Frеderick W. Ahalt, appellant, sought a service-related disability retirement from the Montgomery County Department of Fire and Rescue Services. The Montgomery County Merit System Protection Board (“Merit Board”) concluded that appellant’s disability was permanent, but it denied appellant a service-related disability retirement. Thereafter, appellant sought review in thе circuit court, which affirmed. Appellant now presents the following issue for our consideration:
Did the circuit court err in not holding that the decision of the Merit Board was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and unlawful when reviewed under the facts and law of this case?
As we perceive neither error nor abuse, we shall affirm.
Factual Background
Ahalt had been a firefighter in Montgomery County for 22 years. He had attained the rank of master firefighter when he bеgan to experience pain and stiffness in his joints. Appellant first sought medical treatment from his family doctor for pain in his foot, caused by what was later diagnosed as a bone spur. He also began to have pain and stiffness in his neck, elbow, and knees, and sought treatment from Dr. Wei, a rheumatologist, in February 1991. Dr. Wei diagnosed appellant with osteoarthritis, a degenerative disеase of the joints.
Appellant’s duties as a master firefighter included such tasks as climbing up and down ladders, crawling through burning buildings, lifting and carrying stretchers and loading them into ambulances, as well as a number of training and maintenance tasks that involved long hours of standing or walking on hard surfaces. According to appellant, his pain and stiffness began to interfere with his work performance in about Fеbruary 1991. According to Ahalt’s supervisor, Captain John Harris, appellant’s pain, stiffness, and slowness had begun to affect his work about one year earlier. Dr. Wei’s records place the onset of appellant’s work performance difficulties as one year previous to Dr. Wei’s first evaluation. Dr. Wei opined that while there was no causal relationship between firefighting and the onset of osteoarthritis, “the duties of [appellant’s] occupation aggravate his condition.”
In March 1991, appellant was placed on light duty. The County requested that he file a disability retirement, but he preferred to continue working in order to reach 25 years of service with the County. Moreover, he was not aware of any positions within the department that hе would be able to perform. On July 24, 1991, Ramon Granados, who at that time was the Director of the Department of Fire and Rescue Services, requested a disability retirement for appellant.
The County’s disability retirement administrator, the Prudential Insurance Company, granted appellant a temporary nonservice-eonnected disability retirement, effective Decembеr 7, 1991. Appellant appealed the decision to the County’s Administrator, claiming that his disability was permanent and service-related. After a hearing, the Hearing Examiner issued an opinion recommending a temporary non-service-connected disability retirement.
Subsequently, the Merit Board’s Hearing Examiner determined that appellant had a total and permanent disability, “which was aggravated in an unspecified manner by his work environment.” Nevеrtheless, the Hearing Examiner recommended denial of the service-connected disability retirement, reasoning that “[t]he determinative issue on the Appellant’s eligibility for a service connected disability retirement is purely a question of law and turns on whether or not the Appellant must show a link between his total incapacity and the aggravation of his condition in the work environment.” Disagreeing with appellant’s position that he was required only to show that his condition was aggravated by the performance of his duties in order to receive a service-connected disability retirement, the Hearing Examiner concluded:
The provision requires total incapacity for duty “as the natural and proximate result of’ one of three events: an аccident, an occupational disease, or a condition aggravated. Thus, a link must be established between the total incapacity and the event. The Appellant’s condition, osteoarthritis, is the underlying cause of his total incapacity based on uncontradicted medical evidence. The total incapacity was not caused by whatever aggravation the Appellant’s job may have produced. This aggravation must be the natural and proximate cause of the total incapacity if the Appellant is to prevail and the evidence does not remotely suggest this possibility. It is clear that the Code provision requires an aggravation which is so significant that it has a causal effect on the totality and permanеnce of the incapacity.
The Merit Board accepted the recommendations of the Hearing Examiner; it denied appellant a service-related disability pension. After appellant unsuccessfully challenged the decision in the circuit court, he noted this appeal.
Discussion
I.
Our role in reviewing an administrative decision is “precisely the same as that of thе circuit court.”
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Shrieves,
“Judicial review of administrative agency action is narrow.”
United Parcel Serv. v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore County,
Factual findings made by an
agency
are binding upon a reviewing court, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.
United Parcel Serv.,
As we said in
Mortimer v. Howard Research,
arbitrary, illegal or capricious. In making a determination of whether the Board of Appeals’ decision is arbitrary, illegal or capricious, the reviewing court must decide whether the question before the agency was fairly debatablе. An issue is fairly debatable if reasonable persons could have réached a different conclusion on the evidence and, if so, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. The fairly debatable test is analogous to the clearly erroneous standard under Rule 8-131(c) and a decision is fairly debatable if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole.
(Internal citations omitted.)
In contrast to findings of fact, however, an agency’s interpretation of law is not entitled to deference.
Caucus Distributors v. Maryland Securities Comm’r,
II.
The parties agree that appellant is permanently disabled. Their dispute centers on whether the disability is service-connected. Appellant seeks a service-connected disability retirement pursuаnt to § 33-43(e) of the Montgomery County Code, 1984, as amended, which provides in relevant part:
(e) Service-connected disability retirement. A member may be retired on a service-connected disability retirement if:
(1) The member is totally incapacitated for duty or partially and permanently incapacitated for duty as the natural and proximate résult of an accident occurring, or an occupational disease incurred or condition aggravated while in the actual performance of duty; that the incapacity is not due to willful misconduct or willful negligence, and the incapacity is likely to be permanent.
On the other hand, appellee asserts that appellant does not have a service-connected disability. Thеrefore, it contends that § 33-43(d) of the Montgomery Code, which pertains to a non-service-connected disability, applies here. It provides:
(d) Non-service-connected disability retirement. A member may be retired on a non-service-connected disability retirement if:
(1) The member has 5 years of credited service and is not eligible for normal retirement....
(2) The member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of duty as the result of an illness or injury incurred after enrollment as a member, that the incapacity is not due to the member’s willful negligence, and that the incapacity is likely to be permanent. In extenuating circumstances, the administrator may waive the requirement that a member’s incapacity is likely to be рermanent and may approve a temporary disability retirement for one or more one-year periods until the incapacity is either removed or it becomes apparent that it is likely to be permanent;
(3) The member is not eligible for service-connected disability retirement; and
(4) The member is unable to productively perform the duties of another available position for which qualified. It is undisputed that Ahalt did not sustain an accidental
injury and he does not suffer from an occupational disease. Consequently, the focus here is on the third ground set forth in § 33-43(e) on which to predicate a service-connected disability: a “condition aggravated while in the actual performance of duty.”
The Merit Board construed § 33-43(e) to require that the worker’s incapacity must be “the natural and proximate result” of the “condition aggravated while in the actual performance of duty.” In other words, it concluded that it is not enough that appellant suffers from a degenerative condition that is aggravated by work. Rather, the aggravation itself must be the reason for the disability.
According to appellee, appellant’s disability is his osteoarthritis. It contends that the phrase “condition aggravated” requires a link between the disability and the aggravation; the aggravation must render the employee incapacitated in order for the disability to be service-connected. If the aggravation is so great as to be incapacitating, then, according to the County, it is service-cоnnected.
Appellant argues, however, that the Merit Board and the County have erred in the interpretation of the ordinance. Appellant states:
The object or event triggering eligibility for retirement is a condition. That condition must be aggravated while in the actual performance of duty. Had the Montgomery County Council intended an aggravation to be required as the cause of the incapacity the language would have been “aggrava tion of a condition.” However, the language in the statute is “condition aggravated.” Mr. Ahalt’s disability results from his osteoarthritis which was aggravated in the actual performance of duty. That aggravation was to such an extent that he was prevented from performing his duties and responsibilities as a Master Firefighter. That is all that is required under Section 33-43(e). A fair reading of the statute does not require that an applicant show that the aggravation of a condition was the natural and proximate cause of the total incapacity.
As we see it, the term “condition aggravated” cannot be divorced from its context. We must consider the meaning of the entire phrase “aggrаvated while in the actual performance of duty”, which follows and modifies “condition”, in the context of the entire ordinance.
Interpreting the “condition” clause of § 33-43(e) as urged by appellant would attenuate the “service-connected” element of the provision to such a degree as to render it virtually indistinguishable from the non-service-connected disability rеtirement provided for in § 33-43(d). We interpret ordinances under the same canons of construction that we apply to the interpretation of statutes.
Howard Research and Dev. Corp. v. Concerned Citizens for the Columbia Concept,
Under appellant’s reading, a service-connected disability may result from a work-related aggravation of a non-work-related condition. We rejected a similar argument in
Eberle v. Baltimore County,
The appellant in
Eberle
sustained two work-related knee injuries. There was also evidence that the appellant had preexisting degenerative arthritis in his knees.
Id.
at 164,
has been totally and permanently incapacitated for duty as the natural and proximate result of an accident occurring while in the actual performance of duty at some definite time and place, without willful negligence on his part....
Id.
at 167,
On appeal to this Court, Eberle argued that the Board had incorrectly interpreted the statute to require that his injuries be the “sole and exclusive cause of his disability.”
Id.
at 168,
We recognize that the Baltimore County Code provision in Eberle applied only to a work-place accident that occurs at “a definite time and place,” and is therefore analytically distinct from the “condition” referred to in the Montgomery County Code. A “condition,” by its nature, may arise suddenly or may develoр gradually over time. The Montgomery County Code thus covers a wider range of potentially disabling occurrences than does the Baltimore County Code. Nevertheless, the analysis in Eberle is instructive, because it interpreted the phrase “the natural and proximate result” to mean that a work-place related occurrence must be the sole proximate cause of the incapacity.
The case is stronger here than in
Eberle
for denying service-connected disability benefits. In this case, there is uncontroverted medical documentation that Ahalt’s condition
Appellant argues, alternatively, that even if the statute requires that the aggravation in the course оf duty must be the sole proximate and natural cause of his incapacity, he has made this showing. Therefore, he asserts that the Merit Board erred in denying him a service-connected disability pension.
The Merit Board found that appellant’s work activities aggravated his osteoarthritis. It also found, based on appellant’s own testimony, that appellant’s other life activitiеs, such as sitting, walking, and driving, also exacerbated his condition. The Merit Board had substantial evidence from which it could conclude that appellant’s incapacity was the natural and proximate result of his underlying osteoarthritic condition, and not that the incapacity was the natural and proximate result of the aggravation of the condition arising from the performаnce of his duties as a master firefighter.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
Notes
. Appellees argue that Ahalt’s failure to improve after his retirement is evidence that the aggravation that occurred at work did not contribute to his disability. We note that when a disease is by its nature degenerative, aggravation may mean an increase in the degeneration, and when the damage has been done it does not necessarily follow that stopping the aggravating activity will lead to improvement.