20 Ind. App. 657 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1898
Suit by appellees (plaintiffs below), who are members of Court Glueckauf No. 101, operating under the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Independent Order of Foresters of the state of Illinois, against Court Glueckauf No.' 1, operating under the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Independent Order of Foresters of the State of Indiana, and the members of said court, for the possession of certain regalia, furniture and other articles constituting the outfit of a lodge.
Appellees are an unincorporated association, but the High Court,-under whose jurisdiction they are acting is duly incorporated under the laws of the state of Illinois. The trial court rendered judgment for the appellees and overruled appellants’ motion for a new trial. This action of the court is assigned as one of the errors in this court, and is the only assignment discussed by counsel. The reason specified in the motion for a new trial is that the finding of the court is
Appellees are, and appellants were, with a few exceptions, until the 11th day of December, 1893, members of Court Glueekauf No. 101. On that night, a majority of the members being present, a resolution was passed by said lodge No. 101 to secede from the high court of Illinois, and to join in the organization of a high court for the State of Indiana. Some of the members dissented from the proposition, but subsequently all but ten surrendered their certificates in the old order, pursuant to a notice that such course would be necessary in order to- become members of the new order. At the date of said secession, said lodge had eighty-one members in good standing; forty-three were present; twenty-seven voted; twenty-three of these voted for secession and four against. The next meeting of the seceding members, after said 11th day of December, was not held in the old lodge hall, but ■fhey subsequently came back, and took possession of the Court Glueekauf lodge room and the property in .controversy. On Monday following the 11th day of December, 1893, a portion of the members met at their regular meetingplace andtwenty-three of them signed a statement, which was sent to the grand lodge of Illinois, to the effect that they would recognize their allegiance to such high court, and requested the return of their charter, which the high chief ranger of the local court had in the meantime returned to such high court. The charter was returned to them, and from thence forward such members and the accessions to the membership have constituted the local court, and have been recognized by the high court of Illinois as Court Glueekauf No. 101.
Appellants’ first proposition is that the- absence of proof of any demand on the part of appellee upon ap
The question as to who was the owner of the property must be answered from the circumstances under which it was acquired and the laws governing the organization. It was purchased by Court Glueckauf Lodge No. 101, partly from the high court of Illinois and partly elsewhere. Not having been incorporated, appellants’ learned counsel contend that the relations of its members were, in a limited sense, like those of partners, and that they were, therefore, joint owners of the property that they had acquired together; that one joint owner has as much right to the possession of the common property as another, and that, therefore, one can not maintain replevin against another. This might be true so long as one remains a member of the association. As illustrating the view of the general laws upon the rights of the parties in property accumulated by the joint efforts of the original members, where there is an absence of any agreement among the members as ‘to a dissolution, the following quotation is made from the note of Judge Freeman in the case of Otto v. Journeymen Tailors’ Protective and Benevolent Union, 75 Cal. 308, 7 Am. St. pp. 156 and 168, 17 Pac. 217. “A member of such a voluntary association as one formed for social purposes, or the facilitation of business, has undoubtedly an interest in the general assets of the association so long as he remains a mem
The Independent Order of Foresters is a mutual benefit society. We make the following quotations from Niblack on Mutual Benefit Societies, section 13, p. 16: “If a mutual benefit society be composed of separate bodies, whether co-ordinate or subordinate, the by-laws and rules of the society for the management of its internal affairs, and for the adjustment of the relations between its branches, constitute the law by which they should be governed. * * * The .by-laws of a mutual benefit society are binding upon it and all its members.” *' * * Section 137, p. 158, “The true principle is, and upon
Any member of a sub-court is bound by contract to the high court, the sub-court and each member to be
Appellants’ learned counsel further contend that by the act of secession the membership of Court Glueckauf No. 101 was reduced to less than fifteen, and by the laws of the order the lodge thereby ceased to exist. Section 1 of article 15 of the constitution is as follows: “Fifteen members of a club duly qualified as herein specified shall be necessary to form a new court and make application for a charter.” Section 1 of article 18 reads: “Whenever a court forfeits its charter and becomes dissolved in consequence of the lack of the necessary number (15) of members, each remaining member then in good standing, who has paid all assessments to date of such dissolution, and against whom no charges of any kind are pending, or preferred, who desires to continue in membership in the order, and be entitled to the benefit of the endowment, may do so by filing with the high secretary, within thirty days from the date of such dissolution, a written notification of his desire and intention to that effect, over his own signature.”
These two sections are relied upon by appellants to support their claim. Looking to the entire instrument herein, material parts of which we have set out, we are of the opinion that this position is not tenable. The local lodge was operated under the grand lodge, and the grand lodge had reserved the right through its high chief ranger to demand and receive all papers, when he deemed necessary. If the Court Glueckauf No. 101 became dissolved, the right to its effects, un
We need not and do not decide that the reduction of the local lodge to a membership of less than fifteen does or does not of itself work a dissolution, but under such provision the supreme lodge would be authorized through its high chief ranger to claim the property. This right in the case before us was not exercised. The supreme lodge returned the charter and ever after-wards recognized Court Glueckauf No. 101 as the local order, and there was no legal lapse of which appellants can take advantage. Appellants, in having seceded, forfeited all right to or in any property of the lodge. The court committed no error. Judgment affirmed.