128 P. 92 | Idaho | 1912
This is a suit in equity instituted by the appellants, Elnora E. Ainsworth, Ida Mulheron and
The cause was tried in the district court and findings were made and a decree entered in favor of respondent. This appeal is from the judgment.
In the complaint filed in the district court by the appellants the cause of action is alleged as follows: First, that on or about the 9th day of April, 1905, at Grangeville, in the state of Idaho, one Caleb Squibb died intestate, seised and possessed of a large estate consisting of both personal and real property situated in the counties of Idaho and Bingham, in the state of Idaho, and at his death left surviving the plaintiffs, daughters, and two sons, one Joseph Squibb and one William Squibb, as sole and only heirs; that the defendant is a regularly admitted and practicing attorney at law and a member of the bar of the state of Iowa, engaged in the practice of his profession as such in said state and elsewhere; that in the month of July, 1906, the respondent was employed by the plaintiffs as an attorne.y at law and attorney in fact and undertook such employment in behalf of the plaintiffs to look after, protect and recover for the appellants any property rights accruing to them by reason of the death of Caleb Sqixibb, located in the state of Idaho; that in pursuance of such employment, and by reason thereof, and in settlement of the rights of plaintiffs and their interest in said estate, the respondent secured, on or about the 30th day of July, 1906, at Grangeville, ixi the state of Idaho, a deed of conveyance from Joseph Squibb and William Squibb, sons and heirs with the appellants of the estate of Caleb Squibb, of certain lands in Bingham county, state of Idaho. This deed was duly filed for record on the 6th of August, 1906, in the office of the county recorder and is made a part of the complaint; that it is also alleged that while the defendant took such conveyance of land in his own name as grantee, that in truth and in fact the title so obtained by him was in trust
The respondent, in his answer to the complaint, admits his employment as alleged in the complaint, and alleges that he thereafter proceeded to the state of Idaho and carefully and completely investigated the records of Bingham and Idaho counties, in Idaho, as well as carefully and completely investigated all other matters and things pertaining to said estate in search of any and all property, either real or personal, if any, belonging to the estate of said plaintiffs’ said father, Caleb Squibb, deceased, with a view to, and for the purpose of, ascertaining the nature, kind and extent of the property, and the whole thereof, belonging to said estate, and to protect and secure for the plaintiffs, and each of them, their respective portion or portions of said estate. Respondent also in his answer alleges in substance and effect that he made a thorough investigation and full report to his clients and took the land for himself after full and fair understanding, and with their consent, and that he is now, and for a long time has been, the owner and in the possession and entitled to the possession of the lands in controversy; that the estate of Caleb Squibb consisted solely of personal property,
The trial court in its findings found in favor of the appellants upon the allegations of the complaint, as to the employment of the respondent, and that the respondent accepted said employment and proceeded to Idaho and made the investiga
The question presented by appellants on this appeal is that the evidence does not support the findings and judgment of the trial court. The evidence in support of the appellants’ case is principally in writing, and consists in correspondence between the respondent and the appellants with reference to employing the respondent to investigate the condition of the estate of Caleb Squibb in Idaho, and ascertaining what interest the appellants had in such estate, and the making of the contract between the respondent and the appellants, and the execution of the power of attorney by appellants to respondent, and the correspondence of the respondent with the appellants while in Idaho with reference to said property, and oral testimony as to statements made by respondent to different parties as to the nature and character of his employment.
It is proper to state, before referring to the facts, that the respondent did not testify in his own behalf, neither did he
In a letter dated Blackfoot, July 17, 1906, the respondent states as follows: “The records show that Caleb Squibb, on February 15, 1905, a short time before his death deeded all his land consisting of 680 acres to his son Joseph. The personal property amounted to about $1625.00. The administrator seems to be using this freely in suits. The old gentleman may have left a farm in Grangeville. ’ ’
In addition to this record evidence a witness by the name of Job Harker, who resided on a part of the land in controversy in this case, testified for appellants, and among other things stated: ‘‘He spoke of three ladies that were interested in the estate and he was looking after the interest of the heirs. He said they wanted to get it fixed up and they would see Harker about having the place. He said he came there in behalf of the heirs of Caleb Squibb, that he had a quitclaim deed from Joseph Squibb to all the property here in Idaho.”
A witness, Ernest Harker, testified to his acquaintance with Harding, and that he heard the same conversation that Job Harker had with the respondent, and that the respondent said: ‘‘I am here representing the Squibb estate and I am here to make a settlement.Mr. Joseph Squibb has turned over a quitclaim to me for all the property to make a settlement.” The witness further testifies: “He claimed to represent these heirs and also those in the east and he claimed that Joseph Squibb had quitclaimed all the property to him to make settlement and he stated he wanted to settle things up in a satisfactory manner to them and also to us.”
C. 0. Jensen also testified that in June, 1907, he had a conversation with respondent and the respondent said: “That some of the titles were imperfect and that the old gentleman had died and it belonged to the estate; he said the three sisters were entitled to their share of the estate. He told me the title was imperfect, but he would perfect it, and whatever interest there was to be turned over to Squibb he was to turn over their part to the three ladies in Iowa; this included the 80-acre Harker tract.”
The contract of employment between appellants and respondent was a fiduciary one, and required on the part of respondent the utmost good faith, candor, fairness, honor and fidelity in all his dealings with the plaintiffs with reference to their rights in the estate of Caleb Squibb, and implied reliance on the ability and integrity of the respondent, and in the controversy arising out of such contract of employment such attorney should be held at all times and under all circumstances to the full measure of what he ought to do. Equity would be of no avail if an attorney, who has been employed to represent a client in securing the rights to which such client is entitled under the law, could profit by withholding his knowledge and skill or by giving false counsel during the continuance of the fiduciary relation, in the highest sense confidential and fiduciary, or by acts of such attorney in securing property or money or other interests in that right which he is employed to secure for the client.
It was the respondent’s duty, by reason of his employment, to protect the appellants in all his efforts with reference to the purpose of his employment, and it was a violation of such duty for him to do any act or receive any compensation or advantage while so acting which would in any way mislead or deceive the appellants, or which might result in the appellants being deprived of a legal right which they possessed, although not yet determined. At the time respondent received the deed of conveyance on July 30, 1906, the relation of employment as counsel and client had not terminated, and in the absence of the termination of the fiduciary relation, when such employment was shown, the relation existed, and the burden of proof is on the respondent to show that the same has been terminated. The duty laid upon respondent after his employment imposed good faith, and required that it should not in any way be violated, and that this good faith should be continuous and perpetual as long as the employ
The respondent in this case is a member of the bar and a practicing attorney of the state of Iowa, and the contract of employment entered into between the respondent and the appellants was made in the state of Iowa. The supreme court of that state, in a number of cases, has been called upon to consider contracts of employment of an attorney, and the duties and responsibilities of an attorney when employed, and in the ease of Harper v. Perry, 28 Iowa, 57, the court used this language:
“The rules of law governing the transactions of an attorney with his client are most strict, and operate to protect the client from any advantage that may be possessed by the attorney on account of superior knowledge or confidence reposed in him by the client. "What the law does not consider unfair dealing between other parties, where no fiduciary relation exists, will frequently not be sustained as between attorney and client. "While the relation exists, an attorney is not permitted to take advantage of the client’s affairs, against his interests, to make money. The hardship of the doctrine, in its application to particular cases, is not so much regarded as the public mischief which would grow out of lax rules permitting the attorney to take advantage of his position and knowledge and the confidence of his client, in order to make advantageous transactions for himself. No rule, in its application, has a more beneficial effect upon the pecuniary interests, or more effectually promotes the dignity, of the legal profession. It is the source of the utmost confidence in the attorney, and secures to the client services meriting*659 the most generous rewards. Its strict enforcement is necessary for the proper protection of the client. And the courts will not refrain from its application because the wrong to the client may not be fully apparent in extent, nor the influence under which it was wrought entirely understood.
“The application of this rule forbids the attorney to purchase, against the interest of his client, property sold in the course of litigation, in which he is retained, and such sales will be held void, or the attorney will be held as the trustee of his client, and required to account as such. (Stockton v. Ford, 11 How. (U. S.) 246, [13 L. ed. 682]; Henry v. Raiman, 25 Pac. 354, [64 Am. Dec. 705]; 1 Story’s Eq., sec. 311; Starr et al. v. Vanderheyden, 9 Johns. 253, [6 Am. Dec. 275]; Merritt v. Lambert, 10 Paige, 358; Howell et al. v. Ramson et al., 11 Paige, 538; Howell v. Baker, 4 Johns. Ch. 120; Armstrong v. Huston’s Heirs, 8 Ohio, 554; Wade v. Pettibone, 11 Ohio, 57, [37 Am. Dec. 408].)”
The same court, in Shropshire v. Ryan, 111 Iowa, 677, 82 N. W. 1035, in discussing the same question, says:
“The confidence reposed in the attorney by the client, or in the trustee by the cestui que trust, is so carefully guarded by the law, that it places the burden of proving the entire fairness of the pecuniary transactions between them upon the attorney or trustee. ’ ’
The respondent being an attorney, it will be presumed, of course, he was familiar with the law of the state of Iowa and the decisions of the courts of that state. The rule above announced by the Iowa supreme court is the recognized rule announced and universally adhered to by every court in the land, and every member of the bar who has taken the oath of office required generally by the laws of the state is impressed with the solemnity of the obligation of such attorney to protect his clients in all his efforts with reference to his employment, and that such attorney shall be faithful to, and honest in all his actions in relation to, such employment.-(Kisling v. Shaw, 33 Cal. 425, 91 Am. Dec. 646; In re Evans, 22 Utah, 366, 83 Am. St. 794, 62 Pac. 913, 53 L. R. A. 952; Shirk v. Neible, 156 Ind. 66, 83 Am. St. 150, 59 N. E. 281;
The supreme court of the United States in the case of Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U. S. 494, 25 L. ed. 1065, cites and reviews a great many cases in which the relation of attorney and client is considered, involving facts very much of the character involved in this case. In that case the court said: “The relation of client and counsel subsisted between the attorney and Baker.The bills of the attorney found in the record show the duration of the connection and the extent and variety of the items charged and paid for. They indicate a continuous understanding and consequent employment. Undoubtedly, either party had the right to terminate the connection at any time; and if it were done, the other would have no right to complain. But, until this occurred, the confidence manifested by the client gave him the right to expect a corresponding return of zeal, diligence and good faith on the part of the attorney.
“The employment to draw the contract was sufficient alone to put the parties in this relation to each other.But whether the relation subsisted previously or was created only for the purpose of the particular transaction in question, it carried with it the same consequences.
“It is the duty of an attorney to advise the client promptly whenever he has any information to give which it is important the client should receive. ’ ’
In that same case the court approves the doctrine announced in Henry v. Raiman, 25 Pa. 354, 64 Am. Dec. 705, heretofore cited in- this opinion, and says:
“It has been held that if counsel be retained to defend a particular title to real estate he can never thereafter, unless his client consent, buy the opposing title without holding it*661 in trust for those then having the title he was employed to sustain.”
In commenting on the Henry-Raiman case the court sayS: “Without expressing any opinion as to the soundness of this case with respect to the extent to which the principle of trusteeship is asserted, it may be laid down as the general rule that an attorney can, in no case, without the client’s consent, buy and hold otherwise than in trust, any adverse title or interest touching the thing to which his employment relates. He cannot in such a way put himself in an adversary position without this result. The cases to this effect are very numerous, and they are all in harmony.”
The citations given above certainly announce a precise and universal rule, and this rule applies specifically to the facts shown by the record in this ease, and when Harding was given a power of attorney by the appellants and the contract of employment was entered into, and the respondent agreed to make an investigation for the appellants with a view of discovering the interest, right and title of the appellants in and to the estate and property belonging to Caleb Squibb at the time of his death and of securing whatever interest the appellants had in said property, it was sufficient to bar the respondent from setting up any claim at law or in equity to any of the property which ivas owned or possessed by Caleb Squibb at the time of his death, or prior thereto, which in any way was or could be in question in the settlement of the Caleb Squibb estate. And it can make no difference whether the title or interest in said property had been finally determined. The letters written by respondent show clearly that at the time he made his investigation there was a question whether the conveyance from Caleb Squibb to Joseph Squibb was made in good faith or under improper influences or duress, and whether the appellants could recover from Joseph Squibb their share in the estate of Caleb Squibb.
The statutes of this state prescribing the duties of attorneys, among other things, provide:
“2. To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
*662 “3. To counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings, or defenses only as appear to him legal or just, except the defense of a person charged with a public offense;
“4. To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth, and never seek to mislead the judges by an artifice or false statement of fact or law ;
“5. To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client.” (See. 3997, Rev. Codes.)
These high and responsible duties imposed upon an attorney in his employment are in line with the rule that is universally approved and applied in enforcing the respective obligations and responsibilities imposed by a contract of employment, and the courts of this state, in line with the courts of other states, will adhere strictly and firmly to the rule of duty, and will not approve or permit an attorney, who has been employed, and who has undertaken by reason of such employment to protect his client, to obtain a supposed interest in real property of a client, and thereby repudiate his fiduciary obligation and receive in person the property he has been employed to secure for his client, which clearly appears to have been adjudged respondent by the findings and judgment of the trial court.
The judgment in this case is therefore reversed. Costs awarded to appellants.
Petition for rehearing denied.