Ahmad AHGHAZALI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee

exercises the claimant occur until not does AHGHAZALI, Ahmad been to have the claim option to deem Plaintiff-Appellant, op- may exercise the claimant denied. has months the six after any time tion no denial. been has and there expired AND HEALTH OF SECRETARY places statute short, language SERVICES, HUMAN thus hands and in the claimant’s option Defendant-Appellee. claimant of the contention supports 87-1673. No. this case. Appeals, Court States United pro- the rule Second, important that it is Sixth Circuit. 2675(a) be 2401(b) and by sections vided 17, 1988. Argued Nov. a construction opt for If we definite. filing of for the allows which these statutes Decided Feb. time a “reasonable” only within

an action expired, period has six-month deal have to would then

reviewing court which basis in ad an hoc case on

with each unlimited, factors

multifarious, indeed weighed. considered need

would appear not does

Third, interpretation this admin- burden an unreasonable place an problems, To agencies. avoid

istrative in such deny claim simply can

agency 28 C.F.R. comports with as

manner the six-month thereby 14.9(a) cause However, experi- if run. begin to

period to interpretation that this should show

ence in which to time much

gives claimants too amendment

file an action remedy problem. this easily can

statute claim that Conn’s therefore conclude

We applicable statute by the not barred

limitations. the district court judgment is RE- the case REVERSED

therefore consistent for further action

MANDED opinion.

petition to a review decision of the Secre- tary (the of Health and Human Services Secretary) denying benefits. The district found that because failed to exhaust his administrative reme- (the Act), Security dies under the Social Act Secretary had not rendered a “final meaning decision” within the of section Act, 405(g).1 of the 42 U.S.C. § precludes general Act question jur- federal reviewing isdiction as a basis for a decision 405(h), Secretary, of the 42 U.S.C. and § petitioning comply one for review must the requirements 405(g), the ex- clusive basis I. unusual, history of this case is

say plaintiff, the least. The Ahmad Ah- ghazali, disability filed for insurance bene- fits in 1977 Supplemental Security and for (SSI) Income alleged benefits in 1978. He psychiatric problems physical impair- and legs. ment in the lower back and His disability insurance benefits claim was de- (argued), Wayne Robert Abraham Coun- initially nied and on reconsideration. His ty Neighborhood Services, Detroit, Legal initially SSI benefits claim was denied Mich., on plaintiff-appellant. plaintiff again November 1978. The (argued) Ill., Chicago, Robert E. Hanson disability filed for insurance benefits in defendant-appellee. again initially 1979. The claim was denied 18,1979, on October and on reconsideration WELLFORD, Judge Before Circuit on November LIVELY,* and PECK and Senior Judges. Circuit requested hearing then a (AU). judge before an administrative law LIVELY, Judge. Senior Circuit conducting hearing After a the AU denied security This is a social disability case in the disability claims for both insurance and which the district court concluded that it plaintiff appealed SSI benefits. The lacked Council, matter Appeals over a which affirmed the AU’s * Lively The Honorable Secretary, Pierce became a Senior cisión of the with or without remand- Judge January Circuit ing rehearing.... the cause for a The court may, good on motion of the made for 405(g), pertinent part, provides: 1. 42 U.S.C. answer, cause shown before he files his remand individual, Any any after final decision of the the case to the for further action hearing made after a to which he was Secretary, any and it time order party, irrespective of the amount in controver- additional evidence to be taken before the Sec- sy, may obtain review of such decision ...; shall, retary and the after the sixty days civil action commenced within remanded, case is and after such addi- mailing to him of notice of such decision or ordered, modify tional evidence if so or affirm Secretary may within such further time as the decision, both, findings of fact or his or and part allow.... As of his answer the shall file with the court such additional and copy transcript shall file a certified of the of the decision, findings modified of fact and and a including upon record findings the evidence which the transcript of the additional record and complained testimo- decision of are based. enter, ny upon power upon modifying The court shall pleadings which his action have or af- record, transcript judg- firming was based. affirming, modifying reversing ment or the de- returning After from Yemen in March 1981. The on June nothing heard from the the final decision decision became Council’s eventually he hired an attor- Secretary. ney. Attorney’s In 1986 the United States in the sought review plaintiff then plaintiff contacted the and asked office receiving several ex- court. After district agree plaintiff whether the would to rein- answer, Secretary the time to tensions of state the case in federal court. The In his remand the case. a motion to made 25, 1986, readily agreed. August tiff On Secretary the motion the support of brief “Stipulation the court entered a and Order stated, is to of the remand purpose “The Reinstatement,” by govern- prepared the tape of the novo because hold de signed by parties. ment and both In this missing.” The district prior hearing is the parties stipulated “that be- document the motion in an order en- granted the court Secretary completed cause the has adminis- stated, 12, May 1982. The order tered proceedings in accordance with the trative hereby RE- above-captioned case is “The 2, Remand, May Court’s 19822 Order of Secretary for defendant MANDED to the reinstated, this case be for fur- [sic] appropri- as proceedings be further ther action the Court.” Appeals or- remand the Council ate.” On 28, 1986, August Secretary the filed On administrative dered a de novo answer, which stated in its first num- hearing, the awaiting notice the While paragraph: bered July journeyed to Yemen plaintiff 1982 Answering allegations 1. the con- emergency.” He left without “family for a complaint, plaintiff’s tained in defendant his friends informing either his relatives or 22, 1981, the states that on December August 1982 of his whereabouts. timely complaint filed his plaintiff Secretary plaintiff notice of sent the judicial review of the “final decision” of Sep- hearing, was scheduled for new which 1981; 5, Secretary on rendered June 2, not When the did tember that, upon motion of the before hearing, sent appear at 10, filed, May on the court answer was for his failure him a notice to show cause 1982, the case to the Secre- remanded failed to appear. When development and that after further tary; order, the AU rec- answer the show cause reconsideration, Appeals Council “this matter dismissed ommended that be 1983, 9, February issued its that the reconsideration determination and holding plaintiff is not entitled that the On Febru- held to be determinative.” [be] claimed under sections to the benefits 9, 1983, adopted ary Appeals Council 223, 216(i) respectively, of the Social Accordingly, the AU’s recommendation. amended, Act, as U.S.C. Security Appeals concluded that Council 416(i) 423; Appeals Coun- “final decision” Disability and Trans- cil’s decision became Determination this court has 18,1979, Secretary; and that is the final mittal dated October subject matter of jurisdiction over determination of the Sec- section disability pursuant action retary application for on the Act, 1, Security U.S.C. August filed on the Social insurance benefits No- and the determination dated 6, 1986, November On is the final determina- vember in the dis- summary judgment moved for on the tion contrary to the state- asserting, trict security filed on supplemental income answer, that the court lacked ments in his 4, 1978. October to hear the case. matter agreed magistrate plaintiff, has difficul- At this time who grant repre- recommended that the understanding English, was not ty April Secretary’s motion. On sented counsel. 2, 1982, apparent May May is an The reference to of remand was dated

2. The order May typographical error. and filed in the district court on form, Council the case. The dismissed district court support jurisdiction not be- Secretary had decision could nev- court concluded incapable being reviewed. cause it was a final decision because er reached circumstances, ar- In these his administra- not exhausted had continuing jurisdiction. no Thus, gues, that it there was the court held remedies. tive Rather, by remanding the case the district Act decide jurisdiction under the lacked regained jurisdiction and never Moreover, court lost the court concluded the case. it. stipulation of reinstatement could not “confer” Secretary argues length that he has not waived the exhaustion

II. stipula- 405(g)in this case and that the of § jurisdiction not “confer” on the tion did distinct, plaintiff makes several but The He does not address the district court. First, that arguments. he contends related presented to the district court in argument, by jurisdiction did not lose the district court briefs, admissions contained in his Secretary on remanding the case to the Finally, a waiver. the answer constituted 12, 1982, proceedings. May for further concerning Secretary asserts that the cases Appeals decision of the The June judicata res effect of unreviewed deci- the undeniably constituted a “final de- Council point. A sions are not on reconsideration Secretary sufficient under cision” of the final, disposes determination is that it 405(g) jurisdiction confer on the dis- to § claims, but it is not a “final deci- certain plaintiff The maintains that trict court. the under be- sion” of § jurisdiction when it re- the court retained it a “final decision made after cause is not Secretary for fur- turned the case to the hearing.” a Second, plaintiff proceedings. the ar- ther 405(g) jurisdiction gues, the court had § III. Secretary clearly because the Supreme has identified requirement of exhaustion of administra- Court pur by agency’s requirements three review adopting remedies the tive Determination,” “(1) stipu- 405(g): a decision of by suant to final “Reconsideration § (2) hearing; lating the made after a to reinstatement case dis- of a civil action within 60 by admitting trict and his answer commencement mailing days after the of notice of such that the Council (or was, fact, further time as the a “final decision.” decision within such decision allow); (3) filing Finally, citing Secretary may that hold decisions of cases pursued through appropriate in an district court....” not the re- action 749, 763-64, process judicata Weinberger Salfi, to final for res U.S. view be 2457, 2465-66, Ap- 45 L.Ed.2d 522 purposes, asserts that the 95 S.Ct. (1975). require peals decision final even While the second and third Council with- parties, out a waiver. ments be waived requi is “central to the first Secretary responds that the district grant subject-matter jurisdiction.” site plain- jurisdiction court lacked because the Id. at 95 S.Ct. at 2466. administra- tiff failed to exhaust available appears argue require tive He to the Court did not literal remedies. Salfi compliance the district court’s remand order was with even first challenged equivalent plaintiffs to dismissal. When the Secre- of comply constitutionality provision tary attempted to with the remand of a of the Act in order, However, argues, a class the named failed action. avail himself of the available administra- tiffs had not obtained a final decision with processes by appearing respect for the to their claims. After tive not individual Thereafter, regional hearing. failed to denial on reconsideration a of- plaintiffs fice filed suit in the district seek administrative review the reconsid- Though Supreme eration determination. “final” in court. The Court held that the post-depri- full relief at a could not obtain exhaustion purposes of the administrative 330-31, at at once vation Id. S.Ct. served “have been himself that 900-01. Secretary has satisfied a stat- constitutionality of only issue is the Diaz, 426 96 S.Ct. In Mathews v. U.S. is be- matter which a utory requirement, (1976), none of the 48 L.Ed.2d determine, yond completely ex- plaintiffs in a class action nor invalid otherwise claim is neither remedies. hausted their section of a different cognizable under However, Secretary acknowledged that Thus, at 2467. 95 S.Ct. Id. at Act.” applications for medicare benefits two may de- Court held stipu- disputed no issues of fact raised full ex- eases that particular “in termine interlocutory should denials lated that procedures review haustion of internal litiga- purposes of treated as final for be ‘final’ necessary for not respect application, tion. third With 405(g).” Id. language within Secretary merely stipulated that dealt at 2467. Court 95 S.Ct. filed an that could plaintiff had de- requirement that the similarly with How- under the statute. not be allowed hearing.” Where made “after cision be ever, no formal had taken nothing re- accomplish hearing would applica- deny plaintiffs third action to the resolved, it only issue spect to the found the nonwaiva- tion. The Court that deciding In require one. futile to be would application for ben- requirement that an ble “the noted that Secre- the point, Court this appli- three was met all efits be filed course, with- benefits may, award tary of 75, Turning at 1889. at 96 S.Ct. cants. Id. hearing.” Id. a requiring out requirement of a final deci- the waivable 319, 424 U.S. 96 Eldridge, In v. Mathews stated, “For hearing, the sion Court (1976), Su- 893, 18 the 47 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. stipu- purposes, we treat the jurisdictional in interpreted the statement preme Court District Court as tantamount lation in the 405(g) requirement of that the first Salfi and as denying the to a decision stat- Court is “central” requirements.” of the exhaustion a waiver ed: 76-77, S.Ct. at 1889-1890. at Id. however, principle is the Implicit Salfi, in “the Salfi, as in Sec- that Court concluded ele- consists of two that condition for de- retary’s question of submission “juris- ments, purely is only one of which Court District on the merits cision that it cannot be in sense dictional” aof statutory requirement satisfied the particular Secretary in a by the “waived” 77, 96 Id. at final decision.” re- element is the case. waivable 1890. S.Ct. at reme- administrative that the quirement Eldridge Salfi, feature of The common Secretary be ex- by the prescribed dies requiring only issue is that is and Diaz element The nonwaivable hausted. of constitu- was one judicial claim for benefits determination that a requirement Secretary’s beyond the tionality, a matter presented to Secre- have been shall cases exhaustion there can be those power such a claim to decide.

tary. Absent following some denial any type. And remedies “decision” of no administrative clearly nothing re- by the would have added decision of the claims by the In Heckler quired statute. for review. the record 2013, 602, 104 S.Ct. 466 U.S. Ringer, v. 328, Although the at Id. at S.Ct. however, (1984), the Court L.Ed.2d 622 not waived exhaustion had plaintiffs satisfied had found that El- concluded that requirement, the Court making a nonwaivable for court proper ease presented a dridge benefits, had obtained but none claim for for The conditions to waive exhaustion. Secretary. Al- from the “final decision” (here the issue are that an waiver raised sev- Ringer in though plaintiffs “entirely collat- challenge) be constitutional claims, the statutory constitutional benefits, eral and that to the claim eral” “inextricably these claims he Court considered claim assert a colorable that may a court waive ex- tions under which plaintiffs’ claims intertwined” haustion; question is the Sec- whether at Id. at S.Ct. benefits. retary the exhaustion it that in Diaz The Court noted Salfi opinion the record in this case. In our herself “held that the had Secretary, for unex- demonstrates requirement when the exhaustion waive reasons, plained did waive futile.” Id. further exhaustion she deems administrative that exhaust But, at 2023. the Court 104 S.Ct. following the Council’s remedies concluded, Secretary had not waived order February 1983. That order The Court refused Ringer. exhaustion that adopted the AU’s recommendation because, unlike itself to waive exhaustion re- “matter be dismissed and that the the issues Eldridge, the circumstances determination held to be consideration [be] “wholly collateral” here were not determinative.” plain- and the plaintiffs’ claims for benefits claim presented Secretary sought a colorable tiffs had not When agreement full at a to reinstate this case they could not obtain relief tiff’s later, years prepared court three Id. district post-deprivation stipulation and that recited as the order recently con- Supreme Court most the fact that “the basis for reinstatement requirements of jurisdictional sidered the completed has York, City New in Bowen proceedings accordance with Court’s 467, 106 90 L.Ed.2d 462 S.Ct. 476 U.S. 1982 Order of Remand.” In May [sic] (1986). brought plaintiffs case the In that answer, later, days filed three the Sec- claiming a class action retary unequivocally Ap- stated of an denying on the basis benefits peals Council’s unlawful, policy that was arbi- unpublished denying benefits “became the ‘final deci- trary capricious and violated both Secretary.” The answer fur- sion’ of the Agreeing the Act. with Constitution and that the district court had ther admitted Supreme Court found the district 405(g). subject jurisdiction matter under § appropriate for the that this was an case This case is unlike those which court to waive the exhaustion Supreme Court concluded that Secre- opinion In the of its course § require- exhaustion tary had waived the previous its decisions the Court reviewed No constitutional issue is involved ment. again clear that the “final deci- made clear, though highly it is and it is not sion” contains both waivable record, given the state of the that probable elements. The exhaus- and nonwaivable appeals further administrative would have require- tion of administrative remedies Nevertheless, it is hard to futile. been and, Secretary may by the ment be waived by imagine a clearer case of waiver a re- cases, special by only the courts. The government appears It sponsible official. “purely” jurisdictional requirement that, Secretary sought rein- at the time the the re- sense that it cannot be waived “is prepared stipulation, he statement quirement that a claim for benefits shall jurisdiction the court had not lost believed Secretary.” presented have been Id. remanding place. in the first by the case 2031, quoting Eldridge, at 106 S.Ct. stipulation referred to the remand or- at 899. 424 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. and confirmed that the had der processes completed the administrative for IV. case remanded. The answer which the was “purely” jurisdictional re further; February that the went it verified 405(g) satisfied in this quirement of was the “final decision” of 1983 decision was § plaintiff filed his Secretary. case when For that decision to consti- “special decision,” things for in 1977. This is not a “final one of two benefits tute a judicial for case” where the issue review had to have occurred. Either rem- entirely to the claim for benefits. the available administrative collateral exhausted edies, Thus, exhaustion. are not concerned with the condi- or the waived we Secretary based his later motion Conclusion Since summary judgment on the fact dismissing The district court erred in actually his ad- plaintiff had not exhausted 405(g)’s case. The only met tru- § remedies, only possible ministrative ly jurisdictional requirement. He filed a meaning in the answer is of the assertions benefits, claim for and there is “some deci- exhaustion. Secretary_” sion Eldridge, 424 pleadings Statements in that acknowl- U.S. at 96 S.Ct. at 899. Because alleged by edge the truth of some matter nonjurisdictional waived a re- party judicial opposing are admissions quirement 405(g), the district court party making In binding on the them. his pleadings, had In formal al- petition review chose February to treat leged exhausted all of his ad- had decision of the Council as his remedies, rendering thus ministrative preserve final decision. His failure to 9, 1983, Appeals Council decision transcript hearing of the first can be 405(g) purposes. only “final” for remedied. The review scheme of § responsive pleading removed recognizes that the district court re- by stating this issue from the case quire evidence not found the administra- ren- required “final decision” had been perform appellate tive record in order its dered. function. It obtains this information truly If the exhaustion was remanding to Secretary. The statute jurisdictional, there could be no waiver and Secretary, complying directs the party, agreeing, neither nor both could con- order, the remand to “file with the court jurisdiction upon the fer matter findings such additional and modified by stipulation or admission. “[N]o decision, transcript of fact and and a subject- parties action of the can confer testimony upon record and additional which jurisdiction upon matter a federal court.” affirming in modifying his action or Ireland, Cory, Insurance Ltd. v. Com based.” Guiñee, pagnie des Bauxites de 456 U.S. 2099, 2104, 72 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. plaintiffs appear failure to at the (1982). is, however, There a distinction scheduled in 1982 is no more re- attempting to confer between sponsible incomplete for the record than entering stipulation “a to fact which Secretary’s preserve the tran- failure to jurisdiction.” serves to federal establish script original Since it had Anderson, 503 F.2d United States v. jurisdiction, equitable in the of its exercise (6th Cir.1974). 422 Similarly, an admission powers the district court should have re- jurisdictional pleading may of a fact in a manded the case to the a second subject-matter jurisdic- establish a basis for proceedings conduct time with directions to Ferguson Neighborhood Housing tion. necessary meaningful for a review of his Services, Inc., (6th F.2d Cir. final decision. 1986). The creates smoke Having concluded that argument conferring screen with his about the exhaustion First, ignores he the fact that plaintiff complied purely with the Supreme Court has held that the ex- appeal for an to jurisdictional purely jurisdic- haustion is not 405(g), we do not the district court under § being in tional the sense nonwaivable. arguments presented by the other discuss Second, appears he to overlook the' fact judgment parties. district pleading, required by that his which is Fed. to court is reversed. The case is remanded fact, grounded clearly in R.Civ.P. to be directions to remand the district with reflected a waiver of the exhaustion re- proceedings required it to the by stating unequivocally that quirement capable compose to a record the last Council decision was the juris- The district court will retain “final decision” of the and there- review. diction is on remand. fore to review under while case Yemen, WELLFORD, Ahghazali him to Judge, left to return Circuit followed her there and then divorced her. a remand. concurring in It was after his second return that “overt native, Ahghazali, a Yemen schooled Mr. psychiatric symptoms appear.” seemed to Kuwait, country apparently to this came problem Henry No mental was noted in a jobs in several in 1971 and worked discharge summary hospital Ford issued in claiming disability years before about five perianal relation to a abscess which was hearing an Arabic At his benefits July A treated in of 1977. residual func- present.1 In December of interpreter was August 11, capacity tional worksheet dated hearing on 1980 the found after a AU Ahghazali could return 1977 indicated that only Ahghazali’s that “the evidence claim could, among things, to work and other impairment consists of the of a severe acceptable judgment,” “exercise but Dr. psychiatric prob- records of the claimant’s underlying anxiety Maraba noted “some or 1977,” April “no in March 1977and but lem Rauch, psychia- Dr. emotional disorder.” physical any significant disor- evidence of trist, provided request of the Michi- found no “further evidence der.” AU service, gan exam- vocational rehabilitation problem April, continuing mental of a Ahghazali ined of 1977 and October following to observe opportunity 1977” disabled,” psychiatrically found him “not testimony. Ahghazali and hear despite difficulties in full communication in 1977 made no refer- original claim filed language reason of barriers. and indicated problem ence to mental year for over a until had worked Brooklyn physician years A two later Chrysler inspector. as an February 1977 at ill- could “detect no evidence of mental “left His claim indicated that his side” ness,” malinger- and found “an element of “partially paralyzed” and reflected an ing” physical complaints. in his A New York, Brooklyn, rather address in New Disability York State Bureau of determina- Hamtramck, Michigan ad- than the former his claimed tion October of 1979 found dress. (Dr. impairment only “mild.” Zim- merman indicated after examination no in the administrative The medical files “significant organic findings.”) findings support of the AU record regard physical findings. Despite the loss of the tran- discharge summary of the De- April 1977 script, thorough findings, the AU made Psychiatric troit Institute indicated some and the medical records indicate that the paranoia beating by of a claimed because findings supported by appropriate are an alcohol neighbors and indicated abuse country medical evidence. Plaintiff left the giving psychotherapy problem. The doctor without notice to the and without Ahghazali go desired to back indicated that providing forwarding address. addi- contacted, Yemen, that his friends were tion, timely respond he failed to an order him arrangements “and were made for to why to cause to the case should show as go country.” Prognosis back to his native prosecute. I not be dismissed for failure to deemed fair “once he is back was appropriate believe that dismissal was an environment,” summary familiar but Secretary. action I doubt that persist: indicated some confusion procedural tiff’s fail- primary “he is therapist indicated that leav- provide appeal ures did him a for basis ing country.” under the circumstances. federal courts part history

As a in the record it is Despite my serious doubts and reserva- tions, indicated that claimant returned to Yemen I the case to the dis- would remand arranged marriage determine, record, “where an was trict court this completed,” proof necessary and thereafter he returned to additional whether judgment after his wife the Detroit area. order to render a as to whether although good interpreter provided speaks English.” 1. An the AU that "he Others indicate English” speak found that “he can some and the knowledge English that his and use of is limited. person issuing the notice of indicated an entitlement to established claimant has

benefits. America, STATES of

UNITED

Plaintiff-Appellant, CONNERY, (ar- M. Edmund Lynch, Atty. James C. Asst. U.S. Defendant-Appellee. Cleveland, Ohio, gued), plaintiff-appel- lant.

No. 87-3508. Connery, Hastings-On-Hud- M. Edmund Appeals, States Court United son, N.Y., pro se. Circuit. Sixth Carro, Akron, Ohio, Michael Y. J. Dean Argued May 1988. Canton, Ohio, Demczyk (argued), for de- fendant-appellee. Decided Feb.

Rehearing Denied March NELSON, Before KRUPANSKY and HACKETT, District Judges, and

Circuit Judge.*

HACKETT, Judge. District appeals judg- from the The United States Court, District ment of the United States Ohio, granting defend- Northern District to F.R. acquittal pursuant ant’s motion 29(c). Appellant contends Crim.P. light is viewed in the the evidence when rea- government, most favorable to defendant jury could have found sonable Connery guilty beyond a rea- M. Edmund thorough review of doubt. After a sonable case, we record the voluminous jury had sufficient evi- find that the must therefore its verdict. We dence to sustain of the district judgment reverse the jury’s reinstate the verdict. BACKGROUND PROCEDURAL 28, 1986, nine-count indict- January On Overmyer against Daniel H. was filed ment Overmyer was Connery. M. and Edmund six charged named in nine counts * Hackett, by designation. Michigan, sitting United Honorable Barbara K. Judge for the Eastern District of States District

Case Details

Case Name: Ahmad AHGHAZALI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Feb 10, 1989

Citation: 867 F.2d 921

Docket Number: 87-1673

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.