Lead Opinion
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff
Plaintiff instituted the underlying cause of action on May 28, 1997, seeking recovery for the decreased revenues he experienced due to closure of the Route 901 overpass. Asserting that his reduced revenues were proximately caused by the accident, Plaintiff seeks recovery of $9,000 in lost income.
Arguing that as a matter of law Plaintiff could not recover for his economic losses in the absence of
Following the circuit court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the parties requested and the circuit court agreed to certification of the following issue:
Whether a claimant who has sustained no physical damage to his person or property may maintain an action against another fornegligent injury to another’s property which results consequentially in purely economic loss to the claimant.
The circuit court answered this question in the affirmative. In syllabus point three of Kincaid v. Mangum,
When a certified question is not framed so that this Court is able to fully address the law which is involved in the question, then this Court retains the power to reformulate questions certified to it under both the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act found in W.Va.Code, 51-1A-1, et seq., and W.Va.Code, 58-5-2 [1967], the statute relating to certified questions from a circuit court of this State to this Court.
Recognizing that this Court, in addressing certified questions, has “retained the right to address them with some flexibility!,]” we re-frame the question presented in the case sub judice to more thoroughly encompass the full breadth of the question to be answered. Miller v. Lambert,
May a claimant who has sustained purely economic loss as a result of an interruption in commerce caused by negligent injury to the property of a third person recover damages absent either privity of contract or some other special relationship with the alleged tortfeasor?
We answer this question in the negative.
II. Standard of Review
We recognized in syllabus point one of Light v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
III. The Existence of a Duty
The resolution of any question of tort liability must be premised upon fundamental concepts of the duty owed by the tortfeasor.
“In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence in West Virginia, it must be shown that the defendant has been guilty of some act or omission in violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff. No action for negligence will lie without a duty broken.” Syl. Pt. 1, Parsley v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,167 W.Va. 866 ,280 S.E.2d 703 (1981).
Syl. Pt. 4, Jack v. Fritts,
Given our reliance on Hatten, we must address a recent misapprehension of that decision in Harris v. R.A. Martin, Inc.,
This declaration is in accord with prior West Virginia law, as well as legal commentators on this issue. In Miller v. Whitworth,
We recognized in Robertson v. Le-Master,
In Puffer v. Huh Cigar Store,
Emphasizing the relationship between foreseeability and duty, we explained in syllabus point three of Sewell v. Gregory,
The ultimate test of the existence of a duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised. The test is, would the ordinary man in the defendant’s position, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result?
Commentators have similarly evaluated the critical element of duty:
[T]he obligation to refrain from particular conduct is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the . conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Duty, in other words, is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails.
2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 18.2 (1956) footnote omitted.
IV. Restrictions on Limitless Expansion of Duty
The appropriate application of these fundamental tort principles has served as a source of great controversy. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
Perhaps the most acclaimed declaration of the concept of duty was announced by Justice Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized the need to draw a line to prevent unfettered imposition of unlimited exposure to liability. The Supreme Court reasoned that the doctrine of remoteness is a component of proximate cause, which in turn embraces the concept that “the judicial remedy cannot encompass every conceivable harm that can be traced to alleged wrongdoing.” Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters,
The need to restrict the spatial concept of duty to something less than the limits of logical connection was cogently stated as follows in In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV,
There is no question but that the Exxon Valdez grounding impacted, in one fashion or another, far more people than will ever recover anything in these proceedings. There is an understandable public perception that if one suffers harm which is perceived to be a result of the conduct of another, the harmed person should be compensated. That perception does not always square up with the institutional guidelines (statutes and case law) under which the court must operate. It is the function of both Congress and the courts (principally the courts of appeal and supreme courts) to determine the extent to which public expectations with respect to financial responsibility are to be realized. Legal liability does not always extend to all of the foreseeable consequences of an accident. In the area of harm to one’s body, the reach of what is recoverable is very great. Where one’s property is injured, the extent of legal liability is considerable, but not to the same extent as with bodily injury. Where pure economic loss is at issue — not connected with any injury to one’s body or property, and especially where that economic loss occurs in a marine setting — the reach of legal liability is quite limited except as to commercial fishermen.2
Were it otherwise, we would have a form, of organized anarchy in which no one could count on what rule would apply at any given time or in any given situation.
Id. at 8-9 (footnote and emphasis added).
While the holding of the majority in Harris is not in conflict with our decision in the present ease, we underscore the reasoning of Justice Maynard in his insightful dissent in Harris. Justice Maynard cautioned against the limitless expansion of the element of duty, postulating that the majority had “so expanded] the element of duty, that its existence now becomes almost a given in any tort case. If a party is injured by the conduct of another, there must have been a duty to avoid such conduct.”
A line must be drawn between the competing policy considerations of providing a remedy to everyone who is injured and of extending exposure to tort liability almost without limit. It is always tempting to impose new duties and, concomitantly, liabilities, regardless of the economic and social burden. Thus, the courts have generally recognized that public policy and social considerations, as well as foreseeability, are important factors in determining whether a duty will be held to exist in a particular situation.
The obvious question: Who draws the line demarcating tort liability? Who, in our society, has the burden of defining the existence and extent of the element of “duty” in tort actions? It necessarily falls to the courts to consider all relevant claims of the competing parties; to determine where and upon whom the burden of carrying the risk of injury will fall; and to draw the line, to declare the existence or absence of “duty,” in every case, as a matter of law. The temptation is to accede to the arguments of logical connection in every instance of resulting harm while, in fact, the consequences of pure logic would be socially and economically ruinous.
V. Traditional Approach — No Economic Damages in the Absence of Physical Impact
The sole issue presented for our resolution is whether economic loss from an interruption in commerce in the absence of damage to a plaintiffs person or property is recoverable in a tort action. While this Court has never directly addressed this issue, other jurisdictions, almost without exception, have concluded that economic loss alone will not warrant recovery in the absence of some special relationship between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor. In the seminal decision of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,
Where the factual scenario involves a plaintiffs contractual right to use property damaged by a tortfeasor, courts have invoked the Restatement of Torts as a basis for denying causes of action limited to economic damages. In Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson,
In denying economic damages in the absence of physical impact, courts frequently refer to this element of remoteness between the injury and the act of negligence that is the source of such injury. In Rickards v. Sun Oil Co.,
The entire doctrine assumes the defendant is not. necessarily to be held for all consequences of his acts. Professor McLaughlin, Article 39 Harvard Law Review (Dec.1925) 149 at 155. It is fundamental that there must be some reasonable limitation of liability for the commission of the tort. The wrongdoer is not liable in the eyes of the law for all possible consequences. He is thus responsible in damages only for the natural and probable consequence of his negligent act.
In Kohl v. Love,
The limit of the doctrine relating to actionable negligence is, that the person occasioning the loss must owe a duty, arising from contract or otherwise, to the person sustaining such loss. Such a restriction on the right to sue for a want of care in the exercise of employments or the transaction of business, is plainly necessary to restrain the remedy from being pushed to an impracticable extreme. There would be no bounds to actions and litigious intricacies, if the ill effects of the negligences of men could be followed down the chain of results to the final effect.
Id. at 8 (emphasis supplied); see also In re Marine Navigation Sulphur Carriers, Inc. v. Lone Star Indus.,
In General Foods Corp. v. United States,
Courts which have addressed this issue have repeatedly expressed concern that a contrary rule would open the door to virtually limitless suits, often of a highly speculative and remote nature. Such suits would expose the negligent defendant to a severe penalty, and would produce serious problems in litigation, particularly in the areas of proof and apportionment of damages.
In an analogous ease, Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Carp.,
The recognized necessity of imposing a line of demarcation on actionable theories of recovery serves as another rationale for the denial of purely economic damages. In Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas. Co.,
While the reason usually given for the refusal to permit recovery in this class of cases is that the damages are “indirect” or are “too remote” it is our opinion that the principal reason that has motivated the courts in denying recovery in this class of eases is that to permit recovery of damages in such cases would open the door to a mass of litigation which might very well overwhelm the courts so that in the long run while injustice might result in special cases, the ends of justice are conserved.
Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
In similar fashion, the Seventh Circuit, in affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action seeking economic damages arising from a bridge closing, reasoned that extension of liability in the absence of harm to a plaintiffs person or property would thrust courts into “a field with no sensible or just stopping point.” Leadfree Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,
Astutely anticipating the economic chaos that would result from permitting theoretically limitless recovery of economic injury, the court in Aikens v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.,
that allowance of a cause of action for negligent interference with economic advantage would create an undue burden upon industrial freedom of action, and would create a disproportion between the large amount of damages that might be recovered and the extent of the defendant’s fault. To allow a cause of action for negligent cause of purely economic loss would be to open the door to every person in the economic chain of the negligent person or business to bring a cause of action. Such an outstanding burden is clearly inappropriate and a danger to our economic system.
Id. at 279 (citation omitted).
In analyzing the development of legal theories regarding the efficacy of permitting economic damages in the absence of physical harm, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in State of Louisiana v. M/V Testbank,
After extensive additional briefs and oral argument, we are unpersuaded that we ought to drop physical damage to a proprietary interest as a prerequisite to recovery for economic loss. To the contrary, our reexamination of the history and central purpose of this pragmatic restriction on the doctrine of foreseeability heightens our commitment to it. Ultimately we conclude that without this limitation foreseeability loses much of its ability to function as a rule of law.
VI. The Minority View: Recovery of Economic Damages Under Limited Circumstances
A few jurisdictions have permitted recovery of economic damages without damage to person or property under certain limited circumstances. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s approach to this concept is recognized as the leading authority for the minority view and represents a departure from a substantial collection of American and British cases. In People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
Narrowly crafting its decision to apply to a limited and particularized group, the New Jersey court held:
that a defendant owes a duty of care to take reasonable measures to avoid the risk of causing economic damages, aside from physical injury, to particular plaintiffs or plaintiffs comprising an identifiable class with respect to whom defendant knows or has reason to know are likely to suffer such damages from its conduct. A defendant failing to adhere to this duty of care may be found liable for such economic damages proximately caused by its breach of duty.
the close proximity of the North Terminal and People Express Airlines to the Conrail freight yard; the obvious nature of the plaintiffs operations and particular foreseeability of economic losses resulting from an accident and evacuation; the defendants’ actual or constructive knowledge of the volatile properties of ethylene oxide; and the existence of an emergency response plan prepared by some of the defendants(alluded to in the course of oral argument), which apparently called for the nearby area to be evacuated to avoid the risk of harm in case of an explosion.
Id. at 118. In fashioning its test, the court in People Express determined that liability and foreseeability “stand in direct proportion to one another[:] The more particular is the foreseeability that economic loss will be suffered by the plaintiff as a result of defendant’s negligence, the more just is it that liability be imposed and recovery allowed.” Id. at 116.
An analysis of the facts involved in the People Express decision supports the conclusion that the New Jersey court traversed a logical path more closely akin to that navigat-' ed in cases involving physical damage to property. Subsequent to the Three Mile Island nuclear incident, plaintiffs similarly asserted claims of temporary loss of use of property and “damage to property” as a result of the intrusion of radioactive materials through the ambient air. In resolving their claims in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. General Public Utilities Corp.,
Analysts of the People Express rationale have also criticized the wisdom of that approach by emphasizing that the “Court itself noted the contradictory and inconsistent nature of its reasoning” by acknowledging the inherent limitations to predicating recovery on a principle of particular foreseeability. Lear Siegler,
some cases will present circumstances that defy the categorization here devised to circumscribe a defendant’s orbit of duty, limit otherwise boundless liability and define an identifiable class of plaintiffs that may recover. In these eases, the courts will be required to draw upon notions of fairness, common sense and morality to fix the line limiting liability as a matter of public policy, rather than an uncritical application of the principle of particular foreseeability.
In another case typically referenced as supportive of a minority position on this issue, a California court applied the “special relationship” exception and permitted a restaurant owner to sue for lost profits allegedly caused by a contractor’s failure to promptly install and maintain an air conditioner. J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory,
In another case frequently cited as support for the minority position, an employer sought recovery for economic loss sustained as a result of tortious injuries to his employees. Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College,
The special relationship between the plaintiff and the alleged tortfeasor was also emphasized in another case frequently cited for the minority view. In Hawthorne v. Kober Construction Co.,
[B]y entering into a contract with A, the defendant may place himself in such a relation toward B that the law will impose upon him an obligation, sounding in tort and not in contract, to act in such a way that B will not be injured. The incidental fact of the existence of the contract with A does not negative the responsibility of the actor when he enters upon a course of affirmative conduct which may be expected to affect the interests of another person.
VII. Conclusion
After thoroughly considering the intricacies of a potential rule permitting the recovery of economic damages absent physical or personal injury, we conclude that an individual who sustains purely economic loss from an interruption in commerce caused by another’s negligence may not recover damages in the absence of physical harm to that individual’s person or property, a contractual relationship with the alleged tortfeasor, or some other special relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and the individual who sustains purely economic damages sufficient to compel the conclusion that the tortfeasor had a duty to the particular plaintiff and that the injury complained of was clearly foreseeable to the tortfeasor. The existence of a special relationship will be determined largely by the extent to which the particular plaintiff is affected differently from society in general. It may be evident from the defendant’s knowledge or specific reason to know of the potential consequences of the wrongdoing, the persons likely to be injured, and the damages likely to be suffered. Such special relationship may be proven through evidence of foreseeability of the nature of the harm to be suffered by the particular plaintiff or an identifiable class and can arise from contractual privity or other close nexus. As observed by the Maryland court in L & P Converters v. Ailing & Cory Co.,
We base our holding upon our analysis of the complexities of this area of tort law, demonstrated through both historical evolvement and current concerns, and our belief that a hybrid approach must be fabricated to authorize recovery of meritorious claims while simultaneously providing a barrier against limitless liability. The common thread which permeates the analysis of potential economic recovery in the absence of physical harm is the recognition of the underlying concept of duty. Absent some special relationship, the confines of which will differ depending upon the facts of each relationship, there simply is no duty. A thorough examination of the cases comprising what has been referenced as the minority view reveals reasoning similar to ours, which provides the opportunity for recovery only upon a showing of a special relationship between the plaintiff and alleged tortfeasor and narrowly tailors the recovery to conform to the facts of the case under scrutiny.
Our decision under the limited factual scenario presented in this certified question has no impact upon our prior rulings permitting recovery of purely economic damages in negligence actions where a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the alleged tortfeasor. Our holding in the case sub judice is, in fact, consistent with the rationale underlying such rulings, and we affirm our previous recognition that where a special and narrowly defined relationship can be established between the tortfeasor and a plaintiff who was deprived of an economic benefit, the tortfeasor can be held liable. In cases of that nature, the duty exists because of the special relationship. The special class of plaintiffs involved in those cases were particularly foreseeable to the tortfeasor, and the economic losses were proximately caused by the tortfeasor’s negligence.
For example, auditors
We also emphasize that the holding of this ease applies strictly to plaintiffs alleging purely economic loss from an interruption in commerce caused by another’s negligence. This opinion therefore does not encompass, and has no effect upon, our prior rulings regarding medical monitoring, negligent infliction of emotional distress cases, or nuisance law. See Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
The resolution of this matter of restrictions on tort liability is ultimately a matter of “practical polities.” Palsgraf,
In determining questions of duty and extension of duty to particular plaintiffs, the court in Stevenson echoed widespread speculation concerning the ripple effects of a negligence claim based upon pure economic loss and observed:
Cases might well occur where a manufacturer would be obliged to close down his factory because of the inability of his supplier due to a fire loss to make prompt deliveries; the power company with a contract to supply a factory with electricity would be deprived of the profit which it would have made if the operation of the factory had not been interrupted by reason of fire damage; a man who had a contract to paint a building may not be able to proceed with his work; a salesman who would have sold the products of the factory may be deprived of his commissions; the neighborhood restaurant which relies on the trade of the factory employees may suffer a substantial loss. The claims of workmen for loss of wages who were employedin such a factory and cannot continue to work there because of a fire, represent only a small fraction of the claims which would arise if recovery is allowed in this class of cases.
In an endeavor to focus upon the rights of other innocent parties not typically considered, a commentator reconstructs the Stevenson paradigm, as follows:
Cases might well occur where a manufacturer would be obliged to close down his factory [and the manufacturer’s employees would be obliged to spend days idle and without income] because of the inability of [the manufacturer’s] supplier due to a fire loss to make prompt deliveries; the [employees of a] power company with a contract to supply a factory with electricity would be deprived of [their income] which [they] would have made if the operations of the factory had not been interrupted by reason of fire damage; a [person] who had a contract to paint [the worker’s house] may not be able to proceed with [the] work; a [travel agent] who would have sold [the workers vacation packages] may be deprived of [her] commissions; the [teen-age gardener, the grocer’s delivery person, the piano teacher, and the weekly housekeeper who serviced the worker’s home and family] may [each] suffer a substantial loss.
Silverstein, Eileen, On Recovery in Tort for Pure Economic Loss, 32 U.Mich.J.L.Ref 403, 437 (1999).
Tort law is essentially a recognition of limitations expressing finite boundaries of recovery. Using the absurdity of these chain-of-reaction but purely logical examples, courts and commentators have expressed disdain for limitless liability and have also cautioned against the potential injustices which might result. This Court’s obligation is to draw a line beyond which the law will not extend its protection in tort, and to declare, as a matter of law, that no duty exists beyond that court-created line. It is not a matter of protection of a certain class of defendants; nor is it a matter of championing the causes of a certain class of plaintiffs. It is a question of public policy. Each segment of society will suffer injustice, whether situated as plaintiff or defendant, if there are no finite boundaries to liability and no confines within which the rights of plaintiffs and defendants can be determined. We accept the wise admonition expressed over a century ago, in language both simple and eloquent, proven by the passage of time and the lessons of experience: “There would be no bounds to actions and litigious intricacies, if the ill effects of the negligences of men could be followed down the chain of results to the final effect.” Kahf
Certified Question Answered.
Notes
. An additional named plaintiff is Motel 81, Inc., d/b/a Martinsburg Econo-Lodge.
. The Ninth Circuit, in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,
. In Robins Dry Dock, the court stated:
[A]s a general rule, at least, a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other unknown to the doer of the wrong.
. The prohibition against economic recovery in tort in the absence of physical impact is apparent in the context of product liability actions, in which the economic losses are essentially contractual and allocable by the parties, as reflected in purchase price warranties, or insurance. See Bocre Leasing Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
. Section 766 provides as follows:
Negligent Interference with Contract or Prospective Contractual Relation. One is not liable to another for pecuniary harm not derived from physical harm to the other, if that harm results from the actor’s negligently
(a) causing a third person not to perform a contract with the other, or
(b) interfering with the other’s performance of his contract or making the performance more expensive or burdensome, or
(c) interfering with the other’s acquiring a contractual relation with a third person.
. See also Kingston Shipping Co., Inc. v. Roberts,
. Plaintiffs sought recovery in negligence as well as in strict liability and breach of implied warranty and fitness for a particular purpose.
. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,
. See Capper v. Gates,
. See Stemple v. Dobson,
. See National Sand, Inc. v. Nagel Constr., Inc.,
. See Board of Educ. v. Van Buren and Firestone, Architects, Inc.,
. See Keister v. Talbott,
. See Galloway v. Cinello,
. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tatum,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
(Filed Jan. 16, 2001)
The majority opinion demonstrates a classic struggle in the development of the common law: the battle between crafting remedies for people or businesses that are injured — even people or businesses injured in a purely economic sense — as a direct and proximate cause of a tortfeasor’s carelessness, and protecting litigants from random, unpredictable liability without limit.
I applaud the majority opinion’s bold step forward, and its recognition that a tortfeasor may owe a certain, clearly foreseeable party a duty of due care to avoid causing “an interruption in commerce” which results in purely economic loss. I write separately to emphasize that this Court is not in a position to predict every situation where a tortfea-sor’s actions may have an adverse effect on a party’s economic interests, a party with a “sufficiently close nexus or relationship” to the tortfeasor such that the tortfeasor’s actions may form the basis for liability. In applying the Court’s ruling to such situations in the future, circuit courts must use the existing concepts of legal duty, breach of that duty, and proximate causation to allow plaintiffs a remedy for their economic losses, while protecting defendants from tort liability almost without limit.
In the common law, it is widely recognized that the concept of “duty” is a flexible principle that is dependent upon circumstances.
The ultimate test of the existence of a duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised. The test is, would the ordinary man in the defendant’s position, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result?
The fundamental reasoning behind this test is that a defendant’s “liability to make reparation for an injury, by negligence, is founded upon an original moral duty, enjoined upon every person, so to conduct himself, or exercise his own rights, as not to injure another.”' Syllabus Point 8, Blaine v. Chesapeake & O.R.R. Co.,
The defendants in the instant ease argued that Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,
Commentators
When courts have resisted allowing plaintiffs to recover for negligently caused, but purely economic, losses, the courts have expressed concern about the judicial system
Commentators, however, point out that courts have allowed the grounds of liability to expand in every other area of tort law “despite the now commonplace awards of huge, unknowable sums in claims involving physical injuries.” Eileen Silverstein, “On Recovery in Tort for Pure Economic Loss,” 32 U.Mich. J.L.Ref. 403, 409 (1999). “As compared to awards for pain and suffering, the loss from economic injury is provable, not subjective or speculative.” Id at 423.
The answer to the allegation of unchecked liability is not the judicial obstruction of afairly grounded claim for redress. Rather, it must be a more sedulous application of traditional concepts of duty and proximate causation to the facts of each case.
It is understandable that courts, fearing that if even one deserving plaintiff suffering purely economic loss were allowed to recover, all such plaintiffs could recover, have anchored their rulings to the physical harm requirement. While the rationale is understandable, it supports only a limitation on, not a denial of, liability. The physical harm requirement capriciously showers compensation along the path of physical destruction, regardless of the status or circumstances of individual claimants. Purely economic losses are borne by innocent victims, who may not be able to absorb their losses. In the end, the challenge is to fashion a rule that limits liability but permits adjudication of meritorious claims. The asserted inability to fix crystalline formulae for recovery on the differing facts of future cases simply does not justify the wholesale rejection of recovery in all eases.
People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
Our law exists to provide remedies to those persons or entities who are injured, even in a purely economic sense, as a direct and proximate cause of a tortfeasor’s carelessness. Courts should not obstruct fairly grounded claims seeking to redress an economic wrong, and should only shield tortfea-sors from infinite liability through the “sedulous application of traditional concepts of duty and proximate causation to the facts of each case.” People Express,
I do not, and cannot, endeavor to predict every situation where a tortfeasor’s actions may have an adverse effect on a party’s economic interests, and when under the Court’s opinion those actions may form the basis for liability. I trust to the circuit courts the discretion to use the existing rule of “legal duty, the breach of that duty, and damage as a proximate result,” Sewell v. Gregory,
The majority opinion deftly sets forth a basis for holding defendants responsible for their actions, while simultaneously emphasizing the need for a finite boundary on liability. But the majority opinion is based upon a limited record and a certified question. Because the existence of a defendant’s duty is relative to the “circumstances of time, place, manner or person,” Syllabus Point 1, Dicken v. Liverpool Salt & Coal Co., supra, the evaluation of whether a defendant in a particular case had such a duty of care is a question for the circuit courts to consider on a case-by-case basis.
I therefore respectfully concur. I am authorized to state that Justice MeGRAW joins in this concurrence.
. See, e.g., Eileen Silverstein, "On Recovery In Tort for Pure Economic Loss,” 32 U.Mich. J.L.Ref. 403 (1999); Herbert Bernstein, "Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort Law,” 46 Am.J.Comp.L. 111 (1998); Matthew S. Steffey, "Negligence, Contract, and Architects’ Liability for Economic Loss,” 82 Ky. L.J. 659 (1994); Michael D. Lieder, "Constructing a New Action for Negligent Infliction of Economic Loss: Building on Cardozo and Coase,” 66 Wash.L.Rev. 937 (1991); Pegeen Mulhern, "Marine Pollution, Fishers, and the Pillars of the Land: A Tort Recovery Standard for Pure Economic Losses,” 18 B.C.Env.Aff.L.Rev. 85 (1990); Ann O’Brien, "Limited Recovery Rule as a Dam: Preventing a Flood of Litigation for Negligent Infliction of Pure Economic Loss,” 31 Ariz. L.Rev. 959 (1989); Kelly M. Hnatt, “Purely Economic Loss: A Standard for Recovery,” 73 Iowa L.Rev. 1181 (1988); Robert L. Rabin, "Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment,” 37 Stan.L.Rev. 1513 (1985); Comment, "Negligent Interference with Contract: Knowledge As a Standard for Recovery," 63 Va.L.Rev. 813 (1977); Case Note, "Torts— Interference with Business or Occupation — Commercial Fishermen Can Recover Profits Lost as a Result of Negligently Caused Oil Spill,” 88 Harv. L.Rev. 444 (1974); Harvey, "Economic Losses and Negligence, the Search for a Just Solution,” 50 Can.Bar.Rev. 580 (1972); Roger B. Godwin, "Negligent Interference with Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery,” 16 Stan.L.Rev. 664 (1964); Comment, "Foreseeability of Third Party Economic Injuries — A Problem in Analysis,” 20 U.Chi.L.Rev. 283 (1953). For an early article suggesting the need for reassessing the "no-liability” approach, see Charles E. Carpenter, "Interference with Contractual Relations,” 41 Harv.L.Rev.728 (1928).
. One commentator states:
A favorite illustration of the need to limit liability by not compensating pure economic injury is Judge Kaufman’s 1968 hypothetical [from Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo,388 F.2d 821 , 825 n. 8 (2d Cir.1968)] of the unlucky motorist whose inadvertence causes an accident that shuts down the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel during rush hour:
A driver who negligently caused such an accident would certainly be held accountable to those physically injured in the crash. But we doubt that damages would be recoverable against the negligent driver in favor of truckers or contract carriers who suffered provable losses because of the delay or to the wage earner who was forced to "clock in” an hour late. And yet it was surely foreseeable that among the many [thousands] who would be delayed would be truckers and wage earners.
Many readers may find themselves mentally nodding in agreement with Judge Kaufman. As described, liability to thousands, none of whom suffered physical injury, for mere inadvertence may look disproportionate, perhaps ruinous. But let us investigate this intuitive response. First, as compared to awards for pain and suffering, the loss from economic injury is provable, not subjective or speculative. And even if delay costs 3000 motorists an average of $500 each (a generous assumption), the negligent driver’s liability looks to be about $1.5 million, a significant sum, but hardly pauperizing in a world of multi-million dollar awards to one or two parties seriously injured in traffic accidents. Also noteworthy is the grouping of truckers and contract carriers with wage earners as equally undeserving claimants. The truckers and contract carriers are likely to be insured against losses occasioned by delays, whereas wage earners will not be. Perhaps eligibility for economic loss should exclude professional drivers and carriers in the course of their business, just as public safety officials cannot recover for negligently caused physical harm incurred while performing their jobs. But why exempt the wage-earners? Even more curious is the absence of any specific reference in the hypothetical to liability for property damage occasioned by the accident, the appropriately compensated being "those physically injured.” Certainly the car owner whose automobile, though not involved in the primary accident, suffers $5000 damages attributable to the negligently caused crash will receive compensation for repairs and consequent economic harm. Similarly, if the negligent motorist caused minor physical damage to 3000 vehicles, delaying each driver an hour, in principle all drivers could recover for their proven economic losses as consequential damages from injury to their property. Why should the fortuity of minor harm to property entitle these drivers to recover for economic loss? And what if two tennis stars on their way to compete in the United States Open are involved in this auto accident, one athlete suffering a minor wrist sprain while the other endures only a delay that results in a forfeited match? For both tennis players, the consequences that matter are identical; athletes with a chance at titles are denied a singular opportunity to prove themselves, losing rankings, prize money, and endorsements. But only the athlete with the sprained wrist has a compensable injury and the opportunity to claim consequential economic damages.
On the other hand, viewed through the lens of pragmatism, how likely is it that many wage earners docked one hour’s pay (or a class of wage earners) will engage lawyers to recover the lost earnings from the negligent driver? When the unusual claim for pure economic loss occurs, ought not the courts face the question of when "the link has become too tenuous — that what is claimed to be consequence is only fortuity”? And the hypothetical ignores third-party insurance and the benefit of spreading the risk among motorists, any one of whom could be the careless injurer or the unlucky injured. Thus, on close analysis the intuitive appeal of categorical denial of recovery for pure economic loss in order to forestall unacceptably widespread liability disappears. There may be instances of potentially ruinous liability but those instances do not serve as the foundation for the general rule prohibiting recovery for economic loss.
Eileen Silverstein, “On Recovery in Tort for Pure Economic Loss,” 32 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 403, 422-425 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
