Aikens v. RoyceAikens v. Royce
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Kenneth M. Karas
Anthony Aikens
Collins, NY
Pro Se Plaintiff
Rebecca Ann Durden, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York
New York, NY
Counsel for Defendant
KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:
OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Anthony Aikens (Plaintiff) filed the instant Complaint pursuant to
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff‘s Second Amended Complaint, the documents appended thereto, and the filings that Plaintiff submitted in opposition to the instant Motion, and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the Motion. At the time of the incidents alleged in Plaintiff‘s Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was an inmate at Green Haven Correctional Facility. (SAC ¶ 2.) On January 13, 2012, at approximately 5:15 p.m., Plaintiff was returning to his cell block from the mess hall with Corrections Officer Hamburg (Hamburg), who was informed by another officer that a fight had ensued on the nearby stairs. (See Pl.‘s Mem. of Law in Supp. Not To Dismiss the Second Am. Compl. (Pl.‘s Second Mem.) Ex. D. (Grievance) 1 (Dkt. No. 38).)2 Plaintiff and Hamburg proceeded up the stairs, and Hamburg told Plaintiff to go lock in. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that before he could comply with Hamburg‘s request, other officers arrived and one officer told him to place his hands on the wall, and another officer told him to place his hands higher above his head. (Id.) Sergeant Jones (Jones) then snatched Plaintiff off the wall, slammed Plaintiff into the wall, and then threw him toward another wall, stating that Plaintiff will do as [he is] fucken [sic] told. (Id.) Plaintiff was then placed back on the wall by officers who cuffed one of his hands. (Id.) Hamburg informed the officers that Plaintiff was not involved in the fight and Plaintiff was then
Around 7 p.m. that evening, Plaintiff went to the prison medical clinic accompanied by Officer Rivers (Rivers), where he informed the nurse administrator that he was in pain from the earlier incident and wanted to report it. (Grievance 2.)4 The nurse administrator advised Plaintiff to go to the Emergency Sick Call Unit next door. (Id.) Before Plaintiff could comply, Lieutenant Tokarz (Tokarz) stated to Plaintiff: Oh it‘s you. Last time you got a pass[,] this time you are going down hard [to] Keep lock and the ticket will be a [Tier] 3. (Id.)5 After Tokarz left, Plaintiff was placed into keeplock. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that Jones, at the direction of Tokarz, filed a false misbehavior report, which gave rise to the Hearing. (See Pl.‘s Second Mem. at unnumbered 1.) On January 20, 2012 at approximately 10:47 a.m., Defendant held the Hearing. (SAC ¶ 8.) At the Hearing, Plaintiff informed Defendant that the misbehavior report that was written on him was in retaliation for reporting [an assault] by . . . Jones to the Nurse Administrator. (Id. ¶ 9; see also Pl.‘s Second
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was personally involved in [a] conspir[acy] with witnesses[] he personally call[ed] to testify at the Hearing, including Hamburg and Tokarz, which allowed Hamburg and Tokarz to retaliate and make false accusations on [the] record.
The documents appended to the Second Amended Complaint indicate that Defendant found Plaintiff guilty of Interference with Employee, Refusing Direct Order, and a Movement Regulation Violation, and ordered Plaintiff to keeplock with a loss of privileges. (See SAC Ex. A at unnumbered 2, 4.)6 In response to Plaintiff‘s letter of appeal, Albert Prack (Prack), the Special Housing and Inmate Disciplinary Program Director, reviewed and modified Defendant‘s Order on April 4, 2012. Prack dismissed the Interference with Employee charge and indicated that there was no change in penalty, which was recorded as one month in keeplock with the loss of privileges. (Id. at unnumbered 4.)
In his opposition papers, Plaintiff states that he suffer[ed] a significant hardship while being confined [in keeplock] because [he] was in severe pain from the assault on him on [January 13, 2012], and that the condition of [his] confinement along with [his] condition . . . were not normal conditions. (Pl.‘s Second Mem. at unnumbered 3; see also Pl.‘s Mem. of Law in Further Supp. Not To Dismiss the Second Am. Compl. With Its Exhibits (Pl.‘s Third Mem.) 2 (Dkt. No. 39) (explaining that Plaintiff was significantly injured during an earlier use of force, which cause[d] [him] greater discomfort).) Plaintiff states that he was confined with a severely injured back [and] neck condition, and that while confin[e]d with these injuries[,] [P]laintiff‘s medical provider . . . saw and treated [P]laintiff. (Pl.‘s Second Mem. at unnumbered 4.) In particular, Plaintiff states that his doctor placed him on Percocet on January 17, 2012 to help alleviate the severe pain and discomfort [that he] suffered because of
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed the original Complaint on January 27, 2014. (Dkt. No. 2.) On September 18, 2014, Plaintiff submitted a Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 25.) Attached to the Motion, Plaintiff submitted a Second Amended Complaint with attached exhibits alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id.) In an order dated September 26, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice, finding that it was premature, as Plaintiff first filed his Second Amended Complaint along with his Motion, and Defendant ha[d] not yet responded to this filing. (Order (Dkt. No. 26).) Pursuant to a briefing schedule set by the Court on November 13, 2014, (Dkt. No. 29), Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss and accompanying papers on December 18, 2014, (Dkt. Nos. 32–33), Plaintiff submitted his opposition papers, which included two memoranda of law in opposition to the Motion, on January 5, 2015, (Dkt. Nos. 36–38), and Defendant filed his reply on January 9, 2015, (Dkt. No. 35). Plaintiff submitted a third memorandum of law in opposition to the Motion on January 26, 2015. (Dkt. No. 39.)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff‘s obligation to provide the grounds of his
In considering Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court is required to consider as true the factual allegations contained in the Complaint. See Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (We review de novo a district court‘s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to
Generally, [i]n adjudicating a
B. Procedural Due Process Claim
1. Applicable Law
[T]o present a due process claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he possessed a liberty interest and (2) that the defendant(s) deprived him of that interest as a result of insufficient process. Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 654 (2d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has held that inmates retain due process rights in prison disciplinary proceedings. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–72 (1974) (describing the procedural protections that inmates are to receive when subject to significant disciplinary punishment). However, the Supreme Court has held that [p]rison discipline implicates a liberty interest [only] when it imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 654 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). The Second Circuit has explained that [t]he length of disciplinary confinement is one of the guiding factors in applying Sandin‘s atypical and significant hardship test. Hanrahan v. Doling, 331 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The duration of confinement, however, is not the only relevant factor, and the Second Circuit has explicitly avoided a bright line rule that a certain period of [Solitary Housing Unit (SHU)] confinement automatically fails to implicate due process rights. Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, [t]he conditions of confinement are a distinct and equally important consideration in determining whether a confinement in SHU rises to the level of atypical and severe hardship,
As a guidepost to determine whether due process protections are required in the prison context, the Second Circuit has instructed that [w]here the plaintiff was confined for an intermediate duration—between 101 and 305 days—development of a detailed record of the conditions of the confinement relative to ordinary prison conditions is required. Palmer, 364 F.3d at 64–65 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Abdur-Raheem v. Caffery, No. 13-CV-6315, 2015 WL 667528, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) (same). Moreover, although shorter confinements under normal SHU conditions may not implicate a prisoner‘s liberty interest, [the Second Circuit has] explicitly noted that SHU confinements of fewer than 101 days could constitute atypical and significant hardships if the conditions were more severe than the normal SHU conditions . . . or a more fully developed record showed that even relatively brief confinements under normal SHU conditions were, in fact, atypical. Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65 (citation omitted). The court may resolve the issue of atypicality as a matter of law only when the conditions are uncontested. Houston v. Cotter, 7 F. Supp. 3d 283, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that [i]n the absence of a detailed factual record, [it has] affirmed dismissal of due process claims only in cases where the period of time spent in SHU was exceedingly short—less than the 30 days that the Sandin plaintiff spent in SHU—and there was no indication that the plaintiff endured unusual SHU conditions. Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65–66; see also Houston, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 298 (same).
However, a prison official who refuses to call a requested witness has a constitutional obligation to explain to the prisoner-defendant why the witness was not allowed to testify.
2. Application
Defendant argues that Plaintiff‘s due process claim must fail because although Plaintiff alleges that he was in keeplock, he fails to allege the period of time. (Def. Royce‘s Mem. of Law in Supp. of His Mot. To Dismiss the Second Am. Compl. (Def.‘s Mem.) 5 (Dkt. No. 33).) While Plaintiff does not specifically allege the duration of his confinement as a result of the disciplinary proceeding, the documents that Plaintiff attaches to his Second Amended Complaint, which the Court properly considers in the instant Motion, provide relevant information. Specifically, Plaintiff attaches a document titled Superintendent Hearing Disposition Rendered, which indicates that Defendant found Plaintiff guilty of Interference with Employee, Refusing Direct Order, and a Movement Regulation Violation. (SAC Ex. A at unnumbered 2.) The penalties that Defendant imposed are recorded on the document, but they are difficult to read in Plaintiff‘s filing. (Id.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff attaches another document titled Review of Superintendent‘s Hearing, which indicates that after review of Defendant‘s decision, the reviewing officer noted that there was no change in penalty, and Plaintiff was to
As explained above, the length of confinement is a factor that the Court considers in determining whether disciplinary punishment im-poses atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Hanrahan, 331 F.3d at 97 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). Here, Plaintiff‘s confinement of one month was relatively brief. See Palmer, 364 F.3d at 64–66 (indicating that an intermediate duration of confinement is between 101 and 305 days, and an exceedingly short period of confinement is less than . . . 30 days). Indeed, the [30]-day confinement is right at the cut-off suggested by [the Second Circuit] for a presumptively typical confinement. Ellerbe v. Jasion, No. 12-CV-580, 2015 WL 1064739, at *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 11, 2015).
Of course, the duration of Plaintiff‘s confinement is not the only relevant factor, and [t]he conditions of confinement are a distinct and equally important consideration in determining whether a confinement in SHU rises to the level of atypical and severe hardship. Palmer, 364 F.3d at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted). In his opposition papers, Plaintiff states that he suffer[ed] a significant hardship while being confined [in keeplock] because [he] was in severe pain from the assault on him on [January 13, 2012], and that the condition of [his] confinement along with [his condition] . . . were not normal conditions. (Pl.‘s Second Mem. at unnumbered 3; see also Pl.‘s Third Mem. 2 (explaining that Plaintiff suffered from an
Even liberally construed and taking these claims as true, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that plausibly establish that his confinement in keeplock was atypical. Plaintiff states that the conditions of his confinement were not normal. (Id. at unnumbered 3). However, he does not explain how the conditions were atypical of the standard conditions in keeplock or prison life in general. Cf. Ortiz, 380 F.3d at 655 (explaining that based on allegations that for at least part of his confinement, [the plaintiff] was kept in SHU for twenty-four hours a day, was not permitted an hour of daily exercise, and was prevented from showering for weeks at a time, the Second Circuit concluded that, if proved, they could establish conditions in SHU far inferior to those prevailing in the prison in general (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Although Plaintiff claims that he was in severe pain during his stay in keeplock, it is clear from his
Because . . . Plaintiff has failed to allege a liberty interest, it is not necessary to reach the issue of whether he was provided sufficient process in the hearing on the allegedly fabricated charges. Jean-Laurent v. Lane, No. 11-CV-186, 2013 WL 600213, at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013), adopted by 2013 WL 599893 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013). Nevertheless, in light of Plaintiff‘s pro se status, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Second Amended Complaint to allege facts regarding the conditions of his confinement. See Torres, 2011 WL 1811003, at *4 (recommending that the plaintiff be granted leave to amend his due process claim to the extent
C. Eighth Amendment Claim
1. Applicable Law
The conditions of a prisoner‘s confinement can give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 2002). In such cases, a prisoner may prevail only where he proves both an objective element—that the prison officials’ transgression was sufficiently serious—and a subjective element—that the officials acted, or omitted to act, with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. Id. (italics omitted) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Under the objective requirement, a plaintiff must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to [an inmate‘s] health, which can be satisfied if an inmate is deprived of basic human needs such as food, clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary living conditions. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). [T]o establish the objective element of an Eight[h] Amendment claim, a prisoner must prove that the conditions of his confinement violate contemporary standards of decency. Phelps, 308 F.3d at 185.
Under the subjective requirement, a defendant cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
Finally, as the Second Circuit has made clear, [p]roof of an individual defendant‘s personal involvement in the alleged wrong is, of course, a prerequisite to his liability on a claim for damages under § 1983. Gaston, 249 F.3d at 164. Personal involvement may be established by evidence of direct participation in the challenged conduct, or by evidence of a supervisory official‘s (1) failure to take corrective action after learning of a subordinate‘s unlawful conduct, (2) creation of a policy or custom fostering the unlawful conduct, (3) gross negligence in supervising subordinates who commit unlawful acts, or (4) deliberate indifference to the rights of others by failing to act on information regarding the unlawful conduct of subordinates. Reid, 2014 WL 4185195, at *12 (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 753 (2d Cir. 2003)).
2. Application
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment. (SAC ¶¶ 20–21.) In particular, Plaintiff claims that Defendant cause[d] [him] severe pain stem[m]ing from both physical injuries and the denial of procedural [and] substantive due process with his actions to [] conspir[e] with witnesses he call[ed] to testify on record at the [Tier] III hearing. (Id. ¶ 40.) Nothing in the Second Amended Complaint,
Moreover, while it is clear that Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was personally involved in a conspiracy to deprive him of due process and did in fact deprive him of due process, Plaintiff does not contend that the conditions [at the Hearing or in keeplock], either alone or in combination, pose[d] an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health. Walker, 717 F.3d at 125. As explained above, Plaintiff does not contend that his confinement in keeplock contributed to or otherwise exacerbated his back and neck pain, which allegedly resulted from Jones‘s assault. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that he was deprived of basic human needs while he was confined. See id. ([C]onditions of confinement may be aggregated to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise. (internal
D. Equal Protection Claim
1. Applicable Law
The Equal Protection Clause has traditionally been applied to governmental classifications that treat certain groups of citizens differently than others. Fahs Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Gray, 725 F.3d 289, 291 (2d Cir. 2013). Where, as here, a plaintiff does not claim to be a member of a constitutionally protected class, he may bring an Equal Protection claim pursuant to one of two theories: (1) selective enforcement, or (2) class of one. Vaher v. Town of Orangetown, 916 F. Supp. 2d 404, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rankel v. Town of Somers, 999 F. Supp. 2d 527, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same). To state an equal protection claim on a theory of selective enforcement or selective treatment, a plaintiff must show that (1) he, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated, and (2) the selective treatment was motivated by an intention to discriminate on the basis of impermissible considerations, such as race or religion, or to punish or inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights, or by a malicious or bad faith intent to injure the plaintiff. Vaher, 916 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (alterations omitted) (quoting Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 683 (2d Cir. 1995)). To allege an Equal Protection Clause violation under a class-of-one theory, the plaintiff must allege that (i) no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to a degree that would justify the differential treatment on the basis of a legitimate governmental policy; and (ii) the similarity in circumstances and difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted on the basis of mistake. Fahs Constr. Grp., Inc., 725 F.3d at 292 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a plaintiff asserting a class of one equal protection claim must allege that the intentional disparate treatment alleged to state the first element of the claim was wholly arbitrary
2. Application
Plaintiff does not claim to be a member of a protected class in his Second Amended Complaint. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that he was not only treated differently, but single[d] out as an individual for arbitrary and irrational treatment. (SAC ¶ 24.) Accordingly, the Court construes the claim as an Equal Protection claim under a theory of selective enforcement or a class of one theory. Under either theory, however, Plaintiff‘s claim fails because he does not specifically allege differential treatment from similarly situated individuals. Vaher, 916 F. Supp. 2d at 433–34 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the Second Amended Complaint does not allege that [Plaintiff] was treated differently from any identified individuals, let alone individuals who he claims were similarly situated to him in any respect and is completely devoid of any reference to similarly situated or substantially similar individuals. Id. at 434–35 (dismissing the plaintiff‘s equal protection claim under theories of selective enforcement and class of one where the plaintiff simply alleged that the defendants singled out [the] plaintiff, in part, because of his exercise of constitutional rights (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Butler v. Bridgehampton Fire Dist., No. 14-CV-1429, 2015 WL 1396442, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2015) (dismissing the plaintiff‘s equal protection claim under the selective enforcement and class of one theories because the complaint only discusse[d] the harmful actions [the defendants] took with respect to [the] [p]laintiff, but there [was] no discussion whatsoever of any similarities between [the] [p]laintiff and others); Jones v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 947 F. Supp. 2d 270, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
E. Conspiracy Claim
1. Applicable Law
Claims for conspiracy to violate civil rights, even if brought under
2. Application
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was personally involved in conspiring with witnesses he personally call[ed] to testify at the [Hearing] and that he acted in concert [with Jones, Hamburg, and Tokarz ] to violate Plaintiff‘s rights. (SAC ¶ 14.) Plaintiff claims that [t]he record . . . of the [Hearing] will clearly show that . . . Defendant . . . personally involved hi[mself] in conspiring with his witnesses[] that he call[ed] to testify against [P]laintiff, and that Hamburg and Jones gave different testimony concerning the assault that resulted in [Plaintiff‘s] . . . permanent injury to his neck and lower spine. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff further explains that the tape of the Hearing shows that Plaintiff was confined at 5:10 p.m., specifically that Jones told Tokarz about the use of force on [P]laintiff at 7:10 p[.]m[.] and Tokarz then state[d] to . . . Jones to write a[n] incident report after 7 p[.]m[.] in which . . . the report . . . clearly states
To begin, Plaintiff does not allege some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind [Defendant‘s] action[s]. Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hickey, 2004 WL 2724079, at *22 (same). Further, Plaintiff does not provide any specific facts to plausibly suggest that Defendant entered into an agreement, express or tacit, to achieve [an] unlawful end. Webb, 340 F.3d at 110. Instead, Plaintiff merely states that Defendant was involved in conspiring with the witnesses he called to testify at the Hearing. Although Plaintiff points to the record of the Hearing, Plaintiff fails to explain or otherwise allege how the record supports his conspiracy claim. Moreover, even liberally construing Plaintiff‘s allegations that Jones and Tokarz engaged in conversation about the incident on January 13, 2012, Plaintiff does not explain how Defendant entered into any agreement or understanding that they may have formed. In short, because Plaintiff fails to offer specific facts to suggest that Defendant and witnesses at the Hearing agreed to conspire against Plaintiff, the conspiracy claim is dismissed. See Webb, 340 F.3d at 111 (affirming the district court‘s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim because [t]he plaintiffs have not alleged, except in the most conclusory fashion, that any such meeting of the minds occurred among any or all of the defendants); Bermudez v. City of N.Y., No. 11-CV-750, 2013 WL 593791, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2013) (dismissing a conspiracy claim because [w]hile [the] [p]laintiff allege[d] certain wrongdoings committed by [the defendants] . . . nothing in the [a]mended [c]omplaint plausibly suggest[ed] that these acts were done in furtherance of an agreed upon conspiracy (citations omitted)); Lastra, 2012 WL 12876, at *7 (noting that [u]nsubstantiated, conclusory, vague[,] or general allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim under
F. Substantive Due Process Claim
1. Applicable Law
Plaintiff claims that his substantive due process rights were violated. (SAC ¶¶ 22–23.) Substantive due process protects individuals against government action that is arbitrary, conscience-shocking, or oppressive in a constitutional sense, but not against government action that is incorrect or ill-advised. Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish a violation of substantive due process rights, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the state action was so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience. Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep‘t, 577 F.3d 415, 431 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court held that [w]here a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’ See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395); see also Medeiros v. O‘Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1998) (same). Nevertheless, Graham did not hold that all constitutional claims relating to physically abusive government conduct must arise under either the Fourth or Eighth Amendments; rather, Graham simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997).
2. Application
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant‘s actions were totally illegal as a matter of law and were not only indifferent toward [P]laintiff, [but also] . . . intentional and[/]or purposeful discrimination. (SAC ¶ 23.) Because [Plaintiff‘s] deliberate indifference claim is covered by the Eighth Amendment, the substantive due process claim[] [is] duplicative under the rule articulated by . . . Albright and . . . Graham . . . . Madison v. Mazzuca, No. 02-CV-10299, 2004 WL 3037730, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2004). Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff alleges his substantive due process rights were violated because Defendant‘s actions amounted to intentional and[/]or purposeful discrimination, (SAC ¶ 23), the claim is covered by the Equal Protection Clause. See Segreto v. Town of Islip, 12-CV-1961, 2014 WL 737531, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2014) ([C]ourts in this circuit have held that, where a substantive due process claim is duplicative of an equal protection claim, the substantive due process claim should be dismissed. (citing, inter alia, Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1351 n.8 (2d Cir. 1994))). Finally, Plaintiff‘s claims that Defendant refused to call or credit certain witnesses or properly evaluate the evidence at the Hearing are allegations covered by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the substantive due process claim is dismissed as duplicative of the claims Plaintiff has asserted in the Second Amended Complaint. See Rother v. N.Y.S. Dep‘t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 970 F. Supp. 2d 78, 100 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing substantive due process claim where it s[ought] to remedy the same harm and challenge[d] the same conduct as plaintiff‘s procedural due process claim); Roman v. Velleca, No. 11-CV-1867, 2012 WL 4445475, at *10 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012) ([S]ubstantive due process claims must be dismissed where they are merely duplicative of claims explicitly protected under other constitutional sources.).
III. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court grants Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‘s Second Amended Complaint. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the pending Motion. (Dkt. No. 32.) Plaintiff may file a Third Amended Complaint within 30 days of the date of this Order.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 1, 2015
White Plains, New York
KENNETH M. KARAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE