Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., Cross-Appellees v. City of Akron, Cross-Appellants, Francois Seguin, Intervenors

KENNEDY, Circuit Before LIVELY and GIBSON,* Judge. Judges, District and LIVELY, Judge. Circuit review of appeals consolidated seek These holdings of district court an various constitutionality of challenging action Akron, Ohio City ordinance of the of By its terms the regulates which abortions. 1,May become effective ordinance was to present suit was filed in the and the plain- April on 1978. The district court oper- corporations that tiffs are three Ohio Akron out-patient abortion clinics in ate has abor- physician and a who clinics. The defendants tions at one of the Akron, City mayor and di- are the its police prose- public health and the rector Landsman, Stephan A. Cleveland-Mar- permit- cutor of Akron. The district Law, Cleveland Uni- College shall State group participation as defendants ted Ohio, Cleveland, Beggs, J. Gordon versity, independent “solely in their of intervenors Cleveland, Foundation, of Cleveland ACLU minor capacity parents of unmarried Ohio, cross-appel- plaintiffs-appellants, for daughters child-bearing age.” lees. Opinion I. The District Court Ohio, Haines, Patri- Youngstown, Dennis report- court is opinion The of the district Benshoof, Akron, Ohio, Vance, Janet cia A. (1979), and the ordi- F.Supp. ed at 479 Union, Reproduc- Liberties American Civil reprinted appendix as an nance is City, Rob- Project, New York tive Freedom court concluded that opinion. The district American Campbell, A. App, ert P. Bruce and examined it the ordinance is severable Foundation, Union Ohio Civil Liberties agree We section-by-section basis. Columbus, Ohio, plaintiffs-appel- Inc., for will ordinance is severable and lants, cross-appellees. procedure analysis. in our follow a similar Umbaugh, Segedy & Segedy, Alan G. Ohio, Akron, Umbaugh, for Se- David G.

quin and Black. A. Ohio, Falls, provide The three clinics abortions Bickett, Cuyahoga

James L. Ohio, A. but Akron, during Robert the first trimester Pritt, Robert D. Akron, Wis., willing perform early second trimes- Milwaukee, City of are Destro, so. The permitted if to do ter abortions et al. * by designation. Michigan, sitting Gibson, Benjamin Judge, District of The Honorable F. for the Western United States District Court trimester, usually the abortion will then tri- performed first plaintiff physician performed. of the clinics. There was some evidence abortions at one mester operation of the pa- if described sensed that district court concerning as follows: deci- clinics tient was ambivalent pro- sion, suggest the clinics he would that she return patients for whom range age from services time after she had had some ad- vide their another years approximately for- twelve about ditional time consider alternatives provide years. Two of the clinics ty-five abortion. days (Wednes- three a week abortions on clinics The abortion method used day, Friday, Saturday) the third curettage (D&C). is dilation and suction days a week provides abortions two procedure approximately itself takes (Wednesday Saturday). five minutes. their first con- usually Patients make F.Supp. at 1181/82. with one of the clinics over the tele- tact telephones and indi- phone. If woman B. that she desires an abortion and cates progressed not that her has the will We limit our consideration trimester, beyond the end of the first she constitutionality of ordinance to the Akron appointment for one of given will be an gave due The district court process issues. “procedure days.” patient the the When thoughtful full and consideration to claims day the on the of her arrives at clinic violates plaintiffs that the ordinance ques- appointment is asked certain she sepa- requirement of the First Amendment history about her medical and her tions Equal state and the ration of church and in a pregnancy. participates She also Clause of the Fourteenth Protection with group counseling session counselors rejected We these claims. Amendment respective employed by the clinics. These agree with these conten- the treatment of varying degrees quali- counselors have con- court and with its tions the district none, however, fications, a physician. clusion, repeat will them here.1 session, During counseling group the the plaintiff no district court held that given concern- patients are information validity sev- standing had to contest ing procedure to be Except ordinance. provisions eral them, on information birth control tech- parties specifically appealed have where At niques, and after-care instructions. rulings, standing will not discussed these group of her some time near the close holdings appealed opinion. session, counseling patient each is asked court, general described sign acknowledging a document terms, were as follows: performance of informed consent to the an abortion. 1870.03, requiring all abor- (1) Section patient’s physi- A first contact per- first trimester tions after pro- perform cian who is to the abortion hospitals, was held valid. formed usually cedure occurs when she is taken 1870.04, dealing with abor- (2) Section time, operating into the room. At that viability, was not considered tions after patient’s reviews the medi- plaintiff was found to no court because patient if she has cal chart and asks standing. questions. any performs The doctor then 1870.05, requiring notice to (3) Section рelvic pelvic examination. If the exam- legal guardian of parents or the one of prob- any ination does not reveal medical seeking and consent an abortion and, further, preg- minor lems indicates that the abortion, was held invalid. beyond such an nancy progressed the first 65 L.Ed.2d 784 1. The First Amendment U.S. (1980). district court’s strongly opinion recent reinforced McRae, Supreme Court in Harris Further, (4) 1870.06(A), legislative terest. requiring any in- enactment Section of the woman rights formed written consent seek- which affects narrowly such must be abortion, ing an was held valid.2 express only legitimate drawn to point interest at stake. The first at which (5) 1870.06(B), detailing the in- Section Court identified a required given by formation to be the at- state interest —an interest health of tending physician obtaining consent of approxi- “at woman —was abortion, seeking the woman was held mately the end of the first trimester.” Id. invalid. 93 S.Ct. at 732. after (6) 1870.06(C), requiring Section the at- reviewing Supreme Court decisions subse- tending physician particular to detail quent to Roe district court risks patient’s pregnan- associated with the may impose concluded that a state certain cy technique and the abortion to be em- abortion, limitations to an even ployed, was held valid. trimester, long regu- in the first so as these (7) 1870.07, requiring Section a 24-hour “unduly lations do not burden” the decision- waiting period between the time the con- making process rationally and are related to signed sent per- the abortion is legitimate purpose of the state. This formed, was held valid. following conclusion was summarized (8) 1870.16,requiring Section that the re- language of the district court: mains of an disposed aborted fetus be of in clear, therefore, It becomes from an “a manner,” humane and sanitary was held examination of the cases decided since vagueness. invalid for Roe, that not all of first tri- Testing II. The Standard for providers impermissi- mester abortion Validity of the Ordinance prohibition ble. An absolute of first tri- justified mester abortions could be plaintiffs appeal contend on that the by Likewise, compelling state interest. district court applied an erroneous standard regulations power that afford the to veto testing constitutionality of the vari- preg- a woman’s decision to terminate her ous provisions of the ordinance. Rather nancy supported by compelling must be requiring than City to demonstrate the tion stringent ther a compelling district court failed to necessity subject standards. plaintiffs tested the ordinance the ordinance to the strict various interest of that the district court In short, provisions it is the City, to fur- posi- less gree, with a woman’s L.Ed.2d state interest. See of Central Mo. 67-72, however, 788]. 96 S.Ct. 2831 Regulations v.] require privacy [Planned [at a lesser to a lesser de- 2840-2842, 428 U.S. Parenthood interfere showing ^[52] 49 by the state to withstand constitutional scrutiny required by controlling decisions of Roe, 589, attack: “As Whalen 429 U.S. [v. Court. 869, (1977)] 51 L.Ed.2d 64 makes clear, A. right in Roe v. Wade can be only by considering understood both the acknowledged district court that the woman’s interest and the nature of the pioneering opinion in the field of abortion law, 35 L.Ed.2d fundamental Roe (1973), right 410 U.S. of a speaks 113, 93 in terms of wom 705, ^[2376] Roe], State’s supra 432 U.S. at 2382 ‍​​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍interference with it.” [53 L.Ed.2d ^[464] 484]. Maher 97 S.Ct. [v. an to make an abortion decision in consulta Accordingly, the Court must determine with her regu and holds that degree that each section of Ordinance lations limiting rights fundamental may be Number 160-1978 interferes with a wom- justified only by compelling right, some state in- an’s constitutional in consultation Though 1870.06(B) respect 1870.06(C) ap- sections with to section were 1870.06(A) appealed, pealed opinion. was not it is listed for and are discussed in this clarity, holdings since the as to the related tutionality of the could rest on to terminate statute physician, her to choose with something compelling must than a in- pregnancy. her That interference less state weighed against any be valid state then is no terest. There indication Danforth Final- by such interest furthered section. signif- had that if the intrusions been found necessary to consider the ly, it will be icant, compel- interest less any state than the various sections combined effect all ling one would have served to validate unconstitutional to de- independently not from may them. The most that be inferred impact whether their combined termine slight Danforth is that there are some in- degree of interference results in such may which the make into the trusions right the constitutional at issue during decision-making process, even finding invalidity.22 result in a pregnancy.3 These intru- first trimester “legally significant,” not and do sions are 22Every regulation imposed upon first tri trigger analysis. a further constitutional going impact to have some mester abortions upon Roe, Maher v. 432 U.S. a woman’s to decide to terminate is, pregnancy. any regulation her That (1977), sup- 53 L.Ed.2d 484 offers even less physician’s makes “the work more laborious proposition port than Danforth for the Roe, independent,” or less Whalen constitutionality of the Akron ordinance 605 n. 879 n. is, least, (1977), going to make it L.Ed.2d some standard less de- tested expensive more for woman to effectuate manding state interest. than weight If of a abortion decision. the combined under attack in Maher forbade The statute regulations, independently un number of constitutional, unduly expenditure of for were to serve to make state funds nonther- carry out her burdensome a woman permitting such ex- apeutic abortions while decision, those sections would invalid. plaintiffs penditures for childbirth. at 1200. F.Supp. argued that the statute offended Maher creating im- Clause Equal Protection B. upholding In permissible classification. too We believe the district court read emphasized the Supreme Court statute the decisions of the post-Wade much into the funding statute be- between the differences Supreme In Planned Parenthood Court. restric- and the “drastic” fore it in Maher 52, 428 96 Missouri v. U.S. S.Ct. decision imposed tions on the abortion 2831, (1976), 49 the Court L.Ed.2d 788 at issue Roe v. Wade the statute [410 found, regulation implicitly, at least that a 705, 147], 113, 35 93 L.Ed.2d 432 S.Ct. U.S. requiring sign writ- pregnant woman to a 472, Treat- at 2381-2382. at U.S. ten abortion did not “restrict as two alterna- abortion and ing childbirth patient and her decision preg- dealing with methods tive medical regarding during stage the first to demon- required state was nancy, 66, at pregnancy.” 428 96 S.Ct. at U.S. a rational rela- there was only that strate found, explicitly, 2840. The Court also not to fund decision tionship between Mis- record-keeping requirement its decision abortions and nontherapeutic legally significant “no imposed souri statute over abortions. favor childbirth impact consequence on the abortion deci- in Maher that emphasized repеatedly physician-patient sion or on the relation- funding only with dealt statute Connecticut 81, ship.” Id. at 96 S.Ct. at 2846. any limitations place and did provisions of the Missou- validation of these also, Beal See have an abortion. right to finding that ri statute was based 2366, 438, 53 L.Ed.2d Doe, 432 U.S. into provision an intrusion neither involved McRae, supra. (1977), Harris 464 decision-making process to re- sufficient Maher, pointed out in analysis. As the quire constitutional The decision between direct difference is a basic was not based on a that the consti- “[t]here during ability regulate the first trimester. record-keeping 3. The charac- 80, “ap- at 96 S.Ct. at 2846. 428 U.S. which terized the Court one proach[ed] impermissible limits” of state’s 1204 protected activity decision,

state interference with a “undue burden” on the abortion encouragement is, and state of an alternative whether it is sufficiently narrowly activity legislative policy.” consonant with drawn. (footnote at at 2383 We ap believe the district court omitted). Wade, present In Roe v. as in the plied the test of provision whether a “un case, attempted impose the state “to its will duly burdens” the abortion decision at the by making force of law” it a crime to wrong stage inquiry. of its Once it is found provide pregnant services which a woman is regulation that a constitutes “direct state entitled to receive. Id. at protected interference with a activity,” impinges 2384. Such a statute directly on a Maher, supra, 432 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. at protected activity requires strict scruti- right pregnant here the of a woman ny. The district appears to have ex- abortion, to have an regulation is sub “degree” amined of state interfer- ject then, scrutiny. Only strict provision ence which each of' the Akron process balancing the interest of the imposed statute upon the abortion decision. against the method chosen to deal It is clear that the nature of the interfer- it, “unduly does the burdensome” fac ence must also be examined. Maher does important. tor become Since the state has provide support for the claim that an no compelling during interest the first tri ordinance such as the one now before us mester pregnancy, balancing no is re may be tested aby more lenient standard. quired. If a legally results in a accept We the statements of significant impact consequence on a first Court that its represent later cases do not decision, trimester abortion is invalid. retreat from the Roe v. Wade holding that supra, See Roe v. 410 U.S. at right regulate abortions, state’s Further, though S.Ct. at 732. regu even stage each pregnancy, must rest on a lation stage relate to а of pregnancy legitimate state interest. during which the state has a compelling Roe, g.,E. supra, Maher v. interest, nevertheless, the method chosen to

97 S.Ct. at 2383. effectuate that interest may fail if it un duly burdens the decision to obtain an abor C. tion. As the Carey, Court said in Charles v. Consideration of these decisions leads to (7th 1980), F.2d Cir. “the term the conclusion that a two-step analysis is ‘undue burden’ defines the ultimate consti required. First, the particu- nature of the issue, tutional not merely the threshold re provision lar regulatory must be considered. quirement scrutiny.” for strict If it causes “legally significant no impact or consequence” on the of a Affecting III. Provisions All Abortions woman, in physician, consultation with a We provisions look first at those of the choose to terminate her pregnancy, it does apply abortions, ordinance which not to all raise a constitutional issue. partic- necessarily which include provisions ular those the Missouri statute (written during the first trimester. consent and Our initial in- keeping) record which produced quiry is to any directly determine if of them language Danforth relied upon by here, right pregnant interfere with the defendants of a wom- the entire Maher, physician thrust of the an and her statute in to decide whether were of this she Only kind. provision if the should does obtain an abortion. As the result significant such impact consequence recently reemphasized or Court in Colautti v. Franklin, must a inquiry 379, 387, second be made to 439 determine U.S. 99 S.Ct. whether or the regulatory provision (1979), 58 L.Ed.2d 596 this is in all serves legitimate a respects “up a medical point decision to the interest. If a compelling state important interest is where provide state interests found, must be examined compelling justifications intervention further to imposes determine whether it an

1205 Edwards, (7th 1978); Margaret v.S. Cir. Consent4 A. Parental Notice (E.D.La.1980); 202-03 F.Supp. 488 held sections The district court of Kansas Planned Parenthood Association 1870.05(B) 1870.05(A) notice) and (parental (W.D. Ashcroft, City F.Supp. 483 687 v. Though consent) (parental invalid. Mo.1980). appeal original did not these defendants have done so. holdings, the intervenors Matheson, H. L. v. The decision in argue that the fundamental intervenors of sec requires treatment supra, a different educate, control, nur right parents “to there 1870.05(A). The Utah statute their minor guide the actions of ture and “[n]otify, a if required physician involved is constitu is one which the state children” guardians of the parents or possible, the protect. This tionally empowered is to be upon whom the abortion woman by the Su recognized recently has been is minor or the husband performed, if she with abortion preme in connection Court woman, if she is marriеd.” -U.S. of the 428 U.S. at regulations supra, at-, at 1166-67. Because 2843; Baird, at Bellotti an fifteen- plaintiff in H. L. was unmarried 3035, 3045-46, 622, 637-39, U.S. S.Ct. de- at home and was year old who resided Matheson, (1979); L. v. and H. L.Ed.2d parents decision pendent on her - 1164, 1171, U.S.-, ——, 101 S.Ct. statute was the Utah the Court was (1981). parental While 67 L.Ed.2d 388 ques- when facially unconstitutional rights recognized, the held that were Jus- in her circumstances. tioned one requiring of a provision consent “blanket” two of the and Powell were tices Stewart standing parentis in loco parent person major- up the six members who made imposed as a for abor may not condition ity. separate concurrence these Jus- In during her first tion of an unmarried minor opinion emphasized that tices Danforth, 428 pregnancy. twelve weeks of “whether Utah Court did not decide [the Bellotti, In at 96 S.Ct. at 2843. U.S. burdens unconstitutionally statute] 643, 99 the Court or a minor whose right of a mature minor consequences unique “the nature and noted by paren- would not served best interests which make it of the abortion decision” - -, tal notification.” basis of deference to inappropriate, J., concurring). (Powell, at 1173-74 possible third- parental rights, provide present case are plaintiffs in the pregnant veto the decision of the party over physician. No minor and a abortion clinics to terminate the woman and doctor vаlidity is questioning female patient’s We believe the dis pregnancy. ap intervenors who ordinance. The Akron applied principles these correctly ‍​​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍trict court court of the district 1870.05(B) pealed portion finding unconstitution section 1870.05(A) 1375, 1390 finding invalid Carey, judgment 582 F.2d Wynn al. See having jurisdiction 160-1978, over such minor 4. Akron Ordinance No. Ch. ' pregnant woman. 1870.05 AND NOTICE CONSENT (B) perform physician shall or induce No (A) perform shall or induce No upon pregnant minor woman an abortion an abortion unmarried years age (15) fifteen without under the years age woman under of 18 without having obtained the informed written having given twenty-four (24) first first at least pregnant woman in parents of the minor hours actual notice to one of of this legal guardian pregnant Section 1870.06 accordance with of minor Chapter perform woman to to such and the intention abortion, parent guardian having (1) the informed if can- obtained or such or First parents of or her not be reached a reasonable effort to of one her after written consent her, given having guardian legal find him or without first Section in accordance with seventy-two (72) Chapter, constructive no- least hours or 1870.06 of legal guardi- parents to (2) tice one of the or the pregnant first hav- woman The minor by pregnant having an of the minor woman certified ing from a court an order obtained of mail to last known of one address jurisdiction be her that the abortion over guardian, computed parents from the time or performed induced. or by mailing, is ordered of unless questioned parents daughters, by of are unmarried minor minor who claims to be or emancipated mature or maturity claims that no Neither nor condition with interest, tice would not be in best her we respect emancipation to of these minors is invalid, facially hold cannot the section shown. The decision of the finding 1870.05(A) that section is un leads conclusion that section 1870.- reversed, constitutional is 05(A) is a constitutionally permissible regu B. Informed Consent5 applies lation insofar as it to immature mi parents, nors who live with their are de plaintiffs appealed have not upon pendent emancipat them and are not from the ruling district court’s by marriage or ed otherwise. Until general informed of requirements 1870.05(A) 1870.06(A) of section are is valid. 160-1978, (5) major surgical proce-

5. Akron Ordinance No. That abortion is a Ch. 1870 dure, complica- which can result serious 1870.06 INFORMED CONSENT tions, including hemorrhage, perforated uter- (A) permitted by An abortion otherwise us, infection, disturbances, menstrual sterili- performed only law shall be or induced with ty miscarriage prematurity and and in subse- pregnant the informed written consent of the quent pregnancies; may and that abortion woman, parents legal and of one her or her essentially may leave unaffected or worsen guardian required whose consent is in ac- any existing psychological problems may she 1870.05(B) cordance with Section of this have, and can result in severe emotional dis- Chapter, given freely and without coercion. turbances. (B) In order to insure that the consent for (6) public private That numerous and truly consent, an abortion is informed agencies provide and services are available to upon abortion shall be or induced information, with her birth control and that pregnant she, woman after and one of physician provide her will of her with a list parents legal guardian her or her whose con- agencies such and if the services available required sent is in accordance with Section requests. so she 1870.05(B) Chapter, orally of this have been physician (7) public private That numerous and by attending informed her agencies and services are available assist following facts, signed and have a consent during pregnancy her of and after birth she, acknowledging parent form and. the child, her if she chooses not to have the guardian legal applicable, or where have abortion, keep whether she wishes to her beеn informed as follows: place adoption, child or him or her for and (1) according judgment That to the best provide that her will her with a list attending physician pregnant. her she agencies of such and the if services available (2) elapsed The number of weeks from the requests. so she probable conception time of the of her un- (C) attending physi- At the same time child, pro- born based the information provides required cian the information vided her toas the time of her last men- Section, paragraph (B) shall, of this he period history physical strual or after a and orally, woman, least inform the and appropriate laboratory examination parents legal guardian of her one or her tests. required whose consent is in accordance with (3) That the unborn child a human life 1870.05(B) Chapter, Section of this conception from the moment of and that particular risks associated with her own there been described in detail ana- pregnancy technique and the abortion to be physiological tomical and characteristics of employed including providing her with at particular gestational the point unborn at the general child description least of the medical development subsequent at which time the abor- instructions be followed to the pеrformed, including, recovery, but not abortion in order to insure her safe to, appearance, mobility, provide limited tactile sensi- and shall in addition her such tivity, including perception response, pain, or other information which his own medical function, presence judgment brain and heart in- is relevant to her decision as to organs presence carry ternal and the of external to have an whether abortion or her members. to term. (4) viable, (D) attending physician performing That her unborn child or capable surviving inducing provide preg- and thus outside her the abortion shall womb, twenty-two (22) woman, parents if legal more than weeks or one her nant guardian signing elapsed conception, ap- from the time of the consent form where attending physician legal plicable, duplicate copy and that her obligation has a awith of the consent steps pre- signed her, parents to take all reasonable form one of her legal guardian serve applicable, the life health of her viable unborn where in ac- during (B) Paragraph child the abortion. cordance with of this Section. require- desirability doing of so. Such a that dis- appeal on the defendants contend clearly ment is invalid for first trimester holding section 1870.- trict court erred appears nоt to abortions. The district court entirety. 06(B) They in its unconstitutional the nature of the restric- have considered 1870.- argue subsections within that section, imposed by only the tion but and 06(B) separately considered should be Further, degree. This was error. the dis- which fail to requirements that those state required only trict court that the dem- pass scrutiny, when con- constitutional onstrate a “valid” interest in maternal We individually, sidered should be voided. justification as health section 1870.- properly con- believe the district court 06(C). compelling A state interest must 1870.06(B) and section as a unit sidered support legally significant intru- exist provision set- correctly concluded Finally, into sion the abortion decision. ting specific information forth detailed and compel- assuming even the existence of a pa- given which must be to each abortion interest, ling state the district court failed attending imper- is by physician tient require to demonstrate the defendants requirements of section missible. The 1870.06(C) requirements of section 1870.06(B) regula- impose “restrictions narrowly are drawn to serve that interest. judgment medical of governing tions stated, practice of all three As has been attending physician the pregnant woman’s counseling has for the plaintiff clinics been preg- of respect with to the termination her by persons other than the conducted nancy.” performs the abortion. In the doctor who regulations at 2846. Such restrictions showing that the state’s com- absence of a during first trimester permitted are not health would be pelling interest maternal pregnancy. correctly of The district court by requirement that such counsel- served invalid, 1870.06(B) held section because attending ing physician, this done physician, it would burden the but because is section invalid. its effect would be to encumber the exercise attempting to show the ex- Rather than patient’s constitutionally protected istence of a state interest right “by placing path of obstacles argue that regulation, the defendants the doctor whom she was entitled 1870.06(C) of are rea- requirements section rely for advice in deci- connection unduly burden the abor- sonable and do not Roe, sion.” Whalen v. 604 n. 1870.06(C) We believe section tion decision. n. 51 L.Ed.2d infirmities as section suffers from the same (1977). 1870.06(B). require- impose a It seeks to concluded that section court by compelling unsupported ment which 1870.06(C) a valid state interest serves but the effect of encum- state interest of This sec- health its female citizens. pregnant wom- bering exercise of the counseling attending requires right. an’s constitutional physician and specifies that possible of the individual that some It particular patient of the must advise the 1870.06(B) (C) requirements of sections risks associated with her own See, successfully g., e. could be defended. technique and with the to be em- Margaret v. Carey, supra; S. Charles ployed. The district court determined Edwards, Asso supra; Planned Parenthood rationally could conclude that Ashcroft, supra. City ciation Kansas counseling attending should be done however, written, they have the effect As physician rather than another individual. beyond the valid going far 1870.06(C) impinges per Section 1870.06(A) extending the section judgment attending physi pro medical of the informed missible reach exactly cian way holding the same the dis vision. We affirm the 1870.06(B). 1870.06(B) It make requires the doctor to invalid trict 1870.06(C) is cases, con regardless in all certain disclosures reverse professional judgment his as to the stitutional. own interest The state furthered Waiting Period

C. period requirement insur- waiting is the requires 24-hour wait- 1870.07 a Section ance that a woman’s abortion decision is a ing period between time careful of all made after consideration signs in required woman the consent applicable situ- particular to her facts 1870.06(A) may and the time an abortion important interest ation. This validity performed. upholding In considering the irreversible nature and pri- provision, this the district court relied lasting consequences abor- possible of the marily this court’s decision Wolfe v. tion decision. Schroering, (6th 1976). Cir. F.2d 523 F.Supp. at 1204. acknowledged The district court that there may Desirable as such careful consideration Schroering was no claim Wolfe v. that be, beyond power require. it is state’s particular regulation significantly bur- 785-86; Carey, supra, 627 Charles v. F.2d at process. dened abortion at 526. In Id. Edwards, F.Supp. Margaret supra, S. argue present plaintiffs case the that We reverse at 212-13. waiting period requires an additional section 1870.07 is constitutional. clinic, trip making process more expensive, imposes physical impermissible “Hospital IV. The Second Trimester psychological burdens a woman Only” Requirement seeking abortion, a first trimester and is not every narrowly objec- requires drawn to 1870.03 abor achieve a lawful Section subsequent to tri tive. the end of the first performed mester of to be in a Since section legally 1870.07causes a Wade, In hospital. Roe v. significant impact or consequence on the light present that “in Court found decision, applied abortion it cannot be knowledge,” legitimate medical state’s Assuming first trimester abortions. some expectant interest in the health of the state interest in postponing abortion deci compelling approximate mother became sions, the evidence falls far short estab ly the end first trimester. lishing compelling interest which served at 731. In that decision the requirement. by the The obvious effect of gave specific example as one requirement impose proc is to upon the requirement constitutional obtaining delay ess of an abortion a which subsequent to the abortions first trimester has no medical there Though basis. performed hospitals. Id. period delay evidence before sur plaintiffs’ proof The thrust beneficial, gery is often none there was proce- present case was to the effect an inflexible of 24-hour wait (D dure as dilatation known and evacuation ing period any an abortion serves inter E), requires & a reexamination of certain state, est of the much less a assumptions of the Roe v. Wade. required interest which is under strict scru they argue D In effect that the use of & E tiny analysis. Medical witnesses for the through or 18th makes abortion the 17th defendants testified that a reasonable pregnancy safer week of than childbirth. “work-up” time is often customary and nec Thus, Roe under the state’s inter- prior essary to surgery. none est in maternal health does not become this in-hospital practice related to the very compelling before that time “mor- because procedures early stage brief involved in tality in be less than mortali- abortions. ty in normal childbirth.” 410 U.S. purpose The unstated By requiring early of section 1870.07r second S.Ct. at require a “cooling period” during off abortions to be in a trimester thoughts setting which second might come into and less expensive more convenient clinics, play. appears out-patient they to have than contend recognized impermissibly this effect: burdened con- state has morbidity mortality The and in- abortions. pregnant women seek- of rights stitutional illegal abor- is no com- of self-abortions and there cidence ing abortions. such Since stake before that of the second greatly state interest at exceeds that pelling tions time, assert that a The second plaintiffs procedure. the D & E trimester performed in a be requiring abortions to in-hospital of re- feature burdensome of the 17th or 18th week hospital prior to It that the cost. was testified quirement is not meet constitutional pregnancy does hospital abortion in a trimester a second narrowly drawn so requirement it be that charges $850-$900, for a D total costs while legitimate to state’s only relate to are $350-$400. E in a clinic & abortion interest. plaintiffs argue that the effect of that of evidence There was an abundance to make second trimester section 1870.03is performing D is the safest method of & E many for completely unavailable abortions today. Two post-first trimester abortions Many pregnant women who desire them. it physicians testified that is safe qualified women, young, do especially very out-pa- E in an perform to D & abortions they have entered an abortion until seek through 17th or 18th week tient clinic ability Without the the second trimester. these witnesses stat- pregnancy. of One of pay hospital the funds to for to travel and plaintiff ed Akron Women’s Clinic that treatment, many Akron of these women per- to adequately equipped staffed opportunity no to obtain an abor- have real early form second trimester abortions. tion. expert presented defendants medical ruling the court held In its first unchallenged qualifications witness standing to plaintiffs did not recognized is “not a stat- who that abortion However, upon challenge 1870.03. support for ic and that there is situation” that the the court concluded reconsideration early second trimester opinion standing, ad- did have plaintiffs safely performed be outside abortions respective posi- merits of the Nevertheless, dressed the this witness hospitals. of Referring the deci- parties. of to tions proposition clearly “is not that this stated court stat- Furthermore, in the district he sion Rоe testified established.” College American of Obstetricians that the ed: change made no in Gynecologists recognized that further tri-

its 1973 recommendation that second in maternal a valid interest state had performed in hos- mester abortions potential of hu- protection health and pitals. potential man life. The state’s interest “compel- found to become imposed by Evidence of the burden human life was to interest in requirement ling” viability. of section 1870.03 related The state’s health, light two factors. There was unrebutted testi- “in the maternal protecting hospitals only two mony knowledge,” that there were present was medical abortions Akron in which second trimester “compelling” approxi- found to become being During year performed. were of the first trimester. the end mately trial, preceding only nine such abortions Roe, 93 S.Ct. at supra U.S.] [410 hospitals. It performed in these two were passed in fur- was 1870.03 Section approximately 10%of the testified compelling state of this asserted therance 6,000 sought who abortions at women protecting maternal health interest during period were Akron clinics the same trimester of the first from the close of pregnancy. second trimester of their pregnancy. women were referred Many these F.Supp. at 1215. Cleveland, and in the clinics in Ohio State It then concluded: Michigan. Those who were unable say- 1870.03 Section Plaintiffs’ attack places were faced with travel those beyond the although abortions term, ing that baby at- carrying choice first trimester seeking illegal end of the tempting self-abortion or Many arguments the same hospital setting in a at the were safer decision, longer that is no all second trimester time of the Roe hospital abortions in a uncon- presented true. evidence in the Plaintiffs present support stitutional which were made in testimony form of and exhibits plaintiffs Gary- case finding early second trimester clin- were made Though just ical abortions are now as safe as Northwest. the evidence on this hospital issue in detailed early present second trimester abortions. case was more Court, however, produced Gary-Northwest, than plain- The does not find that proof argument thrust plaintiffs’ tiffs’ so of the and convincing evidence this issue Supreme was the The has now willing it same. Supreme is to discard opportunity had to from retreat Court’s formulation in Accordingly, ‍​​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍Roe. “bright line” drawn Roe v. Wade and has the Court finds that Section 1870.03 fur- declined The court’s to do so. district hold- thers the pro- state interest in ing that section 1870.03 is constitutional is, tection of maternal health there- fore, affirmed. constitutional. V. Standing

Id. A. At least two recently district courts have determined that the state’s interest The district court held none of pregnant health of a does woman not be- plaintiffs standing had to contest sec come compelling until the 18th week of after 1870.04 which forbids abortions Margaret Edwards, pregnancy. supra; S. v. viability except prevent to death or Planned Parenthood Association Kansas impairment pregnant of the health of the Ashcroft, City supra. Both holdings plaintiffs woman. of the None were on findings widespread based use abortions after first trimester E of the D method represents permission preg & a medical to a district court denied during advance which makes early nant woman and an Akron doctor who did perform weeks of the second sufficiently post-first trimester trimester abortions to safe proceed plaintiffs to eliminate maternal pseudonyms. health as a basis under The argue persons for state interference. In each case these would have had standing also if hospital they found that no to attack section 1870.04 region permitted proceed. had been performing post-first was to On the tri- we say mester record before us cannot was an unavailability abortions. The of in- requests to hospital deny E abuse of discretion to D & abortions in the area result- proceed by pseudonym. ed in physicians women and their being to dangerous forced use a more meth- challenge to A more serious od, in the view of these courts. Both courts standing ruling contained in the conten relied fact that a ban on the use of plaintiffs physician- tion of the method, the saline instillation which result- plaintiff jus granted should have been tertii abortions, ed in a similar denial of to access standing represent pregnant women to who was held unconstitutional in Planned Par- but viability, desire abortions after who forth, enthood supra. of Missouri v. Dan plaintiffs were not before the court. The appears Wulff,

The rationale of these rely principally upon Singleton decisions persuasive. However, 2868, 428 U.S. 49 L.Ed.2d 826 3-judge now affirmed a (1976), district court two where doctors were found to decision provision which found a identical have standing rights assert the of their Gary-Northwest patients. Singleton 1870.03 constitutional. sought § In the doctors Services, Bowen, Indiana holding Women’s Inc. v. that a statute which denied Medic 496 F.Supp. (N.D.Ind.1980), 896-902 non-medically aid benefits for indicated aff’d Gary-Northwest suo nom. physi Indiana abortions was unconstitutional. - Services, Orr, Women’s cian-plaintiffs performing Inc. v. were actually -, (1981). needy patients being 68 L.Ed.2d 321 were S.Ct. abortions for at supra, 428 U.S. at 2873 S.Ct. their because services payment denied also, concurring (plurality opinion). See In statutory provision question. Stevens, 428 opinion of Mr. Justice U.S. at standing, the Court upholding the claim Lacking such interest findings plain- made distinct two —that outcome, standing he did injury” “concrete from tiff-doctors suffered despite his the claims of others assert statute, Id. at operation of relationship” with women claimed “close 2873-74, and because of the close rela- rights he whom he counseled and whose patients, their between them and tionship protect. seeking qualified” to “uniquely were doctors party that no demonstrated district court patients. behalf their test the statute on standing challenge constitutionality Though at 2875-76. Id. 1870.04 affirmed. of section present might plaintiff-doctor in the case counsel women who desire an abor- see and B. it is clear that he would viability, tion after dispute the stand defendants perform the abortion. Bliss, who ing physician-plaintiff of Dr. the recognized principle the The court district Dr. Bliss does remained case. jus standing: of tertii Akron, in has first reside but (the jus right of a involving tertii Cases plaintiff- one of the abortions at trimester standing generally expected be party) third can that he to clinics. He testified court cor do so. The district categories. into The first continue to divided two standing as a rectly held thаt Dr. Bliss litigants challenge legisla- involves who plaintiff in this case. regulations upon them imposes tion which and, regulations of im- as a result the Disposal Remains VI. of deprives parties of posed, allegedly third 1870.16, respect re With to section rights. catego- constitutional The second remains, lating disposal to fetus we of injury ry litigants involves who suffer court that the lan agree the district with regulations allegedly impairing because vague definition impermissibly as guage parties rights of third are constitutional City act. The defendants of a criminal imposed directly parties on those third word “hu urged us to void have rights litigants whose seek to assert. mane,” “in a . .. arguing the words category. first This case within the sufficiently clear. If sanitary are manner” is, regulations plaintiffs allege That subject this City legislate to on desires imposed rights directly on them violate specific enacting by so it should do either guaranteed patients. plain- their Such referring regulations to requirements or permitted to uniformly tiffs “have been spec requirements set which forth restricting opera- efforts their resist language of possibility that the ificity. The acting rights tions advocates might construed man 1870.16 be parties of third who access to their seek of an of “decent burial” date some sort market function.” stages embryo of formation at the eаrliest (citations omitted). F.Supp. at 1184 The district to be overlooked. is too real invalid correctly section 1870.16 found standing such denial of vagueness. grounds plaintiff-physician properly based expressed that he never even a fact had court is af- judgment perform post-viability desire a abortion. part. in No part and reversed firmed in Thus, plaintiff injury “no this suffered costs allowed. operation fact” from the of section 1870.04. KENNEDY, Circuit G. CORNELIA requirement, plain- meet Failing to dissenting Concurring part Judge. sufficiently tiff did not have “a concrete part. interest in the outcome” of this action (stan- II respectfully part from controversy make it a case or under Article I dissent IIIA Wulff, review), portion of relat- dard Singleton III of the Constitution. legislative enactments must ing portion and a be to minors under opinion. narrowly express only IIIB of majority’s legit- drawn to imate state interest at stake. ruled that abortion District Court (citations Id. at at 728 omit- regulations absolutely prohibit that do not ted). to veto a power afford the woman’s decision to an abortion withstand the interest material health [Because scrutiny though furthering constitutional the end of becomes something “compelling” than state less that, trimester], first follows from [i]t regulations in- interest. It held that may regulate point, and after this State privacy to a terfere with a woman’s lesser procedure to the extent that against degree may weighed any valid preservation to the relates regulation. furthered interests protection maternal health. . . . majority, rejecting District Court’s means, hand, that, This other on the standard, apply two-step would test. period prior to this First, question provision if the causes no “compelling” point, attending physi- impact “legally significant” on the cian, patient, in consultation with his woman to choose to terminate determine, regulation by free to without Second, her pregnancy, it is constitutional. State, that, judgment, in his medical significant impact, if it causes legally patient’s pregnancy should be termi- provision supported by compel- must be nated. ling must sufficiently state interest and Id. at at 732. narrowly unduly drawn not to so as burden Up point], abortion decision in [this the I right. woman’s Because am less cer- aspects inherently, primarily, all its is majority Supreme tain than the decision, responsibili- a medical and basic Court’s abortion decisions call for such a ty physician.1 for it with the must rest two-step analysis, I am not able to concur 166, Id. at 733. panel though with the I 93 at even do not com- S.Ct.

pletely agree District with the Court either. case, In the next Planned Parenthood of 52, Central Missouri 428 U.S. appears

Because therе to have been some 2831, (1976), 96 L.Ed.2d 788 S.Ct. 49 shift on the Supreme the issue in Court’s appears Court to ambivalent as to the decisions a detailed lengthy and review of review, proper though its required. Language cases is from standard of the case signals supports earliest at least retreat from the abortion decisions the ma- some broad jority’s compelling language part conclusion that a of Roe. In relevant significant state justify give interest will first Court held that Missouri could not regulation. trimester abortion In Roe v. absolute veto over a woman’s abortion deci- 113, 705, 410 93 S.Ct. 35 spouse parents. L.Ed.2d sion to the or woman’s (1973), spoke 147 broadly Court in inva- However, impose Missouri could record lidating absolutely prohibited a statute that keeping on requirements an abortion clinic abortions save except to the life of the surgical for other impose did not mother: procedures; keeping require- the record “legally significant” ment did rights”

Where certain not have “fundamental are involved, impact phy- decision or the regula- the Court held that the abortion 81, limiting rights sician-patient relationship. Id. at justified these only by far “compelling state interest” . . . at 2846.2 Thus Planned Parent- S.Ct. performed by physician. Supreme tion not 1. The did U.S. at Court not use the word 165, “significant” permissible distinguish 93 S.Ct. at to and im- permissible first trimestеr in Roe v. Indeed, language prohibited Wade. apparently Court’s 2. This is the basis the threshold regulation. all first significance” trimester abortion How- requirement “legal in the ma- ever, Court, explana- However, even in jority’s Roe the without because the term “le- test. tion, permitted proscribe any a state abor- gally significant” Supreme used as of the statute from thoritative construction District with both the is consistent hood Supreme Judicial Court. the Massachusetts majority’s test. and the Court’s it did not Supreme Court stated opinion in Planned its In the course point at which re- need to determine language quoted Parenthood Court good cause view a woman’s consent used to Wade that can be from Roe v. a minor the case of for an abortion in test: support majority’s burdensome,” at “unduly 428 U.S. becomes stage prior approximately “For the or whether S.Ct. trimester, the abortion end of the first informed hearing to whether determine must be left and its effectuation decision “unduly burden” given was would consent judgment medical 96 S.Ct. rights of an adult. Id. attending without physician,” woman’s I in Bellotti No mention made at 2866. from the interference State. Again, interest. any compelling state at 2837.3 Id. I not militate the facts of Bellotti do Court, hand, the held that the other On District against majority’s either require could that the woman cоn Missouri However, Supreme standard. Court’s writing procedure, to the sent in panel’s language indicates Court’s though requirement imposed such a formulation is incorrect. surgery, because types for other “[t]he Roe, Maher v. 432 U.S. abort, indeed, important, is an decision (1977), that the Consti- L.Ed.2d 484 held one ....” Id. at and often stressful non- states to fund require tution does not possible that such a at 2840. It Supreme therapeutic abortions. insignifi requirement “legally had read Roe observed the court below cant,” state inter compelling or “furthers a progeny v. Wade and est,” holding is and the Court’s establishing a fundamental with the standard de therefore consistent concluded that abortion and therefore veloped by majority. in- nothing less than analyze did not justify differ- Connecticut’s terest would Indeed, Baird, 428 in Bellotti v. way. childbirth. of abortion and ent treatment 2857, 2866, 132, 147, 49 L.Ed.2d misconceived We think the District Court (1976) (Bellotti I), that 844 the Court stated scope the fundamental the nature and of re held the consent Planned Parenthood right recognized . . . We held in Roe. [in it did not quirement constitutional because only compelling state interest Roe] right an abor “unduly burden” the to seek sweeping restriction justify such a would tion. interest, constitutionally protected on a dur- At Bellotti I was the constitution- state interest issue in and we found no such requiring In subse- ing ality of a Massachusetts statute the first trimester.... cases, other quent we have invalidated to abortions for unmarried parental consent in form but the different Supreme types remanded of restrictions minors. The effect, freedom in on the woman’s get au- similar the court could case so suggests regu- language conclusion, that no as this Insofar more it Court did no than state permitted reaching before the end helpful of abortion is lation not in conclusion. justifica- absent a the first trimester tion, quoted majority’s recently suppo;ts from Roe to the standard. How- it 3. The Court invalidating ever, re- purpose a statute which was em- same effect to since the Colautti quired technique where the phasize certain the central role of the “may decision, Supreme fetus be viable”: and other abortion cases, infra, prohibit points not up important indicate Roe did where state ... to quote regulation, compelling justifications provide for all such first trimester interests intervention, weight the issue of decision all its entitled to little “the abortion inherently, primarily, aspects a medi- of review. standard cal decision” .... Franklin, 439 Colautti 675, 681, (1979). 58 L.Ed.2d 596 1214 Roe, ing only Although

of choice. . . . a state-created from it meant that it not imper- obstacle need not be absolute to be retreating interpreted from Roe as had a requirе- missible ... we have held that preceding Roe in pages opinion its for ment a lawful abortion “is ‍​​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍not uncon- Maher, is, burden- “unduly to forbid it unduly stitutional unless burdens the regulation some” of abortions. right to seek an abortion.” ... As Whal- Baird, In 99 Bellotti v. 443 U.S. S.Ct. Roe, 589, 599-600, en 97 [v. (1979)(Bellotti II), 61 L.Ed.2d 797 869, 876-877, clear, 51 L.Ed.2d makes 64] Court struck down a Massachusetts statute right can in Roe be understood only requiring parental consent to abortions for by considering both woman’s interest four-justice plurality mature minors. The nature State’s interference issue framed the thus: with it. not an unquali- Roe did declare us—in right abortion,” question light The before what fied “constitutional to an as the District Court we said in prior seems think. have cases—is wheth- Rather, right protects the woman statute], authoritatively er inter- [the unduly from burdensome interference preted by Court, Supreme Judicial with her freedom decide to terminate provides parental notice and consent pregnancy. her unduly in a manner that burden does 472-474, (citations Id. at right S.Ct. at 2382 seek an abortion. omitted) (emphasis added). (emphasis Id. S.Ct. at add- upheld The Court also Connecticut’s re- ed). quirement sought that a woman who state plurality The concluded as construed funding therapeutic for a abortion submit the statute request writing her get prior impose would an undue burden approval of the Department Connecticut right exеrcise minors of the seek an Social Services. Id. abortion.... [U]nder Court found the reasona- such as that undertaken Massachu- although ble there was no require- similar setts, every opportu- minor must ment for other forms of surgery because nity go directly so she desires—to to a procedures “such do involve —if [other] consulting notify- court without first potential termination of a human life.” Id. ing parents. majority distinguishes Maher by (emphasis Id. at add- pointing emphasis out the S.Ct. at Court’s ed). that the case did not involve limitations on right true, to an abortion. While plurality added “the constitu- Maher, means that the facts of like the tional seek an abortion not be Parenthood, facts of Roe v. Planned unduly by state-imposed burdened condi- I, and Bellotti do not the determine correct tions initial access to Id. at court.” majority standard. The sig- also attaches added). (emphasis 99 S.Ct. at 3051 to language nificance in Maher in which the requirement going of either to court Supreme Court states that its “conclusion parents signif- or is notifying clearly one’s signals no retreat from Roe or the cases Therefore, icant burden. to be consistent applying it.” Id. at 97 S.Ct. at 2383. panel’s Supreme the analysis the Court majority interprets signalling this as compelling should have found a state inter- [Supreme “that the later cases do Court’s] inquiring est before whether the statute represent not a retreat from the Roe v. unduly right would burden the to seek an

Wade that regu- the state’s plurality abortion. The found the state’s abortions, late stage pregnancy, at each of encouraging family must rest on a interest in resolution compelling legitimate However, state “important.” interest.” of a abortion when the Court minor’s decision Maher announced that it was not retreat- Id. at at 3051. It never found 99 S.Ct. - at-, Id. at Thus, ests.” S.Ct. compelling.4 the state’s interest engage the may be con- 1173-74. The Court did not while the result in Bellotti II suggest- two-step analysis suggested by panel. of the sistent with the standard review analysis panel plurality’s is ed Thus, sug- Supreme has never Court not. analysis majori- gested put forth McRae, ty. suggested Harris that a com- It sometimes upheld (1980), justify as con- necessary 65 L.Ed.2d pelling state interest Amendment, which Hyde during any regulation stitutional of state abortion funds abor- trimester, language use of federal forbade the has al- but that first stated: tions. The Court required by the been far broader than ways exception of the it. With the Roe v. the Court facts before The doctrine of Colautti, part of Maher, supra, and a “protects passage the woman from held in Parenthood, cases since with her all of the unduly burdensome interference Planned proper stаn- suggested whether to terminate that freedom decide Roe have U.S.], id. pregnancy,” simply 473-474 whether a that dard is [432 2382-83], severe effectively prohibit such as the abortions not does [97 issue in Roe v. criminal sanctions at “unduly to the decision burdensome” Wade, supra, requirement absolute The Court’s deci- whether or not to abort. spousal for an abortion chal- of standard. are consistent with that sions all of lenged in Planned Parenthood Central very Although standard is close that this Court, 428 U.S. 52 Missouri applied by [96 the District it differs 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d required Court 788]. District before it prohibition or veto be absolute Id. 448 U.S. at 100 S.Ct. at 2686 justified compelling state in- be must added). (emphasis terest.5 language Again, indi- Court’s issues, remaining My is incor- resolution panel’s cates that formulation however, I depend on whether does not rect. standard, majority’s that of apply the abor- The most recent case deal with Court, perceive what to be the I District Matheson,-U.S.-, tions is H. L. v. position. Supreme Court’s (1981), L.Ed.2d 388 where 1870.05(B) requires for a minor the Court held constitutional Section age consent of unmarried, either immature minors under the under having parent or “an order from court age parents their of their deci- notify her that the abortion jurisdiction over sion to seek an abortion. The Court ob- as a condition performed or induced” statute did not involve an served that District veto, terminating pregnancy. The “important absolute and that served 1870.05(B) did because it “significant considerations” and state inter- invalidated sue, merely requirement for simply ap- threshold argued It 4. scrutiny.” With state- plies strict Id. in the case a different standard review step agree. I has not said I not take additional of minors. that it the Court ment do does, why subjecting regulations stan- and it not clear all abortion review, weights dard of rather than the relative to the minimis are interest standard. de interests, change. parties’ of the state’s should in the case of minors are interests plaintiffs concern that The Seventh Circuit’s weightier, and thus lead to a different outcome regulations challenge must who balancing process. “compelling an across-the-board other than be unable to antici- standard will state interest” pate (7th Carey, v. 627 F.2d 777-778 5. Charles justifications possible for the state’s 1980), persuasive support is for the Cir. not ring simply regulations true in the does not majority’s in that decision. The district court I the Seventh context. Nor do share abortion unduly burdens the case he'd that a law that abortion decision is incapable courts are concern that the Circuit’s subject scrutiny. to strict determining the abortion when burden on that “the term ‘undue Seventh Circuit held “undue.” decision is is- burden’ defines the ultimate constitutionаl 1216

not District protect 1870.06(C) the abortion decision of a ma- of the Court that is § minor, majority requires ture this constitutional. This and affirms section however, Court, attending decision. physician patient The District advise the made no to construe 1870.- attempt section

05(B) in a fashion. constitutional particular risks associated her own pregnancy and the abortion tech- In H. statute L. v. Matheson Utah nique employed including providing to be required notify, “to if minor’s general description her with at least a possible, guardian parents to be the medical instructions followed woman is upon whom abortion to be ” subsequent to the in order performed, is a if she minor.. .. -U.S. recovery, insure her safe and shall at-, 101 1166-67. In an unre- provide addition her with such other in- lated case the federal court Utah judg- formation which in his own medical had apply held that this statute did not is decision unemancipated Hansen, ment relevant to her as to minors. L. R. v. (Feb. 8, 1980). carry Civil No. whether to have an abortion or to C-80-0078J Be- cause brought the minor who Mathe- to term. suit in son did not show that she was mature provision majority holds that in- emancipated, she lacked standing chal- fringes judgment on the medical lenge minors, applied the statute as to such attending not, physician. section does Supreme “unwilling Court was to however, patient’s right interferе with the statute, challenged assume that the when preg- to decide whether to terminate her proper case, not be will construed also to Franklin, nancy. Cf. Colautti v. 439 U.S. at - exempt demonstrably mature minors.” 392-394, 396, 684-85, (1979); S.Ct. at at-, 101 S.Ct. at 1169. Planned Parenthood of Missouri Central Danforth, 2839;

Similarly, I, U.S. at S.Ct. at Supreme in Bellotti Further, supra. Roe v. remanded for witnesses authoritative construc required agreed who at trial parental statute that con testified the infor- sent to light given patient. for should be abortions minors. of mation In- “[I]n disapproval ‘parental deed, our today veto’ in Planned Parenthood v. Parenthood, Planned we must assume that the Court stated that decision to “[t]he courts, lower Massachusetts if called important, abort an often a is stressful upon to enforce the pending one, statute inter imperative and it is desirable and pretation by Court, Judicial knowledge it be made with full of its na- will impose this most serious barrier.” consequences.” ture and U.S. at 96 S.Ct. at 2868. 2840. The S.Ct. at Court considered that informed meant 1870.05(B) capable Section aof con- giving patient to the information struction that would render it constitution- just what be done and as to would as to if, al. example, This would the case consequences. its To ascribe more mean- the order having jurisdiction” from court “a might ing than this well confine the at- bаsed, be, as it constitutionally must tending physician in undesired an first on inquiry into the minor’s maturi- straitjacket practice uncomfortable ty. Thus, the facially section invalid. profession. of his As the ‍​​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍majority notes in reversing the Dis- holding trict 1870.05(A) Court’s that section Id. n. 8. The Utah statute issue H. L. unconstitutional, challenges no minor provided no abortion Matheson could Akron I ordinance. would not find 1870.05(B) unconstitutional until a mature “voluntary unless a and written consent” minor challenges and until it has been attending physi- is first obtained construed a lower court. patient. from the In order for such cian I also portion “voluntary dissent from a consent to be and in- panel’s formed,” opinion which patient reverses the must be advised at a

1217 any carried out.” 439 abortion was be serv- adoption available minimum about 387, at 99 at 681. development, and about U.S. S.Ct. ices, about fetal and risks an complications foreseeable the information The abortion. .06(C) by a specified given in be 1,101 n. at 1167 1. at-n. S.Ct. -U.S. more than seek to ensure that there does no Supreme requirement, upholding In relation- physician-patient a is in fact true that in Planned Parent- simply Court noted goes to an ship even for the woman who rejected “we a constitu- hood v. Danforth presented The at abortion clinic. evidence provi- attack on written tional the dеcision to terminate trial showed that Thus, Supreme ap- Id. Court sions.” by in pregnancy made not the woman does not believe the limited parently by conjunction physician, with her but .06(C) imposes required by an information abortion lay employees woman giving physician. on the undue burden clinic, dependent of which is the income enhances, information rather than such choosing to upon the woman’s abor- restricts, the woman’s freedom of choice. testimony that the doc- tion. The disclosed without this informa- “Informed consent” little, if tors Akron Center’s clinic did at be worthless. See also Wolfe v. would seeing any, counseling patient in before 523, (6th Cir. Schroering, 541 F.2d 526 procedure room. Akron’s ordinance 1976). these realities of simply takes into account giving not to the objection Plaintiffs’ relationship at an “physician-patient” information, rather to the re- of the but clinic. abortion given quirement the information be majority’s I in the conclusion concur Supreme has re- physician. Court delay imposed 1870.07 24-hour § importance of peatedly recognized the the state has unconstitutional. relationship the abor- physician-patient carefully ensuring a con- strong interest in has tion decision. Several times the Court decision, delay the 24-hour sidered abortion during the first trimester stated that inter- substantially related to that state physician, patient, with his consultation est, delay impos- many and in instances must free determine that in his medi- to an es burden on no undue judgment patient’s cal Nonetheless, now stands .07 it abortion. II, 443 should be terminated. Bellotti U.S. example, would re- For is overbroad. 21, 21, 643, n. at at 641 n. S.Ct. delay delay even where quire a 24-hour 3048; Franklin, at v. U.S. Colautti grave risk to the mental impose would 681; at Planned Parenthood of 99 S.Ct. woman, where the health 428 U.S. at Central Missouri already counseled been woman 2837; at Roe U.S. S.Ct. delay would cause or where the physician, 163, 164, at at 732. In Planned an indi- expense extra significant such “partici- emphasized the Court Parenthood effectively if unduly burden as to vidual attending physician pation by [in prohibit the decision. responsibility his decision] ” to the circumstanc- requires attention closer 61, 96 at that decision .... 428 U.S. in the abortion con- cases es of individual Roe, In would have at 2837. II, n. Bellotti text. require permitted a state that abortions n. physician, which performed by a licensed implies the state’s interest strongly at least majority’s balance I concur physician-pa ensuring the existence of opinion. relationship. tient at 732-733. As the Court observed Co

lautti, repeatedly “Roe stressed the central consulting physician,

role of the both or not to about whether the woman abortion, determining and in how

have an

Case Details

Case Name: Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., Cross-Appellees v. City of Akron, Cross-Appellants, Francois Seguin, Intervenors

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Jul 22, 1981

Citation: 651 F.2d 1198

Docket Number: 79-3700, 79-3701 and 79-3757

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.