| N.C. | Jun 17, 1902
Lead Opinion
after stating the case. Was'Section 10 of Chapter 549, Acts of 1891, repealed bj Chapter 146, Acts of 1895? . This, is the issue raised by the facts agreed and presented for our decision by the case on appeal. Defendant contends that while the repeal is not in express termsy' yet it is by necessary implication. This contention is handicapped in the outset with the presumption against it. A statute will not be construed as repealing a prior one on the' same subject (in the absence of express words to that effect) unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is evidently intended to supersede the prior one upon the subject and to comprise in itself the sole apd complete system of legislation' on that subject. Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 112; Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, Sec. 210; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 138. The two acts now being construed being affirmative, and the subject being such that both may stand together, they both should have concurrent efficacy (1 Blk.. 90), unless they be repugnant or inconsistent, or it should appear that the Legislature intended to cover the whole subject embraced in both and to prescribe the only rule in respect of that subject in the later act. State v. Davis, 129 N.C., 570" court="N.C." date_filed="1901-12-20" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/state-v-davis-3644551?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3644551">129 N. C., 570.
Bearing in mind this rule of construction, a careful perusal of the act (Chapter 549, Acts 1891) creating and incorporating the plaintiff college, and construing the subsequent acts by which appropriations of money were made for its use, with reference to it, leads us to the conclusion that it was not intended by the Legislature to repeal any provision therein made.
The general purpose for which it was created, the duties imposed upon its Board of Trustees, and the expenses necessary and incidental to its management, clearly show that the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars therein annually appro
There is imposed upon them tbe power of prescribing rules for tbe management and preservation of good order and morals, tbe appointment of its president, instructors and other officers, servants, etc., to fix salaries, have charge of tbe disbursement of funds, and to have general and entire supervision of tbe establishment and maintenance, to receive any donation of property, real or personal, and to invest or expend tbe same for tbe benefit of tbe college, to locate the college, to make temporary provision pending tbe furnishing of tbe site, buildings, etc. Eor none of these expenses do we find any provision made in any of the subsequent acts. Tbe act of 1893 appropriated $5,000 per year for 1893 and 1894,. “for tbe purpose of completing, erecting and furnishing said buildings.” Tbe act of 1895 appropriated $5,000 annually “for tbe support, maintenance, equipment, enlargement and extension, * * * to* be paid on tbe first days of April and October of each year.” Tbe act of 1897 appropriated $5,000 “for tbe maintenance and equipment * * * for each of tbe years 1897 and 1898, to be paid in instalments of $2,500 on tbe first days of April and October.” Tbe act of 1901 appropriated $5,000 “for each of tbe years 1901 and 1902, in addition to its standing appropriation, * * * if tbe Board of Education shall transfer,” etc. (which has not been done).
If it was the intent of the Legislature of 1895 to appropriate $5,000 annually for the purpose therein declared, in addition to the amount appropriated in the organic act, then it- has done so clearly and without doubt. But if it intended to make this to cover and in substitution for and to' repeal the other, then we fail to find any expression or suggestion to indicate such intent. There is no revisal of the organic act. The two acts are not inconsistent or repugnant, but aro in harmony. The former would be totally inadequate to meet the future needs of the institution, and the latter makes no provision for paying the Trustees for their services, nor for other necessary expenses in managing its affairs. Its rapid growth and increasing needs are shown by the special appropriation of $5,000 per annum for each of the years 1893, 1894, 1897 and 1898 for completing, erecting and furnishing the buildings, maintenance and equipment, and also the one for 1901 and 1902 “in addition to its standing appropriation.”
With this increase of property and progress in promoting one of its institutions of learning and usefulness, accompanied with a like increase of responsibilities and cares, we would not be justified in holding that the Legislature intended to deprive it of that sum of money, which it had provided for carrying out the provisions of the act in preserving and caring for its property, and in utilizing beneficially the
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
A strong sense of duty after a careful investigation of the matter in dispute, compels me to dissent from the opinion of the Court. If I had a reasonable doubt on the question involved, I would gladly acquiesce in the conclusion arrived at by the Court, but to my mind the error in the judgment of the Court below is so clear that I am forced to say so for myself.
The plaintiff institution owes its existence to Chapter 549 of the Acts of 1891. An annual appropriation' was made, under that act, of $2,500, “for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the act.” It is. enacted in Section 3, “That the leading object of the institution shall be to teach practical agriculture and the mechanic arts and such branches of learning as relate thereto, not excluding academical and classical instruction.” There was at the time not a foot of ground for a building of any hind that belonged to the college, ,nor was there any authority conferred on the Board of Trustees to purchase a site. In fact, it was made the duty of the Board of Trustees to receive propositions from the various localities of the State offering inducements for the locating of the college, in the shape of gifts of land or money. In the meantime, and until the site and buildings should have been furnished for the location of the college, the Board of Trustees were authorized to' make temporary provision for the industrial and mechanical education of the colored youth of the State at Some established institution of learning within the State.
Tbe Legislature, at its session of 1901, Chapter 737, made an annual appropriation for this institution of $5,000, “in addition to its standing appropriation.”
What was its standing appropriation ? Beyond question, ir. my opinion, the $5,000 appropriated by tbe act of 1895. Tbe act of 1895 was an implied repeal of tbe act of 1891, in so far as tbe amount of tbe appropriation was concerned. Tbe law, it is true, does- not favor implied revocations; but whenever a statute in a different manner makes provision for tbe same thing provided for in a former statute, tbe former statute is repealed. Every affirmative statute is a repeal by implication of a prior affirmative statute sp far as it is contrary to it. State v. Woodside, 31 N.C., 496" court="N.C." date_filed="1849-06-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/state-ex-rel-county-trustee-of-brunswick-v-woodside-3663974?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3663974">31 N. C., 496. Tbe amount appropriated annually in tbe act of 1891 was $2,500; tbe amount appropriated annually in 1895 was $5,000 — both having been for tbe same purpose in different amounts — the last act repeals tbe first. I can not agree in tbe statement in tbe opinion of tbe Court that tbe amount — $2,500—of tbe appropriation under tbe act of 1891 was intended for “organization expenses” in carrying out tbe provisions of tbe act. Tbe only expense of organization that could have arisen under the.act of 1891 was that of tbe per diem of members of Board of Trustees on account of meetings of tbe Board of Trustees. Tbe appropriation, as we have seen, was to be used in the education of tbe colored youth of tbe State at some established institution of learning within tbe State, until tbe
Eor these reasons I think there was error in the judgment of the Court below.
Lead Opinion
CLARK and MONTGOMERY, JJ., dissenting.
Was section 10 of chapter (369) 549, Laws 1891, repealed by chapter 146, Laws 1895? This is the issue raised by the facts agreed and presented for our decision by the case on appeal. Defendant contends that while the repeal is not in express terms, yet it is by necessary implication. This contention is handicapped in the outset with the presumption against it. A statute will not be construed as repealing a prior one on the same subject (in the absence of express words to that effect) unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is evidently intended to supersede the prior one upon the subject and to comprise in itself the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject. Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 112; Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 210; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 138. The two acts now being construed beingaffirmative, and the subject being such that both may stand together, they both should have concurrent efficacy (1 Blk., 90), unless they be repugnant or inconsistent, or it should appear that the Legislature intended to cover the whole subject embraced in both and to prescribe the only rule in respect of that subject in the later act. S. v. Davis,
Bearing in mind this rule of construction, a careful perusal of the act (chapter 549, Laws 1891) creating and incorporating the plaintiff college, and construing the subsequent acts by which appropriations of money were made for its use, with reference to it, leads us to the conclusion that it was not intended by the Legislature to repeal any provision therein made.
The general purpose for which it was created, the duties imposed upon its board of trustees, and the expenses necessary and incidental to *254 its management, clearly show that the sum of $2,500 therein annually appropriated was intended for organization expenses "in carrying (370) out the provisions of this act," and not for the general purpose of supporting, maintaining and developing the institution. Its management and control, and the care and preservation of all its property, are vested in the board of trustees. For their services they "are entitled to the same per diem and mileage as compensation for attendance upon the meetings of the board as are now allowed by law to the members of the General Assembly." (This compensation was changed by chapter 389, Laws 1899, to traveling expenses and hotel fare.)
There is imposed upon them the power of prescribing rules for the management and preservation of good order and morals, the appointment of its president, instructors and other officers, servants, etc.; to fix salaries, have charge of the disbursement of funds, and to have general andentire supervision of the establishment and maintenance; to receive any donation of property, real or personal, and to invest or expend the same for the benefit of the college, to locate the college, to make temporary provision pending the furnishing of the site, buildings, etc. For none of these expenses do we find any provision made in any of the subsequent acts. The act of 1893 appropriated $5,000 per year for 1893 and 1894, "for the purpose of completing, erecting and furnishing said buildings." The act of 1895 appropriated $5,000 annually "for the support, maintenance, equipment, enlargement and extension, . . . to be paid on the first days of April and October of each year." The act of 1897 appropriated $5,000 "for the maintenance and equipment . . . for each of the years 1897 and 1898, to be paid in installments of $2,500 on the first days of April and October." The act of 1901 appropriated $5,000 "for each of the years 1901 and 1902, in addition to its standing appropriation, . . . if the board of education shall transfer," etc. (which has not been done).
The entire act of 1895 is quoted in the case (except the (371) enacting and ratification clauses). It has no repealing clause; it makes no reference to the organic act; it makes no provision for the necessary organization expenses; it appoints specific days (first days of April and October) for the payments of its appropriations, while payments of the other appropriation (in common with others of like kind) are made with reference to the beginning of the fiscal year, 1 December.
If it was the intent of the Legislature of 1895 to appropriate $5,000 annually for the purpose therein declared, in addition to the amount appropriated in the organic act, then it has done so clearly and without doubt. But if it intended to make this to cover and in substitution for *255 and to repeal the other, then we fail to find any expression or suggestion to indicate such intent. There is no revisal of the organic act. The two acts are not inconsistent nor repugnant, but are in harmony. The former would be totally inadequate to meet the future needs of the institution, and the latter makes no provision for paying the trustees for their services, nor for other necessary expenses in managing its affairs. Its rapid growth and increasing needs are shown by the special appropriation of $5,000 per annum for each of the years 1893, 1894, 1897 and 1898 for completing, erecting and furnishing the buildings, maintenance and equipment, and also the one for 1901 and 1902 "in addition to its standing appropriation."
With this increase of property and progress in promoting one of its institutions of learning and usefulness, accompanied with a like increase of responsibilities and cares, we would not be justified in holding that the Legislature intended to deprive it of that sum of money, which it had provided for carrying out the provisions of the act in preserving and caring for its property, and in utilizing beneficially the means obtainable in giving force and effect to the aims and (372) purposes for which the institution was created. We find no error in the ruling of his Honor in holding that the appropriation made under the act of 1895 was auxiliary, or in addition to the sum appropriated by section 10 of the act of 1891, and the judgment is
Affirmed.