52 Colo. 183 | Colo. | 1911
delivered the opinion of the court:
The substance of the plaintiff’s complaint is, that prior to and upon December i, 1902, when article XX
As we understand the contention of the plaintiff, it is to the effect, that the merger of the city and county of Denver provided for by article XX of the constitution did not take effect until the adoption of the new charter; that when article XX of the constitution went into effect it wiped out the old city and county and created a new city and county; that the instant the new county was created there came into existence, by force of the constitution and statutes of the state, every county office existing in any other county; that by virtue of section 4 of the article which declared that, as far as applicable, the charter of the old city should become the charter of the new city styled the city and county of Denver until the adoption of a new' charter, it operated instantly to create for the new city every single office which had previously existed
Article XX of the constitution received its latest consideration by this court in the case of The People ex rel. v. Cassiday et al, 50 Colo. 503, wherein, at page 507 we' said, “It, as any other part of the constitution, is to be given force and effect according to its plain intent, purpose and meaning.” Referring to the effect of section 3 in this article, we further said:
“Section 3 of the- article, by express provision, terminated, upon its adoption, the terms of office of all officers of the then city of Denver, of the included municipalities and of the old county of Arapahoe, a portion of which, together with the city of Denver and included municipalities, were then merged into the consolidated municipality of the city and county of D'enver. It in effect did away with all county officers and offices, purely as such, in the consolidated territory, and provided a single set of officers or agencies to perform, in the new municipality, all duties of a local nature and all duties pertaining to governmental, state and county affairs as well.”
From the above it will be observed that the consolidation of these offices was provided for immediately upon the adoption of this article. It follows as a matter of course that any portion of the old charter or ordinances of the city in conflict with this article of the constitution would not continue in force for the reason that they would not be applicable. From the opinion last cited, it will
In section 3 of this article it is next declared that the city engineer shall be ex officio county surveyor and that the chief of police shall be ex officio sheriff. If these provisions stood alone, there might be some room for arguing the existence of dual offices as to them, but when we come to the remaining offices, including the one in
In the case of Orahood v. Denver, 41 Colo. 172, involving another city official, we held that the constitutional amendment terminating the term, necessarily implies the cessation of the salary.
If, during this ad interim period the two offices continued absolutely intact with the salary attached to each, we then ask, what was the object to be accomplished in thus arbitrarily providing that one person who had been elected to the office of city clerk should have it taken away
Considering the purposes of article XX, including the phraseology .of section 3, it is clear the intent was, during' this ad interim period, that the office of city clerk as such should be abolished just .the same as the offices of county commissioners were, and that the duties pertaining to this office should be transferred and attached to the office of clerk and recorder for the city and county of
It follows that the plaintiff in error held but one office during this ad interim period and is not entitled to extra compensation for the performance of the additional duties, if any, which were by the constitution transferred and attached to his office.
The judgment is affirmed. ' Affirmed.
Decision en banc.