665 F.2d 1057 | D.C. Cir. | 1981
Opinion PER CURIAM.
This case is before us again because the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for .reconsideration our decision that appellant had made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination in employment.
I. HISTORY OF THE CASE
Appellant Louis Aikens brought this Title VII action alleging that appellee United States Postal Service failed to promote him on account of his race. The district court granted summary judgment for the Postal Service because appellant failed to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This court reversed on two grounds. First, the majority rejected the district court’s legal conclusion that appellant’s claim failed because he did not “prove that he was as qualified or more qualified than the individuals who were promoted or detailed.”
The Supreme Court granted the Postal Service’s certiorari petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case back to this court for further consideration in light of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.
II. ANALYSIS
In Burdine the Supreme Court summarized the three stages in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment:
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie ease of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.6
This case deals with the first stage, where the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case, /. e., “the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption” that the employer discriminated against him.
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.8
The Court elaborated on this test in Bur-dine:
*241 The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous. The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position, for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. The prima facie case serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 & n.44, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866 n.44, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). As the Court explained in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978), the prima facie case “raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.” Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff’s evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.9
The issue here concerns the second part of the McDonnell Douglas test, the question of the plaintiff’s qualifications for the positions sought. The district court found “that plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie case of racial discrimination in that plaintiff failed to prove that he was as qualified or more qualified than the individuals who were promoted or detailed.”
This is not to suggest that the required prima facie showing of plaintiff’s qualifications is without meaning. The Supreme Court has noted that, as part of a prima facie case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his rejection did not stem from “an absolute or relative lack of qualifications.”
If the plaintiff succeeds in presenting a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer. Burdine makes clear that the employer need only articulate (not prove) a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the plaintiff. The opinion in Burdine also states that the employer’s reason must be stated “with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext”;
We recognize that Title VII cases involving professional and managerial positions raise uniquely difficult issues not found in cases involving lower-level jobs. Most abilities of a successful manager — especially the ability to assume responsibility for motivating and directing other employees — are intangible, and each applicant could bring to the position an enormous variety of life experiences that are relevant. The three stages of the McDonnell Douglas framework are flexible enough, we believe, to facilitate a fair and efficient resolution of such difficult issues. At the prima facie stage, as noted above, the plaintiff may be required to go beyond a showing of minimum qualifications to demonstrate that he possesses whatever qualifications or background experiences the employer has indicated are important. At the second stage, the employer must indicate which qualifications or background experiences formed the basis of his hiring or promotion decision; then, at the final stage, the plaintiff would have to show his superiority in those areas in order to prove discrimination. As the Court reiterated in Burdine, Title VII does not affect the employer’s “discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria.”
III. CONCLUSION
The district court concluded that appellant did not prove that he was as qualified or more qualified than the successful applicants. Not only was this an erroneous legal standard for the prima facie case stage of a Title VII case, but the court did not make findings on appellant’s qualifications clear enough to permit us to determine if a prima facie case was established. Consequently, we must remand to the court for determination of this issue. If the court finds that appellant has demonstrated that his rejection did not result from “an absolute or relative lack of qualifications,”
Vacated and Remanded.
. Aikens v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 514 (D.C.Cir.1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 902, 101 S.Ct. 3135, 69 L.Ed.2d 989 (1981).
. Aikens v. Bolger, No. 77-0303, Conclusion of Law ¶ 8 (D.D.C. 26 Feb. 1979), reprinted in Appendix (App.) at 24.
. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972).
. Conclusion of Law ¶ 7, reprinted in App. at 24.
. 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).
. Id. 101 S.Ct. at 1093 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804, 93. S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 1825, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)).
. Id. 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n.7.
. 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824.
. 101 S.Ct. at 1094 (footnotes omitted).
. Conclusion of Law ¶ 7, reprinted in App. at 24.
.International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866 & n.44, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).
. Id.
. Id. 101 S.Ct. at 1093.
. Id. 101 S.Ct. at 1097.
. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866 & n.44, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).
.See 642 F.2d at 519-20; id. at 521 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).