extent that Ghereb~ or Hamlily are inconsistent with the analysis set forth in Al-Bihani, the decision of the Court

UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE BeeRS!'

Al-Bihani's argument "that the war powers granted by the AUMF and

other statutes are limited by the international laws of war," and

held that the sources courts must look to are "the text of relevant

statutes and controlling domestic caselaw." Id. at 871-72.

The Court of Appeals then examined the various "relevant statutes," including the AUMF, the 2006 Military Commissions Act,

Pub.L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C.

§ & note), and the 2009 Military Commissions Act, Pub.L. No.

111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 2575-76. It concluded that a

lawfully detained person could be defined as "an individual who was

part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated

forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or

its coalition partners" or "an individual 'substantially

support [ing] enemy forces." Id. at 872 (iriternal quotation

omitted). The Court made clear that this two-pronged definition (membership and substantial support) included "those who are part

of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban or those who

purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities I51:..

against U.s. Coalition partners." Finally, the Court

concluded that "both prongs are valid criteria that are

independently sufficient" to justify detention. Id. at 874.

of Appeals controls.

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SHElM'!'

III. ANALYSIS UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE BEeRE;'

separate question of whether the petitioner poses a threat to the

united States' national security is one the district courts have

not found determinative, or even relevant, in ruling on the merits

of habeas petitions. ~ Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24

(D.D.C. 2009); Anam v.Obama, No. 04-1194, 2010 WL 58965, at *14

(D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2010) (denying petition for habeas corpus despite

explicit finding that petitioner "does not currently pose a threat UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE to the security of the United States") . See also AI-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870-75 (not considering whether petitioner posed future threat in upholding district court's denial of the writ). Arguing that the threat posed by petitioner is relevant to this Court's inquiry, Petitioner points to language in the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi that "[t]he purpose of detention is to

prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of battle

and tak~ng up arms once again."

However, the Hamdi Court made clear that, under the AUMF, the President possesses "[t]he authority to detain for the

duration of the relevant conflict . . . based On longstanding law­

of-war principles." rd. at 521. Thus, the President is authorized

to detain Petitioner for the duration of the conflict in

Afghanistan, even if Petitioner poses no threat of returning to the

field of battle. See alsQ Transcript of Oral RUling at 12-13, Anam

v. Obama, No. 04-1194 (D.D.C. Dec. 14,2009); Awad v. Obama, 646 F.

Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) ; but see~,_

(concluding that "the AUMF does not authorize the detention of individuals beyond that which is

individuals from rejoining the battle" . UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE In short, the question of whether Petitioner poses a threat is not relevant under the AUMF to this Court's review of his continued

I

B. Evidentiary Presumptions

As a preliminary matter, some attention must be given to the nature of the evidence that has been presented in this case, and

how the Court, as fact-finder, will go about evaluating that In attempting to meet its burden, the Government has

evidence.

provided evidence in the form of classified intelligence and

interview reports that it believes justify the Petitioner's

detention. The reports contain the statements of Petitioner, as

well as staternentsmade by other detainees, that the Government

argues .demonstra~e the .Petitioner's status as a member or

substantial supporter of al-Qaida and/or the Taliban.'

The Government requested that a rebuttable presumption of Petitioner argues that the Government's evidence should be excluded under the Geneva Conventions, because the evidence was

collected in violation of various articles of the Third Geneva Convention. Pet.'s Response to Gov's Mot. for J. on the Record at

3-5. The parties previously had briefed this issue in the weeks

following Petitioner Al-Adahi' s Merits Hearing [Dkt. Nos. 435, 441,

442, and 481). The Court agrees with the Government that the

evidence need not be excluded. Section 5 of the Military

Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA"), Pub. L. 109-366, § 5, oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2631 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § & note), which

was not altered by the MCA of 2009, precludes Petitioner from

relying on the Geneva Conventions "as a source of rights." In

addition, this Circuit held in AI-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 875, that

" [tJ he AUMF, DTA, and MCA of 2006 and 2009 do not hinge the

government's detention authority on compliance with

international law . . " Petitioner therefore cannot rely on the

Geneva Conventions to carve out an exclusionary rule for evidence.

UNCLASSIFIEDIlFOR PUBLIC RELEASE -------------------------------------- UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE -!!IeH'!' authenticity be granted to all the exhibits it intends to

introduce. Petitioner objected to this request. See Pets.' Joint

Opp'n to the Government's Memo. and Supplement Regarding

Presumptions, Hearsay and Reliability of Intelligence Information

at 3-10 ("Pets.' Presumptions Memo.") [Dkt. No. 400]. In the Order

granting Petitioner Al-Adahi' s petition for a writ of habeas the Court ruled that, "[gJ iven the Government' s

corpus,

representations that the specific documents included in its case

against petitioner, as well as the documents provided to

Petitioner's counsel in discovery, have all been maintained in the

ordinary course of business, the Court will presume, pursuant to

Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), that its documents are authentic." AI-Adahi

v. Obama, 2009 WL 2584685, at *3. As provided for in the CMO, the

Government's exhibits will be granted a rebuttable presumption of

authenticity and will be deemed authentic in the absence of any

rebuttal evidence to the contrary.

In Petitioner AI-Assani's case, the Government also requested that a rebuttable presumption of accuracy be granted to all the

exhibits it intended to introduce. The Petitioner objected to this

request as well. See Pets.' Presumptions Memo. at 3-10. This that the proponent, who is offering a writing into evidence as an ^[5] Ordinarily, "the requirement of authentication requires

exhibit, produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

writing is what the proponent claims it to be." 2 K. Broun,

McCormick on Eyidence § 221 (6th ed.). --------------------------:---------, UNCLASSIFIEDJlFOR PUBLIC RELEASE request is denied for several reasons.

First, there is absolutely no reason for this Court to presume that the facts contained in the Government's exhibi ts are accurate.

The accuracy of much of the factual material contained in those

exhibits is hotly contested for a host of different reasons,

ranging from the fact that it contains second-level hearsay, to

allegations that it was obtained by torture, to the fact that no

statement purports to be a verbatim account of what was said.

Second, given the fact that this is a bench trial, the Court must, in any event, make the final judgment as to the reliability

of these documents, the weight to be given to them, and their

accuracy. Those final judgments will be based on a long, non­

exclusive list of factors that any fact-finder must consider, such

as: consistency or inconsistency with other evidence, conditions

under which the exhibit and statements contained in it were

obtained, accuracy of translation and transcription, personal

knowledge of declarant about the matters testified to, levels of

hearsay, recantations, etc.'

Denial of the Government's request for a rebuttable presumption of accuracy does not mean, however, that the Government

, While the supreme Court did suggest in Hamdi that a rebuttable presumption "in favor of the Government's evidence"

might be permissible, 542 U.S. at 534, it did not mandate it. In

Eoumediene, the Court clearly left it to the District Courts to

craft appropriate procedures. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2272. - - - - - - ._- -_ .... ­

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SHORB'i'

must present direct testimony from every source, or that it must

offer a preliminary document-by-document foundation for

admissibility of each eXhibit. As the Supreme Court noted in

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34, hearsay may be appropriately admitted in

these cases because of the exigencies of the circumstances. See

also AI-Bihani v. Qbama, 590 F.3d at 879-80.

Finally, while parties always retain the right to challenge the admissibility of evidence, the Court will be guided by the

Federal Rules of Evidence, in particular Rule 402, providing that

"[aJ relevant evidence is admissible." Once all evidence is

admitted into the record, the Court will then, in its role as fact­

finder, evaluate it for credibility, reliability, and accuracy in

the manner described above. ~

C. Mosaic Theory The Government advances several categories· of allegations which, in its view, demonstrate that the Petitioner was detained

laWfully. Above all, its theory is that each of these allegations

- - and even the individual pieces of evidence supporting these

allegations - - should not be examined in isolation. Rather, U [t] he

probity of any single piece of evidence should be evaluated based

on the evidence as a whole," to determine Whether, when considered

"as a whole, H the evidence supporting these allegations comes

together to support a conclusion that shows the Petitioner to be UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SBeRH'f

justifiably detained. Govt.'s Mot. for J. Upon the R. and Mem. in

Supp. at (internal citation omitted) [Dkt. No. 496]. While the

Government avoids an explicit adoption of the mosaic theory, it is,

as a practical matter, arguing for its application to the evidence

in this case. Cf. Hatim v. Obama, No. 05-1429, 2009 WL 5191429, at

*3 n.1 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2009); Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d

51, 55-56 (D.D.C. 2009).

The Court understands from the Government's declarations, and from case law,7 that use of this approach is a common and well­

established.mode of analysis in the intelligence community. This

may well be true. Nonetheless, at this point in this long, drawn-

out litigation the Court's obligation is to make findings of fact

and conclusions of law which satisfy appropriate and relevant legal

standards as to whether the Government has proven by a

preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner is justifiably

detained. The kind and amount of evidence which satisfies the

intelligence community in reaching final conclusions about the

value of information it obtains may be very different from, and

certainly cannot determine, this Court's ruling.

Even using the Government's theoretical model of a mosaic, it See, e.g., McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (recognizing that the "mosaic-like nature of

intelligence gathering" requires taking a "broad view" in order to

. contextualize information) (internal citations and quotations

omitted) . I

I saeRS'!

must be acknowledged that the mosaic theory is only as persuasive

as the tiles which compose it and. the glue which binds them just as a brick wall is only as strong as the

together

individual bricks which support it and the cement that keeps the

bricks in place. Therefore, if the individual pieces of a mosaic

are inherently flawed or do not fit together, then the mosaic will

eventually split apart. just as the brick wall will eventually

collapse.

A final point must be kept in mind. One consequence of using intelligence reports and summaries in lieu of direct evidence is

that certain questions simply cannot be answered, i.e., there are

no deposition transcripts to consult and few if any witnesses are

available for cross-examination. Sizeable gaps may appear in the

record and may well remain unfilled; each party will attempt to

account for these deficiencies by positing what they think are the

most compelling logical inferences to be drawn from the existing

evidence. Accordingly, that existing evidence must be weighed and

evaluated as to its strength, its reliability, and the degree to

which it is corroborated. In any event, the Government always

bears the ultimate burden of showing by a preponc;ierance of the

evidence that Petitioner's detention is lawful. Just as a criminal

defendant need not prove his innocence, a detainee need not prove

that he was acting innocently. In sum, the fact that the _._-_ .. _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , SilSR'! Petitioner may not be able to offer neat answers to every factual

question posed by the Government does not relieve the Government of

its obligation to satisfy its burden of proof.

D. Legal Standard Governing Petitioner's Knowledge and Intent

Petitioner relies heavily on the argument that, assuming arguendo that he was recruited through an al-Qaida network to train

in Afghanistan, the Government has not proved by a preponderance of

the evidence that he knew that the facilitators, guesthouses, and

training camp that he encountered along the way were associated

with al-Qaida. Instead, Petitioner argues, he decided to travel to

Afghanistan to receive military training, which he considered a

sort of rite of passage, for its own sake. Pet.'s Mot. for J. on

the Record at 3 {Dkt. No. 493] ("Pet.'s Mot.").

This argument raises the important question of what level of knowledge or intent is required under the relevant caselaw. Given

how central this question is to Petitioner's defense, the Court

will address the legal standard first,8 before evaluating the

evidence offered by the Government to prove its allegations.

Under the standard adopted in this Circuit, the President may parties were ordered to file supplemental briefs on the knowledge ^[8] On January 6, 2010, at the end of the Merits Hearing, the

and intent issues and the degree, if any, to which Al-Bihani

addressed them. Order (Jan. 6, 2010) [Dkt. No. 531].

unfortunately, the Court of Appeals had no occasion in the Ai=.

Bihani opinion to address the issues of knowledge and intent.

L- . ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE saORB'! detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported,

Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces. Al-Bihani, 590

F.3d at 871-74. Although there is no explicit scienter

requirement, the District Court in Hamlily concluded that this

framework "does not encompass those individuals who unwittingly

become part of the al Qaeda apparatus." Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. at

75. Instead, "some level of knowledge or intent is required," at

least under the membership prong. Id.

First, given the tenor_ of some of Petitioner's arguments it bears emphasis that the Government is not required to prove that

Petitioner had reason to know specifically that Coalition forces

would enter the conflict in Afghanistan, or that Petitioner had the

specific intent to fight against the United states or its allies.

See, e.g., Pet.'s Mot. at 4. Instead, the knowledge or intent that

must be shown relates to Petitioner's decision to become a part of

or to substantially support al-Qaida and/or the Taliban. Thus,

even a recently recruited, low-ranking Taliban and/or al-Qaida

member who had no reason to suspect the united States' entrance

into the conflict is detainable, so long as the decision to

"function[} or participate[] within or under the command structure

of the organization" was made with some knowledge or intent, and so

long as the individual was functioning or participating within the

command structure at the time of capture. Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d

L- ------­

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE saeRB'I'

at 68-69.

Second, the Government need not show that a petitioner knew or intended from the moment his journey began that it would end in al­

Qaida and/or Taliban membership. ~ Pet.' s Supp. Brief at 6 (Dkt.

No. 537]. It is both possible and probable that an individual

would obtain such knowledge or form such intent over the course of

a journey, as training and indoctrination are undertaken and

political views are crystallized. The fact that an individual may

have been initially motivated to travel abroad for innocent

reasons, or that an individual's knowledge or intent was less than

clear at the inception of his journey, does not defeat the

Government's case. Instead, it is sufficient for the Government to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, at some point before

capture, it is more likely than not that petitioner knew he was

becoming or intended to become a part of or substantial supporter

of al-Qaida and/or the Taliban.

Finally, as this Circuit has explained, albeit in the criminal context, \\ eel xcept in extraordinary circumstances, (] intent cannot

be proved by direct evidence," and "it is therefore not only

appropriate but also necessary for the [fact-finder] to look at

'all of the circumstances.'" United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d

31, 115-16 (D.C. Cir.1976)i see also United states v. Rhodes, 886

F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). The Government need - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . UNCLASSIFIEDIlFOR PUBLIC RELEASE not always have direct evidence of a petitioner's knowledge that an

organization is, or is associated with, al-Qaida and/or the

Taliban, or of a petitioner's intent to become a part of or to

substantially support such an organization. In such cases, an

inference of knowledge or intent may be drawn from indirect and

circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Anam, 2010 WL 58965, at *11.

B. Government Allegations

In narrowing the issues for trial, the parties focused on six broad factual areas that are in dispute. The Court then heard

arguments and evidence on whether Petitioner (I) was recruited by

an al-Qaida operative and traveled to Afghanistan to join al-Qaida

forces; (2) stayed at al-Qaida guesthouses and knew the guesthouses

were affiliated with al-Oaida; (3) received military training at

al-Qaida training camps and knew the camps were operated by al-

Qaida; (4) served as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden; 5) knowingly

served with an al-Qaida unit at Tora Bora and participated in

hostilities against the United States or its alliesj9 and 6) was , In preparation for the Merits Hearing, Petitioner identified as a factual issue in dispute " [w]hether Mr. al-Nahdi

ever participated in hostilities against the United States or its allies." Pet. ' s Stmt. of Main Il:jsues in Dispute 1 9 [Dkt. No.

515]. However, the Court of Appeals' subsequent decision in Al­

Bihani has made clear that the legal standard governing the

President's detention authority under the AUMF is whether

Petitioner was a member or substantial supporter of al-Oaida and/or

the Taliban. Al-Bihani, F.3d at 870-74. While participation

in hostilities is certainly relevant to the legal inquiry into

membership and/or substantial support, it is not controlling.

L­

~ _ . UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SB€M1'P

captured on or near the battlefield at Tora Bora. Because issues

five and six are closely related, they will be considered together.

1. Recruitment by al-Qaida Operative and Travel to Afghanistan

The Government seeks to show that it is more likely than not that AI-Assani was being recruited by an al-Qaida operative when he

decided to travel to Afghanistan, and that his motivation in

traveling there was to fight alongside al-Qaida and/or the Taliban.

It is undisputed that a man named approached Al-Assani

at the Taqwa Mosque, where AI-Assani worked as a chanter, in the

Mukalah region of Hadramout, Yemen. Gov's Statement of Material

Facts Not in Dispute ("Gov's Stmt. of Undisputed Facts") ~ 1. Al­

Assani andlllllllbecame friends, discussing religion, the problems

related to Palestine, and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan.

lIIIIIIencouraged Petitioner to receive military training, which he

agreed to in August 2001. IIIIIIfhen gave AI-Assani 3,000 riyal~ Thus, this issue has been incorporated into the broader discussion

in this section of whether Petitioner was a member or substantial

supporter of al-Qaida and/or the Taliban.

gathered states that AI-Assani was given 3,000 Yemeni riyals, ^[10] The interrogation report from which this information was

which, according to representations made by the Government at the

Merits Hearing, would have equaled about $20 in 2001. JE 14 at 2.

However, the Government argued at the Merits Hearing that, because

individuals being recruited by al-Qaida are typically given much

more money than this, the Court should infer that the report is

mistaken. The Government asks the Court to conclude instead that

Al-Assani was given 3,000 Saudi riyals, which would have equaled

about $800 in 2001. In essence, the Government asks the Court to for travel money, took his passport to obtain the appropriate

visas, and advised him that he would be met at the Sanaa, Yemen bus

station and taken tolllllllllfriend,1IIIIIII ~" 5-8.

The Government alleges, relying principallY on statements made by other Guantanamo Bay detainees, that _ was "an al-Qaida

recruiter, travel facilitator, and commander in Osama Bin Laden's

55 th Arab Brigade." Gov's Stmt. of Undisputed Facts , 2. According

to intelligence reports, Fahd Umr Abd AI-Majid (AI-Sharif) (ISN

215) stated that he met a man named Salam in Kabul, Afghanistan in

2001 on the "front lines," and that Salam had received all training

available at al-Qaida' s Khaldan and Al Farouq camps. JE 18.n ISN

28 described a Salam Al HadramP~ as having commanded Arab fighters

in the Kabul area. JE 31 at 5. ISN also named a Salam Al assume the accuracy of that which it sets out to prove. The Court

rejects this assumption. It is the Government's job to introduce

evidence it believes to be probative of its allegation that Al­

Assani was being recruited to join al-Qaida, not to introduce

evidence and then ask the Court to discount it and substitute some

more favorable interpretation of it.

comprise the vast majority of evidence presented during trial. "JE" Unless otherwise indicated, citations to refer to the universe ^[11] Parties submitted one volume of Joint Exhibits, which

of Joint Exhibits. ISN 28

identifying an individual as "AI Hadramiu--as ISN 44 and ^[12] The Government explained at the Merits Hearing that

did--signifies that the individual is from Hadramout, Yemen, which new as Salam.

is where Petitioner

See also Decl. of JE 3 at 3.

Petitioner did not 0 BB@!RB1f'

Hadrami as his recrui~er. JE 33 at 1. He later stated that he met

Salam at the Said Center, a rest area that serviced the Taliban

front lines outside of Kabul, where Salam encouraged him to remain

in Afghanistan and fight with the Taliban. JE 34.

Given this evidence, and considering Salam's role in arranging Al-Assani's travel to Afghanistan, the Court finds it more likely

than not that the Salam who befriended Al-Assani was an al-Qaida

member active in recruiting young men to fight.

Petitioner argues, however, that none of this evidence establishes that AI-Assani ever knew of Salam's connection to al-

Qaida. 13 The Government replies that the unusual generosity

exhibited by Salam in arranging Petitioner's travel must have led

AI-Assani to at least suspect that Salam was associated with al-

Qaida. The Government's argument is unpersuasive. First, it is

conceded that the two men considered each other to be friends.

Second, the Government's evidence which has been admitted.

establishes that Salam gave Al-Assani the equivalent of around $20

which, while not insignificant in a country as poverty-stricken as

Yemen, is not so staggering a sum that AI-Assani could have been

28, which the Government initially used to support the allegation ^[13] AI-Assani also questions the reliability of JE and JE

that Salam was an al-Qaida recruiter. Pet.'s Response to the Gov's

Mot. for J. on the Record at 8-9. Because the Court finds that the

Government has met its burden on this issue through the use of

other evidence, Petitioner's objections to JE 26 and JE 28 need not be addressed. . SBEIM'!

expected to infer Salam's connection to al-Qaida. Without more

persuasive evidence that AI-Assani knew or suspected Salam's al­

Qaida connection, the circumstances are not suspicious enough to

warrant the inference that he did.

In addition, the record supports Petitioner's claim that he was motivated to travel to Afghanistan to receive military

training, and not to fight. In 2001, military service was

compulsory in Yemen, but Al Assani had been rejected

He stated before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (RCSRT") that he felt training was

"important in coming of age. II Because he could not receive

military training in Yemen, he claims he was persuaded to go to

Afghanistan. JE 35. petitioner's other statements in the record,

including those made at his Administrative Review Board (RARB")

proceeding, are consistent with these statements. JE 36 at 4, JE at 2~ JE 15.

The Government responds that the evidence suggests that Al­ Assani intended to stay in Afghanistan for much longer than would

be necessary to receive training. UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SH@H'!'

Thus, while the Government has proven that it is more likely than not that Salam was an al-Qaida recruiter, it has not shown

that Al-Assani knew of the connection when he left for Sanaa in

August 2001, or that AI-Assani' s initial motivation in traveling to

Afghanistan was to fight with al-Qaida and/or the Taliban.'

The parties do not dispute the facts of Petitioner's travel to Al Farouq, with one exception that will be discussed below. At the

Sanaa bus station, Petitioner met two other men--one of whom was

Petitioner ~-and the three proceeded together to an

apartment where they stayed for several days. IilJlQRIii'

friend, brought Petitioner his passport and visa for Pakistan and

provided all three men with plane tickets to Karachi, Pakistan.

The three men were also given the name of a contact in Karachi.

Gov's Stmt. of Undisputed Facts ~~ 9-13.

At the Karachi airport, the three men were met by the contact, liliiii and traveled with him and three other Yerneni men by taxi to

a Karachi guesthouse. This guesthouse was run by a man named I.sl.. ~~ 14­

_ who is currently a detainee at Guantanamo Bay.

20. The Government claims, based upon admissions made by Riyadh,

that he is "an admitted mujahadeen [known as "Riyadh the

Facilitator"] who facilitated travel for al-Qaida members and was

an associate of Usama Bin Laden. ^[1114] IQ... ~ 21.

From Riyadh's guesthouse, the seven Yemeni men took a cab to the Karachi bus station, where they were met byllllll a Pakistani

,U Petitioner argues that any admissions made by _ are unrel iable because he was rendered to Jordan an ~e arriving at Guantanamo. Pet'.'s Response to Gov's stmt. of

Material Facts Not in Dispute 21. As this Court explained in

Mohammed v. Obama, No. 05-1347, 2009 WL 4884194, at *22-27 (D.D.C.

Dec. 16, 2009) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 226

(1973) ), courts apply a "totality of the circumstances" test,

considering "the time that passes between confessions, the change

in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the

interrogators" in determining whether prior coercion carries over

into a second confession. However, Petitioner has presented no

information on the extent of torture suffered by Riyadh or its

impact on his statements. Without such information, the Court is

not prepared to reject the Government's evidence as unreliable.

Cf. id. Therefore, the Government's evidence stands as unrebutted

and must be accepted as credible.

UNCLASSIFIEDJlFOR PUBLIC RELEASE BB@&iI'i'

man who took them by bus to Quetta, Pakistan. There, the group

separated and AI-Assani, along with his two original travel

companions, rested at a safehouse for a few hours. An .Afghani

youth they met there next took them to the Afghan border, where

they evaded a border checkpoint by traveling on motorcycles, only

to reconvene with the taxi on the Afghanistan side of the border.

rd. " 22-25.

Once in Afghanistan, they traveled to the al-Nebras guesthouse, arriving after dark. At al-Nebras, AI-Assani and his

companions were required to turn in their bags, passports, money,

and all other fonns of identification, which were inventoried. The

men were told they were supposed to pick up these items when they

returned to al-Nebras after completing their training at Al Farouq.

After a few days at al-Nebras, a bus took AI-Assani and

approximately forty-five other men to Al Farouq. rd." 26-30.

The Government alleges that the fact that Petitioner's travel was so coordinated and closely controlled, that it was fully paid

for by virtual strangers, and that it was arranged in such a

secretive and evasive manner compels the inference that he likely

knew he was being recruited by al-Qaida. While the Court agrees

that the manner in which Petitioner traveled to Al Farouq is

suspicious, it need not decide whether the Government, as of this

point in the evidence, has produced sufficient evidence to

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE , . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - "

saSH!'

establish that it is more likely than not that AI-Assani knew he was associating with al-Qaida, since it is clear that he became aware of that connection after arriving at Al Farouq.

2. Guesthouse Stay The Government produced evidence that AI-Assani stayed in four guesthouses during the period in question: 1) Riyadh the

Facilitator's guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistani 2} a guesthouse in Quetta, Pakistani 3) the al-Nebras guesthouse in Afghanistan; and

4) a guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan. Petitioner does not deny

that he stayed at these guesthouses, but does dispute whether 'they

were al-Qaida safehouses and, even if they were, whether he knew

it.

The Government argues that these guesthouses differed from those typically frequented by young Yemeni men traveling abroad,

which resemble youth hostels. ~ Decl. of Dr. Sheila Carapico, JE ~ 4 (describing typical guesthouse).

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SBeRS!

public, but were restricted to individuals who either had

connections to al-Qaida or had been brought there by al-Qaida

supporters. JE a at 3.

Ample evidence has been produced in this case to support the conclusion that the Karachi and al-Nebras guesthouses were al-Qaida

safehouses. ~ Al-Nahdi v. Obama, No. 05-280 (Feb. 24, 2010).

There is far less evidence, however. to support the claim that Al-

Assani knew he was staying at al-Qaida guesthouses.

There are relatively few statements by Al-Assani in the record concerning his guesthouse stays, especially when compared to

Petitioner Al-Nahdi's account.1& With respect to the Riyadh and

Quetta guesthouses. AI-Assani says little more than that he stayed

Quetta or Kabul guesthouses. ^[15] The Government has provided little evidence about the

by Petitioner AI-Nahdi to demonstrate that AI-Assani was staying in ^[16] On several occasions. the Government:, relies on statements

an al-Qaida safehouse and, more problematically, that he was aware

of it. As discussed above, Petitioner must have had some knowledge or intent to become a part of al-Qaida and/or the Taliban for his

continued detention to be justified. See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d

at 75. While the Court credits the Government's evidence with

respect to the issue of whether the guesthouses were al-Qaida

safehouses. admissions made by AI-Nahdi as to his personal

knowledge of the guesthouses' operations or experiences while

staying there cannot be considered evidence of Al-Assani' S state of

mind.

UNCLASSIFIEDJlFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SS8Rl!I'P at them. With respect to his stay at al-Nebras, the guesthouse

notorious for housing recruits on their way to AI Farouq, Al-Assani

described how his possessions--including his passport--were taken

and inventoried. He identified the man running the guesthouse as

a man named which matches other intelligence regarding

the al-Nebras guesthouse. JE 14 at 3; JE 20 at 2. He also stayed

there for two days without leaving the house, although it is

unclear whether he felt he was required to remain inside. In one

interrogation, he stated that there were no rules preventing him

from leaving the guesthouse, although on another occasion he said

he was not allowed to come and go from the house at will. JE at

3 i JE 15.1'7 Finally, he stated that no training video or audiotapes

were seen or heard there. JE 14 at 3. While this evidence

provides some support for the inference that Al-Assani was aware of

the al-Nebras guesthouse's connection to al-Qaida, it does not

establish Al-Assani's knowledge by a preponderance.

Merely staying at an al-Qaida safehouse is typically insufficient to satisfy the detention standard. See Ali Ahmed, 613

statements in JE 14 should be given more weight than those in JE ^[17] Petitioner argued at the Merits Hearing that his

15, since the latter were tangential to the purpose of the

interview.and because other details in JE 15 indicate some

confusion over Al-Assani's alias. However, JE' 15 also describes a

test conducted by the interrogators of AI-Assani's veracity, which

he passed. On balance, there is no reason to suspect that the

statements captured in this report--while not consistent with those

in JE 14--are less trustworthy.

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE "- -"-~------------------ F. SUpp. 2d at 6S (finding guesthouse stay insufficient to justify

detention); but see AI-Bihani, F.3d at 873 n.2 (suggesting in

dicta that the ~military's reasonable belief n of a non-citizen's

guesthouse stay alone would "overwhelmingly" JUBtify the

government's detention). Still, the fact that Petitioner willingly

stayed in houses where he was either advised not to go outsid~.or

felt it better not ·to, and where his passport and other personal

belongings were taken and held, adds strength to the inference that

he knew he was associating with al-Qaida, and, in turn, the

inference that he was intentionally taking steps to join al-Qaida' S

ranks. Cf. Razak Ali v. Obama, No. 09-745, 2009 WL 4030864, at *3­

4 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2009).

3. Attendance at Al Farouq AI-Assani does not deny that he spent approximately two weeks at the Al Farouq training camp in order to receive training on the

Kalashnikov rifle. In addition, Petitioner admitted in

interrogations to having heard Usama Bin Laden speak about jihad at

Al Farouq before the September 11, 2001 attacks. JE 14 at 4; JE 20

at 2. He stated that he knew who Usama Bin Laden was at the time,

as he had seen news reports about him in Yemen. Gov's stmt. of

undisputed Facts ~~ 38-40. However, Petitioner claims that he was

not aware of Al Farouq's al-Qaida affiliation during his time spent

there. That claim is patently not credible, and the Court rejects UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIGRELEASE HaeM'!

it.

According to Government experts, Al Farouq was al-Qaida' s "primary Afghan basic-training facility, providing ideological

indoctrination and [weapons and other] training. n ~, 31. It is

undisputed that Petitioner spent a little over two weeks at Al

Farouq, where he focused on the use and maintenance of small arms,

including Kalashnikov rifles, and physical fitness. ~, 35. He

appears to have had some knowledge of the camp's hierarchy, as he

stated that he was trained by two men--one whose "code name n was

and the other whose name waslllllllll-and identified the commander of the camp as His statements indicate that

he was assigned to a "unit," in which he and other members were

subjected to a structured training regime beginning every morning

at 3:45 a.m. before being "released on their own." JE at 4.

Even if the evidence leading up to AI-Assani's attendance at Al Farouq does not clearly establish that he knew he was

associating with al-Qaida, the Court finds that it is definitely

more likely than not that he became aware of that connection while

a t Al Farouq. It is simply not credible that he would have

attended the camp, which subjected its trainees to ideological

indoctrination for two full weeks, without realizing with whom he

was deal ing . That Petitioner heard Usama Bin Laden--whom he

recognized--speak about jihad at Al Farouq resolves any remaining

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SlISMI'

doubt, especially in light of the way in which Al-Assani was led to

the camp. ~ Transcript of Oral Ruling at 48-50, Allam v. Obama,

No. 04-1194 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2009) (concluding petitioner had to

have known Al Farouq was an al-Qaida training camp) .

4. Boayguard for Usama Bin Laden Having established that it is more likely than not that Petitioner knew he was associating with al-Qaida by this point, the

next issue in dispute is whether a preponderance of the evidence

establishes he was a part of or sUbstantially supported al-Qaida.

While Petitioner's guesthouse stays and training at Al Farouq alone

might suffice to justify detention, the Government makes far

stronger allegations of membership and substantial support. One of

the Government's key allegations is that AI-Assani served as a

bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden after September 11, 2001.

As its only piece of evidence supporting this important claim, the Government points to an identification of Petitioner from a

photograph by

identified Al-Assani as one of fifty individuals who served as

Usama Bin Laden's bodyguards, and said that he saw Al-Assani

driving a Toyota pick-up truck with other bodyguards to Tora Bora.

JE 17. These individuals were said to have weapons and to have

received "specialized" training. Id. The Government points out

that Al-Assani admitted to being driven in cars with approximately BS8U't'

fifty other men to Tora Bora. JE 1~ at 4; JE 21 at 2.

It seems exceedingly unlikely that Usama Bin Laden would, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, when he was probably

the most hunted man in the world, calIon an unknown, brand-new

recruit with two weeks of rifle training to serve as his bodyguard.

at *12-14. Moreover, certain identification--such as the statement that details of

Bin Laden's bodyguards had "specialized training"--do not appear to

fit what is known about AI-Assani. Finally, as Petitioner points

out, there is some question as to· credibility. First,

there is no indication of what personal knowledge he had of who was

concludes that the Government's evidence, an identification

contained in a· single paragraph and made on the basis of a

photograph, does not make it more likely than not that Al-Assani

served as Usama Bin Laden's bodyguard.

5. Role at Tora Bora, Injury, and Capture The Government claims that Petitioner's conduct after leaving UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE QHeRS'!

Al Farouq and upon arriving at Tora Bora demonstrates that it is

more likely than not that he was a. part of or substantially

supported al-Qaida. Petitioner stated in interrogations that he the commander

and a group of fifty' other men, led by

of Al Faroug, left Al Farouq by car in the middle of his training.

The group stopped for one night at the al-Nebras guesthouse in

Kandahar, and for a second night at a guesthouse in Kabul. OUtside

of Kabul, they were taken to an area with little construction,

where AI-Assani stated he received additional training ^[19] on the

Kalashnikov and on ~long-distance walking" for ten to fifteen days.

Gov's Strnt. of Undisputed Facts ~ 51-52; JE 14 at 4-5.

AI-Assani was then driven to a forested area around Jalalabad, where _informed the gro~p of the events of September 11, 2001.

Petitioner does not deny that, by this point, he knew that Al

Farouq was "sponsored" by Usama Bin Laden. Gov'S Stmt. of

Undisputed Facts 53. After one or two days, the group drove

Brian Spahn, at the Merits Hearing, Mr. Spahn declared that AI­ ^[19] In a sworn declaration submitted by Al-Assani' s counsel,

Assani stated on January 4, 2010 that he did not receive any

additional training after Al Faroug. JE 61. While this Court

agreed to admit Mr. Spahn's sworn declaration, over the

Government's objection, it did so with the understanding that it

would be evaluated for its reliability and credibility, just as any

other piece of evidence would be. Given the lack of detail

supporting Petitioner's last-minute claim, especially when compared

to the detail supporting his previous account, the late hour at

which Petitioner chose to raise this claim, and the lack of

opportunity for the Government to test or respond to this evidence,

the Court will credit the account given in JE 14.

UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 888M'!

through Jalalabad to Tara Bora, where they were split into groups

of eight to ten people. JE 14 at 5~

Al-Assani stated in interrogations that his "group leader" or, according to other accounts, "commander," was Azuber I although

Abdel Kadus remaine~ in charge of the group as a whole. Id. at 5;

JE 21 at 2. AI-Assani gave a detailed description of the

commanders of different camps at Tora Bora, indicating his position

as an al-oaida foot solder. JE at 2-3. He also reportedly

stated that when he arrived at Tora Bora, "positions were already

dug," and that "his g~oup was used to augment the groups already in

place in Tora Bora." ^[20] Id. at 2.

Of significance is the account of another Guantanamo Bay detainee,

stated in an interrogation that he was assigned to_un i t ,

and, although he did not name AI-Assani as a member of his unit, he

claimed their role was "to fight against the Northern Alliance" on

the front line of Tara Bora. According tolllllllll each position on the front line consisted of about fifteen fighters. JE 10 at 3.

al Qaida forces already in defensive positions in Tora Bora, ^[20] Petitioner denied being "assigned to augment Taliban and

Afghanistan" at his 2005 Administrative Review Board proceeding.

In response to that allegation, he said that his purpose in being

in Afghanistan "was not to be with the Taliban or the al Qaida."

JE 36 at 2. Considering the Government's evidence as a whole,

however, it appears more likely than not that Petitioner knowingly

and intentionally did augment al-Qaida forces at Tora Bora.

UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SS@M"!' At some point, Azuber told Petitioner that a withdrawal of

troops was taking place from the North. From his location at Tora

Bora, AI-Assani, who was armed with a Kalashnikov rifle,2l watched

people moving below him on the mountains. When the bombing began,

IIIIIIIImoved the group on foot to Pakistan. On the way, they met

up with "other groups of soldiers," and _h ad them split into

two groups. JE 14 at 5j JE 20 at 2. Al-Assani was injured after

his group was bombed, he was escorted and turned over· to Afghani

forces, and eventually--after over a month of recuperation in a

hospital--was turned over to u.s. custody.22

Petitioner claims that the evidence fails to establish that he was a part of al-Qaida. In the words ot Petitioner's counsel,

"(b]y the time Mr. Al-Assani learned that al-Farouq was run by al- Qaida, he had surrendered his passport and his money, and had no

n AI-Assani admitted before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal that he had a weapon in Tora Bora, but said he had no

bullets. JE 35 at 3. However, Mr. Spahn declared that AI-Assani

stated on January 4, that he was offered a weapon without

bullets at Tara Bora, but declined. JE 61. For the reasons given

above, the Court will credit Petitioner's prior statement at the

ARB, and not those contained in Joint Bxhibit 61.

that his leaving Tora Bora was an effort to dissociate himself from ^[22] The Court does not find credible Petitioner's statement

al-Qaida and/or the Taliban. ~ Pet.'s Mot. at 14. Al-Qaida had

begun to retreat from Tora Bora weeks before, and Petitioner left

when his commander, Azuber, told him to, following his instructions

to split into two groups. While it may be true that Petitioner

wanted to flee out of fear for his life, he made no effort to

abandon his position or leave the al-Qaida command structure. UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE means of transporting himself out of Afghanistan. Thus, when he

and his training class were taken to Tora Bora, he had no choice but to go along. He was not willingly accepting and executing

orders." Pet.'s Response to Gov's Mot. for J. on Record at 16.

While it might be true that Al-Assani had a practical motive in deciding to remain with his group and to accept and execute

Azuber's orders, the legal inquiry remains whether he functioned or

participated within the command structure of the organization, not

why he did BO. In addition, there is some doubt as to whether

Petitioner was truly seeking to flee the country, as there is no

evidence that he attempted to retrieve his passport from al-Nebras

during his stay there after leaving Al Farouq. Indeed, there is

only one indication that Al-Assani ever wanted to retrieve his

belongings: in his 2005 ARB proceeding, he said that he wanted to

go back to get his passport, but never did. JE 36 at 4. In any

event, while abandoning the group might have been dangerous and

difficult, there is no evidence that he made any attempt to do so

or that he had any choice in the matter. In sum, the Government's evidence supports the conclusion that it is more likely than not that Al-Assani was both a member of al­

Qaida and executing al~Qaida's orders. After realizing that Al

Farouq was sponsored by Usama Bin Laden. Petitioner continued to

travel under the leadership of camp commander Abdel Kadus. Cf.

UNCLASSIFIEOliFOR PUBLIC RELEASE sasy'l'

~, 2010 WL 58965, at *11 (finding that voluntary association

with al-Qaida members after leaving Al Farouq supported denial of

habeas petition). He was able to provide concrete details about

the "leaders" or "commanders" at Tora Bora. He--as well as every

other individual in his group--was armed with a Kalashnikov rifle.

He followed Azuber's directions to join groups of varying sizes at

different points in his travel. Finally, he was told in advance

that al-Qaida forces were retreating while he was armed. It is not

credible that the al-Qaida leadership would inform Al-Assani of the

retreat in advance unless he was a part of the organization. ^[2] ) See,

~, id., at *13 (finding it "telling" that al-Qaida behaved as

though the petitioner were a member) .

In addition, the Court concludes that it is more likely than not that Al-Assani was following orders when he traveled from place

240 (D.D.C. 2009), stands for the proposition that a petitioner's ^[23] Petitioners claim that Hammamy v. Obama, 604 F. Supp. 2d

"mere presence" at Tora Bora is insufficient to support detention.

Pet.'s Mot. at 11. To the contrary, in Hammamy, the Court denied

the writ after having concluded that, in light of petitioner's prior connection to terrorist organizations, the mere fact that his

identity papers were recovered at Tora Bora was SUfficient to

establish his presence there. Because the Court found that Hammamy was present at Tora Bora, it. concluded that it was more probable

than not that he was part of or supporting Taliban or al-Qaida

forces.

In any event, this case is a far cry from Hammamy. AI-Assani has not only admitted to his presence at Tora Bora, but the

evidence establishes much more than "mere presence"; it gives a detailed account of what Petitioner was doing, and with whom he was

associating, at the time. UNCl:ASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 8118."

to place with Kadus and Azuber. Cf. id. (finding that petitioner

participated within al-Qaida command structure by attending

training camp and following orders from instructors). That armed

al-Qaida leaders would merely "ask" that Petitioner accompany them,

arm him with a Kalashnikov rifle, or assign him to different groups

of armed men without any expectation of AI-Assani's compliance or

of his support in future hostilities is not credible. Cf. Mohammed

v. Obama, No. 05-1347, 2009 WL 4884194, at *11 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,

2009). In~, JUdge Hogan relied in part on the fact that al­

Qaida treated the petitioner "as reliable and as a member" in

concluding that the Government had shown it more likely than not

that he was a member of al-oaida at the time of capture.

See Transcript of Oral Ruling at 51, Allam v. Obama, No. 04-1194

(D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2009). Similarly, al-Qaida provided AI-Assani

with training, permitted him to be in close prOXimity to Usama Bin

Laden, and housed, ted, and armed him throughout his journey to

Afghanistan, travel to Tora Bora, and retreat to Pakistan. When

combined with the Government's other evidence, the fact that

Petitioner was clearly accepted by al-Qaida, at a minimum, as a

substantial supporter of the organization further supports the

conclusion that it is more likely than not that Petitioner

knowingly was a part of or substantially supported al-Oaida.

UNCLASSIFIEDJlFOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNCLASSIFIEOIfFOR PUBLIC RELEASE BB8M'i'

IV. CONCLUSION

TO summarize, the Government has met its burden of demonstrating that Petitioner was recruited by al-Qaida members in

Yemen, that he subsequently traveled--at no cost to himself, and

through al-Qaida-associated guesthouses--to Afghanistan, that he

received military training at al-Qaida's Al Farouq camp, that while

at the camp he became aware of its connection to al-Qaida and Usama

Bin Laden but did not dissociate himself from camp commanders or

al-Qaida, that he left Al Farouq and received further training tram

Al Farouq leaders, that he traveled to Tora Bora under the command

of and _ that he obeyed orders intended to

organize his group into distinct units, and that, after leaving

Tora Bora under_command, he was injured by Coalition bombs

and captured.

First, the Government has established that it is more likely than not that Petitioner knew he was associating with al-Qa1da.

Petitioner's travel was conducted in a tightly controlled and

clandestine manner, he trained for two weeks at Al Farouq, and he

admits that he knew the camp was sponsored by Usama Bin Laden

before arriving at Tora Bora. Second, the Government has carried

its burden of proof with regard to Petitioner's membership in or

substantial support of al-Qaida. The touchstone inquiry in

determining whether an individual is a part of the Taliban or al­

UNCLASSIFIEOflFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 8J!e!ftB!'

Qaida is Uwhether the individual functions or participates within

or under the command structure of theorganization--i.e" whether

he receives and executes orders or directions." Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 68-69. The Government has shown that it is more likely

than not that Petitioner followed orders from the al-Qaida

leadership when he traveled to Tora Bora and, under the leadership

or command of _ followed orders to join certain units of

soldiers and travel with them until he was wounded by Coalition

bombing.

For all the reasons discussed herein, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. /s/

February __ I 2010 Gladys Kessler United States District Judge Copies to: Attorneys of Record via ECF

Case Details

Case Name: Al-Adahi v. Obama

Court Name: District Court, District of Columbia

Date Published: Mar 10, 2010

Citation: 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21954

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2005-0280

Court Abbreviation: D.D.C.