Thе sole issue before this court is whether service of process was effectively made upon the appellees. In resolving this issue we look first to Civ. R. 4.1(1), governing service by certified mail.
In Castellano v. Kosydar (1975),
“It should also be noted that certified mail, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, no longer requires actual service upon the party receiving the notice, but is effеctive upon certified delivery. Prior to its amendment in 1971, Civ. R. 4.1(1) stated that ‘***if the return receipt shows failure of delivery to the addressee the clerk shall forthwith notify, by mail, the attorney of record* * *.’ (Emphasis added.) However, the above-italicized words were subsequently deleted, evidencing an intent to avoid the impression that certified mail, to be effective, had to be delivered to and signеd by the addressee only. The above considerations, and the recognition that a need for actual notice would be contradictory to modern service requirements, represent persuasive arguments for the rejection of appellants’ position.”
Although Castellano authorizes service upon someone other than the named addressee, thus dealing with the question of who may be served, it does not speak to the issue of where service by certified mail may be sent. This court has recently dealt with that issue, holding that certified mail notice served at property used solely for investment (i.e., rental) purрoses, where the residence address of the individual sought to be served was known, did not meet the requirements of due process. In re Foreclosure of Liens (1980),
“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due procеss in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action аnd afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” (Emphasis added.) See In re Foreclosure of Liens, supra.
So long as service is “reasonably calculated” to reach interested parties, thеn the service is constitutionally sound. Accordingly, it is not necessary that service be attempted through the most likely means of success—ordinarily residence service; it is sufficient that thе method adopted be “reasonably calculated” to reach its intended recipient. We believe therefore that certified mail service sent to a business address сan comport with due process if the circumstances are such that successful notification could be reasonably anticipated.
This position does not reflect а relaxed adherence to due process rights. Indeed, we look suspiciously at any service attempted by means falling short of that most likely to achieve success. Therе are inherently greater risks involved in attempting certified mail service at a business rather than at a residence by virtue of the oftentimes numerous intermediate, and frequently uninterested, parties participating in the chain of delivery. The federal rule reflects the concern we should have in authorizing this type of service.
In the instant cause service was not made in a manner “reasonably calculated” to reach apрellee Sengpiel. He did not maintain an office on the premises of the business where he was attempted to be served. His principal place of business was in fact in anоther city. Affidavits demonstrate that Sengpiel only sporadically visited the business where service was attempted, usually two or three times per month. Service at this business address under these circumstances simply does not comport with due process.
Due to the fact that service was invalid as to appellee Sengpiel, the service of process upon appellee Swinehart need not be examined. The appropriation sought by appellant was of property owned jointly by the appellees, each owning an undivided one-half interest. To hold service valid upon Swinehart at this point, thus allowing value to be declared on his one-half interest in the property pursuant to R. C. 163.09, and to allow immediate appropriation of this interest by appellant, could lead to inconsistent judgments concerning the jointly owned property. Sengpiel, under R. C. 163.08, may later chаllenge appellant’s right to make the appropriation and the necessity for such an appropriation, thus creating this possibility of conflicting determinations regarding the fractional interests in the property. Cf. Broussard v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. (C.A. 5, 1968),
The trial court in this cause effectively dismissed appellant’s appropriation complaint because of the problems surrоunding its service. This dismissal, however, was improper
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the cause is remanded to the trial court for'further proceedings.
Judgment accordingly.
Notes
R. C. 168.07 provides that notice to a landowner in appropriation cases shall be made in the manner of service of summons in civil actions. Civ. R. 4.1(1) is the applicable provision in this cause. It prоvides, in pertinent part:
“Service of any process shall be by certified mail unless otherwise permitted by these rules. The clerk shall place a copy of the procеss and complaint or other document to be served in an envelope. He shall address the envelope to the person to be served at the address set forth in the caption or at the address set forth in written instructions furnished to the clerk with instructions to forward. He shall affix adequate postage and place the sealed envelope in the Unitеd States mail as certified mail return receipt requested with instructions to the delivering postal employee to show to whom delivered, date of delivery, and address where delivеred.”
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for certified mail service. Fed. R. C. P. 4, however, does restrict service where delivery of process is to be made on someone other than the individual named defendant by stating:
“(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the persоn making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows:
“(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitablе age and discretion then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process." (Emphasis added.)
The requirements of the federal rule were engrafted upon the Ohio rule in the case of Southgate Shopping Center Corp. v. Jones (1975),
We note, for the purpose of analogy, that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procеdure 1009 (b)(2)(iii) provides, in part, that service of process may be accomplished “at any office or usual place of business of the defendant to his agent or to the person for the time being in charge thereof.” See Sharp v. Valley Forge Medical Center (1966),