The sole issue we address in this appeal is whether a convict may maintain a successive application for post-conviction relief (PCR) on the ground that his first complete PCR application was insufficient due to ineffective PCR counsel. We hold that a successive application is not allowed on this basis, and we therefore аffirm the judgment of the lower court.
*449 FACTS
Michael Aice was convicted of two murders in a drive-by shooting incident in Columbia occurring at night on July 5, 1980. He received two consecutive life sentences for these crimes. Aice’s direct appeal was affirmed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 by this Court in 1982. Aice next petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, which was denied.
Aice filed his first application for PCR in 1983, alleging several grounds for relief. Following a hearing, Aice’s application was denied in 1985. Aice petitioned this Court for certiorari to review the decision of the PCR judge. In his petition to this Court, Aice argued three additional grounds for post-conviction relief. The State asserted that the additional grounds raised by Aice were procedurally barred, since they had not been raised before the lower PCR court. The State also contended that this Court should decline to overturn the PCR court on thosе grounds concededly properly raised by Aice. We denied Aice’s petition for certiorari in 1986.
Aice next attempted to obtain habeas corpus relief in federal court, but was unsuccessful. Subsequently, Aice filed a second, and therefore successive, application for PCR, raising the same three additional issues not raised in his first PCR application before the first PCR lower court. These grounds were raised under the rubric of the alleged ineffectiveness of the first PCR trial counsel in failing to raise these issues. The second PCR court summarily dismissed the application on procedural grounds, as impermissibly successive. Aice petitioned this Court for certiorari to review this latest ruling, and we agreed to review the decision.
LAW/ANALYSIS
Aice argues that he should be allowed to file a sеcond application for PCR because: (1) he has three arguments of great merit rendering his conviction fundamentally unfair; and (2) his counsel in his first PCR application was ineffective in failing to make those arguments. As an initial matter, we disagree that any of the three grounds for relief argued by Aice have merit. However, we need not have even reviewed Aice’s asserted grounds since we agree with the lower court that Aice’s successive PCR application should be summarily dismissed on procedural grounds.
*450 South Carolina Code Ann. § 17-27-90 provides:
All grounds for relief аvailable to an applicant under this chapter must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in thе original, supplemental or amended application.
(emphasis added). This statute forbids a successive PCR application unless an applicant can point to a “sufficient reason” why the new grounds for relief he asserts were not raised, or were not raised properly. We are aware that some jurisdictions have interpreted the words “sufficient reason” in a way favorable to Aice. We decline to follow such an interpretation.
This Court has by promulgation of rule interpreted § 17-27-90 and the phrase “sufficient reason” very narrowly. Supreme Court Rule 50(3) states:
Under Section 8 of the Act, successive applications for relief are not to be entertained, and thе burden shall be on the applicant to establish that any new ground raised in a subsequent application could not have been raised by him in the previous application.
(emphasis added).' Therefore, as long as it was possible to raisе the argument in his first PCR application, an applicant may not raise it in a successive application. Clearly, the arguments Aice seeks to advance in his secоnd PCR could have been raised in his first application. This being so, this Court need look no further. We will not engage in an exploration of why the grounds were not raised, it is sufficient that they could have been raised, but were not.
We have explicitly held that Rule 50(3), as well as the other Supreme Court rules dealing with PCR, was “designed to effectuate the purposes оf the Uniform (PCR) Act.”
Foxworth v. State,
As with most broad rules, there have been exceptions.
See, e.g., Case v. State,
Finality must be realized at some point in order to achieve a semblance of effectiveness in dispensing justice. At some juncture judicial review must stop, with only the very rarest of exceptions, when the system has simply failed a defendant and where to continue the defendant’s imprisonment without review would amount to a gross miscarriage of justice.
See Butler v. State,
Finally, in conjunction with our submittal of this decision, we have handed down an amended version of our recent deci
*452
sion in
Austin v. State,
Op. No. 23256 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 27,1990) (Davis Adv. Sh. No. 18 at 8).
See Austin v. State,
In Austin the petitioner expressed his desire to seek review of the denial of his PCR application pursuant to his state law rights as set forth in S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-100 and in Supreme Court Rule 50(9). Supreme Cоurt Rule 50(6) expressly provides for the appointment of counsel to an indigent to seek appellate review of a denial of PCR. Austin’s counsel failed to timely seek review. This Court is not empowered to expand its jurisdiction and grant Austin additional time to petition for review. Hence, merely as a method of enforcing Rule 50(6), and of enforcing Austin’s еntitlement to a PCR proceeding, complete with a petition for certiorari to this Court, we held that Austin could attack his PCR counsel as ineffective.
We have held that the PCR rales “cоntemplate an adjudication on the merits of the original petition, one bite at the apple as it were.”
Gamble v. State,
Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is
*453 Affirmed.
Notes
Among the “facts” in Case was that Case had no attorney in his first PCR application. Hence, it is highly doubtful whether, in point of fact, Case “could have” raised the appropriate arguments.
We note that we are not depriving Aice of any procedural entitlements whatsoever. The United States Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to counsel in PCR proceedings.
Pennsylvania v. Finley,