delivered the opinion of the court:
On thе 11th day of October, 1892, William Clark conveyed tl^e west half of the north-east quarter of section 33, tоwnship 12, north, range 7, east of the third principal meridian, to Mary J. Clark. The deed contains the follоwing language: “William Clark conveys and warrants to Mary J. Clark during her natural life and at her death to revеrt back to my heirs.” Clark died December 20, 1897, leaving him surviving Mary J. Clark, the grantee in that deed, his widow, and certain children áhd grandchildren, as his only heirs-at-law. On the 29th day of November, 1897, said Clark executed a will, by which he dеvised the fee in the premises in the deed described, to his daughter, Eliza Jane Snapp, subject to the life estate of Mary J. Clark, which will was duly probated. The will contains this language: “I will and devise to my beloved daughter, Eliza Jane Snapp, wife of Jonathan Snapp, the farm on which I now reside, аt the' death of my beloved wife, Mary, in accordance with the deed above mentioned, to her and her heirs forever.” Certain of the children of Clark filed a bill for partition, making certain grandchildren and Eliza J. Snapp defendants. The latter answered, setting up the execution of the dеed with the clause as stated, and averring the execution of the will, duly probated, etc. The evidence was in accordance with the answer, and on hearing a decree was entеred dismissing the bill for want of equity. The complainants prosecute an appeal to this court, and assign as errors the failure to render a decree for partition and the dismissal of complainants’ bill.
It is stated by Washburn in his work on Real Property (vol. 2, p. 242): j3rt°is accepted as one of thе dogmas of the common law, that if one makes a limitation to another for life, with a remainder over, either mediately or immediately, to his heirs or the heirs of his body, the heirs do not take remainders at all, but the word ‘heirs’ is regarded as defining or limiting the estate which the first taker has, and his heirs take by dеscent, and not by purchase. So if a man by his will gives an estate to his devisee for life, with a remaindеr over to his own heirs, they do not, at common law, take as remainder-men by the will, but by descent as rеversioners and heirs, that being regarded as the better title. The statutes in several States have сhanged the rule in Shelley’s case, so that in similar cases the heirs now take as remainder-men. But such a remainder is contingent during the life of the first taker."
A devise giving precisely the same estate and interest in property as the devisee would take by descent if the devise had not been made, is void, for the reason that a title by descent is regarded as a worthier or better title than by devisе or purchase. (Kellett v. Shepard,
Without, however, rejecting any word in the conveyance, by the terms of the dеed the heirs would take as reversioners and not as remainder-men. It is said in Washburn (p. 395): “At common law, if а man seized of an estate limited it to one for life, remainder to his own right heirs, they would take not as remainder-men but as reversioners; and it would be, moreover, competent for him, as being himself thе reversioner, after making such a limitation, to grant away the reversion.” The same principle was announced in Hobbie v. Ogden,
It was not error to dismiss complainants’ bill. The decree of the circuit court of Coles county is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.