On October 15, 2004, appellee Carol Couch, Director of the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (“EPD”), issued a permit to Agri-Cycle for the operation of a wastewater
On September 5, 2007, during the pendency of that appeal, Agri-Cycle’s polishing pond caught fire. Two days later, the director filed an action in the Superior Court of Jackson County seeking to enjoin Agri-Cycle from receiving waste for processing until a ruling was received in the administrative appeal, or until Agri-Cycle was able to demonstrate compliance with its permit and the law. After a hearing on September 7, 2007, at which counsel for both parties participated, 1 the trial court issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”).
Agri-Cycle moved for modificаtion or clarification of the TRO which resulted in an amended TRO by consent of the parties. The amended TRO allowed Agri-Cycle to operate in the manner in which it had previously, but prohibited it from accepting new waste for processing.
Following an evidentiary hearing on the interlocutory injunction, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that “Agri-Cycle has violated its permit and the . . . Act by modifying its treatment processes without obtaining a permit to do so, by expanding its capacity to treat waste without EPD approval, and by hydraulically overloading its spray fields.” The court issued an interlocutory injunction limiting Agri-Cycle’s operation in the manner set forth in the consent TRO until the administrative appeal is concluded, or until Agri-Cycle can demonstrate to the director that it can operate in accordance with the law. Agri-Cycle appeals from that order.
1. Agri-Cycle contends that the superior court did not have the authority to issue the injunction because venue was improper.
Venue in equity cases lies “in the county where a defendant resides against whom substantial relief is prayed.” Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. III. For the purpose of venue, domestic corporations reside “in the county of this state where the corpоration maintains its registered office.” OCGA § 14-2-510 (b) (1). Agri-Cycle asserts that the injunctive action was improperly filed in the Superior Court of Jackson County (the location of the facility), because Agri-Cycle maintains its registerеd office in Upson County.
It is required under the Civil Practice Act that a venue defense “be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto, if one is required . . . [or] by motion in writing.” OCGA § 9-11-12 (b). Want of venue, however, may be waived exрressly by failing to raise it in an answer or by written motion, or impliedly by failing to elicit a ruling from the trial court on the question of venue prior to the entry of judgment or the commencement of trial.
Williams v.
Willis,
Agri-Cycle appeared before the court twice without making an objection to venue: first at the TRO hearing and again at the evidentiary hearing on the interlocutory injunction. In between it filed numerous motions and entered into a consent order modifying the TRO. Venue was first asserted as a
Clearly, “ ‘[a] party may waive the defense of improper venue by his conduct during the course of litigation or by failing to elicit a ruling on thе venue issue before entry of judgment.’ ”
AKA Mgmt. v. Branch Banking
&c.
Co.,
2. There is no merit to the assertion that the complaint should have beеn dismissed because the verification was insufficient under OCGA § 9-10-110 (petitions for extraordinary equitable relief shall be “verified positively by the petitioner or supported by other satisfactory proofs”). “[Fjailure to verify a petition is an amendable defect . . . [which is] waived by the defendant’s failure to object thereto in the trial court.”
Harvard v. Walton,
Even absent а waiver, the issue is wholly without merit. A sworn verification by Director Couch was filed with the complaint, although not phrased in positive language. Under those circumstances, dismissal of the complaint is not demanded “but the рetition may be retained in court and an injunction granted thereon, where ‘other satisfactory proofs’ are submitted.”
Bracewell v. Cook,
3. Agri-Cycle further submits that the interlocutory injunction impermissibly exceeds the scope of OCGA § 12-5-48 and thereby enjoins lawful activity. That Cоde section authorizes the EPD in its judgment to make application to the superior court for an order enjoining and restraining “any person [who] has engaged in or is to about to engage in any act or prаctice which constitutes or will constitute any violation of [the Act].” After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found numerous ongoing violations of Agri-Cycle’s permit and the Act, and the court concluded that such cоnduct constituted “a clear and present danger” to the citizens of the county and the state. As a result, Agri-Cycle was enjoined “from receiving waste for processing at its facility” until the administrative appeal is concluded or until Agri-Cycle can demonstrate that it can operate in accordance with the law. The granted relief enjoins and restrains the illegal practices and does not exceed the scope of OCGA § 12-5-48.
4. Agri-Cycle asserts that the trial court erred in denying a motion in limine to exclude all testimony from Dominic Weatherill, an environmental scientist employed by EPD, because of a violation of OCGA § 24-4-22 (wherе a party has evidence within his power or control to repel a claim but omits to produce it, a rebuttable presumption arises that the claim is well founded). In support of this claim, Agri-Cycle relies on а statement by the witness that EPD purges its email correspondence every 30 days, thereby “intentionally” destroying email correspondence between Agri-Cycle and EPD which was favorable to the company. Agri-Cycle, however, was equally in a position to produce the evidence since the alleged email exchange took place between it and EPD. Thus, there was no showing that Agri-Cycle “ ‘was prejudiced аs a result of the [alleged] destruction of the evidence.’ [Cit.]”
Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assoc.,
5. There is no merit to the alternative assertion that Weatherill’s testimony should have been exсluded because he failed to qualify as an expert under OCGA § 24-9-67.1. See also
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
6. Agri-Cycle also asserts that during pretrial depositions, certain EPD employees improperly invoked the privilege granted by OCGA § 24-9-27 (c). That Code section provides: “[n]o party or witness shall be required to make discovery of the advice of his professional advisers or his consultation with them.”
The record reveals that on the morning of the interlocutory hearing, Agri-Cycle filed a motion to compel the testimony of the EPD employees, and counsel attempted to argue the motion at the
inception of the hearing. The trial court, however, determined that it would not rule on the motion to compel prior to going forward with the hearing, and would consider only the evidence presented at the hearing in making a decision on the request for injunctive relief. Agri-Cycle aсquiesced in proceeding with the hearing as outlined by the court, and in the reservation of a ruling on its motion to compel; the privilege issue did not arise again during the hearing. We further note that the pre-hearing dеpositions were not filed with the trial court until two months after the final judgment was rendered. See generally
Parker v. Silviano,
7. Under OCGA § 12-5-48, an injunction “shall be granted without the necessity of showing a lack of adequate remedy at law” upon a showing by the EPD that a facility has engaged in or is about to engage in any act or practice that violates the Act. (Emphasis supplied.) As shown previously, there was adequate proof that Agri-Cycle violated the Act. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting an injunction.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Although no transcript of the TRO hearing is contained in the record on appeal, Agri-Cycle does not dispute that it was represented by counsel at that hearing.