Akron Standard Division of Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Raymond Donovan, Secretary of U.S. Department of Labor

return prepared. 1977 tax Petitioner independent had no income of her own required which would have that she file a separate return. Therefore, peti hold we particular tioner did not intend tax own, return only- to be her because the petitioner return intended to file was a husband,

joint signed her return and the return, party sign failure of either to sign petition authorize someone it for er, renders it as to petitioner. invalid Since the Tax other did not Court consider these factors, we find that the Tax Court clearly determining was petitioner erroneous joint intended to file this return. above, For the reasons set forth AF- we FIRM the Tax Court with respect to the 1976 tax deficiencies REVERSE with

respect to the 1977 tax deficiencies. This accordingly case is pro- REMANDED for

ceedings consistent opinion. with this

AKRON STANDARD OF DIVISION INDUSTRIES,

EAGLE-PICHER

INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, DONOVAN,

Raymond Secretary of U.S. Labor,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 84-3650. Appeals, States

United Court Circuit.

Sixth Aug. 26,

Argued

Decided Jan. days for suspended alleged

was for five disobey- and absence from his work station ing by orga- Palmer reacted instructions. nizing a wildcat strike at Lectromelt. He discharged together was then with other strikers. then filed two complaints, Palmer one with and the other the OSHA with (NLRB) National Board Labor Relations asserting Lectromelt had suspended him him in and later had fired retaliation complaint for his and his safety union activ- ity.1 During the course of their several independent investigations, OSHA and witnesses, NLRB interviewed number including Palmer’s former fellow employ- investigator, ees. The OSHA accordance procedures, with usual was allowed access file, including to the NLRB case summaries Sweeney, Atty., Emily testimony M. Asst. U.S. of witnesses interviewed (ar- Cleveland, investigator. Frank A. the Ohio. Rosenfeld Board OSHA declined to Schaitman, prosecute Palmer’s retaliation gued), complaint, Leonard Div., Staff, but the for the Justice, Appellate Wash- General Counsel NLRB Civil accepted complaint pend- his which is still D.C., ington, defendant-appellant. for ing agency.2 with that (argued), Bickett David H. L. James During the course of the NLRB Shaffer, investi- Stephen Spolar, Joondeph B. & gation requested Akron Standard Akron, Ohio, Shaffer, plaintiff-appellee. for investigatory OSHA its entire disclose file WELLFORD, MERRITT and Cir- Before under the Freedom of Information Act CELEBREZZE, Judges; and cuit Senior (FOIA). declined to disclose this Judge. Circuit ground that information on the pending with the NLRB interfere WELLFORD, Judge. Circuit proceedings the and invade of the Palmer, employee to in the file those Hollis at that time an individuals referred Casting Machinery and Com- who furnished information OSHA. Lectromelt (Lectromelt) response appeal, and of the un- to Akron Standard’s the pany chairman committee, (parent complaint agency filed a of Labor safety ion OSHA) documents, Safety and Admin- disclosed a number of Occupational Health file, portions of (OSHA), charging safety but withheld some istration certain Akron, (1) again claiming privacy and interference plant. violations at Ohio investigation, (2) plant with the NLRB inspectors cited the for several agency violations, shortly opinions need to internal Palmer afterward was, anyone drops who time tromelt to reinstate at the of the incidents Lectromelt 11, 1984, here, complaint. April panel of Akron Standard Division of a division NLRB On Industries, Eagle-Picher finding but Standard Akron ALJ’s the NLRB affirmed the discharge. shortly plant after Palmer’s sold suspension for cause but it remanded the Standard, however, remains one Akron case for determination further complaint. parties named in Palmer's NLRB Act, discharge Labor later violated the Relations holding offer the reinstatement did not (ALJ) Judge Law dismissed An Administrative he since turned the moot Palmer's (1) finding suspen complaint, that Palmer’s remand, the ALJ offer On found that down. for cause and was not retaliation sion was lawfully discharged and he has Palmer was (2) activity related or union again appealed to the Board. once discharge propriety now issue over buyers of Lec because of an offer moot (The recommendations and the identities of administrative internal memorandum exemption sources. is not subject confidential appeal.) Labor Shortly before the is- the company’s appeal, its decision on sued I. Employee’s Job Per- Information suit in Akron Standard filed district court 7(C) formance — FOIA, seeking of the under disclosure Secretary contends under of portions the In withheld OSHA file. Exemption 7(C) claimed pri- the individual’s suit, response the of to the vacy interest must against be balanced the by filed an affidavit Sofia Petters Labor P. public’s interest in disclosure. In the Labor, the of the Office of Solicitor of case, noted, present he Palmer claimed that setting history forth of the the case company the against had retaliated him for Department’s justification for with- the its filing safety complaint, despite the em- holding of parts some of the file. She ployee’s right complaint to file a without explained that the full file had located been suffering doing discrimination for so under newly that “the vast of the 11(c) of Occupational Section the Safety discovered documents will be released.” Act, 660(c).3 and Health 29 U.S.C. § added, however, portions She some Secretary deleted por- not would be disclosed. The withheld information which interpreted could be to categories: (1) fell tions into three internal unfavorably upon complainant’s reflect memoranda, for which the performance, performance as well the 552(b)(5); Exemption claimed U.S.C. § others, performance in of terms of the of (2) their Employees work. have an extreme- (which competence gathered was in order ly significant privacy interest in matters disciplined to determine he this____ such as poor job

and dismissed perform- public the in As for ance), disclosure to 7(C), for which Exemption it claimed against privacy interest, be balanced this 552(b)(7)(C) (the 5 U.S.C. law enforce- § Secretary’s representative the stated: (3) exemption); ment the identi- witnesses, employee ties of some of the essentially here Plaintiff has stated that given each whom was the standard writ- purpose the for which it seeks the infor- assurance ten that his be supplement discovery mation to its or confidential, kept agency for which the use otherwise the information in the un- 7(D), claimed practice proceeding fair labor currently 552(b)(7)(D). upon are to de- pending called before the NLRB. Interests the propriety cide these two repeatedly recog- latter such as this have been exemptions appeal public claimed to court. to nized be ones and 660(c): appropriate. investiga- 3. 29 U.S.C. § such deems tion, If (c)(1) Secretary provi- person any determines that the discharge No shall inor violated, against any employee manner of this discriminate sions subsection have been he employee any bring any because such appropriate had filed com- shall an action in Unit- plaint or instituted or caused to be instituted against person. ed States district such court any proceeding chap- under or related to this any such action the United States district any testify ter or has or is testified about to jurisdiction, courts shall have for cause proceeding such because or of the exercise (1) paragraph to shown restrain violations employee such on behalf of others himself or appropriate of this subsection and order all any right chapter. afforded including rehiring or relief reinstatement of (2) Any employee who he believes that has employee position with his former back discharged or otherwise discriminated pay. against by any person in of this violation (3) receipt days Within 90 of a com- may, thirty days subsection such within after plaint filed under this subsection the Secre- occurs, violation file a with the tary notify complainant of his deter- shall Secretary alleging Upon such discrimination. (2) paragraph under of this subsec- mination receipt complaint, Secretary of such shall tion. cause such to be as he made nom., Clark, Kiraly v. cert. denied sub weight given no accordingly have been 7(C). 104 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d under balance Scientology v. (1984) (citing Church nondis- public interest Since “the (9th Defense, 611 F.2d 738 U.S. disclosure, closure, of such informa- not the Cir.1979)). put way, it another To tion,” position Secretary took exemption, it “privacy” narrowly con- claiming exemptions are FOIA Congress’ intent to legislative would frustrate strued in accordance with complaints to reveal employees who file purpose Congress rath- to Akron Standard. this information objective secrecy is the dominant er than of the Act. (by access to whether We look others) constitutes Akron Standard Rose, the Air Force v. Department of respect job per invasion 1592, 1598-99, 352, 360-61, 96 S.Ct. complaining employee. formance in Radowich v. (1976), cited L.Ed.2d 11 pri that Palmer’s Secretary The contends 957, Attorney, 658 F.2d 965 to be invaded because vacy interests would (4th Cir.1981). perform job disclose information about establishing The burden of an ex Palmer to embarrass might subject ance furthermore, upon emption, is the Secre impact adverse might have an ment or tary. Kiraly, 728 F.2d at 276. In discuss upon by language relied upon him. The ing exemption this court discussed this 7(C), Exemption Secretary in investigative material involved 552(b)(7)(C),is that disclosure would “con § “intimacy” or revelation of the kind where person invasion of an unwarranted stitute subject might involved of information language of this subsec privacy.” The al 277, Id. at danger,” party “physical to to 6, Exemption of very to that tion similar retribution,” 278, Id. at “potential once it exempt 552(b)(6), 5 U.S.C. § personal priva first that a was established nature where personal a “information of course, cy Kiraly,4 existed. of interest clearly un a disclosure would constitute investigative gathered involved privacy.” personal of warranted invasion racketeering of a and murder in the course has been language Exemption of 6 The involving some investigation; a situation personal matters in apply construed to to compelling con sensitive and what more health, “person’s volving things as a such present, and there than those here cerns drinking financial circumstances.” habits or the information recognized the court Regulatory Nuclear Cause v. Common nature and its revela was of a confidential Commission, (D.C.Cir. 921, 938 674 F.2d an unwarranted inva tion would constitute 1982). That case observed also district court personal privacy. The sion of 6, Exemption personal privacy exemption, its determination adequate had an basis for shelter substandard “was not intended to appropriate here and that disclosure was 938, although performance,” 674 F.2d at privacy. do not of not an invasion govern considering there a the court was Secretary that agree with the rather than job performance ment official’s “com the circumstances was interest under party’s job performance. merely it claimed because pelling” as may be Cause Common rationale of above to reflect unfavor interpreted “could be priva analogous to somewhat Ap performance.” ably upon Palmer. exemption [Palmer’s] claimed as to cy here Brief, 14. The thrust pellant’s p. “as a matter acknowledged We have before an OSHA viola respect to man principle, that the FOIA general of Palmer’s Kiraly broad disclosure.” policy dates a of Ak- upon whether F.B.I., (6th Cir.1984), but rather 273, performance 276 v. 728 F.2d 1222, (1979); Dept. 71, (2d F.B.I., Stein v. L.Ed.2d 459 59 658 F.2d 75 4. See also Brown 1245, (7th (8th F.B.J., F.B.I., Cir.1981); 1260 Cir. F.2d 620 F.2d 662 Kuehnert Justice (8th F.B.I., 1980); 1981). 587 F.2d 372 Cir. Cir.1978), Librach v. denied, S.Ct. cert. guilty press Standard was promise ron violations of confidentiality cir- or in pertaining related standards cumstances from which such an assur- safety in workplace. to Under the cir- ance reasonably could be inferred.” here is no compelling cumstances there in- 93-1380, Conf.Rep. No. 93rd 2nd Cong., under the FOIA terest claimed (1974). Sess. 13 Radowich v. United 7(C) protect regard quali- to Palmer to States Attorney, District Maryland, ty performance.5 his work (4th Cir.1981); 658 F.2d 959-60 Justice, Lame v. 654 F.2d important here note that It (3d Cir.1981); other [and job performance cases]. quality had fully explored public proceedings L Transport, & C Marine Ltd. v. United heretofore, the NLRB before and there is States, (11th 923-24 Cir. remaining juncture basis little at 1984). broadly exemption the claimed un- construe Exemption 7(D) government allows the der these These circumstances. matters deny any disclosure law enforcement effectively issues have come into the records when disclosure would “disclose through prior hearings domain of a confidential source.” testimony of some of the witnesses who 552(b)(7)(D).6 U.S.C. The district court’s gave public’s information to OSHA. recognize 7(D) refusal to the nature case, based on what he characterized as the extent agency’s investigation routine and conditional nature of the confi charge of insignifi- retaliation is neither dentiality grant based on the fact that weight” by cant or of “no as claimed the investigation the completed, ap had been Secretary, and we conclude that the or- pears contrary to be to the of reasoning by dered the district court was number of other courts that have the faced clear error. question. same L & C Marine Transport, Ltd., Tower, supra; Marshall, Inc. v. T.V. Identity II. Employees Who Gave In- of Borton, F.Supp. (D.D.C.1978); 444 1233 7(D) Exemption formation — OSHA, (E.D.La. F.Supp. Inc. v. 1420 566 of Labor also with 1983); Corp. v. Steel United States from held disclosure the names of several Dept. Labor, (W.D.Pa. F.Supp. 558 80 Akron employees Standard’s former who 1983); Miles v. La United States provided had to information OSHA or to bor, (M.D.Pa.1982); F.Supp. 546 Lloyd 437 NLRB provision the under a standard form Marshall, Henniger & F.Supp. 526 485 their kept that identities be would confiden (M.D.Fla.1981). pursue the We therefore tial. This material was withheld under Ex inquiry beyond by the basis stated trial 7(D), emption which allows information in judge. enforcement law files to be withheld if its production would identity “disclose the of a The Secretary, apparently by inadvert- confidential source.” U.S.C. ence, em- revealed the names of several 552(b)(7)(D). The Secretary may show ployee-witnesses summary of their a worker provides that who information to statements, but has not disclosed their is a confidential source statements. There remain undisclosed

by proving employee-wit- either names and that statements other witnesses provided ness category. information “under an ex- reiterate, time, F.B.I., by agency. 5. We at the same claimed See Brown v. observation this court and others that FOIA is not to F.2d at be merely private litigant utilized of a benefit purely personal reveal dispute does not Akron Standard government investigation, obtained in a nor do Ex- records at issue meet threshold test for accept we Akron Standard’s contention that "investigatory emption they be 7 that records merely because the and file compiled purposes.” enforcement for law exemption may proper is closed that a 552(b)(7). not be U.S.C. § whether, easy under the cir- davit shows that it would be too must decide figure this case to out who made each cumstances, of these witnesses’ production so few revealing their names statement because witnesses without statements confidentiality many of their involved and because too were destroy the 7(D). unique would be found in each Exemption details identity under statement. acknowledged in re court The district Brief, Appellant’s p. 23. Radowich v. See 7(D) that information spect (4th Attorney, 658 F.2d 957 express implied guaran given under citing Cir.1981). confidentiality may protected, tee of Attorney, v. United States dowich only remaining Since the issue with re- Ra Cir.1981). (4th See also 7(D) spect to claimed relates to F.2d at 925 Transport, 740 L Marine & C remaining statements of wit- information, given in confi n. 8. Such identities have not already nesses whose dence, protected even after the may remain may be “safely” been disclosed edited so closed, extent to the investigative file is particular source of the statement giv confidentiality not waived divulged, disposed will not be we are testimony Rado or otherwise. ing of oral aspect dispute believe Attorney, supra; wich v. United States remanded to the should be district court. F.B.I., F.B.I., supra; Kiraly v. Brown It should determine whether redaction of supra. effectively may each statement be accom- plished yet identity still that, wit- held since The district court confidentiality. the witness and his or her already testified nesses had remand is directed with the observa- This (per- the Board charges before occasion), of statements of tion the content wit- one the asser- haps on more than divulged has protect their iden- nesses whose confidentiality already into account supportable, taking into ac- should be taken tity was not carrying out the remand investigation. It is district court count the nature together clear that witnesses here involved with our decision also Exemp- fear retaliation from of Palmer under privacy have no basis to interests company 7(C) has Akron Standard since under these circumstances do not tion in the long disposed since of its interests shield from disclosure that question. in remand to the dis- plant may job performance. relate to his which consideration, how- court for further trict eliminated from the mate- There should be ever, directing the aspect of his order under rial turned over to Akron-Standard of the statements of witnesses 7(C) 7(D) Exemptions comments of em- identity has not revealed. workplace, whose of the ployees about the primary purpose of the was the which in its brief that The Board concedes investigation. L & C Marine See 7(D) provides informa- 740 F.2d at 923. Transport, in provided by a confidential source tion then, particular criminal, summary, under the civil, investi- opposed as to a a case we find the dis- only if circumstances of this its disclo- gation can be withheld personal conclusion that of the trict court’s reveal sure would Exemp- under privacy exemption claimed Ordinarily, that would mean source. 7(C) proved applicable is has not been of the portion at least a statement erroneous, and that the statements released, long as outsiders not so could be made identity has been witnesses whose to determine who the would not be able furnished should be known and summaries studying the edited was from source Akron because Here, over to Standard the full texts of the turned statement. 7(D) effectively been has been with- statements have witnesses’ remaining statements held, As to no edited version waived. but because remand this as- witnesses we affi- undisclosed safely released. The Petters can controversy added). pect of the to the district court question in this case is wheth- to decide in camera whether these state- er Palmer has privacy a may investigatory ments be redacted to the iden- records which relate to his tity persons competency. Although of the who furnished this in- “personal pri- vacy” FOIA, is not defined formation to OSHA. legislative history analogous “clearly CELEBREZZE, Judge, Senior Circuit unwarranted invasion of privacy” concurring part part. dissenting exemption 552(b)(6), of Section 552(b)(6)(1982), is of some aid in deter- I II part majority’s opin- concur mining parameters privacy interests However, ion. since I that the ma- believe protected 552(b)(7)(C). by Section The Sen- incorrectly jority concludes that Palmer Report between, ate drew distinction investigatory lacks a interest in the health, example, “For welfare and selective compiled by Occupational records Safe- service highly personal records are [which] (OSHA), ty and Health Administration I involved, persons to the facts con- [and] respectfully part majori- dissent to I of the cerning pension the award of a or benefits ty’s opinion. should be disclosed public.” to the [which] case, The focus of this as 813, S.Rep. No. Cong., 89th 1st Sess. 9 indicates, records which OSHA (1965). Congress prevent intended to compiled during investigation to discern disclosure of “intimate details” whose reve- discharged by whether Palmer was his em- might lation harm a individual. ployer, Casting Machinery Lectromelt H.Rep. Cong., No. 89th 2d Sess. (Lectromelt), Company a division of Akron reprinted Cong. in 1966 U.S.Code & Ad. Eagle-Picher Standard Division of Indus- Thus, News objective data (Akron Standard), filing previous tries place birth, birth, “such as date of date OSHA, resulted in marriage, employment history ... citing Lectromelt for several viola- normally regarded highly personal.” as tions, or for absenteeism and refusal State orders, obey purported. Lectromelt Af- Co., 595, 600, Washington Post completing investigation, ter its OSHA de- 1957, 1960, (1982); 102 S.Ct. 72 L.Ed.2d 358 pursue clined to the matter. The General Washington see Post Co. United States Counsel of the National Relations Labor Health and Human Ser- (“NLRB”), however, Board determined af- vices, (D.C.Cir.1982)(dis- ter its charges against to file past closure of list of employers only raises Lectromelt under the National Rela- Labor interests). “minimal” On the other Act; proceedings tions those pend- are still hand, subjective perform- evaluations of ing. Standard, Akron subsequently, re- ance, disciplinary records, like impor- raise quested the disclosure of the documents privacy Department tant concerns. See compiled during investigation OSHA’s un- Rose, 352, the Air Force v. 96 der the Freedom of Information Act 1592, (1976). 48 11 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (FOIA), (1982). 5 U.S.C. 552 The district § This case concerns remarks made to granted court request Akron Standard's investigators by Palmer’s co-work reasoning for disclosure that Palmer lacked pertaining performance. ers to his job any cognizable “privacy interest” under Subjective job by employ evaluations made 552(b)(7)(C), 552(b)(7)(C) Section 5 U.S.C. § clearly Ripskis ers raise concerns. (1982),in investigatory files. Department Housing v. De and Urban Investigatory compiled records for 1, (D.C.Cir.1984) law velopment, 746 3 F.2d purposes enforcement exempt curiam); are from dis- (per Dry Corp. Associated Goods NLRB, (S.D.N.Y. closure under the 802, FOIA the extent that F.Supp. v. 455 815 production their 1978); would “constitute an un- Depart v. Celmins warranted privacy.” Treasury, invasion ment Internal Revenue Ser 552(b)(7)(C) (1982) vice, (D.D.C.1977); (emphasis F.Supp. 457 17 see

575 Rose, 425 at 96 S.Ct. at 1606 not U.S. intended to per- shelter substandard ” (disclosure of of ... an “evaluations by formance government work executives. interests). performance” raise Cause, Common 674 F.2d (emphasis 938 at Likewise, concerning an em added). The holding court’s regard ployee’s individual career has de supported by Report the Senate which raising “weighty” privacy inter scribed 552(b)(6) indicated that Section should not Packing ests. Columbia Co. United interpreted be to shield discussions con- Agriculture, 417 States cerning competency government of a (D.Mass.1976), F.Supp. aff’d, 563 Cause, official. Common 674 F.2d at 938. (1st Cir.1977); F.2d 495 see Core v. United contrast, the case at bar concerns not Service, Postal 948-49 States private a employee but also lower- (4th Cir.1984) (list appli of unsuccessful private employee. level See Common 522(b)(6)). protected by cants The Section Cause, (Section F.2d at 552(b)(6) protecting rationale for information of this “provides greater protection private indi- type sensitivity any human be “[t]he government viduals ... and to lower-level ing may to disclosure of information that Further, employees”). legislative no histo- compe taken to on his or her bear basic ry indicates that discussions á NLRB, tence.” Detroit Edison Co. v. private employee’s lower-level job proficien- 301, 318, 1123, 1132, 99 S.Ct. 59 cy protection is outside the of Section (1979). Further, performance L.Ed.2d 333 552(b)(7). Finally, the District of Columbia inherently subjective are evaluations Appeals Court of has not extended the ambiguous; people may reasonable differ holding of Common Cause to discussions employee doing job, well an how pertaining to the competency depending factors, upon output, like employees. Ripskis attitude, punctuality, the evaluator Housing Development, and Urban significant. deems the most Considered (D.C.Cir.1984). F.2d 1 majority’s re- light, distinguish I no see basis to upon is, liance according- Common Cause employer’s between and a co-worker’s ly, without merit. job performance. evaluation of Comments Next, reasons that since performance upon job employers either job competency fully Palmer’s has been co-employees inherently subjective, are explored prior proceeding, at a NLRB these biased, possibly likely to cause embar public matters are within the domain. The injury upon rassment or economic disclo issue, majority’s entire discussion of this I Accordingly, sure. believe that com however, begins with the incorrect asser- pertaining ments co-workers to a co that, “The investigation thrust of the job performance worker’s raise substantial respect to an OSHA violation Nevertheless, privacy interests. major upon job performance was not Palmer’s but ity concludes that the investigatory files in upon rather whether Akron Standard was disclosed, this case relying upon should be guilty of violations of safety related NRC, Common Cause v. 674 F.2d 921 pertaining standards in the work- (D.C.Cir.1982), reasoning fact, place.” In OSHA’s con- NLRB proceedings put have discharged cerned whether Palmer was competency domain. filing complaint with OSHA or was fired majority’s reliance Common obey for absenteeism and failure to orders. misplaced. Cause is Common Cause con- Consequently, the crux Regula- cerned a decision the Nuclear job performance. was Palmer’s tory meetings Commission to hold closed majority The concerning contends that since Palm- agency’s budget. Common Cause, job competency fully explored er’s has been 674 F.2d at 923. The District of NLRB, Appeals held that before the these matters are in the Columbia Court of such contention, however, meetings exempt public This were not under Section domain. case, 552(b)(6), issue, reasoning point. the FOIA “was misses the The in this privacy Palmer has a interest isn’t whether job competen- information NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS public, cy which has been made but rather BOARD, Petitioner, privacy Palmer has a interest in is whether relating job performance to his TRANSFER, ALLCOAST INC. and public. has not been made The fact Moving Inc., Storage, Ward statements made Respondents. investigators

to the OSHA have been made public way privacy in no affects Palmer’s No. 84-5961. interest the statements which have not Appeals, United States Court of FBI, Kiraly See public. been made Sixth Circuit. (6th Cir.1984)(“The mere F.2d act testifying at trial therefore should not Argued Oct. open private public disclosure.”); files to Decided Jan. FBI, (2d Brown v. Cir.1981) (“Mr. that, by testifying, Brown’s assertion Shepardson right has waived her

Ms.

privacy is without foundation in law or

logic____ Shep- While it is true that Ms. suppress cannot those

ardson facts which record, public

have a matter of become she right privacy her

retains to other matters.”) majority finally support seeks to its

position by reasoning that “there is no com-

pelling interest” to withhold the informa- 552(b)(7)(C)

tion under Section and that public's interest disclosure con-

“[t]he

cerning agen- the nature and extent of the

cy’s investigation” insignificant. is not problem with these statements is that

they represent balancing between Palm- public’s

er’s interest and the inter- simply

est disclosure. This issue is not

before this Court since the district court any privacy

concluded that Palmer lacked

interest all in at the records. reasons, foregoing

For the I would af- part, part,

firm in reverse in and remand

this case to district court to balance against

interest in disclosure.

Case Details

Case Name: Akron Standard Division of Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Raymond Donovan, Secretary of U.S. Department of Labor

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Jan 8, 1986

Citation: 780 F.2d 568

Docket Number: 84-3650

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.